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ABSTRACT
My dissertation explores Louisiana’s political development from
1S24 to 1S61.

Many antebellum state studies have been written, but

none focus specifically on Louisiana.

While sharing the rest of the

South’s commitment to slavery and cotton, Louisiana possessed atypical
attributes including: a unique ethnic composition, a sugar cane crop
dependent upon a protective tariff, and the presence of New Orleans,
the South’s foremost commercial city.

Louisiana’s antebellum

political situation resulted from the interaction of these distinctive
traits with the characteristics that Louisiana shared in common with
the rest of the United States.
The primary focus of this political narrative is the development
of parties and the interaction between parties and the electorate.
During the 1820s and 1830s, Louisianans moved from a political system
based on personality and ethnicity to a distinct party system with
Democrats competing against Whigs.

These parties, which were evenly

matched, battled until the Whig party collapsed in the lS50s.
Subsequently,

the nativist Know Nothing party rose and fell.

And, in

1861, after an increase in tension over the slavery issue, Louisiana
seceded from the Union.
Through its examination of Louisiana politics, my dissertation
addresses several key historiographical questions.

I investigate the

relationship between state and federal parties and the role of
individuals in party politics.

I also explore the impact of both the

ideology of republicanism and of the politics of slavery.

Moreover, I

probe the role played by ethnic diversity, which often overshadowed

vi
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partisan allegiance.

Additionally, I analyze the differences and

similarities among the parties’ programs— especially concerning the
value of governmental activism.
My dissertation also discusses the rise of Jacksonian democracy.
Louisiana’s 1SI2 constitution restricted voting and office-holding.
Later constitutions, written in IS45 and LS52. adopted universal white
male suffrage and decreased office-holding requirements.

Furthermore,

extensive campaigning provided an opportunity for voters and non
voters, including women, to participate in the political process.
Despite these changes, elites continued to occupy the main positions
of power.

Though elites served in state government and as party

leaders, I contend that political power remained in the hands of their
constituents throughout the antebellum period.

vi i
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CHAPTER ONE
THE EARLY STAGES OF PARTY DEVELOPMENT.

1S24-IS29

At first glance, antebellum Louisiana stood in stark contrast
with the other southern states.

The South was a region consisting

primarily of rural American-born Protestants involved in the
production of cotton.

Thus. Louisiana’s Creole and Catholic

populations, its substantial foreign and northern immigration, its
immense leading city New Orleans, and its large sugar cane crop
combined to make it possibly the most u n - s o u t h e m of the southern
states.

A visitor to the state in 1S48, worrying about Louisiana’s

dedication to the region, echoed this assessment.
New Orleans is almost free soil in their[sic] opinions.
The population is one half Northern agents another one
quarter or one third are Foreigners. The remnant are
creoles who cannot comprehend their dangers until the
negroes are being taken out of the fields
Louisiana will
be the, last if at all to strike for the defense of the
South.1
While he succinctly captured many of Louisiana’s unique
characteristics, the visitor inaccurately assessed its southernness.
Despite these differences,

important similarities remained between

Louisiana and the rest of the South.

Staple crop agriculture

predominated in the Pelican State with cotton joining sugar cane as
the most important crops.

Louisiana shared the rest of the South’s

commitment to the peculiar institution— in every antebellum census
slaves composed more than 45 percent of the population.

And, most

importantly, Louisianans joined their fellow southerners in seceding

!Henry W. Connor to John C. Calhoun, January 12, 1849, in J
Franklin Jameson, e d . , Correspondence of John C. Calhoun (Washington
D.C., 1900), 1188-90.
1
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from the Union in early 1861.

Perhaps the visitor would have been

more sanguine about Louisiana's loyalty to her region if he had heard
a West Feliciana Parish planter assert. ”T consider the wealth &
prosperity of this state to rest principally upon the labors of
slaves.. .without our negroes we should be poor indeed.”

Another

planter added that "the slavery question is making strong deep and
abiding impressions on the minds of our southern—

men.

The injustice

of the North is uniting all parties.""
Louisianans, along with other southerners, shared a commitment
not only to slavery but to the idea of republicanism.

What

politicians and the electorate meant when they used the term
"republicanism,” however, varied from politician to politician, place
to place, and over time.

The main tenet of this belief involved an

almost obsessive fear that the people’s Liberty was constantly under
threat.

This menace could come from aristocrats, military despots and

armies, federal or state government, banks, corporations, or even
large cities such as New Orleans.

Concentrations of power could use

"intrigue" and "corruption" to usurp the sovereignty and liberty of
the people and reduce them to the status of slaves.^

A Louisiana

Alexander Barrow to William S. Hamilton, January 25, 1830, William
S. Hamilton Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections,
LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Hereinafter LLMVC) (first quote);
Maunsel White to Pierre Sould, April 23, 1850, Maunsel White Papers,
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
(Hereinafter SHC) (second quote).
3The literature on republicanism is voluminous. For a discussion of
the tenets of republicanism see Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution (Cambridge, 1967); and Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969).
For
republicanism in antebellum politics see Harry L. Watson, Liberty and
Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, 1990); and Michael
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congressman traced how this tragic progression worked: the passage of
a protective tariff. leading to an increase in manufacturing
establishments, and ultimately industry becoming ”a monster."

This

series would conclude with the formation of a standing army "dangerous
to the liberties of the people" to protect this "monster.”

The

lawmaker maintained "this government is literally & emphatically
sustained by public opinion and to keep it from Corruption &
impurities the people should be enlightened.
In the years immediately following Louisiana’s statehood,
republicanism did not imply democracy, but as time progressed, the
commitment to republicanism transformed itself into a devotion to
Jacksonian democracy.

The past and future met on a steamboat in 1S25

in a conversation between former governor Thomas Bolling Robertson and
future congressman John B. Dawson.

Their exchange illustrates how the

view of the people’s proper political role would change over the
course of the antebellum era.

Discussing the governor’s power to

appoint local officials, Robertson argued that "the people
right to say who is to govern them.
in my hands...."

have no

The constitution places the power

He continued, "whenever I hear everybody speak well

of a man I set him down as a damn rascal."

This view may have enabled

Robertson to capture the governor’s office in 1820, but over time the

F. Holt, Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, 1978).
For its
application to southern state studies see Mark W. Kruraan, Parties and
Politics in North Carolina. 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge, 1983); Lacy K. Ford,
Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Dpcountrv. 1800-1860
(New York, 1988); and Jonathan M. Atkins, Parties. Politics, and the
Sectional Conflict in Tennessee. 1832-1861 (Knoxville, 1997).
Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, January 7, 1832, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC.
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people would demand and receive a greater political voice.

Dawson

expressed the creed by which most Louisiana politicians would learn to
live.

Believing "popularity a fair test of merit." Dawson countered,

"you should never disregard the people's will.. .Because the
constitution enables you to play the Despot it does not follow you are
to be one.”'
Louisiana politicians catered to the idea of the people as
sovereigns in their deeds as well as in their words.

The writing, in

1845 and 1S52. of new constitutions which expanded suffrage, increased
the number of elective positions, and reduced office-holding
requirements resulted from politicians following the lead of the
people.

As a state legislator who disagreed with his constituents on

whom to select as a United States senator affirmed.
better—

not to contend with the people.

my opinion in opposition to theirs.”

"It is

I have no desire to set up

Those politicians who felt so

bold as to challenge their constituents’ will frequently found
themselves out of office.

Robertson left the governor’s office in

1824 to take an appointive judicial position.

In 1828. despite his

ambition, he recognized that he could no longer successfully run for
governor.

B y the end of the antebellum period, for Louisiana

politicians "vox populi" did indeed serve as "vox dei.”^

*John B. Dawson to William S. Hamilton,
Papers, LLMVC.

April 6,

1825, Hamilton

6John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, November 30, 1828, Josiah
Stoddard
Johnston
Papers,
Historical
Society
of
Pennsylvania,
(Hereinafter H S P ) ; Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Thomas Bolling Robertson" in
Joseph G. Dawson, ed., The Louisiana Governors: From Iberville to Edwards
(Baton Rouge, 1990), 94.
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Louisiana shared a commitment to republicanism with other
states, but her ethnic heritage differed from the rest of the United
States.

French and Spanish colonists were the first Europeans to

occupy the territory which would become Louisiana.

The French settled

the region in the early eighteenth century, founding Natchitoches in
1714 and New Orleans in 1718.

The French king appointed the colony's

governor, and Roman Catholicism was established as the official
religion.

Louisiana’s population grew slowly and by the 1760s

numbered only ten thousand people, half African slaves.

As a result

of France’s defeat in the Seven Years’ War, control of Louisiana was
transferred to the Spanish in 1763.

A Spanish king now named the

governor and Catholicism remained the established religion.

The

colony maintained a commitment to slavery and began to grow faster,
and by 1800 the population exceeded thirty thousand people.
Early in the nineteenth century, Napoleon re-obtained the
territory for France.

But, in 1803, fearing that he could not defend

it and needing money for his European military campaigns, he agreed to
sell Louisiana to the United States.

From 1803 until 1812, the

American government, under the auspices of territorial governor
William Claiborne, ruled the territory.

By 1810, Louisiana possessed

well over the sixty thousand persons required for statehood.

A

constitutional convention met in New Orleans in November 1811, and on
April 30, 1812, Louisiana officially entered the Union as the
eighteenth state.
Statehood did not imply homogeneity.

Throughout the antebellum

period, Louisiana lacked cohesion in terms of both population and
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geography.

It included French-speaking Catholic sugar cane growers.

English-speaking Protestant cotton planters. Spanish-speaking Catholic
fishermen, cajuns on its bayous, and yeomen in its pinev hills.
disparities in population density existed in the state.

Great

In 1S60. New

Orleans, the greatest urban center of the antebellum South, possessed
almost 150.000 whites, while seven parishes each contained less than
two thousand white residents.

Some areas, especially along the

Mississippi River, had over 90 percent of their population enslaved,
while in other areas less than one quarter of the population was held
in bondage.

One could find sections with a majority of Louisiana-bom

residents, a majority bora elsewhere in the United States, or a
majority foreign-born.

Thus, in order to facilitate an understanding

of antebellum Louisiana, I have divided it into four regions: the
Florida Parishes, North Louisiana, Greater Orleans, and South
Louisiana.

(TABLE 1.1)

The Florida parishes were bordered by the Mississippi River on
the west, the Pearl River on the east, Lakes Pontchartrain and
Maurepas on the south, and the state of Mississippi on the north.
This region, unlike the rest of Louisiana, was not included in the
1803 Louisiana Purchase.

Instead, these parishes remained part of

Spanish-owned West Florida until winning their independence in the
1810 West Florida Rebellion.

But in 1812 when Louisiana became a

state, this area was included within its boundaries.

The region

combined wealthy cotton plantation country in East Baton Rouge and the
Felicianas with poorer piney woods in its eastern parishes.

Anglo-

Saxon Protestants predominated in the Florida Parishes— almost 90
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TABLE 1.1

Louisiana’s Regions

1820

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

POPULATION
WHITE
SLAVE
11260
1320S
11603
9189
18435
2054S
22756
26229

TOTALS

6S115

65113

SLAVE
PERCENT
44.7
43.0
39.8
51.9

PERCENT OF
LOUISIANA’S POPULATION
IN THE REGION
TOTAL WHITE
SLAVE
17.6
19.4
17.3
14.9
17.0
14.1
32.3
30.2
28.3
35.2
33.4
40.3

45.4

1830

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

POPULATION
SLAVE
WHITE
17651
14566
13078
15799
24719
27273
48890
36814

TOTALS

89177

109613

SLAVE
PERCENT
53.9
53.3
42.3
55.2

PERCENT OF
LOUISIANA’S POPULATION
IN THE REGION
TOTAL WHITE
SLAVE
15.2
16.3
16.1
13.7
14.7
14.4
29.9
27.7
24.9
41.1
41.3
44.6

50.9

1840

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA
TOTALS

POPULATION
WHITE
SLAVE
25875
17493
29334
43431
66771
33956
65239
44755
158353

168501

SLAVE
PERCENT
58.8
58.5
28.1
57.6

PERCENT OF
LOUISIANA’S POPULATION
IN THE REGION
SLAVE
TOTAL WHITE
12.5
11.1
15.4
21.1
18.5
25.8
34.3
42.2
20.2
38.7
32.1
28.3

47.8

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

(TABLE 1.1 cont.)
1S50

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

POPULATION
WHITE
SLAVE
22767
32969
56773
84416
113104
31366
62847
9605S

TOTALS

255491

SLAVE
PERCENT
58.3
59.3
20.1
58.9

244S09

PERCENT OF
LOUTSIANA *S POPULATION
IN THE REGION
TOTAL WHITE
SLAVE
10.9
8.9
13.5
27.5
22.2
34.5
30.1
44.3
12.S
31.5
24.6
39.2

47.3
1860

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

POPULATION
WHITE
SLAVE
25743
37287
90669
146783
163399
27229
120427
77818

TOTALS

357629

1840
PERCENT
FRENCH
FLORIDA
4.5
NORTH LA
4.3
ORLEANS
36.2
SOUTH L A 70.4
35.8

PERCENT OF
LOUISIANA’S POPULATION
IN THE REGION
TOTAL WHITE
SLAVE
9.1
7.2
11.2
33.8
25.4
44.2
45.7
S.2
28.6
28.6
21.8
36.3

SLAVE
PERCENT
58.2
61.4
13.5
59.5

331726

46.9

1840
PERCENT
AMERICAN
89.8
91.2
42.8
26.0

1850
COTTON
BALES
31827
129964
60
16826

58.9

178677

1850
% OF L A ’s

COTTON
17.8
72.7
0.0
9.4

1850
1S50
% of L A ’s
SUGAR
HOGSHEADS SUGAR
13086
5.8
2.1
4653
31594
14.0
78.2
177118
226451

percent of the families had English surnames, and Protestant churches
accounted for over 85 percent of the church seating capacity.

In

1820, these parishes contained approximately one-sixth of Louisiana’s
population.

The region’s relative population, however, declined in

each of the succeeding censuses.

As the state grew, most newcomers

settled in either Greater Orleans or North Louisiana, and by 1860 the
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Florida parishes contained less than one tenth of the state's
populat ion.
North Louisiana, the state's largest region, consisted of all of
the parishes in the state north of the thirty-first parallel, except
for Avoyelles.

This section contained both important cotton country

along the Mississippi and Red Rivers and less fertile pinev hills and
swamps between the two rivers.

Like their counterparts in the Florida

parishes, white North Louisianans were primarily Anglo-Saxon
Protestants engaged in agriculture.

Over 90 percent of North

Louisiana's families had English last names, and Protestant churches
contained over 90 percent of its church seats.
king in Louisiana,

And.

if cotton were

its palace was located in North Louisiana, which in

1850 produced three out of every four bales in the state.

2

Only sparsely settled when Louisiana obtained its statehood in
1S12, North Louisiana’s growth outpaced that of the rest of the state
during the ensuing five decades.

In 1824, only five of the state’s

twenty-eight parishes were in this region, but of the twenty new
parishes created in the next thirty years, fifteen were in North
Louisiana.

Additionally, in 1820 the area contained approximately

one-sixth of Louisiana’s population, but by the Civil War, one-third

7Samuel C. Hyde, Jr., Pistols and Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy
in Louisiana’s Florida Parishes, 1810-1899 (Baton Rouge, 1996), 2-3;
Perry H. Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1971),
10; Derek L. A. Hackett, "The Social Structure of Jacksonian Louisiana,"
Louisiana Studies 12 (Spring 1973), 328-331.
0
I have included Avoyelles Parish with South Louisiana because
deraographically it fits more into that region in terms of birthplace of
its residents, their ethnicity, their religion, and the parish’s sugar
production.
For another example of grouping Avoyelles Parishes with
parishes in South Louisiana see Howard, Political Tendencies. 9.
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of alL Louisianans resided here.

A significant portion of this growth

resulted from people moving into North Louisiana from other states.
In 1850, over half of the section's population had been born elsewhere
in the Union.

And. primaril\r because of the cotton parishes along the

Mississippi River, in I860 the zone contained four out of every nine
slaves in Louisiana.
South Louisiana consisted of the area east of the Texas border,
west of the Florida Parishes and Greater Orleans, and south of the
thirty-first parallel plus Avoyelles Parish.

The region contained

both the South’s foremost sugar-producing region in south central
Louisiana and sparsely settled prairie in the southwestern corner of
the state.

South Louisiana offers a stark contrast to the state’s

Anglo-Saxon cotton-producing regions.

Its main staple was sugar cane-

-in 1850 it produced four out of every five hogsheads in Louisiana.
In addition. French heritage dominated— over 70 percent of its
families in 1840 were of French extraction.

Its settlers included

refugees from French Canada— the Acadians or Cajuns— who had started
arriving in large numbers in the 1760s.

Moreover, Roman Catholicism

pervaded these parishes with over three-fourths of the seating
capacity in Catholic churches.
South Louisiana declined relatively in terms of total population
during the antebellum period from 35 percent in 1820 to 28 percent in
1860.

Even more significant than this decrease was the relative drop

in its white population.

In 1820, over one-third of the state’s white

population lived in South Louisiana, but by the Civil War this
fraction had diminished to only about one-fifth.

This reduction can
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be explained by South Louisiana's failure to attract immigrants from
either other states or abroad.
newcomers settled there.

Only about one out of every twenty

In 1S50. almost 90 percent of the section's

residents were Louisiana natives, compared to approximatel}r 33 percent
in the rest of the state.
The smallest geographically, but perhaps the most important
region of Louisiana was Greater Orleans which included Orleans and its
surrounding parishes: Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines.

This

region, and some would contend the entire state, revolved around the
city of New Orleans, which Henry Clay called "the pivot" of Louisiana.
The Crescent City served as one of the nation’s most important
entrepots and had no rival either commercially or in terms of
population in the state.

B y 1860. almost half of Louisiana's white

population lived in these four parishes.

New Orleans split

culturally, and at times physically, between its competing Creole and
American populations.

In the later antebellum period, an influx of

immigrants, especially Irish, further changed the social and political
complexion of the city.

In 1850, over one-half of Greater Orleans

population had been born outside of the United States.

Q

Because of New Orleans’s commercial and political influence,
engendered resentment throughout the rest of the state.

it

Discussing

the propensity of the Crescent City’s population to exaggerate its own
importance, a legislator contended, "They had so long had the habit
here in New Orleans of fancying themselves Louisiana, that they had
g
Henry Clay to Josiah Johnston, March 11, 1830, in James F. Hopkins,
et al., eds.. The Papers of Henrv Clay (11 vols., Lexington, 1959-92).
8:178-79.
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now come to think themselves the United States."

New Orleans

represented a concentration of power that, according to republican
ideals, could present a threat to liberty.

Many in the country

parishes feared locating the state capital in such a large city and in
the Constitution of 1S45 had it removed from the corrupt colossus.
They believed that "there is an influence brought to bear upon the
minds of the members in a large town, which operates prejudicialIv to
wise legislation."
voters.

This corrupting influence extended to the city’s

Contrasting campaign strategy in northern Louisiana and New

Orleans, a politician observed that in the former, votes must be
obtained "in a fair way," while in the latter, "there is an immense
floating vote which can be & is every election bought & sold."i!!
The Constitution of 1812 established the ground rules for
politics in Louisiana.

Even taking the conservative standards of the

period into account, Perry H. Howard describes Louisiana’s
constitution as "ultra-conservative and ultra-aristocratic."

Visiting

Louisiana soon after the charter’s adoption, a young lawyer extended
the oxymoronic yet accurate observation that "the government is an
Aristocratic Democracy."

Restrictive suffrage and office-holding

provisions contributed to this view of the document.

Suffrage was

limited to free white males, twenty-one years or older, with a
residency requirement.

Most importantly, only those who had paid a

state tax or had purchased federal land could vote.

The provision

I0Henry Huntington to James Taliaferro, June 2, 1848, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Franklin C. Wharton, "Seat of
Government," 1830, Edward Clifton Wharton Family Papers, LLMVC (second
quote); John Ray to John Moore, February 11, 1852, David Weeks and Family
Papers, LLMVC (third quote).

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

which stipulated that, in gubernatorial contests, the legislature
chose between the top two popular vote recipients further stifled
democracy, as did a law granting it the power to cast the state's
electoral votes in presidential elections.

Requirements for office-

holding were even more stringent than those for suffrage.

Members of

the General Assembly had greater restrictions on age and residency
than voters.

Additionally, they needed to own landed property worth

at least S500 in the lower house and 51000 in the Senate.

The most

difficult requirements were reserved for those who aspired to the
gubernatorial chair— thirty five years of age. six years in the
Louisiana, and S5000 in landed property.

Every four years, the House

of Representatives was to be reapportioned based upon the number of
qualified electors with fifty as the maximum number of members and
without a representative being guaranteed to each parish.

Composed of

fourteen single member districts, the Senate was never to be
reapport ioned.11
Louisiana’s first elected governor, W.c.C. Claiborne, described
the constitution as "purely republican in principle, and tolerably
well adapted to our local situation."

The "local situation" in

Louisiana meant the division between Americans and Creoles.

The

Creoles were people born in Louisiana of French or Spanish descent,

!IHoward, Political Tendencies. 20; John C. Windship to William
Plumer, Jr., March 20, 1814 in Everett S. Brown, e d . , "Letters from
Louisiana, 1813-1814." Mississippi Valiev Historical Review (1924-25) XI,
574; For a copy of the Louisiana Constitution of 1812 see Cecil Morgan,
ed., The First Constitution of the State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge,
1975). The number of senate districts was expanded to seventeen when the
Florida parishes joined the state a few months after the constitution was
written.
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while the Americans consisted of settlers from elsewhere in the United
States.“■ The third most prominent group, the foreign French,
settlers from France or her colonies, most often aligned with the
Creoles in opposition to the Americans.

The division between these

two opposing groups rested not only upon language, but upon political
heritage and religion as well.

For much of the early antebellum

period, political loyalty centered on a candidate’s ethnicity not on
partisan allegiance.

Especially in gubernatorial races, Americans

generally cast their ballots for American candidates, while Creoles
cast theirs for Creole candidates."
The explanation for the aristocratic nature of the constitution
lies in this split between the Creoles and the Americans.

In the

•zThe definition of "Creole" is contested. Fred Kniffen agrees that
it "originally applied to the Louisiana-born of European descent." but
since then it has lost its precision. Fred B. Kniffen, Louisiana: Its
Land and People (Baton Rouge, 1968), 127. The third edition of Bennett
K. Wail, e d., Louisiana: A History (Baton Rouge, 1997), 91, lists several
possible definitions of Creole including "To some it means native
colonials of French or Spanish ancestry." For an antebellum definition
see New Orleans B e e . July 21, 1835, (quoting the Louisiana Recorder) "In
Louisiana, the term ’creole’ is usually given and limited to the
descendants of the French and Spanish colonists— often restricted to
those of the French, seldom if ever extended to those of the Americans."
I concur with Joseph Tregle that "Creole" should not include any
connotation of class, wealth, o r sophistication, and I admit that Tregle
is correct in asserting that it can be used to portray a much broader
group than my definition implies, but I contend that my definition a
commonly accepted one. Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "On that Word ’Creole’
Again," Louisiana History. 23 (Spring 1982), 193-198.
1%.C.C. Claiborne to Robert R. Livingston, January 26, 1812, in
Dunbar Rowland, ed., Official Letter Books of W.C.C. Claiborne. 18101816. (6 vols.: Jackson, MS, 1917), 6:40-41. For a series of letters
discussing the propensity of voters in the 1830 gubernatorial campaign
to support men in their own ethnic group regardless of party affiliation
see Dr. R. Davidson to William S. Hamilton, February 4, 1830, April 9,
1830; W.L. Robeson to Hamilton, February 6, 1830, April 20, 1830,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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period following the territory's purchase in 1S03. Louisiana began a
process of Americanization— the gradual movement from Creole to
American control.

Realizing their numerical superiority would erode

over time, the Creoles concluded that the best way to cement their
hold on the state would be to freeze political power in time, or at
least slow the impact of this Americanization.

Joseph Tregle asserts

that "the vehicle chosen for this purpose was the Constitution of
1812."

In his study of the development of the second American party

system, Richard P. McCormick agrees that "The Louisiana constitution
of 1812...was a product of the determination of the Creoles to secure
and retain control of the government."^
With the constitution limiting suffrage to propertv-holders and
those who paid a state tax, only a fraction of the population
possessed the ballot.

The 1820 census lists Louisiana’s total

population as 14-3.222 including 21.262 white males eighteen years or
older.

According to the 1821 census of voters, however, only 9.188

people possessed the franchise and fourteen of Louisiana’s nineteen
parishes had less than 200 eligible voters.

The most extreme example,

Concordia Parish, which was entitled to both a representative and one
of the state’s seventeen senators, had 105 eligible voters in 1821 and
123 in 1829.

In the 1824 gubernatorial race, Concordia’s voters cast

only 24 ballots, while in 1828 they cast 49.

Similarly, St. Charles

‘ Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Political Reinforcement of Ethnic Dominance
in
Louisiana,
1S12-1845,”
in
Lucius
F.
Ellsworth,
ed., The
Americanization of the Gulf Coast. 1803-1850 (Pensacola, 1972), (first
quote on p. SO) and Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of
Cultures and Personalities (Baton Rouge,
1999), 54-62; Richard P.
McCormick, The Second American Party Svstem: Party Formation in the
Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill, 1966), 311 (second quote).
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Parish, which case 51 and ~r voces respectively in these two contests.
containeci I2S voters in IS2i and by 1J>29 this number had only grown to
132.

This paucity of voters magnified the power of anyone who could

control a bloc of votes.'3
During this period of Louisiana's political development frequent
mention is made of the importance of "men of influence" who dictated
what their community thought and how it voted.

In the words of a

state senator, public opinion was like a stream:
The opinion of men hang upon one another. One man adopts
the opinion of another on public measures without giving
himself the trouble of forming one of his own. And
finally the opinion of the few where there is no immediate
opposition becomes the uniform opinion of the whole.
Important men and families controlled a significant portion of the
votes in many of the parishes outside of New Orleans.

Upon the death

of Henry Thibodeaux, considered one of the "most influential men in
the state," future United States Senator Alexander Porter worried
about the two hundred voters on Bayou Lafourche "who are now from the
loss of his salutary influence left exposed to the seductions of bad
politicians."

Porter also asserted that with certain men in Opelousas

including Jacques Dupre, a fixture in the legislature and Louisiana’s
largest cattle rancher, behind a candidate elections were "fixed"
there.

A legislative candidate, assessing his own prospects,

complained that in Ascension Parish personal merit often had little
weight when compared to "a Jacgast or Pierrot, supported by his uncles
and cousins, [and] extended family connexions."

This lament offered a

i5182l census of voters in Louisiana House Journal. 1822. 27-8; 1829
list never published but a copy appears in William S. Hamilton Papers,
LLMVC.
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sharp contrast from the prior year when the same man had been more
optimistic because two members of the Martin family with "sufficient
influence to make good on their word" had offered to guarantee his
,

16

-

election.'

While friends and neighbors possessed significant influence in
antebellum Louisiana, the development of national parties added
another element for voters to consider.

As national politics

increased in importance in Louisiana, the federal government
controlled a greater number of patronage positions and consequently
more leverage.

Before his ascension to the presidency. Andrew Jackson

complained of the "corrupting influence" of executive patronage in
Louisiana.

With patronage the power of friends of the national

administration in New Orleans could be felt in the country parishes.
In North Louisiana where it was "not uncommon for a few Demagog[sic]
Zealots to produce a Wonderful 1 [sic] effect," Martin Duralde, a
stalwart New Orleans legislator and dispenser of federal patronage,
"wielded all his immense influence with a zeal and adroitness almost
super natural," in helping a loyal administration supporter win reelection to Congress.*7

I<•

°Charles T. Scott to Josiah S. Johnston, January 27, 1826 (first
quote), Alexander Porter to Johnston, August 6, 1827, December 8, 1826,
January 20, 1826, July 2, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP; Joseph G. Tregle,
Jr., "Henry S. Thibodeaux," in Dawson, e d . , Louisiana Governors. 96-98;
Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 69-71;
Hore Browse Trist to
Nicholas P. Trist, November 1826, September 25, 1827, Nicholas P. Trist
Papers, SHC.
n

Andrew Jackson to David C. Ker. November 6, 1828, Andrew Jackson
Papers, Library of Congress, (Hereinafter LC).
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As with most other issues in antebellum Louisiana, the CreoleAmerican split also affected influence.

Requesting Senator Josiah

Johnston's support for an appointment, a constituent opposing a
"creole competitor." decried the John Quincy Adams administration’s
"rather extraordinary penchant... for that species of our population."
In consoling a losing a congressional candidate, an adviser claimed he
had only lost in the Creole parishes where most were "governed by the
influence of a few."

Amongst the Acadians a "social aristocracy"

ruled, according to historian Carl Brasseaux. and political campaigns
were essentially personality contests among members of this elite
group.

Joseph Tregle agrees that Creoles submitted "their will and

their ballots to the decision of those who were their respected
leaders."

Among these was Henry Thibodeaux, who. as "pere" to the

people along Bayou Lafourche, served as the area’s "undisputed arbiter
to

of political power."
Not only did some Americans remain skeptical of the Creoles’
ability to participate in a representative government because of their
susceptibility to the power of influence but also because of their
monarchical heritage.

An American resident of South Louisiana argued

that out of all the states, Louisiana remained "the most radically and
essentially unfit for the form of government."

Another agreed that

Louisiana was in "her political infancy" and "the people are just
getting rid of the prejudices created by national feelings and
IS

N. Wilson to Josiah S. Johnston, April 10, 1826, Johnston Papers,
HSP; S.F. Hunt to William S. Hamilton. July 30, 1826, Hamilton Papers,
LLMVC: Carl A. Brasseaux, Acadian to Caiun: Transformation of a People.
1803-1877 (Jackson, Miss., 1992), 48; Tregle. Louisiana in the Age of
Jackson, 69-71.
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distinctions."

Campaigning for Jackson in Louisiana, a friend of the

General asserted that while Jackson could rely on three-fourths of the
Americans, the Creoles opposed Jackson because they lacked American
feeling and were ignorant of American principles of government.
Another reason that Americans doubted the Creoles* ability to
participate in partisan politics involved allegations that they failed
to connect state and national political contests.

Porter contended

that the Creoles "cannot understand.. .how any election but the main
one should turn on the presidential question."

The presence of

Creoles in elective positions supports this contention.

While

electing Creole governors in 1S16. 182S. 1S30, and 183S, not a single
Creole represented Louisiana in Congress during the first twenty eight
years of statehood.

In Louisiana, the Creoles had used the

Constitution of 1812 to perpetuate their hold on state government.

In

the lS20s. this determination remained an essential element in
statewide elections, but it did not play as vital a role in national
elections.

Additionally, while the state elections occurred in July,

when many Americans had left N e w Orleans because they feared diseases,
presidential elections occurred in November.

According to an American

settler, that month served primarily as sugar cane harvesting season
for Creoles, not as a time for politics.

10

tc

John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, September 30.
Johnston Papers. HSP; Nicholas Trist to Mrs. Randal. April 10,
Trist Papers, SHC; David Kerr to Andrew Jackson, November 11,
Jackson Papers, LC.
10

1827,
1824,
1828.

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, April 16. 1827. Johnston
Papers, HSP; Lewis W. Newton, "The Americanization of French Louisiana:
A Study in the Process of Adjustment between the French and the AngloAmerican Populations of Louisiana, 1803-1860,” (Ph.D. dissertation,

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

In ISI2. despite the Creoles* efforts to use the constitution to
control Louisiana,

the people and the legislature selected the

V'irginia-born territorial governor William Claiborne to serve as the
state's first governor.

The War of 1812. and especially fear of a

British invasion of Louisiana, dominated his administration.

In

November 1814, as an attack became imminent, the United States
commander in the Southwest, General Andrew Jackson, arrived in New
Orleans.

Unsure of the loyalty of the New Orleans residents,

especially the foreign French and Creoles. Jackson declared martial
law in the city.
militias,

On January 8, 1S15, federal troops and state

including Louisiana’s, routed the British invasion in the

Battle of New Orleans.

After the tremendous victory and ignoring an

order from Federal District Judge Dominick Hall. Jackson continued to
rule the Crescent City under martial law.

Ultimately, when news of

the peace treaty reached New Orleans. Jackson terminated martial

law,

but the judge punished him for his earlier impudence with a SI.000
fine.^'
The victory restored the nation’s confidence and made Andrew
Jackson a national hero.

Nearly every state passed resolutions

praising his victory, and, as a Tennessee slaveholder, he had a
special appeal in the South.

Paradoxically, Louisiana contained some

of Jackson’s most ardent disciples and many of his fiercest
detractors.

Some Louisianans would never forget his role as their

University of Chicago. 1929J, 136; Thomas Butler to Edward G.W. Butler,
October 6. 1828, Butler Family Papers, LLMVC.
21
Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire,
1767-1821 (New York, 1977), 246-320.
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savior.

The Corporation of New Orleans,

in proclaiming Jackson "their

deliverer" exclaimed that but for Jackson "a heap of ashes and
scattered, ruins would have been all that would have remained of New
Orleans."

More than twenty-five years after the battle, a resident of

the city, on behalf of his wife, wrote Jackson soliciting "a lock of
hair from the venerable and honored head of your excel lency."

In

1S43, opposition to refunding Judge Hall's fine of Jackson caused a
United States senator from Louisiana to lose his bid for re-election.
Later. New Orleans renamed its central square "Jackson Square" and
erected a statue to commemorate the hero.

Many who fought alongside

Jackson during the battle found it only a short step from military
service under General Jackson to political allegiance to presidential
candidate and Democratic party leader Andrew Jackson.^'
While Jackson’s name evoked reverence for some, others would
only remember Jackson as the military despot who refused to yield to
civilian authority.

When Jackson ran for the presidency in 1828. a

former Louisiana governor declared that he would rather support a man
he disagreed with than one like Jackson, who "runs his sword through
[the constitution]” when it stands in his way.

That same year, the

Argus reminded its French readers that Jackson had "called you
TRAITORS" and had tried to have a French adversary shot for contesting
martial law.

In 1853, a longtime Jackson opponent wrote, "Twenty five

years have I labored to destroy the malign influence of the arbitrary
conduct of Andrew Jackson upon the republican institutions of my

22

Corporation of Orleans to Andrew Jackson. January 1828,
Kennedy to Andrew Jackson October 4, 1842, Jackson Papers, LC.
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country."

He suggested that the statue honoring Jackson should

include his horse trampling upon a volume labelled "Laws of the United
States" and that in the foreground the constitution should appear
" t o m and violated.""
The first American party system, which involved the competition
between Republicans and Federalists, never achieved a solid foothold
in Louisiana.

During Claiborne's term, the establishment of a new

state government and fear of British invasion overshadowed partisan
politics.

By the 1816 presidential election, the Federalist Party,

which never had more than a handful of proponents in Louisiana, had
almost completely collapsed in the South.

In both this and the

subsequent presidential contest, Louisiana’s legislature cast its
electoral votes for the victorious Republican candidate.

In neither

the 1816 nor the 1820 gubernatorial eLection did national party
politics play a role.

Each of the elections revolved around the

Creole-American split with Creole Jacques Vi H e r e and American Thomas
Bolling Robertson succeeding Claiborne in the governor’s office.
During his administration. Vi H e r e attempted to achieve a balance
between the two groups, but Robertson worked to augment the strength
of Americans at the Creoles’ expense.^
21

Thomas Bolling Robertson to William Robertson. August 22, 1827,
Walter Prichard Collection, LLMVC (first quote); New Orleans Argus,
November 4, 1828, (Hereinafter all newspapers New Orleans unless
otherwise specified); Henry Marston to Gales & Seaton, February IS, 1853,
Henry Marston Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote).
^James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists. 1800-1816 (Baton
Rouge, 1978), xii, 177; Sidney L. Villere, Jacques Phillippe Villere.
First Native-Born Governor of Louisiana. 1816-1820 (New Orleans, 1981),
63-67; Carolyn E. Delatte. "Jacques Phillippe Viller6," and Tregle,
"Robertson," in Dawson, ed., The Louisiana Governors. 86-96.
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With neither the governor, the legislature, nor the electorate
associating themselves with a nationaL party. Louisiana lacked any
semblance of a true party system.
progressed.

This situation changed as the lS20s

The presidential elections of 1824 and 1S28 proved to be

the catalysts for the growth of partisanship, and party division could
be found in congressional, gubernatorial, and legislative elections as
well.

By the end of the decade, a large proportion of the electorate

identified themselves as Jackson or Adams men. though the CreoieAmerican division prevented the complete development of political
parties.

This cultural cleavage still often overshadowed partisan

allegiances, especially in state-level campaigns.

With ethnicity and

party allegiance imperfectly corresponding, voters who called
themselves "Jackson men" and supported Andrew Jackson for the
presidency might vote against the "Jackson" candidate for the
governor’s office or Congress.
The 1824 presidential election served as one of the first
important steps in the development of the Louisiana’s political
parties.

This growth, nonetheless, remained incomplete, as the

electorate failed to connect the national race to state contests.
Though none of the previous presidential elections had generated much
notice in Louisiana, the 1824 campaign witnessed an increased interest
in presidential politics especially in New Orleans.

The year included

legislative and gubernatorial elections as well as the selection of
presidential electors, but generally neither the politicians nor the
people tied these state and national campaigns together.

Instead,

they chose to view the state races in terms of established Louisiana
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ethnic divisions, and thus political party development in the state
remained unfinished."
In 1S20. Republican James Monroe had run unopposed for the
presidency.

Since then his party had fractured, and in 1S24 four

candidates, all calling themselves Republicans, competed for the
nation's highest office.

Traditional Iv. a congressional caucus had

selected the nominee, but without an opposition party, this method had
come to be seen as too aristocratic.

In February 1S24. only 66 of the

291 congressmen gathered together and nominated Secretary of the
Treasury William Crawford, a Georgian.

The widespread condemnation of

this caucus left the field open, and others quickly filled this
breach.

John Quincy Adams, the candidate of New England, ran on his

record as secretary of state and as a champion of activist government,
especially the tariff and internal improvements.

Kentuckian Henry

Clay portrayed himself as the candidate of the West and joined Adams
as a proponent of a strong nationalistic program.
emerged as the wildcard.

Andrew Jackson

Known primarily as the hero of the Battle of

New Orleans and campaigning as an outsider with no specific program.
Jackson proved immensely popular with the public.
Of these four candidates, only William Crawford generated
virtually no enthusiasm in Louisiana.

His association with the

5
4 For an excellent discussion of the 1824 presidential campaign in
Louisiana, see Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 145-73.
lh

Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster. Clay, and
Calhoun (New York, 1987), 116-131; Harry L. Watson, Liberty and Power:
The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York, 1990), 73-95.
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aristocratic caucus had sealed his fate.*'

John Quincy Adams's appeal

rested upon his record as an experienced statesman, his pro-tariff
stance, and upon settlers from Nev*" England residing in the Florida
parishes.'^

Clay and Jackson proved to be the strongest candidates in

Louisiana.

Part of their attraction rested on their claims as

westerners— an important consideration since for the past twenty-four
years Virginians had controlled the presidency.

Clay joined Adams in

championing an activist program, which was especially popular among
the state's sugar cane planters who depended upon a tariff.

When

offered a choice between a Kentucky slaveholder and a New England
blueblood.

the people of Louisiana naturally gravitated to their

fellow southerner.

Clay also benefitted from the power wielded by his

family connections in the state.

His brother and one of his sons-in-

law were prominent New Orleans businessmen.

Meanwhile, another son-

m - l a w Martin Duralde was an influential Louisiana legislator.
Jackson profited from his status as the savior of Louisiana in the
Battle of New Orleans and from his ambiguous stance on the tariff,
which was favored in the sugar cane regions but disdained in cotton
areas.

His proponents portrayed him as the "CANDIDATE OF THE PEOPLE"

^ Louisiana Courier, May 7, 1824; Louisiana Gazette, July 21, 1S24.
70

William H. Adams, The Whig Party in Louisiana (Lafayette, La.,
1973), 22; St. Francisville Asvlum. April 10, 17, 1824; Charles T. Scott
to Josiah S. Johnston. July 24, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP.
19

WilliamL. Brent to Henry Clay, September 3, 1824, in Hopkins, ed.,
Clav Papers, 3:827-28.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

26
and as a m o d e m day George Washington— a military leader/statesman
devoted to republican principles."'
The most prominent political split in Louisiana in 1S24 remained
the division between Americans and Creoles, and many approached the
presidential election from this already established division.

The

Creoles tended to gravitate toward Henry Clay because of their
preponderance in the pro-tariff sugar cane-producing regions in South
Louisiana and their leadership's ties to Clay— especially Duralde.
The Creoles also tended to oppose Jackson, because of the perception
that many of his heavy-handed actions during his defense of New
Orleans in 1814-15 were directed at them.

The Americans primarily

supported Jackson because they generally came from anti-tariff cotton
regions and because they admired Jackson for his role in saving
Louisiana.

One of Jackson’s proponents at first observed a

"lukewarmness" toward the general’s cause but later found that "A
sense of their obligation to him who saved their liberty from
impending danger is now gaining the ascendancy."'*
Yet, Louisiana did not neatly divide between pro-Clav Creoles
and pro-Jackson Americans.

Some Creoles, including General Jean

Plauche, the vice-president of a New Orleans pro-Jackson meeting,
shared the devotion to Jackson because of his service to the state at
the Battle of New Orleans.

Similarly, some Americans, often despite

in

Louisiana Gazette. June 7, 1824.
3iAnthony W. Butler to Edward G.W. Butler, March 7, 1824, June 28,
1824, Butler Family Papers, Williams Research Center, Historic New
Orleans Collection, (Hereinafter HNO); John B. Dawson to William S.
Hamilton, September 8, 1824, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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their personal admiration for Old Hickory, echoed the fear that a
military chieftain would not be the proper person to elevate to the
presidency.

Governor Thomas Bolling Robertson, while disapproving of

Clay's tariff stance, preferred "a pure & unmixed republican
administration" under Clay as opposed to the "Despot" Jackson.
Additionally, both candidates had loyal friends in Louisiana, where
personal ties frequently overshadowed all other considerations.

The

appeal of John Quincy Adams, though limited, further demonstrates the
difficulty in assigning a one-to-one correspondence between the ethnic
groups and the candidates.”
At this time, the legislature still had the power to select the
state's presidential electors.

During the 1823 legislative session, a

year prior to actual race. Clay's friends attempted to place
Louisiana’s electoral votes in his column by forcing an early vote.
They introduced a bill to establish a legislative caucus in order to
nominate Clay for the presidency and included a series of resolutions
praising Jackson to confuse his supporters.

Because many believed

that the bill was brought forward prematurely. Clay partisans lacked
the votes to pass it.

Instead, they backed down and talk of the

presidential campaign subsided for the rest of the year.

The

legislature that met in early 1824 witnessed an attempt to allow for

n
'Louisiana Gazette, June 8, 1824. For Americans wary of the placing
political power in the hands of a military leader see Philemon Thomas to
Henry Clay, April 30, 1825, in Hopkins, ed.. Clay Papers. 4:313-14; T.G.
Slocum to Josiah S. Johnston, December 8, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP;
Thomas Bolling Robertson to William Robertson, August 12, 1824, Prichard
Collection, LLMVC.
For pro-Clay Americans and pro-Jackson Creoles in
legislature see Isaac L. Baker to Andrew Jackson. May 3, 1823, Jackson
Papers, LC.
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the popular election of presidential electors, but the measure failed.
In the hyperbolic words of the St. Francisville Asvlum. the vote was
perhaps "the most ultra-aristocratic" decision in state history.
Thus,
meet

the legislature that would be elected In July IS24 and would
in November retained the power to select the stateTs presidential

electors.Jj
While failing to receive the right to vote for presidential
electors, the people were not completely denied a voice in the
selection process.

The 1824 legislative elections gave thevoters

a

chance to express their views on the presidency by voting for
candidates pledged to one of the four contenders, but only in New
Orleans and St. Francisville did the electorate take advantage of this
opportunity.

In New' Orleans, an official Jackson ticket appeared, and

Jackson supporters sent letters to all candidates soliciting their
preference for president.

Four of the six men on the Jackson ticket

won, with the two weakest losing to Clay's two strongest men.

In St.

Francisville, where the presidential race was "the only political
subject that occupies much public attention," not only did several of
the candidates pledge their vote to a particular candidate, but, at
the urging of the St. Francisville Asvlum. the people wrote their
choice for president on their ballots for legislators.^

J Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 147-8; Isaac L. Baker to
Andrew Jackson, February 14. 1823, Jackson Papers, LC; St. Francisville
Asvlum, February 2, 1823, May 29, 1824.
^James M. Bradford to Josiah S. Johnston,
November 11, 1824,
Johnston Papers, HSP; Anthony W. Butler to Edward G.W. Butler, 4 July
1824 Butler Family Papers, HNO; St. Francisville Asvlum, July 3, 10,
1824.
St. Francisville proved to be one of the few John Quincy Adams
strongholds in Louisiana as he received 65 votes, Jackson— 46, Clay— 9,
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Outside of New Orleans and St. Francisville. the legislative
election and the presidential race were not intertwined.

A newly-

elected state senator from Alexandria lamented that "the people in
this District have no fixed opinion on the [presidential election]."
Future congressman Walter Overton, a Rapides cotton planter, agreed
that "the state generally has not been much excited."

An Opelousas

contributor to the Asvlum contended that the election in his region
had not focused on presidential politics.

With newspapers providing

the populace most of its political information, their absence outside
of New Orleans and St. Francisville partially explains this apathy.
While during 1824 New Orleans had five newspapers and St. Francisville
had two. the rest of the state had only three.

Without newspapers,

these communities lacked an important link between the legislative and
presidential races.^
The 1824 legislative contests also provided voters an
opportunity to punish the legislators who had voted against the bill
providing for the popular selection of presidential electors.

Both

the Louisiana Gazette and the St. Francisville Asvlum printed lists of
the members who had opposed the change with the latter crusading
against those who had committed this "political fraud."

Of the

fourteen men on the list only two were re-elected to the next
legislature.

This warning against trampling upon the people’s

and Crawford— 2.
33Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, June 15, 1824, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC: Charles T. Scott to Josiah S. Johnston, July 24, 1824,
Walter H. Overton to Johnston, November 22, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP;
St. Francisville Asvlum. July 24, 1824.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

30

sovereignty read loud and clear in the capital, and the next session
saw the passage of a law granting to the people what one legislative
candidate termed their "usurped right" to choose presidential
electors.

Giving this power to the electorate proved to be a

significant step in the development of political parties in Louisiana.
Participation in presidential campaigns provided voters with a new
link to the national party organizations. 0
While passing a bill granting voters the privilege of selecting
presidential electors in future races, the legislature that met in
November 1S24 still had to cast Louisianars votes in the present
contest.

The voice of the electorate regarding the presidential

question remained unclear.

The legislature divided among Clay,

Jackson, and Adams supporters, and none of these groups possessed a
majority.

A plurality championed Clay, while Jackson's men ran a

close second.

Because of the narrow margin separating their

candidates, both Clay and Jackson men feared that their opponents
would use intrigue and corruption to wrest the electoral votes of the
state from their favorite.^

The few members advocating Adams

possessed the balance of power in Louisiana and were willing to make a
deal in exchange for two of the state’s five electoral votes.

They

^ Louisiana Gazette. May 21, July 24, 1824; St. Francisville Asvlum,
May 29, 1824; Isaac L. Baker to Andrew Jackson, March 21, 1825, Jackson
Papers, LC.
While the Asvlum targeted 14 men, the measure actually
failed 17-10, and only 11 of the 14 the newspaper labelled opposed it,
Louisiana House Journal. 1824. 31.
11

For intrigue in Louisiana legislature see David C. Ker to Andrew
Jackson, November 23, 1824, Jackson Papers, LC; Reuben Kemper to Josiah
S. Johnston, Johnston Papers, HSP; Henry Clay to Francis T. Brooke,
December 22, 1824,
in Hopkins, ed., Clav Papers. 3:899-900; St.
Martinvilie Attakanas Gazette. January 15, 1825.
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found the Jacksonian members willing to accept this compromise, and on
November 22. IS24, with some Clay supporters absent, the legislature
selected three Jackson electors and two Adams men.^5

Legislators

championing both Clay and Jackson considered this vote-trading as
"improper” and "an abandonment of principle.”

Thus, the "intrigue"

that Clay's proponents had feared had occurred, for they believed that
this

dirty bargain" had undermined the will of the people.

ie

The vote of the legislature, however, did not mark the end of
the presidential controversy in Louisiana.

Because no candidate won a

majority of the nation's electoral votes, the names of the top three—
Jackson. Adams, and Crawford respectively— were submitted to the House
of Representatives with each state getting one vote.

Jackson men

asserted that Louisiana’s delegation was obligated to support their
candidate for two reasons.

First, they argued that since Jackson had

received the majority of the state’s electoral votes, the
representatives should not deviate from this preference.

Second, they

contended that this situation roughly paralleled the normal operation
of a gubernatorial campaign in Louisiana where the legislature,
selecting a governor from the top two vote-recipients, had always
chosen the one with the highest total.

According to this reasoning,

the delegation should cast the state’s votes for Jackson, who had
received the greatest number of popular and electoral votes.

Thus.

38

JohnH. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, November 18, 1824, Johnston
Papers. HSP: Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824-25. 12-13.
1C

Philemon Thomas to Henry Clay, April 30, 1825, in Hopkins, ed.,
Clav Papers. 4:313-14; David C. Ker to Andrew Jackson, November 23, 1824,
Jackson Papers, LC; John Clay to Josiah S. Johnston, November 30, 1824,
Johnston Papers, HSP.
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many in Louisiana believed that, as the people in the state and the
nation had spoken,

it was required that Jackson be the choice.

Unfortunately for Jackson, however, he could count only one friend,
his former aide-de-camp Edward Livingston, among Louisiana's threemember delegation.

As early as September 1S24. William Brent, the

representative of the Third District and an ally of Henry Clay
declared that Jackson could never get the state's vote.if
Brent’s prediction proved accurate.

O n February 9. 1S25.

Louisiana’s congressmen cast their state’s vote for John Quincy Adams,
helping to elevate him to the presidency.

Livingston supported

Jackson, while Henry Guriev joined Brent in championing Adams.

The

Louisiana Gazette's editor reported the results in dramatic fashion—
decrying the "shameful treachery unparalleled in history.” outlining
his paper in black in the traditional method of announcing the death
of an important individual, and surrounding his columns on the
election with numerous skulls and crossbones.

The paper mourned the

political deaths of Henry Clay. Gurley, and Brent— the men who had
subverted the will of the people of Louisiana and the nation.

A

Jacksonian expressed his mortification at this "scandalous intrigue"
and opined that the "unprincipled" Brent would never return to

40
Walter H. Overton to Josiah S. Johnston. November 22, 1824, Isaac
L. Baker to Johnston, December 21, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana
Gazette. March 7, 1825; St. Martinville Attakapas Gazette, January 15,
1825.
41

William L. Brent to Henry Clay, September 3, 1824, in Hopkins, ed.,
Clav Papers. 3:827-28.
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Louisiana and that Gurley's overwhelmingly pro-Jackson district would
**

punish his treason.'"
The Jackson men's attacks on Gurley and Brent emphasized that
the congressmen had subverted the will of their constituents and that
this unrepubiican corruption had threatened the people's liberty.
Realizing the potency of the labels anti-repubIican and aristocratic,
both men quickly responded.

On March 12, a letter from Gurley

appeared in the Louisiana Gazette contending that he had no certain
information on the public feeling in Louisiana, but he did know that
Clay had the most support in the legislature and that Clay men would
support Adams before Jackson.
the people of Louisiana.

Consequently, he had obeyed the will of

Perhaps sensing the firestorm that would

accompany the receipt of the delegation’s vote at home. Brent penned a
letter on February 10— the day after the vote in the House and
seventeen days before Louisiana received the results.

He asserted

that Jackson could not have won, and thus his vote expressed a desire
to avoid a constitutional crisis and save the Union— a noble
/I
repub1i can goal.
While the 1824 presidential election contributed to an increase
in the politicization of the state, the connection between state and
national politics remained incomplete.

Not only did the presidential

issue fail to surface in many legislative races, but also it played
almost no role in the July gubernatorial election and the three United
il
' Louisiana Gazette. February 28,

1825:
Jackson, March 21, 1825, Jackson Papers, LC.
43
Louisiana Gazette. March 12,
Whig Partv in Louisiana. 24.

Isaac L. Baker to Andrew

1825: Brent’s letter in Adams, The

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

34-

States Senate contests in 1S24-25.

Without established parties in the

state, some thought it desirable to keep these campaigns separate.

A

legislator from the Florida parishes. John B. Dawson expressed his
desire to remain aloof from the gubernatorial contest though he
"leanfed] on the French side" because he feared that if he expressed
his opinion regarding the gubernatorial candidates, it might offend
someone and thereby lose a vote for Jackson in the legislature.
Instead of connecting the national race to the state campaign. Dawson
continued to view the gubernatorial race in the traditional manner: a
ft
battle between the Creole and American populations.’
Five men campaigned for

the gubernatorial chair in 1S24: two

Creoles— the very wealthy Bernard Marigny and former-govemor Jacques
Villere— and three Americans— United States Senator Henry Johnson,
hero of the West Florida Rebellion Philemon Thomas, and formerCongressman Thomas Butler.

The editor of Le Louisianien lamented that

"We cannot conceal the fact that the two languages form two opinions
in regard to the gubernatorial election."

The Creoles argued that the

Americans were violating an unwritten accord which stipulated that the
office would rotate between the two populations, and according to this
scenario,

it was now the Creoles’ turn.

The Americans denied such an

agreement existed, and that if it had, it violated the sovereignty of
the people/3

*TJohn B. Dawson to William S. Hamilton,
Papers, LLMVC.

May 26,

1824, Hamilton

^ Louisiana Courier. June 11, 1824; Quote from Le Louisianien June
11,1824, in Newton, "The Americanization of French of
Louisiana," 124,
130.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

The campaign involved little debate over specific policies, and
instead focused on this ethnic split and on charging one's opponents
with being anti-republican.

A letter from a Viliere supporter that

appeared in the St. Francisville Asvlum decried that in Louisiana
"each class or tribe has notions, prejudices and opinions peculiar to
itself.” and the best solution to this unfortunate situation involved
electing Viliere.

The author contended that Johnson would be governor

of only the American party, while Viliere would be governor of all of
L o u i s i a n a . O p p o n e n t s on the same side of the ethnic divide accused
one another of being dupes of the other ethnic group and being
persuaded to run solely to divide their own group's votes.

The anger

the Creole candidates displayed toward Johnson did not compare to
their antipathy towards one another.

Marigny even accused Viliere of

the "unforgivable sin of trying to work with the Americans."

47

Marigny’s massive wealth made him an easy target for being labelled an
anti-republican royalist and "an aristocrat in disguise."

Others

accused Johnson’s friends of assuming an unrepublican and "dictatorial
tone, as if his merits were as paramount as his claims are
48
arrogant."
Henry Johnson won the July battle with a one thousand vote
maj'ority over his nearest competitor, Viliere, and with 43.6 percent

46St. Francisville Asvlum. July 3, 1824.
if

Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 114.
48
Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, March 5, 1S24, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Robert Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, June 28, 1824. Butler
Family Papers, HNO; Louisiana Gazette. May 5, 13. 1824; Joseph G. Tregle,
Jr., "Henry Johnson,” in Dawson, ed., Louisiana Governors. 98-103.
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of the popular vote.

In November. despite an effort to elevate

Viliere past Johnson, the legislature in a forty-one to fifteen vote
selected Johnson as the next governor.

An examination of the popular

vote indicates the importance of the Creole-American split and
sectional preferences within the state.

Combining the votes of the

two Creole candidates and comparing this sum to the total that the
three Americans received reveals that only sixty-eight votes out of
over sixty-five hundred separated the two populations, yet the votes
were not evenly distributed throughout the state-

In only eight of

the twenty-eight parishes which delivered official returns did the
victorious ethnic group receive less than 70 percent of the vote,
while in ten parishes over 90 percent of the vote went to one of the
two ethnic groups. (SEE APPENDIX B)
While Johnson had significant backing throughout the state, the
other candidates relied on one or two areas of strength.

The voters

of the Florida parishes refused to support either of the Creole
contenders, casting only 4.7 percent of their ballots for Marigny or
Viliere.

In contrast, Philemon Thomas, a Florida parish resident,

received four-fifths of his votes there.

Like Thomas’s results,

Butler’s small vote was geographically concentrated, with North
Louisiana providing him almost two-thirds of his total.

Neglected in

North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, Marigny won a plurality in
Greater Orleans and performed competitively in South Louisiana.
Viliere obtained the largest total in this Creole-majority region but
received less than 30 percent of the vote elsewhere.

Johnson captured

over 50 percent of the vote in both the Florida Parishes and North
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Louisiana, and his respectable minority in the other two zones can be
partly attributed to his residency in South Louisiana and his fluency
—

in rrench. both of which made him tolerable to Creole voters.

iP

In the three Senate elections surrounding the presidential
election of 1824. no direct connection was made between national and
state events.

In the January 1824 election. Josiah S. Johnston

defeated Edward Livingston with the Creole-American fight and state
sectionalism the key issues.

On one hand, the Creoles in the

legislature generally supported Livingston both because his brotherin-law Auguste Davezac was a prominent New Orleans Creole legislator
and because, according to rumor, a Creole had been promised
Livingston’s vacated congressional seat upon his elevation to the
Senate.

On the other hand, the Americans, especially those outside of

New Orleans, supported the Red River cotton-planter Johnston.

With

Livingston garnering the city support and Johnston the westerners, a
strug g le ensued over the votes of the Florida parish members.
Livingston alleged that Johnston favored the maintenance of large
Spanish land grants at the expense of American settlers and that he
had supported the Orleans Navigation Company to the detriment of the
Florida parishes.

These allegations could not overcome the members’

antipathy toward New Orleans and Creoles, and Johnston was elected by
a vote of twenty-nine to twenty-seven.50
i9

Louisiana Senate Journal, 1824-25. 3.

10Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, January 16, 1824, Hamilton
Papers. LLMVC; Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, January 20, 1824,
Johnston Papers, HSP. While no roll call vote was recorded Johnston
stated that he had gotten all of the American votes with one exception—
Josiah S. Johnston to [his wife], January 15, 1824, Johnston Papers, HSP;
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With Senator Henrv' Johnson's election to the governor's office
in July 1S24, the subsequent legislature had two United States Senate
seats to fill in addition to its selection of presidential electors.
Despite the timing of these two events, no evidence links the
presidential and senate races.

First, to fill the remainder of

Governor Johnson’s term, the legislators selected Dominique Boulignv.
a New Orleans Creole who spoke no English.

Bouiigny's victory rested

in part on a bargain between his men and Livingston's, who traded
votes for Boulignv in November for votes for Livingston in January
1S25 when he met Josiah Johnston in a rematch of their battle from the
previous year.

The election of Boulignv heightened the country versus

city tension in the legislature, and, in promoting Johnston's
candidacy, the Attakapas Gazette decried New Orleans’s ’’greedy spirit
of monopoly" in its attempt to control both Senate seats and thus
three of Louisiana’s five representatives in Washington.

Even the

city’s own Louisiana Gazette expressed disbelief that the legislature
would elect another senator from the Crescent City, though it
advocated the Florida parishes’ Philemon Thomas not Johnston.^
Once again, proponents of both candidates viewed the votes of
the Florida Parishes’ legislators as pivotal.

They exchanged

allegations that their opponents supported the Spanish land grants
over those of the American emigrant population.

Also, as in the prior

year, Johnston had to defend himself against charges that he opposed

Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824. 13.
SiSt. Martinvilie Attakapas Gazette, November 17. 1824; Louisiana
Gazette January 4, 1825; David C. Ker to Josiah S. Johnston, December 3,
1S24, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana Senate Journal. 1824-25. 11.
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any investigation into the corrupt Orleans Navigation Company which
had defrauded many Floridians.

An added complication came from the

candidacy of Philemon Thomas, a resident of the Florida parishes and
the hero of the West Florida Rebellion.

Johnston's coterie believed

that Livingston had tricked Thomas into running in order to take votes
away from Johnston.
welt enough.

If that had been the plan, it worked well but not

On the first ballot Livingston received twenty-five

votes. Johnston nineteen, and Thomas fifteen.

To win. however, a

candidate needed a majority not just a plurality.

Realizing their

candidate had no hope of victory. Thomas's men withdrew his candidacy
on the second ballot, and thirteen of the fifteen pro-Thomas members
switched to Johnston giving him the victory .ji
The contests between Johnston and Livingston cleariv
demonstrate that Louisianans viewed the presidential race and state
contests through different lenses.

The opposing sides of the Creole-

American cleavage exhibited no consistency in the two races.

While

the Creoles had been Clay’s strongest backers in the presidential
contest, in the Senate race, they generally voted for Livingston.
Jackson’s former aide.

Correspondingly, Johnston, who had spent most

of 1824 campaigning for Henry Clay in the northeastern states,
received the vote of the American legislators who had been primarily
pro-Jackson.

Thus, the gubernatorial and senate races demonstrate

"Edward Livingston to Henry H. Gurley, Gurley Family Papers.
September 24, 1824, Manuscript Department, Tulane University, New
Orleans, Louisiana; David C. Ker to Josiah S. Johnston, December 3, 1824,
Alexander Porter to Johnston, December 10, 1824, John H. Johnston to
Johnston, November 18, 1824, December 29, 1824, John Moore to Johnston,
Januarv 10, 1825, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana Senate Journal. 182425, 49.
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that, despite the increased interest in the IS24 presidential
election, no strictly partisan lines had been established in
Louisiana.''
The 1826 congressional elections provide a further opportunity
to assess the integration of national and state politics in Louisiana.
With the three incumbents running, these elections offered the voters
a chance to express their opinions on their delegation's role in
electing Adams to the presidency.

In the First District, Edward

Livingston, who had supported Jackson in 1825, easily defeated his
opponent with national politics not really an issue.

The true test of

the integration of national and state politics and the development of
parties in Louisiana would come in Gurley and Brent’s districts.
These two races would give the voters a chance to render their
judgement on the two men who allegedly betrayed the people’s will by
opposing Andrew Jackson in 1825.

54

In the Third District, John Brownson and Antoine Garrigues de
Flaugeac opposed William Brent.

Brent’s anti-Jackson stance did not

prove to be significant, as neither Garrigues nor Brownson was a
Jackson partisan.

The Jacksonians did not present a candidate because

they feared that this would divide the opposition and ensure Brent’s
victory.

Instead, they backed Brownson. who, though a supporter of

Adams, pledged himself to stand by whomever received the state’s

53Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, October 5,
Papers, HSP.

1826, Johnston

54

The three congressional districts included: First District— Greater
Orleans and most of the sugar bowl; Second District— Florida parishes
plus West Baton Rouge, Iberville, and Pointe Coupee; Third District—
North Louisiana, Avoyelles, and the Attakapas country.
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popular vote if the presidential contest again went to the House of
Representatives.

His two opponents declined to make such a pledge.

Brownson's northern birth along with his failure to campaign
contrasted with the Maryland-born Brent's well-managed campaign which
included the wide distribution of bilingual pamphlets.

As in the

gubernatorial and senatorial contests in the middle 1820s. the
American-Creole tension surfaced in this race.

A Jackson partisan

moaned that the Creoles could not be persuaded to vote for Brownson
but hoped that Garrigues de Flaugeac and Brent would split this vote.
This hope was dashed when, on the first day of the election. Garrigues
declined in Brent’s favor thus guaranteeing Brent’s victory.^
In the Second District, William S. Hamilton. Gurley's chief
opponent, made the representative’s vote for Adams the centerpiece of
his campaign.

Hamilton wrote a public letter as "Jeremiah" contending

that Gurley’s presidential vote was the only noteworthy event to occur
during his tenure in Congress.

Others agreed that the Americans in

the Florida parishes would not forget his violation of his
constituent’s instructions in supporting Adams over Jackson in the
1824 presidential contest.

This argument dovetailed with the

contention that "when a Yankee was to be served," the Connecticut-born
Gurley, "forgot that he owed any obligation to the people of

5SIsaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, September 25, 1825, October
5, 1825, November 9, 1825, January 16, 1826, Walter H. Overton to
Johnston, August 2, 1826, John H. Johnston to Johnston, May 9, 1826, July
25, 1826, L.S. Hazel ton to Johnston, May 24, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP.
Results from all three districts can be found in Louisiana Gazette,
November 7, 1826.
Under the 1812 constitution, state elections in
Louisiana lasted for three days in July and presidential elections for
three days in November.
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Louisiana."

Gurley's proponents responded to this line of attack by

producing a January 1S25 letter in which Gurley complained that,
despite his best efforts, he had been unable to obtain the opinion of
the people which when "clearly and fully expressed ought to be obeyed
by the Representative" in selecting the president.

Hamilton's

supporters scoffed at this "sophistry" and asserted that legislature’s
vote, which Gurley had disobeyed, had expressed the people’s will.55
For the first time in Louisiana history, congressional
candidates, while not running under the banner of parties, at least
explicitly recognized the connection to presidential politics.
Alexander Barrow, a prominent planter, described the race as "between
Adams(viz) Gurley & Jackson(viz) Hamilton," and he had "very little
doubt of the triumph of Old Hickory."

He also believed this election

would "decide whether the friends of Jackson can with certainty count
on the support of this state at the next presidential contest."

One

of Hamilton’s advisers assured him that he would be "supported by
every friend to General Jackson."

And, Gurley in his recapitulation

of the election referred to Hamilton’s friends as "the Jackson party."
Additionally, a Hamilton advocate alleged that the Adams
administration had established newspapers in the state to support
Gurley and Brent and oppose Livingston.57

55Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, May 6, 1826, Johnston Papers,
HSP: Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, March 19, 1826, "Jeremiah"
to the Electors, June 24, 1826, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC, St. Francisville
Louisiana Journal. June 22, 1826, Louisiana State Gazette. June 21, 1826.
57Alexander Barrow to Edward G.W. Butler, July 1, 1826, Butler Family
Papers, HNO; Alexander White to William S. Hamilton, May 21, 1826, P.K.
Wagner to Hamilton, July 30, 1S26, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Henry H.
Gurley to Henry Clay, August 20, 1826, in Hopkins, ed., Clav Papers.
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Gurley and Hamilton did not limit themselves to debating their
allegiances to Adams and Jackson.

They fought for the title of

republican and offered contrasting points of view on the role of
government.

Hamilton, of course, alleged that Gurley’s vote for Adams

had been unrepublican, and that he. as the people’s representative,
would support their voice even if they were so ungrateful as to choose
another over their ’’saviour” Jackson.

He campaigned as a Jeffersonian

Republican in favor of states rights and strict construction of the
United States Constitution and opposed to federally sponsored internal
improvements.

He also placed himself in the mold of Jackson, a

veteran of the War of 1812 who had retired as an independent planter.
While Hamilton challenged the idea that ’’power is liberty."
Gurley embraced this theory.

He portrayed himself as a proponent of

Louisiana’s welfare who had encouraged federally sponsored internal
improvements in the state.

One of his supporters mocked Hamilton for

opposing internal improvements in the very parishes where a
Washington-New Orleans road would pass, and even one of Hamilton’s
supporters agreed that a circular he had published on these issues had
hurt his candidacy.

Gurley also reiterated his stance that he had

acted as a republican in supporting Adams.

Through the publication of

letters, circulars, and newspaper articles, both candidates made
extensive efforts to place their views before the electorate.

5:634-35.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

exertions indicating that they accepted the republican ideal of the
sovereignty of the people.
When the results were taliied. Gurley had won re-election to the
House with 52.5 percent of the vote.

While some rejoiced that his

majority presented "a very strong answer to the assertion so
repeatedly made, that [he] violated the wishes of [his] constituents"
in voting for Adams, his victory resulted from other causes.

Gurley

owed his election to East Baton Rouge and Iberville where he won by
402 votes, whereas in the district's other seven parishes he lost by
267.

East Baton Rouge voters supported Gurley because he lived there.

The administration’s appointment of Creoles to key positions.
including the post master of New Orleans, helped sway prominent
Creoles in Iberville to put their influence behind Gurley.

Many of

Hamilton's friends chastised the parish’s Creoles for their
abandonment of him.

59

Despite these defeats, Jacksonians in Louisiana eagerly awaited
1828 when they would have a chance to elevate their hero to the
presidency.

In that year, the state’s voters confronted legislative,

congressional, and gubernatorial races in July, in addition to their
first opportunity to select presidential electors in November.

With a

national election coming on the heels of the state election, the
58

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, June 21, 1826, Johnston
Papers. HSP; William S. Hamilton to the People of the Second
Congressional District in St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. May 25,
1826; Louisiana State Gazette. May 30, July 25, 1826; Archibald Haralson
to William S. Hamilton, June 17, 1826, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
59

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, August 31, 1826, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Alexander White to Williams. Hamilton, September 24, 1826,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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opportunity existed for party leaders to connect these two contests.
Attempts were made to attach party iabels to the gubernatorial
candidates and Louisiana became more committed to a two party system.
In the gubernatorial and legislative races, however, traditional
prejudices prevented the complete assimilation of the state into the
national political spectrum.

Also, with the state elections in July

and the presidential election not until four months later, combining
the two remained difficult.
With a multiplicity of candidates, the gubernatorial race, as in
1824, focused on the American-Creole split.

Even eighteen months

prior to the election the "public mind" was "much distracted” about
the governor’s race and "at least fifteen [candidates] are talked of.”
United States Senator Josiah Johnston found himself among those being
considered, especially because many deemed him the only electable
American.

He preferred the security of his Senate seat to the

unpredictability of a gubernatorial campaign.

Perhaps because he

combined an American and French heritage, Henry S. Thibodeaux was
considered the most prominent candidate, but his untimely death in
October 1827 left the field wide open.“^

Eventually, the canvass

narrowed to Pierre Derbigny and Bernard Marigny on the Creole side,
and Philemon Thomas and Thomas Butler on the American side.

As in

0 Henry Adams Bullard to Josiah S. Johnston, January 26, 1827,
Johnston Papers. HSP.
Letters soliciting Johnston to run as the only
American who could win include Alexander White to Johnston, February 7,
1S27, Walter H. Overton to Johnston, October 3, 1826, Alexander Porter
to Johnston, April 14, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP. Thibodeaux was b o m
an Acadian but, orphaned at an early age, was raised by the influential
Schuyler family in New York before moving to Louisiana in 1790, marrying
an Acadian, and settling on Bayou Lafourche.
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1S24, both factions feared that a division of their votes would lead
to the victory of the opposing ethnic group.

A letter in the Baton

Rouge Gazette suggested that a legislative caucus choose between
Thomas and Butler with the weaker man dropping out of the race, but
nothing came of this idea.

Also, the Americans,

in an unsuccessful

further effort to divide the Creole votes, tried to persuade Martin
Duralde to run.Bt
With the election of a president in the same year, the
possibility of combining the two races was discussed but opinion
divided on the subject.

In the 182S presidential contest. Andrew

Jackson, campaigning mainly on the issue that a "corrupt bargain" had
usurped the will of the people in 1S24-25. opposed the incumbent John
Quincy Adams.

Because of Gurley and Brent’s roles in the election of

Adams over Jackson, this issue had particular resonance in Louisiana.
In the gubernatorial contest, one candidate of each ethnic group could
be associated with Adams (Derbigny and Thomas) and one of each with
Jackson (Marigny and Butler).

Running for re-election to Congress

from the Third District, William Brent asserted that "the elections in
July are very important" because "they will fix the votes of our state
for the fall election."

A leading proponent of Jackson’s cause in the

Third District alleged that the noise, violence, and intolerance of
the administration men would lead many Americans to support Marigny
for governor.

An effort by Marigny’s supporters to have the Jackson

nominating convention which met in New Orleans in January 1828 to

5IFor a discussion of Duralde’s running see Montfort Wells to Josiah
S. Johnston, December 15, 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP: Baton Rouge
Gazette, March 15, 1828.
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declare for a governor failed. "The convention determined to keep the
Presidential &: Governor's election separate, not to blend the
questions. "c‘
Despite attempts to connect the two races, most voters still
viewed the gubernatorial and presidential campaigns as separate
entities.

The failed effort to have the Jackson convention nominate a

candidate demonstrated that not everyone saw an advantage in
connecting the two races.

A Jackson advocate seemed confused as he

discussed in the same letter an "Adams ticket" for the legislature but
"American" and "French" candidates for governor.

Another announced

his determination to support Derbigny because "he does not come out as
a party candidate.

Nor is it necessary that he should."

An adviser

to gubernatorial candidate Thomas Butler avowed the "disposition of
each [of the populations] to support their own countrymen" and
predicted that "the Presidential question will not mingle in near so
great a degree in the gubernatorial election as some imagine."

A

letter in the Louisiana Journal proclaimed, "Happily the presidential
question does not enter into the canvass."

The timing of the two

elections also added a further obstacle to their connection.

With the

gubernatorial election in July and the presidential contest in

6 William L. Brent to James G. Taliaferro, May 9, 1828, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Isaac L. Baker to Josiah S. Johnston, October
5, 1826, Alexander Porter to Johnston, January 24. 1828, Mr. Grima to
Johnston. January 16. 1828, Johnston Papers, HSP; Isaac L. Baker to
Andrew Jackson, April 21, 1827, Jackson Papers, LC.
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November, one campaign would end before the other reached its
c 1imax.
Also, despite the candidates' association with Adams or Jackson,
only Bernard Marigny and Thomas Butler openly aligned themselves with
a particular candidate, and even their attachments remained tenuous.
Both Adams and Jackson supporters condemned Marigny’s efforts to tie
himself to Jackson as insincere and chastised "his Ivins pretensions
to Jacksonism" which he used "only as far as answered his own
purposes."

Although his brother had served as Jackson's chief of

staff. Butler hesitated to connect the two races.

In the November

1S27 address announcing his candidacy, his proponents declared. "We
consider the mingling of the national politics, with our gubernatorial
election, as contrary to the true spirit of our constitution."

By the

election, however, the leaders of the Jackson party in New Orleans had
endorsed Butler’s candidacy, and he had openly aligned himself with
the General’s cause.

Butler’s friends believed that his defeat could

be attributed to this belated embrace of Jackson and on his being "a
little too careful." They asserted that "if he had come more boldly
CM

out in favor of Jackson it would have secured his election." ’

0 Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, March 29, 1827, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC; G. Smith to Josiah S. Johnston, January 9, 1827[8].
Johnston Papers, HSP; Samuel H. Harper to Thomas Butler, June 24, 1828,
Thomas Butler Papers. LLMVC; St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. June 21,
1828.
f*

’Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, January 24, 1828, Johnston
Papers. HSP; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 219; Butler address
in Baton Rouge Gazette, November 3, 1827; Argus. July 4, 1828; Caroline
Bell to Edward G. W. Butler, August 3, 1828, Butler Family Papers, HNO.
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The final results of the election revealed that, once again, the
Creo!e-American split played a prominent role.

Thomas and Butler,

both from the Florida Parishes, understood that any chance of victory
would depend on Creole votes.

This realization led the latter to

declare that he entertained "a high opinion of the patriotism and
republicanism of the Creole French inhabitants."

The former agreed

that he opposed the "party feelings" which had led to the creation of
an "illiberal distinction" between the two populations.

Neither of

these appeals proved effective as Pierre Derbignv captured 44.5
percent of the votes, while the other three candidates received from
16 to 22 percent.

Unlike 1S24, where the two ethnic groups received

almost exactly the same number of votes, this time the Creole
candidates earned 62.1 percent.

One major differences occurred in

North Louisiana where, mainly because of Derbigny’s moderate stance on
the ethnic division, the Creole percentage doubled.

Additionally, in

South Louisiana, without favorite-son Johnson running, the Creoles
solidified their already strong hold.(SEE APPENDIX B)
Of the twenty-nine parishes which reported official results,
twelve of them recorded a vote of over 90 percent to one of the two
ethnic groups, while only eight reported a return of less than 70
percent for the victorious ethnic group.

Also, as in 1824, the

returns did not demonstrate geographic uniformity across the state.
Thomas won just above 50 percent of the vote in the Florida parishes,
but this sum represented over 75 percent of his total.

Butler had

more balanced support than in 1824, but two-thirds of his total came
from Florida and North Louisiana.

Marigny again performed best in
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Greater Orleans and South Louisiana but elevated his total in North
Louisiana as well.

Derbigny's victory stemmed from his domination in

South Louisiana and Greater Orleans.

Even if he had received no other

votes, his 1ST0 votes in South Louisiana would have elevated him to
the governor's of f ice.03
In the concurrent legislative elections, the winners were viewed
in partisan terras— as Jackson or administration men— for the first
time in Louisiana’s history.

A letter to the Louisiana Journal

denounced the prevailing spirit which viewed all subjects ’’through the
optics of party” and asserted that in legislative races, "the first.—
nay the only question to be asked is— ’Is he an Adams or Jackson
man?*”

As in 1824, the connection between the two elections was

strongest in New Orleans, where a Jackson and an administration ticket
contested for the legislature.

Even in rural St. Mary Parish,

however, the "friends of the administration" urged support of a proAdams ticket for governor, Congress, and the legislature.

By all

accounts. Adams men controlled both houses of the legislature,
especially because of their triumph in New Orleans and the surrounding
parishes of the First District where not a single Jackson man was
elected.60
The congressional elections also terminated to the liking of the
administration men.

In the First District, Edward White ousted

Jacksonian Edward Livingston partly because of White’s "Jacksonian

660fficial election returns in Louisiana House Journal. 1828-29, 5-6.
66Robert Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, July 18, 1828, Butler Family
Papers, HNO; St. Francisville Louisiana Journal. June 21, 1828; Argus,
February 22, 1828, July 21, 1828.
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friends” who voted for him because he was a friend to the Creoles and
a Catholic.

Others refused to support Livingston because he opposed

the tariff on imported sugar cane and because he spent more time in
N:ew York than in Louisiana.

In the Second District. Jackson

supporters again failed to oust Henry Gurley.

The loser Lafayette

Saunders attributed his loss to his short residence in the state, and
consequently the voters' unfamiIiarity with him.

Also. Gurley

benefitted from his supporters* determination to keep the
congressional and presidential contests separated.

The Jacksonians

could only console themselves with a victory in the Third District
where Walter Overton, campaigning as a friend of Jackson and opponent
of the tariff, triumphed over Gurley's partner in the 1S24 betrayal,
the "infamous scoundrel" William Brent, whose extended absences from
the state further injured him.t,,
These victories led one administration man to exclaim. "Our
elections in Louisiana have settled the Jackson question in this
state."

Also, they left St. Mary Parish sugar planter Alexander

Porter exulting "we have preserved the government of this state from
failing into evil hands for the next four years."

Despite holding the

non-partisan position of associate j'ustxce of the Louisiana Supreme
Court, Porter acted as a leader the administration’s cause in

S7

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston. May 21. 1828. Isaac L.
Baker to Johnston, December 15, 1827, May 12, 1828, Johnston Papers, HSP:
Lafayette Saunders to Andrew Jackson, July 18, 1828, Jackson Papers, LC:
James Hamilton to Martin Van Buren, July 31, 1828, Martin Van Buren
Papers. LC; Caroline Bell to Edward G. W. Butler, August 3, 1828, Thomas
Butler to Edward G. W. Butler, October 6, 1828, Butler Family Papers,
HNO; Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, September 10, 1828,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Argus. July 16, 1828.
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Louisiana, and he cheerfully added that "the Jackson party in this
state are humbled beyond measure."

Less than ten days Later. Porter

admitted that "not a single one of our elections turned exclusively on
[the presidential question]."

Victorious Third District congressional

candidate Walter K. Overton agreed that "in some parishes the
Presidential question obtained, whilst in others personal
considerations governed.”

Baker, too. believed that many Adams men

voted for Overton, while some Jackson supporters had gone with Brent.
Prior to the election. GurLey had wondered whether "little things [the
congressional election]" were to be "mixed with great ones[the
presidential campaign].
The 1S28 presidential campaign gripped the state as none
previously had.

A state legislator rejoiced that "Never was so much

anxiety, excitement, and impatience universally felt as in the present
contest.
state."

It
For

is a great novelty to witness its influence

in this

the first time, Louisiana voters had the privilege of

selecting the state’s presidential electors.^

Perhaps, more

importantly,

in January of 1828. Andrew Jackson returned

to the

of his glory

to celebrate the anniversary of his victory

in the Battle

of New Orleans.

field

During the antebellum era, presidential candidates

George Eustis to Josiah S. Johnston, August 9, 1828, Alexander
Porter to Johnston, July 19, 1828 (first quote), July 27, 1828 (second
quote), Walter H. Overton to Johnston, August 7, 1828, Isaac L. Baker to
Johnston, May 12, 1828, Johnston Papers, HSP; Henry Gurley to John C.
Buhler, December 24, 1827, Buhler Family Papers, LLMVC; Wendell H.
Stephenson, Alexander Porter: Whig Planter of Old Louisiana (Baton Rouge.
1934), 27.
John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, August 21, 1828, Johnston
Papers. HSP.
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did not campaign, so Jackson ostensibly visited solely to participate
in the anniversary ceremonies.

Despite the payment of lip— service to

the idea that Jackson's visit had nothing to do with presidential
politics, from the start Louisianans viewed it in no other terms.

An

administration-dominated legislature, not wanting to show disrespect
toward the hero and anger its constituents, reluctantly invited
Jackson, but they intentionally failed to provide an appropriation to
pay for his visit.!u
Not surprisingly, the verdict on the effect of Jackson’s visit
depended upon which side of the partisan divide the judge fell.

While

a Jackson supporter claimed that "the celebration surpassed anything
I've ever witnessed," an Adams man asserted, "a poorer display I have
never seen."

He explained how Jackson's friends had sponsored a

dinner for the General, but, even after decreasing the price, they
failed to fill the subscription.

The Crescent City newspapers,

especially the Louisiana Courier and the B e e , feuded over the size and
quality of the General’s reception.

Taking advantage of the General's

visit, Old Hickory’s advocates held a nominating convention in New
Orleans at which one hundred twenty delegates from twenty-seven
parishes announced Jackson as their presidential candidate.7*
Partisans of both candidates seized on the idea that only their
favorite could preserve republicanism in the nation.

Adams supporters

70
Josiah S. Johnston to Henry Clay, May 19, 1827, Hopkins, ed., Clav
Papers, 6:568-69.
71Joshua Baker to Nicholas P. Trist, February 8, 1828, Trist Papers,
SHC? Philip Yost, Jr., to Henry Clay, January 9, 1828, Hopkins, ed., Clav
Papers, 7:26; Bee January 22, 1828; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of
Jackson, 215-9.
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from sixteen parishes assembled at Baton Rouge in November IS2“ and
produced an address to the voters of Louisiana which denied that
"bribery and corruption" had elevated Adams to the presidency.

More

importantly, they attacked Jackson as a military despot and proclaimed
that he had, after the Battle of New Orleans in 1S15,
"substituted...his will to that of the law” and "trampled upon the
constitut ion."

Despite their differences, former Governor Robertson

announced for Adams maintaining that Adams unlike Jackson respected
the Constitution.

During the election, the Argus denounced Jackson's

declaration of martial law in 1815. and pro-administration carriages
had "Adams & the Constitution" painted on their sides.
A Jackson meeting in Baton Rouge almost a year later viewed
things in a completely opposite manner.

It saw the contest as not

between republicanism and military despotism but as "between
Republicanism on the one hand, and of Aristocracy on the other."

The

delegates contrasted the "Farmer of Tennessee" Andrew Jackson, "a
patriot of practical wisdom, republican virtue and simplicity" with
John Quincy Adams "a notorious aristocrat" who held in contempt the
idea of a republican system of government.

Every pro-Jackson assembly

repeated the charge that Ada m s ’s election in 1824 had violated the
will of the people.

Jackson proponents labelled him "incorruptible.”

11

Baton Rouge Gazette. December 8, 1827; Thomas Bolling Robertson to
William Robertson, August 22, 1827, Prichard Collection, LLMVC; Argus.
November 3, 1828; Caroline Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, November 7, 1828,
Butler Family Papers, HNO.
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and claimed the General’s election would "save our country from the
polluting grasp of intrigue and corruption.’"'
The proper role of the federal government in the economic sector
emerged as a key issue in the campaign.

Adams and Clay were

associated with the American System which envisioned an activist
federal government harmonizing the country’s diverse economic and
sectional interests.

A national bank, a protective tariff, and

federally sponsored internal improvements were the chief instruments
of this policy.

While the bank received scarcely any mention in the

state, the other two pillars had a stronger appeal in Louisiana than
in other southern states-

Louisiana sugar cane needed a protective

tariff to compete against imports from the West Indies.

And,

Louisiana’s extensive river and bayou system needed federal help in
their development.

The proponents of the administration in Louisiana

never labelled themselves "National Republicans,” preferring either
"Adams men" or "Administration men,” because of the strong association
of "National Republicans" with the New England states.

Whatever name

they chose, these Louisianans did clearly adopt the party’s economic
nationalism and its American System.
The Argus boldly proclaimed its allegiance to the "AMERICAN
SYSTEM" which contained "the very heart and soul of our nation’s
independence" and labelled its opponents as "the most short-sighted
politicians in existence."

While admitting that some southerners

' Baton Rouge Gazette. October 25, 1828; Edward G.W. Butler to Thomas
Butler, February 16, 1828, Thomas Butler Papers, LLMVC; David Kerr to
Andrew Jackson, November 6, 1828, Jackson Papers, LC; Louisiana Courier.
November 9, 1827; November 3, 1828.
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found the system's provisions unconstitutional, the Argus asserted
that "the most liberal construction should be put upon the letter of
the constitution."

It also alleged that if Jackson won the November

election, the American System would be destroyed.

Owning a large

sugar cane plantation and one hundred and fifty slaves. Alexander
Porter claimed the termination of the duty on sugar cane would lead
cane growers to turn to cotton which would cause an over-production of
that staple and lead to the ruin of ail planters.

In Louisiana, he

concluded that both sugar cane and cotton planters had a vested
interest in the protective tariff.'
Others, however, celebrated the idea that Jackson’s election
would destroy the American System and expressed disbelief that any
southerner could advocate the idea of broad construction.

Congressman

Walter Overton considered the tariff "a tax on the Southern Planter”
and "oppressive to the cotton grower."

A speaker at a pro-Jackson

meeting in Alexandria deplored the "injurious tendency" a tariff would
have on southern planters.

Just emerging on Louisiana’s political

scene, John Slidell, a lawyer who had emigrated from New York to New
Orleans, alleged the tariff would convert "the independent cultivators
of the soil into slavish tenants of the workhouse."

Realizing the

popularity of the sugar cane tariff in certain areas, the Jackson
party repeatedly distinguished between a constitutional revenue tariff
and an unconstitutional protective tariff.

Arguing for this strict

constructionist viewpoint, William S. Hamilton proclaimed that "our

H

Argus, June 1, 14, 1828; Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston,
July 2. 1826, Johnston Papers, HSP; Stephenson, Alexander Porter. 28.
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Federal government Is one of limited powers, and can exercise no
authority wh[ichj

is not granted in the consti tut ion. ”'J

In the November election "there never was anything seen like the
exertion on both sides."

In New Orleans, "the administration party

had hacks running to take all they could find to the polls."

In bold

print, the Argus reminded "FRENCHMEN” that Jackson "banished ail
Frenchmen after the war." threatened to have their countryman
Louaillier shot, and called them "TRAITORS [and] mistrusted you all.”
The pro-Jackson Louisiana Courier countered with "REMEMBER OLD HICKORY
ON THE PLAINS OF CHALMETTE" and implored its readers to support the
slave-holding Jackson, "A MAN OF THE SOUTH,’' over Adams, the proponent
of northern manufacturing.

Louisianans responded to the frenzy

surrounding the contest and came to the polls at their highest rate
ever.

While 63.6 percent of those eligible voted in the July

gubernatorial election, in November, turnout exceeded 75 percent in
the state and, in the Florida parishes, reached an astounding 91
percent.

(TABLE 1.2)76

Andrew Jackson triumphed nationally, and, despite the efforts of
the administration party. Louisiana remained true to her savior, as
Jackson won the state 4,605

to 4,066.

The Florida Parishes, "the

75Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, September 10, 182S,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Overton to Josiah S. Johnston, September 30,
1S28, Johnston Papers, HSP; Louisiana Courier. November 9, 12, 1S27;
Slidell quotation from Louisiana Courier. June 13, 1843 quoting Louisiana
Advertiser May 1827; Hamilton speech written for John B. Dawson to
deliver, July 1829, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
76Caroline Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, August 3, 1828, November 7,
1828, Butler Family Papers, HNO: Argus. November 4, 1828: Louisiana
Courier, November 3, 1828.
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TABLE 1.2

Turnout in 1S2S Elections

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

■JULY
GUBERNATORIAL
84.0
69. I
76. I
66.9
63.6

NOVEMBER
PRESIDENTIAL
91.0

8L.S
65.9
52.9
75.3

backbone of the Jackson party." gave over three-quarters of its votes
to the General.

He also won a large majority in North Louisiana and

lost a very close contest in Greater Orleans.

Adams supporters did

have some reason to be sanguine with the results in Louisiana.

In

comparison to the rest of the South, where Jackson received over SO
percent of the vote. Adams’s 47 percent in Louisiana appeared very
respectable.

Undoubtedly. Adams’s relatively strong showing stemmed

from the attraction of the American System in the Pelican State.

He

won not only in Greater Orleans but also in pro-tariff South Louisiana
which gave him two-thirds of its votes. (SEE APPENDIX A)77
One month after the presidential campaign, the legislature,
which had been elected in July, gathered in New Orleans.

One of its

most important tasks was the election of a United States senator. The
Senate election of January 1829 combined the prominent themes of this
early party period in Louisiana: partisan preferences, the growing
power of the voice of the people, and ethnic prejudices.

The

legislature divided between Adams and Jackson partisans, but the vote

77
William J. Cooper, Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery.
1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 5-11; Unidentified newspaper clipping,
March 20, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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did not simply follow these lines.

While the Jackson men united

behind former Congressman Edward Livingston, the Adams men. who had a
majority, failed to agree upon a candidate.

The Creoies wanted to re

elect Dominique Bouligny, while the Americans supported former Senator
and Governor Henry Johnson.

Despite fears that a division between

Bouligny and Johnson might allow Livingston to triumph, both men
refused to yield.

A further complication for the administration men

stemmed from an effort, especially in the Third Congressional
District, to have the people instruct their legislators to vote for
the pro-Jackson Livingston.

Rapides Representative John H. Johnston

planned to vote for Henry Johnson until receiving instructions from
his constituents to vote for Livingston.

He realized the risk in

opposing the people’s will and changed his preference accordingly.
Recognizing this danger to their aspirant’s chances. Johnson
proponents circulated counter instructions supporting their candidate.
While increased partisanship and the people’s instructions
played a role in the election, the Creole-American conflict could not
be kept at bay.

As the election approached, supposedly Bouligny and

Johnson worked out a tacit understanding whereby whoever received
fewer votes on the first ballot would withdraw in favor of the other.
Despite falling two votes behind Bouligny, Johnson, to whom "officeholding was an obsession," stubbornly refused to abandon the race.

On

the fifth ballot, several of Bouligny’s followers switched to
Livingston, assuring his victory.

This defeat resulted in a series of

bitter recriminations between the two ethnic groups of the Adams
party.

Even an American member of the party blamed Johnson’s ambition
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and contended that by refusing to yield to Bouligny. "Johnson has cut
his own throat.”

And. for the next five years. Johnson's name would

disappear from the lexicon of Louisiana politics.'’
By 1S29. Louisiana had taken important steps toward the
formation of popularly based political parties integrated into a
national party system.

First, the electorate, though only a small

percentage of the total population, had become much more active and
powerful.

The 1824 law granting it the right to select the state’s

presidential electors had helped spur this change, and over three
quarters of the eligible voters had taken advantage of this
opportunity in IS2S.

In what would be the first salvo in a long

battle, the Baton Rouge Gazette in 1S27 announced its advocacy of
constitutional changes that included expanding the electorate and
making more offices elective.

Additionally, while previously only

ethnicity had classified legislators, now, politicians, the press, and
the electorate had begun to view them by their allegiance to national
leaders— either pro-Jackson or pro-administration.

Furthermore,

in

1S28, for the first time, all three congressional races had tied to
national politics with each race having a Jackson and an Adams
79

candidate.

78

James Erwin to Henry Clay, January 6, 1829, Hopkins, ed . , Clav
Papers. 7:590-91: J. Essin to Josiah S. Johnston. January 12, 1829,
Alexander Porter to Johnston, January 13, 1829, Henry Adams Bullard to
Johnston, January 12, 1829, Johnston Papers, HSP: "Obsession" quotation
from Tregle, "Henry Johnson," in Dawson, e d . , Louisiana Governors. 98;
Louisiana Senate Journal. 1828-29. 51-52.
79

Baton Rouge Gazette, August 11, 1827.
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As the lS20s came to a close, the partisan picture in Louisiana
remained ciouded.

Both parties had reason to be confident as they

looked forward to IS32 and another combination of gubernatorial and
presidential races.

On one hand, supporters of Adams and the American

System could proudly claim the governor's office, a majority in the
legislature, and two of Louisiana's three congressional seats.

On the

other hand. Andrew Jackson's victory in the presidential contest and
the legislature’s selection of a pro-Jackson senator helped
Jacksonians remain optimistic.
still persisted, however.

Traditional patterns and prej'udices

In the 1S2S gubernatorial race, the

electorate split not only between Adams and Jackson candidates but
subdivided between Creole and American proponents.

Thus, because of

this division, the race involved candidates from the following groups:
Creole-Adams, Creole-Jackson, American-Adams, and American-Jackson.
The 1829 senate race also demonstrated that, while the legislature may
have divided between Adams and Jackson supporters, strict party
discipline could not be assumed.

The Adams legislators could not put

aside their ethnic differences to unite behind a single candidate,
which led to the victory of the minority Jackson party’s nominee.
Until partisan allegiance could overcome the sharp differences between
the American and Creole populations, party development in Louisiana
would remain incomplete.
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CHAPTER TWO
TWO-PARTY POLITICS IN LOUISIANA. 1829-1836
Entering the 1830s. party formation in Louisiana remained
incomplete.

Ethnicity, state sectionalism, and personality

overshadowed partisan attachment for many Louisianans.

Voters often

supported candidates who stood on their side of the Creole-American
divide regardless of party.

Louisianans preferred aspirants from

their section of the state, and voters living outside New Orleans
remained suspicious of nominees from the city.

Additionally,

Louisiana parties were incompletely integrated into a national party
system.

Louisianans aligned themselves with Andrew Jackson, John

Quincy Adams, or Henry Clay but declined to call themselves Democrats
or National Republicans and frequently failed to perceive any
connection between state and national races.

These elements limited

party growth and partisan attachment in Louisiana, and state level
races often witnessed a multiplicity of candidates divided not by
party but by ethnicity and/or residency.
By 1836, however, party structure in Louisiana had become more
complete, and the state’s political parties had become more fully
integrated into the national party system, dividing almost evenly
between the Democratic and Whig parties.

With an increase in partisan

organization, most races had only two candidates, one from each party.
The Whigs and Democrats differed primarily in their stances on the
American System— a national bank, federally sponsored internal
improvements, and a protective tariff.

In Louisiana, Whigs generally

supported these measures, while Democrats, following President Andrew
Jackson’s lead, opposed most aspects of the system, only making an
62
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exception for a tariff on sugar cane, one of the staters primary
staples.

Though the American System invoLved national issues, the

intensity of partisan disagreement over its policies made it a topic
even in state contests.
While attitudes toward the American System shaped party
development in Louisiana, ethnicity, regionalism, personality, states
rights, republicanism, and slavery remained important.

Creole-

American tension and sectional rivalry persisted, but in most cases
operated within the party system.

For instance, voters might prefer a

Creole Whig over an American Whig or a Florida parish Democrat over a
New Orleans Democrat.

When an ethnic group or region considered

itself snubbed by the party leadership, these feelings could override
party loyalty.

Personal rivalry, especially among the leaders of the

Jackson party, further undermined party solidarity.

Louisiana also

contained a small contingent of states rights men who shared the
Democrats’ hostility to the American System but joined the Whigs in
opposition to Jackson’s executive tyranny.

The parties based their

claims on the electorate not only on economic issues, but on their
ability to protect republicanism.

By 1836, partisans also battled

over who could best guard a more tangible southern asset— slavery.
From this period until the Civil War, both Louisiana parties portrayed
themselves as the best defenders of slavery and contended that the
peculiar institution would be unsafe in the hands of their opponents.
Party organization among Louisiana Jacksonians began with the
Andrew Jackson’s defeat of John Quincy Adams in the 1828 presidential
election.

For the first time, his supporters would receive the
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patronage of the federal government in Louisiana.

For more than ten

years, Beverly Chew had served as the Collector of Customs, the most
prestigious patronage post in Louisiana.

Jackson partisans demanded

"an early example ought to be made of this man."

An Adams supporter,

Chew had committed the unforgivable sin of blaspheming the traditional
January 8 celebration in honor of Jackson’s victory at the Battle of
New Orleans.

In an angry epistle, a New Orleans Jacksonian alleged

that Chew, a church vestryman, had refused to raise his church’s flag
or to ring its bells because Chew believed that he "could not
celebrate that glorious victory without honoring the chief who
achieved it."

The correspondent suggested that Jackson replace Chew

with Martin Gordon whose appointment would be "almost as painful to
the coalition as your election" because of the prominent pro-Jackson
role Gordon had played in the 1828 presidential contest.

Jackson

concurred and quickly relieved Chew of his post and appointed Gordon
in his place.1
In the wake of Jackson’s victory, Gordon, a New Orleans
businessman, brilliantly maneuvered himself into the position of the
administration’s chief representative in Louisiana.

After the

election, Gordon followed Jackson to Washington and convinced the
president of his loyalty.

Upon returning to Louisiana, Gordon

received the appointment as Collector, and his New Orleans associates
received the other prime Louisiana patronage posts.

Gordon’s rise to

^David C. Ker to Andrew Jackson, November 15, 1828, Andrew Jackson
Papers, Library of Congress (Hereinafter LC); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr.,
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of Cultures and Personalities
(Baton Rouge, 1999), 229-33.
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the top of Louisiana’s Jackson party was somewhat surprising.

Unlike

most of Jackson’s closest allies in the state, Gordon had not served
alongside the General in the Battle of New Orleans, not even meeting
Jackson until 1827.

Aware of the importance of linking himself to

Jackson, Gordon and his friends created a fictitious history between
the two men.

They portrayed Gordon as a valiant defender of the

ramparts at the Battle of New Orleans, and later even alleged that
Gordon, at a young age, had earned Jackson’s lifelong friendship by
coming to the aid of an out-numbered Jackson in a hotel lobby brawl.

1

The administration’s patronage policy angered three important
groups in Louisiana: Adams proponents, the Creole population, find
residents of the Florida Parishes.

Obviously Jackson chose not to

include those who had advanced Adams’s cause in his patronage plans.
Seemingly unaware that his support of Adams could have angered
Jackson, Judge Alexander Porter complained that "silly fools" had
persuaded a man he had befriended twenty years before, when they both
lived in Tennessee, to turn against him.

In a more public display,

friends of Chew staged a meeting to protest his ouster and, according
to Gordon, to keep partisan excitement alive.3 The Creoles were kept

2

For a list of other Jackson appointments in New Orleans see Tregie,
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 233. Letter of introduction from John
Grymes to Andrew Jackson, November 3, 1827, Jackson Papers, LC. During
the battle, Gordon left New Orleans for the safer confines of Cincinnati-New Orleans Argus. May 20, 1829. (Hereinafter all papers New Orleans
unless otherwise noted). For brawl story see J.M. Whitaker, Sketches of
Life and Character in Louisiana (New Orleans, 1847).
3Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, December 24, 1829, Burton
Norvell Harrison and Family Papers, LC; Wendell H. Stephenson, Alexander
Porter: Whig Planter of Old Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1934), 9-10; Martin
Gordon to Andrew Jackson, December 10, 1829, Jackson Papers, LC.
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from the public trough because the parishes where they predominated
had backed Adams in November.

Jackson received advice from Louisiana

which asserted that "The French parishes alone have given majorities
against you.

These people are entirely ignorant of the principles of

our government."*

With neither the Adams men nor the Creoles offering

Jackson much electoral support, their absence from patronage positions
was not startling.
Much more astonishing, however, was the omission of men from the
Florida Parishes among the key patronage posts.

Considered "the

backbone of the Jackson party,” the Florida Parishes were "run mad
about Genl. Jackson."*

The region’s residents had loyally voted for

Jackson in the 1828 election and felt that they deserved to be
rewarded for this fealty.

They knew where to place the blame for

their exclusion: Martin Gordon.

Writing to Jackson, a Florida Parish

partisan lamented that despite "the noisy clamors of New Orleans

it

was the silent work of modest and noiseless Patriotism in Florida that
gave us the victory."6 While aware of the role that the Florida
Parishes played in Jackson’s election, Gordon wished to concentrate
power in New Orleans generally, and in his own hands specifically.

He

*David C. Ker to Andrew Jackson, November 11, 1828, Jackson Papers,
LC.
Unidentified newspaper clipping, March 20, 1830 (1st quote) in
William S. Hamilton Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley
Collections, LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, (Hereinafter LLMVC);
T.J. Pew to Josiah S. Johnston, January 31, 1830 (2nd quote), Josiah
Stoddard
Johnston Papers,
Historical
Society
of
Pennsylvania,
(Hereinafter HSP).
6John B. Dawson to Andrew Jackson, May 26, 1829, quoted in Tregle,
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 234-5.
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decided on a plan whereby, in the guise of giving into the Florida
Parishes’ patronage demands, he would actually diminish their
political clout even further.
Correctly sensing that one of the region’s leading Jacksonians,
William S. Hamilton, desired to run for Congress in 1830, Gordon
attempted to have him removed from the state.

Gordon arranged for

Hamilton to receive a federal patronage post requiring him to move to
Mississippi.

Gordon intended to have one of his allies, Eleazer

Ripley, a northern-born New Orleanian, run for Congress in Hamilton’s
place further cementing Gordon’s hold on the Louisiana Jackson party.
Realizing that "it appeared strange that [the Surveyor General’s]
office should be given to a person [Hamilton] who had never sought
it," Hamilton and his friends saw through Gordon’s subterfuge.

They

also stressed that "Florida should be represented at Washington" and
disparaged the "Yankee" Ripley’s efforts to maneuver his way into
Congress despite not even living in the district.

Hamilton declined

the office, and he and his alLies learned to beware of the gifts
•J

offered by Gordon.
The competition for control of Louisiana politics took a strange
turn on October 6, 1829, when Governor Derbigny died from injuries
sustained in a carriage accident.

The state constitution had no

provision for a lieutenant governor instead stipulating that upon the

7

Alexander Barrow to William S. Hamilton, October 28, 1829, (1st
quote) Lafayette Saunders to Hamilton, November 4, 1829, (2nd quote)
Hamilton to Saunders December 14, 1829, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC. The
Second Congressional District included the Florida .Parish region plus the
parishes of Iberville, Pointe Coupee, and West Baton Rouge but did not
include Orleans Parish.
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governor's death, the president of the Senate would ascend to the
position.

Though this provision may have seemed straightforward to

the constitution’s framers, in practice it proved a "source of great
0
deal of confusion" and "a singular predicament."
The constitution
failed to indicate whether the president of the senate actually became
the governor or whether he simply acted as governor while serving as
president of the senate.

The senate decided that the office

transferred not to the man but to the position.

According to this

interpretation, the governorship, until the regularly scheduled 1832
election, would rotate each year when the Senate elected a new
o
president.
Upon Derbigny’s death, A m a u d Beauvais, the acting president of
the Senate, became governor.

When the legislature reassembled in

January 1830, however, the senate elected Jacques Dupr6 as its new
president, and he replaced Beauvais as governor.

Realizing the

absurdity of this gubernatorial merry-go-round, the legislature
scheduled a new election for July 1830 despite the absence of any
constitutional sanction for such an event.

Thus, two years earlier

than anyone had anticipated, the Jackson party and its opponents, most
commonly called either the Clay or Adams party, were forced to don
their political armor and return to battle.

The 1830 gubernatorial

battle proved that in Louisiana: (1) political organization had
a

See Article III, Section 17 of 1812 constitution in Constitutions
of the State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1930), 86; Alexander Porter to
Josiah S. Johnston, November 15, 1829, Johnston Papers, HSP (first
quote); Isaac L. Baker to William S. Hamilton, October 16, 1829, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC; Argus. October 8, 1829 (second quote).
a

Baton Rouge Gazette. October 17, 1829; Argus. October 13, 1829.
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advanced but remained incomplete, (2) state sectionalism continued to
exist, and (3) the split between Americans and Creoles continued to
undermine party development.^
As in previous gubernatorial elections, a multitude of
candidates emerged, and four months prior to the July election, the
Baton Rouge Gazette still listed as many as eleven men vying for the
position.

Despite realizing that victory could best be achieved by

uniting on a single candidate, neither party possessed an effective
mechanism for designating a nominee.

At the July election, four

different aspirants, two allied with Jackson and two with the
opposition, received over five percent of the vote.

An exasperated

Clay partisan recognized both parties’ organizational difficulties
when he declared, "Our hope is in the divisions of the Jackson party,
for if they were to unite upon one, they could elect
him—

.Fortunately they are as yet more disunited than we are."11
In their effort to unite on a candidate, opponents of the

administration benefitted from Henry Clay’s visit to Louisiana in
February 1830.

With "Henry the 1st" in New Orleans, Jacksonians

worried that "whomever he advocates will be elected."

While in the

state, Clay attended the legislature and spoke to his supporters there
in an effort to help coordinate their efforts.

During this time, two

10Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, January 13, 1830, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Argus. January 18, 1830; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of
Jackson. 238-45.
^Baton Rouge
Argus had listed
Henry Clay, April
of Henry Clav (11

Gazette. March 6, 1830. Less than two weeks before the
fourteen candidates. William C.C. Claiborne, Jr. to
11, 1830, in James F. Hopkins, et al., eds., The Papers
vols., Lexington, 1959-92), 8:190.
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of Clay’s closest Louisiana allies. Senator Johnston and Clay’s sonin-law Martin Duralde withdrew from the race in favor of Creole Andre
Bienvenu Roman.

Roman, a wealthy, St. James Parish sugar planter had

served for a total of ten years in the legislature including four as
Speaker of the House.

Despite Clay’s efforts some Clay partisans

still clung to other candidates, including interim Governor A m a u d
Beauvais who received 17.8 percent of the vote.

12

In addition to benefitting from Clay’s appearance in Louisiana,
Roman’s Creole heritage also helped him.

Many Creoles had been

disappointed in the Jackson administration’s patronage policy, which
had completely ignored them.

As a result, the Creoles were determined

to hold on to the reins of government at the state level and thus
opposed to Martin Gordon— the proscriptive policy’s architect.

While

the 1830 election, like the 1828 contest, saw two Creoles battle two
Americans, there was an important difference.
a Creole and an American candidate.

In 1828, each party had

In 1830, both Creoles— Beauvais

and Roman— were proponents of Henry Clay, and the two Americans were
both Jacksonians.
The Martin Gordon-authored appointment policy of the Jackson
administration had not only offended Louisiana Creoles, but had
angered residents of the Florida Parishes as well.

In January, the

Florida Parishes’ William S. Hamilton announced his bid for the
governor’s office.

If Gordon had not wanted Hamilton as a

congressmen, he certainly did not approve of his gubernatorial bid.
12

Dr. R. Davidson to William S. Hamilton, January 20, 1830, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC; Henry Clay to Josiah S. Johnston, February 27, 1830, in
Hopkins, ed., Clav Papers. 8:178.
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Following the announcement of Hamilton’s candidacy, Gordon and his New
Orleans cronies countered by declaring Congressman William H. Overton,
a Red River cotton planter, their choice for the office.
suggested to Hamilton that he withdraw from the race,

They

and in exchange

they would support him for the United States senate seat which be
chosen during the upcoming legislative session.

Receiving favorable

reports about his candidacy throughout the country parishes and
doubting the Gordon’s sincerity, Hamilton declined the offer and
decided to stay in the race.^
Gordon’s clique had nominated Overton without even consulting
him.

Writing to Hamilton, Overton asserted that the most important

goal should be for the party to offer only one candidate, and to
achieve this goal he would be willing to withdraw in favor of Hamilton
if necessary.

Aware of the anger which Gordon’s policies had produced

in the country parishes, Overton understood the difficulty of
campaigning as Gordon’s hand-picked candidate.

Many voters living

outside of New Orleans resented that "dictators" meeting at "Castle
Gordon" had taken it upon themselves to select the party’s
candidate.1* Antipathy toward Gordon’s heavy-handed policies resulted
in a surge of support for Hamilton.

He received letters contending

that "Your being opposed by old Martin Gordon would only make me stick
more closely to you" and "I should like to see a country candidate
succeed...if for no other reason than it would surely disappoint a

^Peter K. Wagner to William S. Hamilton, January 21, 1830, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC.
^Walter H. Overton to William S. Hamilton, March 5, 1830; W.L.
Robeson to Hamilton, April 20, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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certain New Orleans Set."

After assessing his prospects, Overton

withdrew from the race and announced for Hamilton.*6
While Overton may have given his support to Hamilton, Gordon and
his New Orleans faction still did not welcome the idea of a governor
from the Florida Parishes.

Ultimately both sides agreed that the

calling of a statewide nominating convention would offer the best
chance to reduce the field to a single Jackson candidate.

In response

to the call for a convention, local meetings occurred in many of the
Florida Parishes and New Orleans.

The remainder of the state, perhaps

because of the short-notice, did not respond as enthusiastically.
Meeting in Donaldsonville in early May, the first statewide nominating
convention in Louisiana’s history proved a total failure as less them
ten delegates from four parishes attended.

Recognizing that they

could not adequately claim to represent the entire Jackson party in
Louisiana, they did not offer a nomination, though Hamilton’s
supporters informed him that he had been the unanimous choice of the
few delegates present.16 After the convention, all of Hamilton’s
opponents within the party withdrew except for David Randall, a state
senator from Ascension.

Some Hamilton supporters actually welcomed

Randall’s candidacy and spoke of the "danger" of his resigning from

liIsaacL. Baker to William S. Hamilton, April 18, 1830, Robert Haile
to Hamilton, January 27, 1830, Gilbert C. Russell to Hamilton, April 13,
1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
I6E. A. McConnel to William Hamilton, May 6, 1830, John T. MacNeil
to Hamilton, May 6, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Baton Rouge Gazette,
May 15, 1830; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 243-4. In 1830,
Donaldsonville, in Ascension Parish, served as the state capital.
Legislators had moved it from New Orleans in 1829 but moved it back to
the city in 1831.
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the field.

Like Roman, Randall lived in South Louisiana, where

Hamilton anticipated little support.

Hamilton’s men hoped Randall’s

candidacy would cause "terrible havoc on Roman’s party" in that
region.

17

Though Randall and interim Governor A m a u d Beauvais would
receive votes, the contest primarily became a battle between the
Jacksonian Hamilton and the Clay partisan Roman.

Observers disagreed

on whether party would be the most important variable in determining
the victor.

On one hand, newspapers such as the Baton Rouge Gazette

"deprecate[d] the idea that the question of Jackson and Adams,
Coalition and Combination, or any other National Watchword should
influence and decide our local elections."

On the other hand, a Baton

Rouge resident asserted that "The vote of our parish will be divided
by Adams Clay & Co. vs. Jackson..."

These conflicting views of the

political situation demonstrate that, while party identification had
become an critical element in voting decisions, its influence was not
total.1®
As in previous contests, tension between Americans and Creoles
and sectionalism intermixed with and sometimes overshadowed partisan
differences.

Demonstrating the importance of all three variables, the

Florida Gazette asserted that voters should support a Floridian, a
Jackson man, and an American— characteristics which described
Hamilton.

Mocking this claim, the New Orleans Argus countered with

l7W. James to William S. Hamilton, June 25, 1830, Robert Williams to
Hamilton, May 29, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
18

Baton Rouge Gazette. May 6, 1830; Montgomery Sloan to William S.
Hamilton, February 10, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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its advocacy of a Creole, a Clay man, and a resident of the
Mississippi River parishes— am accurate description of Andre B. Roman.
For some voters, ethnicity did not complement but overrode partisan
concerns.

Hamilton received advice that French Jackson men would

"vote for a French Adams candidate in preference to an American
Jackson man" and that Americans were determined not to vote for a
French candidate.

19

Differing not only in ethnicity and section, Roman and Hamilton
also offered voters divergent views on the American System, especially
the tariff.

The Clay party cheered Hamilton’s candidacy, for they

believed that his "ultra feelings" made him "the most odious man in
the state."

Tn labelling Hamilton as an "ultra," the Clay party meant

that Hamilton’s opposition to internal improvement projects and to all
protective tariffs, including the one on sugar cane, were too extreme
for Louisianans and would guarantee his defeat.

2D

Hamilton countered

that, while he objected to protective tariffs, he did not challenge
the constitutionality of a revenue duty on sugar cane and that he did
not oppose internal improvements generally, only monopolies.

Despite

these avowals, some of Hamilton’s friends admitted that the perception
that Hamilton opposed the sugar cane duty was hurting him.

Worried

that the voters did not understand Hamilton’s tariff views, an anxious

19St. Francisville Florida Gazette in Argus. April 13, 1830; Dr. R.
Davidson to William S. Hamilton, February 4, 1830, W.L. Robeson to
Hamilton, April 20, 1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
10

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, March 10, 1830, T.J. Pew
to Johnston, January 31, 1830, Johnston Papers, HSP; David Bannister
Morgan to William S. Hamilton, November 24, 1830, David Bannister Morgan
Letter, LLMVC.
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partisan a week prior to the election pleaded with Hamilton to "write
me anything about the tariff which if published would benefit you."
In an effort to cloak Hamilton’s views, others advised the candidate
not to issue any circulars because their publication would give "your
Enemies all kinds of chances to tear you to pieces...without securing
any corresponding advantage.'

21

Other topics which surfaced in the 1830 gubernatorial contest
involved the towering image of Jackson in Louisiana and the
candidates’ commitments to republicanism.

Hamilton supporters charged

that in 1815 Roman had opposed the awarding of a sword to General
Jackson and wondered whether any friend of Jackson could vote for him
after such an insult.

Stressing the importance of having a governor

"on terms of intimacy and cordiality with the Executive of the Union,"
they compared Roman’s "general hostility" toward Jackson with the
"ardent reciprocity of attachment" that existed between Hamilton and
22

the General.

The Jackson party further charged Roman, a wealthy St.

James Parish sugax planter who owned more than fifty slaves, with
being "a rank aristocrat" who "treats the poor with contempt."
Hamilton supporters added that Roman had pledged all state offices to
his relations and Creole connections.

On the defensive, pro-Roman

21

W. James to William S. Hamilton, June 25, 1830 (first quote), John
J. Burk to Hamilton, April 1, 1830, Isaac L. Baker to Hamilton, February
2, 1830 (second quote), Hamilton Papers, LLMVC. For Hamilton’s view of
the tariff see William S. Hamilton, Writings, 1830, Hamilton Papers.
22

On the issue of the sword to Jackson see Louisiana Advertiser.
January 20 , 29, 1830 and Charles Bullard to William S. Hamilton, May 1,
1830, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Advertiser. July 2, 1830.
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newspapers denied Roman had made any pledges and proclaimed his
"independence and truly republican principles."^
Roman triumphed in the July election, capturing 43.8 percent of
the vote with Hamilton in second with 32.1 percent.

The vote of

Louisiana continued to be divided along sectional lines.

Hamilton

captured over two-thirds of the vote in both the Florida Parishes and
North Louisiana where his American ethnicity, hostility to the tariff,
and association with Andrew Jackson had their strongest impact.

He

faltered in Greater Orleans, where Gordon’s faction never embraced his
candidacy even after Overton’s withdrawal and the Donaldsonville
convention.

Writing to President Jackson, a member of the Gordon’s

Custom House coalition assured him that "Your friends are as true as
steel," and that the party had only lost because it had offered
candidates who "were not our choice."

Hamilton also suffered in South

Louisiana for not only did Roman and Randall live there, but this
sugar cane-producing region had the most reason to object to
Hamilton’s anti-tariff stance.

As in the previous two gubernatorial

races, South Louisiana proved the difference.

Casting more votes than

the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana combined, its hostility
toward Hamilton could not be overcome.

(SEE APPENDIX B)

Not only could the Clay party claim the governor’s office, but
it captured all three of Louisiana’s congressional seats as well.

23

Louisiana Advertiser. April 20, 1830, Baton Rouge Gazette. May 15,
22, 1830. Natchitoches Courier quoted in Baton Rouge Gazette. May 22,
1830.
24

Maunsel White to Andrew Jackson, January 29, 1831, Jackson Papers,

LC.
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Incumbent Edward Douglass White, a sugar planter and law partner of
Alexander Porter, popular among members of both parties, ran unopposed
in the First District.

In the Third District, Henry Adams Bullard

carefully assembled the support of influential Creoles and capitalized
on a mistake of his opponent, who while serving in the legislature
voted against a measure which would have increased the district’s
representation.^

Even the overwhelmingly pro-Jackson Second District

elevated Clay partisan Philemon Thoracis to Congress.

As the Hero of

the 1810 West Florida Rebellion, Thomas had a loyal following in the
region.

During the campaign, he stressed his commitment to internal

improvements and a fair tariff.

To entice Jacksonians, Thomas

promised to support the people’s choice for president if the election
went to the House of Representatives.

More importantly, Thomas

benefitted from divisions within the Jackson party.

Gordon continued

to push the candidacy of Eleazer Ripley, but the residents of the
Florida Parishes balked at Ripley’s fictitious residency in the
district and nominated Lafayette Saunders.

With neither Ripley nor

Saunders willing to yield, Thomas easily won the seat.

yc

The 1830 gubernatorial and congressional contests proved that
the Jackson party in Louisiana continued to have difficulty in
transferring the popularity of its hero to its candidates for state
office.

According to Alexander Porter, a Clay leader in Louisiana,

25

Diedrich Ramke, "Edward Dougla[s] White, Sr., Governor of
Louisiana, 1835-1839,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly XIX (1936), 280;
Henry Adams Bullard to Josiah S. Johnston, February 12, 1830, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Baton Rouge Gazette. July 17, 1830.
26Baton Rouge Gazette. April 24, July 17, 1830; Louisiana Advertiser.
May 14, 1830.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

78

"Many Jackson men who bear the name, & avow it, are not so in their
hearts.”

The Louisiana Advertiser, a Jackson party organ, agreed that

"something besides an adherence to names is necessary" for the success
of the party.

27

The events of the next two years continued to

demonstrate that.

While Andrew Jackson clearly possessed more

popularity than Henry Clay in Louisiana, the Clay party’s program had
a strong resonance with the state’s voters.

The Clay party won

Louisiana’s next three United States Senate contests and held onto all
three congressional seats in 1832, while Jackson easily triumphed over
Clay in the 1832 presidential election.
In 1830, Henry Clay expressed unrestrained delight at the
standing ovation he received when he met with the Louisiana
legislature and pronounced his surprise at the allure his American
System had in Louisiana.

The most important element of Clay’s program

for Louisianans involved a protective tariff on sugar cane.

Pro-

tariff sentiment in Louisiana could be described as "so general and so
strong," because by 1829 sugar cane had eclipsed cotton as the state’s
most valuable crop.

While in 1820 the sugar cane crop had been valued

at slightly over two million dollars and the cotton crop at almost
seven million dollars, by the end of the decade these numbers had been
reversed.

In 1829, the value of cane products in Louisiana exceeded

six million dollars, while cotton’s total had slumped to approximately
two million dollars.

Additionally, the number of sugar estates in

27

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, December 1, 1831, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Louisiana Advertiser quoted in William J. Beard, "The
Political Career of Josiah Stoddard Johnston," (Master’s thesis,
Louisiana State University, 1939), 69.
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Louisiana had surged from 193 in 1824 to 691 in 1830. and the number
of slaves in the sugar region had increased over 86 percent in the
decade.^
Sugar cane growers in Louisiana relied on a tariff on imported
cane to remain competitive with imports from the West Indies.
Politicians from both parties agreed that ending the tariff on sugar
cane would lead to total ruin in Louisiana, and that the attempt to
repeal the duty on sugar had "goaded the people almost to madness."

IQ

Governor Roman argued that the sugar cane industry "cannot succeed in
Louisiana, unless the protection hitherto afforded is continued."
These sentiments were not limited to Clay partisans.

The Jackson-

appointed district attorney in New Orleans, John Slidell hoped that
declining sugar cane prices would "secure us from any attempt to
reduce the duties on sugar.”

Even a call for an anti-tariff

convention specifically exempted the duty on sugar from discussion.

28

Henry Clay to James Brown April 17, 1830 in Hopkins, ed., Clay
Papers, 8:192, Clay to Josiah S. Johnston, February 27, 1830, ibid..
8:178; Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846,"
(Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1941), 46, 50-51, J.
Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country; The Cane Industry in the South. 17531950 (Lexington, 1950), 28. See TABLE 1.1 for the size of the slave
population in 1820 and 1830.
The slave population outside of South
Louisiana had increased 56 percent.
19

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, March 2, 1832, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Henry Clay to unknown, February 16, 1831, Calvin Colton,
ed., The Works of Henrv Clav (10 vols, New York, 1904), 4:293-99 (quote
on 293), Clay to Samuel Southard, February 14, 1831, Hopkins, ed., Clay
Papers. 8:323; St. Martinsville Attakapas Gazette. October 9, 1831 in
Louisiana Courier. October 14, 1831.
30Roman address in Louisiana House Journal. 10th leg, 1st sess., 54;
John Slidell to C.C. Cambreleng, December 6, 1829, John Slidell Letter,
Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter
HNO); Louisiana Advertiser. August 31, 1831.
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Tariff advocates stressed the importance of the maintenance of
the duty on cane for not only the state’s sugar cane region but also
for the rest of the South.

They convinced Henry Ciav that "all parts

of the Union would partake of the distress which would certainly
inflicted upon them" if sugar cane protection was removed.

Senator

Johnston, in a report to the secretary of the treasury, warned that a
decline in the sugar cane duty would lead to a corresponding decrease
in the price of slaves throughout the South, possibly cutting their
value in half.

Additionally, protectionists claimed that if Louisiana

produced less sugar cane, the state would produce more cotton thus
further lowering that staple’s already decreasing price.

Armed with

this argument, Johnston felt confident discussing the value of the
sugar cane tariff even at a public dinner in the predominantly cottonproducing Rapides Parish.^1
While in Louisiana the pro-tariff forces may have swept the
field, the rest of the South viewed all protective tariffs, including
the one on sugar cane, as anathema.

The southern wing of the Jackson

party branded protective tariffs as unconstitutional, arguing that the
Constitution only sanctioned revenue tariffs.

Furthermore, they

viewed tariffs as a tax on the southern cotton grower to provide
relief for northern industry.

Despite this southern animosity toward

the tariff, in 1828, Congress passed a tariff containing the highest
duties of the antebellum era.

While most southerners decried the

3IHenry Clay to unknown, February 16, 1831, Colton, The Works of
Henrv Clay. 4:293; Louisiana Courier. November 15, 1830; Johnston’s
Report to the Secretary of Treasury in Bee. February 4, 1831; Johnston’s
speech in Rapides in Niles Weekly Register. June 11, 1831, XL, 258-60.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

81

tariff of 1828 and labelled it the "Tariff of Abominations." many in
Louisiana celebrated the bill for its protection of sugar cane.

With

only seven dissenting votes, the Louisiana legislature instructed the
state’s senators to oppose any change of the measure.
In 1832, in an effort to achieve a compromise between tariff
advocates and opponents, Congress passed a new tariff which lowered
duties.

Reaction in the South varied.

Because the tariff reduced the

sugar cane duty by one-half cent, two of Louisiana’s three congressman
voted against it as too mild.33

If Louisiana represented one end of

the spectrum of southern reaction to the tariff, South Carolina
represented the other.

This hotbed of anti-protection declared the

tariffs of 1828 and 1832 unconstitutional and nullified them.

South

Carolinians led by Vice-President John C. Calhoun argued that because
the states had created the national government, the states’ authority
superseded the federal government’s limited powers.

This philosophy

of states rights had considerable allure in much of the South, but in
Louisiana proponents of this principle were an isolated minority.

The

doctrine had little appeal in Louisiana for two reasons (1) the
importance of the sugar cane tariff find (2) the vehement opposition of
the state’s hero, President Andrew Jackson, to nullification.

32

As a

Martin Duralde to Henry Clay, March 18, 1830, in Hopkins, ed., Clay
Papers, 8:182-83. For a copy of the legislature’s pro-tariff declaration,
see Louisiana Legislature to Josiah Stoddard Johnston, March 6, 1830,
Johnston Papers, HSP; For the South and the tariff and subsequent
nullification controversy see Richard Ellis, Union at Risk: Jacksonian
Democracy. States’ Rights, and the Nullification Controversy (New York,
1987); William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification
Controversy in South Carolina. 1816-1836 (New York, 1965).
33Bee. July 11, 1832.
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Clay partisan derisively observed, Louisiana Jacksonians’ stance
regarding nullification would echo the stance of the "God of their
Idolatry."3*

In December 1832, Jackson issued the Nullification

Proclamation, his reaction to South Carolina’s actions.

Written by

former Louisiana senator and current Secretary of State Edward
Livingston, the document branded South Carolina’s actions as
treasonous and threatened federal military intervention.
In the nullification controversy, Louisianans quickly lined up
on the side of the president in his battle against South Carolina.
Both the Clay party and the Jackson party in Louisiana expressed their
contempt for the South Carolina nullifiers.

In his 1831 inaugural

address, Governor Roman railed against demagogues who talked of
disunion, and in 1833 he adamantly declared, "Such doctrines find no
advocates in Louisiana."35 Writing to the president, Jackson’s New
Orleans cotton factor asserted that "Your proclamation was hailed here
by all parties with the greatest enthusiasm," and the Louisiana
Advertiser offered copies of it for sale.

To demonstrate their

opposition to South Carolina’s course, Louisianans held public
meetings throughout the state.

In New Orleans, even before Jackson’s

proclamation, an anti-nullification gathering eschewed moderation and
endorsed a resolution to compel South Carolina "immediately [with]
sword in hand."

A meeting in St. Landry Parish added that the

^Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, December 6, 1832, Johnston
Papers, HSP.
35Roman’s inaugural address in Louisiana House Journal, 1831, 10th
leg., 1st sess., 54. Roman’s annual message in Louisiana House Journal.
11th leg., 1st sess., 4 (quote).
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unconstitutional actions of South Carolina "involv[ed] the entire
overthrow, and destruction of our Union.
The few Louisianans who sympathized with South Carolina’s stance
realized the importance of keeping silent if they wished to continue
their political careers.

Not surprisingly, these men were primarily

found in the Florida Parishes— a region of Louisiana similar to the
rest of the South in terms of ethnicity* religion, and agriculture.
Even members of an anti-nullification meeting in this region declared
that they were not advocates of the tariff and sympathized with the
South Carolinians who "had suffered grievously" from the oppressive
duties.

Among the most prominent of these Louisiana states rights men

were former gubernatorial candidate William S. Hamilton and state
legislator Alexander Barrow.

Barrow hoped that the appearance of a

states rights newspaper would lead, the people of Florida to "the true
faith" but such a newspaper never materialized.

Perhaps Barrow hoped

for a replacement for the Florida Gazette which two months prior to
his comments had changed from condemning all tariffs to accepting the
duty on sugar cane.
difficulty.

States rights men in Louisiana faced a double

Not only did the importance of sugar cane in the state

lead many to champion the tariff, but also because of Louisianans’
adoration of President Jackson, few would openly challenge his views.
After being "denounced as a nullifier" because he did not "laud the

Maunsel White to Andrew Jackson, January 12, 1833, Jackson Papers,
LC; Louisiana Advertiser. December 28, 1832; Alexander Porter to Josiah
S. Johnston, June 27, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP; Carl Kohn to Samuel
Kohn, July 5, 1832, February 1, 1833, Kohn Letter Book, HNO: Louisiana
Courier. January 29, 30, 1833; Baton Rouge Gazette. January 26, 1833.
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[nullification] proclamation & pronounce General Jackson to be
immaculate,” Barrow declared that he "would be hung for treason”
before taking up arms against South Carolina.^
Both sides in the debate over the tariff and nullification
appealed to the ideals of republicanism, contending that an adherence
to the competing views would lead to the end of the republic and the
rise of a military dictatorship.

On one hand, for the anti-

protectionists the passage of a tariff would cause the country to
change from agriculture to manufacturing.

This transformation would

create large manufacturing enterprises, or "monsters,” requiring a
standing army to protect them and to suppress the people’s
ig
liberties.
On the other hand, an anti-nullification meeting in St.
Landry Parish resolved that an acceptance of South Carolina’s view of
the Union would result in the division of the United States into
twenty-four countries, each with a standing army protecting its
borders.

To maintain these armies, the people would have to be

heavily taxed "and finally a military despotism would arise on the
free republican institutions of our country."

A gathering in New

Account of St. Helena Parish anti-nullification meeting in
Louisiana Courier. January 30, 1833; Alexander Barrow to William S.
Hamilton, December 9, 1831 (first quote), February 19, 1833 (second
quote), Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Description of St. Francisville Florida
Gazette’s change in Louisiana Courier. October 21, 1831.
38WalterH. Overton to William S. Hamilton, January 7, 1832, Hamilton
Papers, LLMVC.
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Orleans concurred that nullification would lead from disunion to
anarchy and eventually to the dissolution of republican government.
Though the overwhelming majority of Jacksonians in Louisiana
dutifully lined up behind Old Hickory in his battle with South
Carolina and advocated a sugar cane tariff, these actions did not
signal their acceptance of Henry Clay’s American System.W

Most

Louisiana Jacksonians realized that opposition to the protection of
sugar cane would mean political suicide in the state.

Thus, the

Jackson party in Louisiana tried to maintain its commitment both to
the southern opposition to protection and to one of its state’s
staples.

Contending that they only opposed unconstitutional

protective tariffs, Jacksonians argued that the sugar cane duty was
not a protectionist measure but a constitutional revenue tariff which
had existed prior to Louisiana’s entrance to the Union.

Without a

hint of irony, the editor of the Louisiana Courier claimed that "the
sugar duty. ..ought not to be considered in connection with the
tariff.”

Voters often found the distinction between protection and

revenue tariffs unclear, and Clay partisans in Louisiana repeatedly
exploited the electorate’s confusion.

They branded tariff opponents

as nullifiers and asserted that the success of Jackson candidates

39

.

.

Louis iana Courier. January 29, 1833 (quoting the resolutions of an
anti-nullification meeting from the Opelousas Gazette); Bee. June 29,
1832.
*°Bee, June 21, 1832; Louisiana Advertiser. November
Louisiana Courier. October 21, 1831.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

14,

1831;

86

would mean the end of the sugar cane duty and consequently the
destruction of the state's cane industry.^
The debate over the protective tariff had entered into both of
Louisiana’s 1831 United States Senate contests.

With the expiration

of Josiah Stoddard Johnston’s term and with Edward Livingston’s
appointment as Jackson’s secretary of state, the Louisiana legislature
had the opportunity to fill two seats.

In both contests, the Jackson

party made an issue of their opponents’ pro-tariff records.

The Clay

candidates did not attempt to hide their pro-tariff stances and
instead wore them as badges of honor.

They countered the Jacksonian

attacks with the contention that given a choice the Jackson party
would rather have a low tariff and a destitute Louisiana than have a
protectionist tariff and a flourishing Louisiana.

42

In January, Clay partisan Johnston ran for re-election against
John B. Dawson, a Florida Parish Jacksonian.

The pro-administration

newspapers attacked Johnston’s tariff policy, contending that it aided
New England weavers more than Louisiana sugar planters/3

Despite the

Jackson party’s majority in the legislature, Johnston easily triumphed
over Dawson on the first ballot.
three causes.

Johnston’s victory stemmed from

First, approving of his conduct as senator, many

Jacksonians voted for him aside from party considerations.

Second,

Florida Parish Jacksonians had pushed for a nominee from their region,
and some legislators from other sections "bolted the track" because

^ Louisiana Courier. September 7, 1831.
^ Louisiana Courier. May 19, 1831; Bee January 10, 1831.
^ Louisiana Advertiser. January 1, 8, 1830.
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they found a nominee from this anti-tariff region "a hard chicken to
swallow."

Third, some Creole members, remembering their snub for

patronage positions, would not vote for a candidate associated to the
it

administration.
When President Jackson selected his former aide-de-camp Edward
Livingston as his secretary of state, the legislature received a
second opportunity to elect a senator in 1831.

Since Livingston’s

resignation occurred between legislative sessions, Governor Roman
legally could have appointed a senator to fill the vacancy.

Instead,

after being reminded that he owed his election to Jacksonians who had
crossed party lines to vote for him, Roman called a special session of
the legislature to select a new senator and to respond to the Nat
Turner slave revolt in Virginia.

The Clay party put forward sugar

planter George Waggaman, an attorney currently serving as Louisiana
secretary of state.

The Jackson party countered with New Orleans

lawyer Henry Carleton, whose most important asset was his marriage to
Livingston’s sister.**
In the months preceding the election, the Jackson party tried
once again to awaken Louisianans to the danger of the Clay party’s
protective tariff doctrines.

Opponents of protection hoped to arouse

**John H. Johnston to Josiah S. Johnston, January 8, 11, 1831, T.J.
Pew to Johnston, January 10, 1831, Johnston Papers, HSP; Robert Baile to
William S. Hamilton, January 19, 1830[1], Hamilton Papers, LLMVC;
Louisiana Courier. December 3, 1830, January 11, 1831. For Florida
Parishes’ desire to have one of their own in the Senate see James M.
Bradford to David B. Morgan, August 25, 1830, Sol Wexler Collection,
Louisiana State Museum.
**Louisiana Courier. May 14, 1831, Alexander Porter to Josiah S.
Johnston, June 10, 1831, Johnston Papers, HSP; Tregle, Louisiana in the
Age of Jackson. 125-6.
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the state by calling for a Free Trade meeting in New Orleans to select
delegates to a national free trade convention.

They acted in vain.

Clay party leader Judge Porter predicted that "No meeting of that kind
speaks at all the sentiments of the state."

His prognosis proved

accurate as protectionists and not free traders controlled the
assembly.

In his opening address, the protectionist chairman

denounced the men who had called the meeting as nullifiers and
"temporarily" recessed the meeting for one hundred years/6
The breakdown of the free trade gathering presaged the problems
that the anti-protection Jacksonians would have in the November senate
contest.

Clay partisans feared that with the election occurring

during the sugar cane rolling season, some of their strongest protariff advocates would miss the vote.

Great exertions were made to

ensure their attendance, and the Clay party stressed the importance of
uniting behind Waggaman, "the candidate of the party."

The Jackson

party emphasized the need for Louisiana to have at least one proadministration representative in Washington and promoted Carleton as a
man who could separate the sugar cane duty from protection of
manufacturing.

They caucused in an attempt to unite behind Carleton,

but with only a minority of their members in attendance, the caucus
"broke up in confusion."

Waggaman won on the first ballot not only

because of his party’s pro-tariff stance, but also because he received
support from Jacksonians who resented the nepotism in Livingston’s
attempt to pass the seat to his brother-in-law.

With possibly as many

^Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, September 2, 1831, Johnston
Papers, HSP; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 1, 8, 1831.
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as ten pro-Jackson Legislators voting for Waggaman, the pro-Jackson
Louisiana Advertiser expressed its disappointment the party’s
"pretended friends" had again let them down.^
In addition to gaining control of both of the Louisiana’s senate
seats, the Clay party retained all three congressional seats in 1832.
With even the pro-administration Bee admitting that no one was "rash
enough to enter the field against our worthy representative,” Edward
Douglass White again won an uncontested election in the First
District.

48

In the Third District, Henry Adams Bullard stressed his

commitment to a national bank and asserted that a reduction in the
sugar cane duty "would be ruinous" to Louisiana.

Put forth as "the

champion of Jacksonism," Lafayette Parish’s Alexander Mouton, the
first Creole to contend for Congress in Louisiana, campaigned against
Bullard.

To counteract the threat posed by Mouton among the

district’s Creole population, Bullard allied himself with the wealthy
and influential Jacques Dupr6 and held onto his seat.

49

In the Second District, incumbent Philemon Thomas reiterated his
pro-tariff, pro-internal improvement platform of 1830 and added a
commitment to a national bank.

The Clinton Olive Branch repeated

47

Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, October 29, 1831, December
1, 1831, J. Simone to Johnston, November 10, 1831, Johnston Papers, HSP;
Porter to John Ker, December 12, 1831, Ker Family Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina (Hereinafter SHC);
Louisiana Courier. May 19, 1831, October 17, 21, 1831; Louisiana
Advertiser. November 17, 1831.
48Bee, May 25, 1832.
49

Henry Adams Bullard circular (1832) in James G. Taliaferro Papers,
LLMVC, Thomas Curry to Josiah S. Johnston, May 6, 1832, Johnston Papers,
HSP; Louisiana Advertiser. March 29, 1832.
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Thomas’s 1830 claim that presidential politics should have nothing to
do with the election as Thomas would support the people’s choice for
president in the House of Representatives.

His opponent, Eleazer

Ripley, argued that while the tariff may be legal it was also "an
oppressive tax" which should be lowered and asserted the
unconstitutionality of both federally sponsored internal improvements
and a national bank.

Though the Florida Parishes was the state’s

strongest Jackson region, Thomas narrowly defeated Ripley.

Even a

Clay partisan realized that Thomas’s victory had more to do with his
personal popularity than with the candidates’ opinions regarding
governmental activism-

Thomas’s long residency in the region coupled

with his participation in the 1810 West Florida Rebellion led proadministration papers to admit that he could never be defeated in the
region.

Additionally, Ripley simply possessed too many negatives to

win— his association with Martin Gordon, his questionable residency
claims, and his angering prominent Jackson men in the district all
worked against him.50
Thus, entering the 1832 presidential contest, the Clay party and
its program clearly held the upper hand in Louisiana with the governor
and the entire congressional delegation all Clay partisans.

This

contest, however, demonstrated the unparalleled popularity of the
Andrew Jackson in the state.

In the election, Henry Clay armed with

Philemon Thomas to his constituents in Baton Rouge Gazette, May 5,
1832; Clinton Olive Branch quoted in Baton Rouge Gazette. June 16, 1832;
Nicholas Baylies, Eleazer Wheelock Riplev of the War of 1812 (Des Moines,
1890), 104-108; (quote on 105); Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston,
August 3, 1832; Baton Rouge Gazette. May 18, 1833; Bee. August 14, 1832.
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his American System challenged the incumbent Andrew Jackson.'*

Even

Clay’s strongest partisans acknowledged the futility of challenging
Jackson in Louisiana and only made a half-hearted effort.

While the

Clay party'’s attempts to employ the American System had succeeded in
state races, against Old Hickory they were casually brushed aside.
Defeatism pervaded the Clay campaign, and Jackson swept to an easy
victory, though the total vote in Louisiana was greatly reduced
because of the presence of a devastating cholera epidemic in New
Orleans and its environs during the election.
The failed Free Trade meeting of September, 1S31, had provided
some of the first sparks of the presidential campaign.

The meeting’s

protectionist chairman, a legislator from Baton Rouge, took the
opportunity to attack Andrew Jackson as well as free-traders.

Trying

to associate Jackson with free-traders, he alleged that the meeting
had been called "to prop up the remaining popularity of Andrew Jackson
in this state."

While admitting that he had previously supported the

General, the chairman asserted that Jackson’s recent conduct,
especially his decision to run for a second term, had driven
supporters from his ranks.

Baton Rouge Jacksonians and Clayites held

meetings to address the chairman’s remarks.

The former called for the

legislator’s resignation and celebrated Andrew Jackson, while the

For a discussion of the issues involved in the 1832 presidential
race see Robert V. Remini, "Election of 1832," in Arthur M. Schlesinger,
Jr., ed., History of American Presidential Elections (4- vols., New York,
1971), 1:495-516. The Anti-Masons entered William Wirt as a third party
candidate but he had virtually no impact in Louisiana.
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latter praised the chairman's course and condemned Jackson's actions
as president.
The initial enthusiasm of this anti-Jackson meeting quickly
disappeared.

Even a year prior to the presidential election. Clay

partisans despaired of his chances in Louisiana.

Senator Johnston

received letters from some of Clay’s most loyal supporters indicating
that it was "a hopeless business to persist in running [Clay} any
longer!!" and that unfortunately we "have no other choice but to hang
to Mr. Clay."

In New Orleans, two pro-Clay newspapers, the Bee and

the Mercantile Advertiser, defected to the opposition.

The perceived

inevitability of Jackson’s election had Clay party leaders wondering
not how their candidate could win but who would be Jackson’s vicepresident.53 After achieving so many victories, why did Clay
partisans in Louisiana give up the election almost by default?
Clayites’ despondency has two explanations.

First, they sensed that

Clay would not win the vote of the rest of the South nor the national
contest.

Thus, their efforts would be in vain.

Second, because of

Jackson’s role in the Battle of New Orleans, supporters of Clay in
Louisiana realized that they did not challenge a man but a demigod.5*
While Clay partisans approached the election with apprehension,
Jacksonians viewed the contest as a chance to show that their party
represented the majority of the state.

They quickly called for a New

53Baton Rouge Gazette. October 8, 22, 1831.
53Thomas Curry to Josiah S. Johnston, November 15, 1831, Alexander
Porter to Johnston, December 1, 1831, March 26, 1832, Johnston Papers,
HSP.
5*Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 253-4, 264.
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Orleans convention to choose their electoral ticket.

Learning from

their disastrous attempt at a gubernatorial convention in 1830. this
time the Jacksonleadership created more auspicious conditions.

They

held the assembly in New Orleans in January, the city’s busiest time
of year.

More importantly, the gathering occurred during the

legislative session, and the party allowed pro-Jackson legislators to
serve as delegates for parishes with no other representation.

As a

result, forty-two delegates (twenty-five members of the legislature
and seventeen selected in parish meetings) representing "nearly every
parish" attended the convention, and a Clay party leader jealously
admitted
As

that the "Jackson party was confident of success."^
in 1828, Jacksonians in Louisiana returned to the theme that

Jackson, because of his services in the Battle of New Orleans, was the
state’s savior.

The first resolution of a pro-Jackson meeting

declared that Louisiana owed Jackson "a special debt of gratitude."

A

call for another meeting urged the party to come out and support the
"Victor of New Orleans."

The Louisiana Courier concurred that the

"sons of Louisiana" would show that they "have not forgotten the
services that Jackson rendered them in times of peril."

On the

opening day of the election, headlines in the Louisiana Advertiser
screamed "Remember OLD HICKORY on the Plains of Chalmette ON THE
GLORIOUS EIGHTH JANUARY, 1815."

Four years earlier, Jackson’s

opponents had replied to these arguments by portraying him as a
military despot who would run roughshod over the Constitution.

For

^ Louisiana Advertiser. January 13, 1832; Thomas Curry to Josiah S.
Johnston, January 26, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP.
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the majority of Louisianans. events had belied this claim and instead
had shown that his performance in this battle had been "but a preface
to a more important work.”

In 1832 pro-Clay newspapers offered no

counter to this appeal-^
The Jackson party claimed that Jackson’s actions as president,
particularly his veto of the bill to recharter the second Bank of the
United States, had followed the same noble course that he had pursued
in the Battle of New Orleans.

In 1S32, two years prior to the

charter’s scheduled termination, Clay partisans pushed through
Congress a bill to recharter the national bank, an institution which
Jackson had denounced.

In Louisiana, few questioned its

constitutionality, and, following the instructions of the legislature,
all five of the state’s representatives in Washington voted for the
bill.

In his study of Louisiana banking, George D. Green finds a

favorable attitude toward the national bank in the state among
prominent Jacksonians.

Some, including Martin Gordon, had even served

as directors of the New Orleans branch.

Additionally, staunch

Jacksonians such as former gubernatorial candidate Thomas Butler and
former congressman Walter H. Overton desired its recharter in some
form.

57

Thus, Jackson’s opponents believed that they had placed the

^ Louisiana Courier. October 8, 24 (third quote), November 3, 1832;
Louisiana Advertiser. January 13 (first quote), November 5, 1832 (fourth
quote); Bee. October 31, 1832 (second quote).
57George D. Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South;
Louisiana Banking. 1804-1861 (Stanford, 1971), 91-92; Thomas Butler to
Josiah S. Johnston, February 23, 1832, Walter H. Overton to Johnston,
April 29, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP; For discussion of Jackson and bank
war see Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Freedom. 1822-1832 (New York, 1981), 331-73.
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president in a no-win situation.

On one hand, he could veto a bill

popular with much of the electorate.

On the other hand, he could

approve the recharter, after announcing his opposition to the
institution, and break his word.

Clay supporters hoped that either

course would severely damage his popularity.

CO

Delighting in Jackson’s predicament regarding the recharter of
the bank, a Louisiana Clay partisan only expressed the caveat that "It
is true that [Jackson] gets out of dilemmas better than other
people."

59

Jackson’s actions quickly proved the accuracy of this

assessment.

Understanding the electorate much better them his

opponents, Jackson vetoed the bill in a message that the partisan
press in Louisiana labelled the "Second Declaration of the Rights of
the People."

While previously there had been no outcry against the

Bank of the United States in Louisiana, once Jackson declared the
institution "a monster" dangerous to the people’s liberties,
Jacksonians suddenly realized that they had foolishly allowed this
threat to republicanism to exist in their midst.
converts, they acted quickly and spiritedly.

With the zeal of new

The veto message was

published, and meetings were held in which Jackson was praised for his
defeat of this anti-republican institution "dangerous to the liberties
and properties of this Union."

With his veto message "as impregnable

as the lines of the battleground of the 8th of January 1815,"

58

Thomas Curry to Josiah S. Johnston, January 26, 1832, Johnston
Papers, HSP.
55Ibid.
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Jacksonians claimed that their hero had saved the Onion a second
time.68
Like its use of the bank recharter, the Clay partyrs attempt to
employ another plank of the American System— the sugar cane tariff—
against Jackson also backfired.

Having successfully exploited their

association with the protection of sugar cane to win every state race
since 1828, Clay partisans now tried unsuccessfully to wield it
against Jackson.

With Jackson?s approval of the tariff of 1832, which

had only slightly reduced the sugar cane duty, the Jackson party in
Louisiana contended that he had placed sugar cane on a stable basis;
he had provided equal protection to agriculture, manufacturing, and
commerce; and most importantly that he had demonstrated his commitment
to the Onion in supporting this measure.

Jacksonians argued that the

tariff question had been settled equitably and that the "ultratariffists," with their insistence that rates on imported sugar cane
not be reduced, threatened the Union.

While in prior state elections,

advocates of the American System had grouped anti-tariff Jacksonians
with the nullifiers, now the Jackson party in Louisiana turned the
tables and contended that the "ultra-tariffists" and the nullifiers of
South Carolina had formed an unholy alliance in opposition to Jackson
and to the Union.61

Louisiana Courier. July 25, October 8, 22, 1832; Bee. July 26,
August 18, October 9, 15 (first quote), November 3, 1832; Louisiana
Advertiser, October 16, 1832 (second quote); Tregle calls the bank war
"an imported disagreement in Louisiana," Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of
Jackson. 258.
6lBee, September 8, October 24, 27, 1832.
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When the election commenced, however, neither the bank, the
tariff, nor Jackson's role in the Battle of New Orleans were foremost
in most Louisianans’ thoughts.

Instead, the state’s populace was

"rather looking to the cholera than to the presidential election."^
The people had reason to fear this scourge, and the disease struck New
Orleans just prior to the election.

Governor Roman described

cholera’s effect in New Orleans as "more fatal than in any of the
cities of the union," and approximately ten percent of the Crescent
City’s population died in the two weeks surrounding the election.
Businesses closed, political meetings were cancelled, and partisan
newspapers curtailed the number of printings per week.

Because of

this tragedy, many voters stayed home and the total vote decreased by
twenty-four percent from the 1828 presidential cont e s t . ( S E E
APPENDIX A)
Andrew Jackson once again demonstrated his tremendous popularity
in Louisiana and throughout the nation.

Nationally, he easily

triumphed in the electoral college, and he won 61.6 percent of the
vote in Louisiana.

Voters in the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana

continued their overwhelming support of Old Hickory as he received
approximately three-quarters of their votes.

Additionally, Jackson,

unlike in 1828, captured the vote of Greater Orleans, though receiving
CA

Walter H. Overton to Josiah S. Johnston, October 16, 1832, Johnston
Papers, HSP.
fiJFor a description of the ravages of cholera in New Orleans see
Theodore Clapp, Autobiographical Sketches and Recollections during a
Thirtv-Five Years Residence in New Orleans (Boston, 1857), 120-129;
Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 263-4; Annual message of
Governor Roman, Louisiana House Journal. 11th leg., 1st sess., 2; Bee.
November 3, 6, 1832.
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fewer votes than he had in 1828.

Only South Louisiana, with its

dependence on the sugar cane duty, favored Clay.

While the presence

of cholera made no difference in the Jackson’s capture of Louisiana’s
electoral votes, it undoubtedly exaggerated his victory.

The total

vote decreased dramatically in Clay’s two strongest regions— South
Louisiana and Greater Orleans, but the Florida Parishes saw only a ten
percent decline and the number of voters in North Louisiana actually
increased from 1828 to 1832.
While the 1832 presidential election had again demonstrated the
invincibility of Andrew Jackson in Louisiana, the question of whether
the Jackson party could transfer this popularity to other candidates
remained.

Clay partisans feared that the indifference on the

presidential question would allow their enemies to gain control of the
state government, and the Jackson press wondered what state was
represented in Washington by Johnston, Waggaman, White, Thomas, and
Bullard, for it certainly could not be the pro-Jackson Louisiana.®*
The first opportunity to test relative party strength came sooner than
expected when six months after the presidential election, Senator
Johnston died in a steamboat explosion on the Red River.

Governor

Roman called for the legislature to fill the remainder Johnston’s term
in December 1833.

Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Alexander Porter

adroitly lined up members of the legislature behind his candidacy
months prior to the scheduled session.

Fearing the election of this

pro-bank, "thorough going opponent of the administration," the Jackson
party tried to unite behind a single candidate, but as in previous

®*Bee. November 15, 1832.
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contests, party organization crumbled.

The night before the election,

the Jackson party changed their nominee from Walter Overton to Joseph
Walker because of a belief that he would be more likely to attract the
Creole vote.

The switch may have aided their cause, but Porter won

with a majority of two votes.^
Once again, despite its claim to represent the majority of
Louisianans, the Jackson party had failed to elect its candidate.
Clay men celebrated the loss of faith that the result had produced
among the overconfident Jacksonians.

In the game of political musical

chairs following Porter’s election, Governor Roman appointed
Congressman Henry Adams Bullard to Porter’s vacated state supreme
court position, and Clay supporter Rice Garland won Bullard’s seat
without Democratic opposition.®^

Perhaps sensing that national party

leaders might be questioning his leadership, Martin Gordon immediately
sent a series of letters to Washington defending his conduct in the
senatorial contest.
within the party.

He lashed out at his opponents both outside and
Calling Porter "an Alien in every sense of the

word," Gordon falsely accused the Irish-born Porter of not being a
United States citizen.

He railed against "the monied influence" of

New Orleans banks and chastised national party leaders for depositing
federal monies in two New Orleans banks which had used their financial

65Nicholas P. Trist to wife, December 26, 1833, Nicholas Trist
Papers, SHC (quote); Alexander Porter to John Ker, July 8, 1833,
Alexander Porter Letter, LLMVC; Alexander Porter to Ker, October 6, 1833,
December 20, 1833, James Porter to Ker, December 15, 1833, Ker Family
Papers, SHC. For the importance of the bank issue in the senate contest
see Stephenson, Alexander Porter. 29-30.
6% e n r y Adams Bullard to Daniel Webster,
Webster Papers, LC.

March 8,
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leverage against the Jackson party.

He attacked the directors of one

as "violent enemies of Andrew Jackson” and the other as "the corrupt
machine of which Henrv Clav is the sole director."

Gordon further

attributed Walker’s loss to "Traitors in our Ranks," singling out
Federal District Attorney John Slidell for vituperation because of his
alleged betrayal of the party.67
Seeing enemies everywhere, Gordon failed to realize that his own
actions more than anyone else’s had jeopardized the success of his
party.

Joseph Tregle contends that a possibly unbalanced Gordon had

come to believe "he was the Jackson party in Louisiana" and that the
party’s triumph in the 1832 presidential campaign had "emboldened
[Gordon] to bid for the complete mastery of his Jacksonian
colleagues."

68

"Making himself daily more obnoxious." Gordon arranged

to have John Slidell dismissed as Federal District Attorney.

Caught

off-guard, Slidell at first tried to repair the rift with Gordon, but,
after realizing the impossibility of this effort, joined Gordon in a
competition to enlist the support of national party leaders—
particularly President Jackson and Vice President Martin Van Buren.

69

67

Martin Gordon to Andrew Jackson, December 13, 1833,(quotes
regarding the banks), December 14, 1833, (alien and traitor quotes)
Gordon to F.P. Blair, December 16, 1833, Gordon to William B. Lewis,
December 16, 1833, all in Jackson Papers, LC.
68

Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "The Political Apprenticeship of John
Slidell." Journal of Southern HistoryXXVI (February 1960), 57-70. (quote
p. 62.)
6®Carl Kohn to Samuel Kohn, April 17, 1833, Kohn Letter Book, HNO
(quote); John Slidell to Martin Gordon, December 13, 1832, Slidell to
Andrew Jackson, January 7, 1833, Slidell Letter Book, Manuscripts
Department, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana; Slidell to Martin
Van Buren, March 27, 1833, Van Buren Papers, LC; Jackson to Gordon, April
9, 1833, Jackson Papers, LC.
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Gordon shrewdly used a two-pronged attack to out -maneuver
Slidell in the contest for the backing of the national party
leadership.

First, he gained Jackson’s ear before Slidell could

present his side of the story.

He labelled Slidell a nullifier and an

associate of South Carolinian John C. Calhoun— the leader of the
nullification movement and Jackson’s sworn enemy.

Second, Gordon sent

a one thousand dollar donation to a Jackson ally in Washington.

An

emotional Jackson recognized that "these friends of mine mean to pay
back—

the thousand dollar fine imposed on me at New Orleans [in

1815]."

Slidell valiantly fought back.

He had his supporters,

including some of Jackson’s closest friends, send a petition to the
president, and Slidell went to New York to explain the situation to
Van Buren in person.

Jackson, however, was the type of mem who once

his mind had been made up nothing Slidell or anyone else did could
change it.

Slidell lost his position, and Gordon at least temporarily

remained the master of Louisiana’s Jackson party.^
Gordon had succeeded in his attempt to control the Jackson
party, and Senator Porter would assert that in Washington enemies of
Gordon were considered enemies of the president and that Slidell would
never be forgiven.

Gordon’s victory would soon prove pyrrhic, and

Slidell’s name not Gordon’s has come to be equated with Louisiana’s
antebellum Democratic party.

If Gordon wished to continue to have the

confidence of the national party’s leadership, he needed to produce
results, and his alienation of much of his own party in Louisiana made
7G
Tregle, "The Political Apprenticeship of Slidell," 66-7; Francis
Blair to Gordon, April 11, 1833, quoted in ibid., 66; John Slidell to
Martin Van Buren, March 27, 1833, Van Buren Papers, LC.
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this achievement almost impossible.

Porter's victory in the 1833

senate contest demonstrated that the Jackson party would not
automatically line up behind a Gordon nominee, and the subsequent
defeat of Gordon’s hand-picked candidate in the 1834 gubernatorial
contest would signal the end of Gordon’s tenure as undisputed
chieftain of Louisiana’s Jackson party.^
In 1834, Louisianans would witness the state’s first truly
partisan gubernatorial campaign with each party having a single
candidate.

Gordon and the Jackson party, which would become known as

the Democratic party by the election, hoisted John B. Dawson’s name
atop their newspapers as early as 1831.

72

Realizing after the 1830

governor’s race that he could not afford to alienate the party’s
stronghold, the Florida Parishes, Gordon and his associates selected
Dawson, a very popular Florida Parish judge as their choice.

Their

opponents, who would be called Whigs by election day, acknowledged the
potency of the combination of Gordon and the Florida Parishes.

Whig

leaders recognized the necessity of running their most popular man
even if not their most capable and concluded "no one else but
[Congressman Edward Douglass] White has any chance with Dawson."

A

sugar planter and former law partner of Alexander Porter, White had
demonstrated his popularity as twice the Democrats had declined to
oppose him for Congress.

At White’s urging the party waited until

71

Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, June 1, 1834, Burton N.
Harrison and Family Papers, LC.
72

Louisiana Advertiser, November 21, 1831; For 1834 gubernatorial
campaign see Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 276-95.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

103

after his victory in the 1832 congressional race to announce
It
officially his name as a candidate.
With Dawson and White prominently before the public more than
two years prior to the election, other men were reluctant to come
forward.

The break between Slidell and Gordon did briefly lead to the

appearance of a third candidate— New Orleans Mayor Denis Prieur.

The

Slidell faction hoped that the popular Prieur could take the Creole
vote from the two American candidates.

Gordon, however, designed a

clever stratagem to ensure Prieur’s withdrawal from the race.

In

April 1834, two months prior to the gubernatorial election, Prieur
faced re-election as New Orleans mayor.

When Prieur entered the

gubernatorial canvass, Gordon and his allies placed a candidate in
opposition to Prieur for the mayoralty.

Preferring the security of

the mayor’s office, Prieur withdrew from the governor’s race, and
Gordon’s candidate withdrew from the mayor’s race.

Thus, the contest

remained a battle between Dawson and White.^
White remained in Washington lamenting that despite his
inclination to canvass he lacked-the knowledge or instincts to do so,
but his partisans in Louisiana proved very adept at campaigning.
Instead of attacking Dawson directly, they aimed most of their barbs
at Martin Gordon.

They labelled Dawson the candidate of the "custom

house cabal" which already controlling national politics in the state,

^Alexander Porter to Josiah S. Johnston, March 18, 1832, May 9,
1832, Johnston Papers, HSP; Edward Douglass White to George W. Boyd, June
2, 1832, Edward Douglass White Letter, LLMVC.
7<Carl Kohn to Samuel Kohn, October 3, 1833, Carl Kohn Letter Book,
HNO; Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 277-84.
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now wished to control state level politics, too.

Words such as

"despotic control,” "coterie." "cabal." "dictate." and "faction"
filled their columns.

They argued that if Dawson were to win the

governor’s race. Martin Gordon would rule the state with Dawson as his
puppet.

Pro-Dawson newspapers complained that White partisans saw

Dawson and Gordon as twins, and insisted that a separation must be
made between Gordon advocating Dawson’s election and Gordon
controlling Dawson.

White advocates found no need for such

distinctions and continued campaigning as if Gordon and Dawson were
7C

the same man. J

If White partisans found their bogeyman in Martin Gordon, Dawson
proponents found theirs in recently elected United States Senator
Alexander Porter.

The pro-White Louisiana Advertiser realized the

similar nature of the attacks on Porter and Gordon and alleged that in
attacking Porter, Dawson men "find their truest model in Martin
Gordon."^

Dawsonites accused White of being "a passive instrument"

or "a pet and slave" in the control of Porter’s aristocratic junto.
The papers contrasted Porter and White’s aristocratic contempt for the
common people with Dawson’s championship of democracy.

Dawsonites

gained political capital from a White advocate’s condescending remark
that whiskey drinkers favored Dawson, and they contended the race was
a contest of "DEMOCRACY versus ARISTOCRACY."

White proponents did not

^Edward Douglass White to George W. Boyd, January 28, 1834,
Antebellum Letter Collection, HNO; Louisiana Advertiser. January 15, 28,
April 2, 9, June 2, 1834; Louisiana Courier. October 15, 1833.
Louisiana Advertiser. May 19, 1834; For a discussion of Porter’s
role in the election see Stephenson, Alexander Porter. 81-87.
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allow Dawsonites sole claim as the party of the people as they
compared the simple tastes of White with the elaborate trappings of
Dawson whom they accused of "foppery" and "dandyism."77
The Democrats’ charges of aristocracy reached a crescendo after
Whig Henry Johnson entered the race for White’s vacated First District
congressional seat.

Having placed Johnson in political exile since

his refusal to withdraw from the 1829 senate race had led to Edward
Livingston’s victory, the party in April 1834 welcomed the former
governor back into its fold.

With the election less than three months

away, the Whigs needed a congressional candidate and Johnson’s
popularity in the region overcame their five-year old grudge.

For

Dawsonites, the appearance of Johnson provided all the proof they
needed that an aristocratic conspiracy existed.

They charged that

Porter and Johnson, members of Louisiana’s 1812 constitutional
convention, had written aristocratic provisions into the document to
allow themselves to monopolize the offices of the state.

Since the

constitution’s inception, Porter, currently a United States senator,
had served in the state legislature and as a state Supreme Court
justice for twelve years, while Johnson had been governor, senator,
and now wished to be a representative.

They had added the three-term

congressman White to their aristocratic inner circle which intended to
rotate state offices among themselves.

78

77Bee, June 19 (first quote), 28, July 1, 1834; New Orleans Daily
News. April 24 (second quote), June 24, 1834 (3rd quote); Plaquemine
Iberville Gazette quoted in St. Francisvi 1le Phoenix. September 21, 1833
(fourth quote).
78New Orleans Daily News. April 17, May 21, 1834; Bee. June 29, 1834.
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While voters may not have accepted this sinister view of Porter
and Johnson’s role in the 1812 convention, debate over the
constitution did offer them a tangible choice.

Labelling the document

aristocratic, Dawsonites championed constitutional reform,
particularly the removal of a tax-paying requirement which thwarted
universal suffrage.

They also hoped to reduce the governor’s

patronage powers by expanding the number of elective offices, perhaps
even including the judiciary.

They charged that their opponents,

especially the aristocratic Porter, felt that the poor deserved no
choice in their government.

White and the Whigs did have a different

constitutional vision, as a pro-White platform celebrated their
candidate’s opposition to "a premature change in our state
constitution."

Porter admitted that he believed that the property

basis was the proper one for suffrage, and the pro-White Louisiana
Advertiser asserted that suffrage was extended far enough already.

79

In addition to debate over the state constitution, national
issues also played a role in the gubernatorial campaign.

As in

previous contests, the debate over the tariff proved central.

White

partisans alleged that Dawson had nullification propensities, and the
Democrats were forced once again to explain how they distinguished
between the sugar cane duty and protective tariffs.

Dawsonites

countered with an attack on White for his vote for the compromise
tariff of 1833 which lowered the duty on imported sugar cane.

They

alleged that White had betrayed his constituents and had voted on the

79Bee. May 13, 1834; New Orleans Daily News. April 21, 1834;
Louisiana Advertiser. July 2, 7 (platform quote), 1834; Alexander Porter
to Jesse B. Harrison, June 1, 1834, Harrison and Family Papers, LC.
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same side as the nullifiers.

White partisans adroitly parried this

blow with their contention that White had advocated compromise to save
the Union and that he had taken the same position on the bill as the
Democrats5 idol President Jackson.

When combined with White5s

residency in the sugar region, these arguments helped provide him with
an overwhelming victory m

the sugar cane producing parishes.

flQ

The two candidates also offered contrasting views on the other
two planks of the American System— a national bank and internal
improvements.

White supporters compared their candidate5s

championship of these measures with Dawson’s antagonism.

Dawsonites

explained how their nominee’s opposition stemmed from his desire to
protect the people’s republican liberties.

Echoing the words of

President Jackson, they branded the bank a "monster of corruption"
attempting to establish a "moneyed aristocracy."

Federally-sponsored

internal improvements joined the bank in threatening to shackle the
limbs of republican freemen.

Dawsonites alleged that the only

legislators who voted for these projects were speculators and those
0!
whose local area benefitted from them.
The debate over the value of the American System demonstrates
the importance of national issues in the campaign.

During the battle

between White and Dawson, the Henry Clay-led opposition to President
Jackson assumed the name Whigs.

The origins of the southern Whig

party have engendered much debate among historians.

Generally these

80

Louisiana Advertiser. January
1, February
12,
1834;
St.
Martinsville Attakapas Gazette in New Orleans Bee. February 22, 1834.
81

New Orleans Dailv News. May 13, 1834.
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scholars fall into one of two schools: those who emphasize the party's
states rights origins, and those who stress its economic antecedents—
specifically debate over the Bank of the United States and the tariff.
Arthur C. Cole has defined the Whig party in the South as a
combination of National Republicans, states rights men, and alienated
Democrats.

The relative weight of each of these components varied in

each state, but in most of the South the states rights wing
predominated with the National Republican element often reduced to a
voiceless minority primarily because its American System had little
appeal in the region.

82

Though Louisiana’s Whig party possessed the same components as
other southern Whig organizations— National Republicans, states rights
advocates, and disaffected Democrats— the formation of the Whig party
did not lead to an elaborate redrawing of party lines in the state.
In Louisiana, the attraction of Henry Clay’s program had led his
supporters to dominate state politics, and these men saw no reason to
overhaul their platform to gain more adherents.

In their studies of

Louisiana Whiggery, Leslie Norton and William H. Adams stress the
importance of economic origins in the party’s birth, and Charles
Sellers has even asserted that Louisiana’s Whig party simply
represented "National Republicanism continued under a new name."
conclusion rings true with two caveats.

This

First, while Louisianans had

Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South (Washington, 1913), 138; Charles G. Sellers, Jr., "Who Were the Southern Whigs?" American
Historical Review. LIX (1954), 335-346; William J. Cooper, Jr., The South
and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge, 1978), 43-58. By
1834,
the national
bank
issue
involved discussion
over
the
constitutionality of the institution and debate over the president’s
right to remove federal funds from it.
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been lukewarm in calling themselves National Republicans, preferring
to label themselves the Clay party, they gladly accepted the titie of
Whigs.

Not fully integrated into the national party system during the

life span of the National Republican party, Louisianans preferred the
attachment to strong personalities such as Clay or Jackson to partisan
labels.

Also, with the National Republican party being an

overwhelmingly northern organization. Louisiana’s voters had been wary
Ql
of the name.
Second, Sellers’s pronouncement ignores the Louisiana Whig
party’s states rights minority.

Henry Robertson has demonstrated that

in the Florida Parishes the nationalist Whigs had to enter into a
coalition with states rights men to hope to achieve victory.

States

rights advocates opposed to the executive tyranny of the president
they referred to as "Andrew the 1st" joined the Whigs.

The two groups

did not agree on most issues, but they could agree to unite in
opposition to Jackson’s assumption of too much power in the executive
branch.

In contrast to the rest of the South, where the National

Republican wing remained silent partners in a states rights Whig
coalition, in Louisiana the opposite situation prevailed.

Former

congressman Henry Adams Bullard’s description of his successor and
fellow Whig Rice Garland demonstrates this distinction.

He cheerfully

related that Garland though b o m in Virginia is "not of the hair
splitting state rights party” but a proponent of internal improvements

01

Leslie M. Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in Louisiana,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, 1940), 37; William H. Adams, The Whig Party of
Louisiana. (Lafayette, La., 1973), 41; Sellers, "Who Were the Southern
Whigs?" 346.
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and a national bank.

States rights men did join the Louisiana Whig

party, but in Louisiana, they entered into the coalition not as
dominant but as minority partners.
The 1834 congressional elections which occurred simultaneously
with the gubernatorial race demonstrate the prominence of the American
System in the origins of the Louisiana Whig party.

Across the state,

even in the Florida Parishes, Whig candidates loudly proclaimed their
allegiance to the tenets of the American System, and none mentioned
states rights.

Three months prior to the election, the New Orleans

Whig organ, the Louisiana Advertiser lamented the absence of an antiadministration, pro-tariff, pro-internal improvement, pro-bank
candidate for White’s vacant First District seat.

To fill this gap,

the party welcomed former Governor Henry Johnson back and he faced two
Democrats divided over the constitutionality of a national bank.

The

relative importance of economic policy in the formation of the Whig
party can be seen in the Second District, which included the states
rights Florida Parishes.

The popular Philemon Thomas, now sixty-seven

years old, declined to run for re-election, and four men challenged
for his position.

Even here, the Whig nominee stressed his commitment

to the tariff and the Bank of the United States, with positions on the
bank serving as the main difference between the two strongest

84

Henry O. Robertson, "The Emergence of the Whig Party in Louisiana’s
Florida Parishes, 1834-1840,” Louisiana History 33 (Summer 1992), 283316; Henry Adams Bullard to Daniel Webster, March 8, 1834, Daniel Webster
Papers, LC.
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candidates.

A similar situation prevailed in the Third District,
3C
where a pro-bank Whig opposed and anti-bank Democrat.
The July elections proved once again that the proponents of the
American System, whether labelled the Clay party, National
Republicans, or Whigs, held the upper hand in Louisiana.

The Whigs

had to be satisfied with their employment of economic issues which led
to capturing the governor’s office, winning two of the three
congressional races, and achieving a majority in the legislature.
Obtaining 57.3 percent of the vote, White won a convincing victory in
the gubernatorial contest.

As in previous contests, the Whigs’ allure

proved strongest in Greater Orleans and the South Louisiana with White
winning almost two-thirds of the vote in the former and over threefourths in the latter.

The performance of White and the Whig

congressional candidates demonstrate the absence of a Whig appeal to
states rights men.

In the states rights Florida Parishes, White won

less than one-fifth the vote, and the Whigs lost their only
congressional race because of weak support in this region.

(SEE

APPENDIX B)
Not only did the election witness the entrance of the Whig party
into Louisiana politics, but it also marked the termination of Martin
Gordon’s reign as undisputed master of the Louisiana Democratic party.
Gordon’s autocratic policies had alienated members of both parties.

85

First District— Louisiana Advertiser. April 8, 1834; Bee. June 28,
1834; Second District— Baton Rouge Gazette. April 5, May 3, 1834; Bee.
August 13, 1834; Third District— St. Martinsville Attakanas Gazette. July
5, 1834.
86Bee, July 14, 17, 1834; Louisiana Advertiser. July 14, 17, 1834.
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Once again, his choice for a state office had been defeated, and his
opponents had even effectively used Gordon's association with Dawson
against the candidate.

More importantly, in the midst of the

campaign, the news that the United States Senate had rejected Gordon’s
re-appointment as Collector of Customs reached the state.

Gordon’s

opponents both outside and within the party celebrated this
announcement which effectively ended Gordon’s stranglehold on the
Democratic party.

87

The growing assimilation of Louisiana political parties into the
national parties resulted in the partial suppression of the AngloCreole split.

In his study of relationship between American and

Creoles, Lewis Newton declares that in the 1834 canvass, "Only the
faintest echoes of the old distinctions" remained from this division
which had dominated prior gubernatorial campaigns.

After Prieur’s

resignation from the contest, the race did not have a Creole
candidate.

While both candidates portrayed themselves as the better

friend of the Creoles, they also deprecated any attempts to
distinguish between the two populations.

Each party counted Creoles

and Americans among its members, and with the strengths of the Whigs
and the Democrats being approximately equal, any alienation of either
of the major ethnic groups could prove costly.

For the rest of the

87
For an example of a Jacksonian alienated by Gordon’s policies see
Carl Kohn to Samuel Kohn, April 17, 1833, Carl Kohn Letter Book, HNO.
Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 292-4.
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antebellum period, candidates would be labelled first and foremost as
00
partisans, but ethnicity could never be entirely ignored.
The subsequent legislative session confirmed that while partisan
politics had overshadowed ethnic tensions, the Creole-American rivalry
could overcome partisan loyalty in races where the candidates
represented different ethnic groups.

In January 1835, a Whig

legislature elected Democrat Charles Gayarre to the United States
Senate.

Senator Porter could not control his anger at the "petty

divisions" in the Whig party which prevented it from uniting on a
nominee and contributed to the "disastrous" election of Gayarre.

A

lawyer and state legislator from New Orleans, Gayarre, a selfdescribed "staunch friend—

of the present administration," opposed
0Q
federal ly sponsored internal improvements and the bank.
In an

attempt to explain the defeat, an exasperated Whig informed a friend
that Louisiana politics contained "an element unknown in other
states—

’creolism’" which undermined party loyalty.

Gayarre agreed

that the "personal devotion of three Whig friends" and not
partisanship had secured his election.

90
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Lewis W. Norton, "The Americanization of French Louisiana: A Study
in the Process of Adjustment between the French and the Anglo-American
Populations of Louisiana, 1803-1860," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago, 1929), 135. For the candidates’ appeals to Creoles see Louisiana
Advertiser. January 28, June 26, 1834; New Orleans Daily News. March 18,
24, 1834.
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Alexander Porter to John Ker, January 13, 1835, February 20, 1835,
Ker Family Papers, SHC; Gayarrd’s self-description in Louisiana Courier.
January 28, 1835.
90

"Creolism” quote in Henry Adams Bullard to Amos Lawrence, February
28, 1835, Amos Lawrence Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; Charles
Gayarre, Letter to the Editor of the Washington Union (New Orleans,
1854), 4.
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Because of illness, Gayarre never took his seat in the senate,
instead he temporarily retired from Louisiana politics and spent the
next eight years convalescing and doing historical research in France.
By the time of the new election in January 1836. the Democrats had
gained control of the legislature.

In an effort to capture Democratic

votes, the Whigs nominated Alexander Barrow a states rights Whig from
the Florida Parishes.

Barrow had previously been labelled a

"nullifier" and had left the Democratic party because of the "man
worship” of Andrew Jackson.

The ploy proved unsuccessful, however, as

on the second ballot, Barrow lost to Democrat Robert Carter Nicholas,
a sugar planter from Terrebonne Parish.

91

The presidential election of 1836 provided the Whigs and
Democrats their first opportunity to challenge each other in a
national campaign.

In 1835, a national Democratic convention

nominated Vice President Martin Van Buren, a New Yorker who had the
blessing of President Jackson.

The Whigs, both because they realized

that they were the country’s minority party and because their party
represented a coalition of groups which could agree to oppose the
Democrats but on little else, did not hold a national convention.
Instead, Whig state conventions endorsed three separate candidates:
Daniel Webster and William Henry Harrison in the North and Hugh Lawson
White in the South.

The candidacy of White, a Tennessean and former

Jackson party stalwart, represented the Whigs’ attempt to make inroads

9!

Alexander Barrow to William S. Hami 1ton, February 19,
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 81.
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into the Democrats’ solid grip on southern voters, especially states
-

i

rights men.

si

The southern Whigs’ strategy involved an attempt to capitalize
on White’s southern birth, especially in contrast to the New Yorker
Van Buren.

By the mid— 1830s. primarily because of the rise of an

organized abolitionist movement in the North, tensions between the
sections had increased.

The movement’s actions involved sending

antislavery petitions to Congress, mailing abolitionist tracts to
southern states, and attempting to end slavery in the nation’s
capital.

Southern Whigs urged voters to consider these attacks and

ask themselves whether their region would be safer with a Tennessee
slaveholder in the White House or with Van Buren.

According to their

argument, Van Buren magnified the misfortune of his northern birth
with voting for Negro suffrage in New York, opposing slavery in
Missouri, and advocating abolition in the District of Columbia.
Louisianans in the 1830s were as sensitive as their fellow
gi
southerners to threats to slavery.
Some presumably recollected the
Pointe Coupee conspiracy of 1795 which had concluded with the
beheading of more than fifteen slaves, and many more remembered an

92
For a discussion of the presidential election of 1836 see Joel H.
Silbey, "Election of 1836," in Schlesinger, ed., History of American
Presidential Elections, 1:577-600.
91

For a discussion of the presidential campaign in the South see
Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery. 74-97.
94

For an excellent discussion of the role of slavery
presidential election in Louisiana see Derek L.A. Hackett,
this Republic will be Numbered: Abolition, Slavery, and the
Election of 1836,” Louisiana Studies XV (1976), 131-160; and
Whig Party in Louisiana," 108-125.
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1811 revolt involving more than five hundred slaves in the parishes up
the Mississippi River from New Orleans in which more than sixty slaves
died.

By the 1830s, fears of slave insurrection in Louisiana had not

diminished but perhaps had increased.

According to the 1830 census,

slaves outnumbered whites in Louisiana for the first time.

Governor

Dupre, in his annual message of 1831, warned that this disparity
threatened the state’s peace and security and urged lawmakers to
restrict the entry of new slaves into the state.

The legislators

failed to heed his advice, but, later that year, Nat Turner’s revolt
in Virginia "reminded the Citizens of Louisiana of their defenseless
situation."

Governor Roman called a special session of the

legislature in November 1831 with the dual purpose of responding to
the revolt and electing a United States senator.

Roman repeated

Dupre’s warnings regarding the inequality between Louisiana’s white
and black populations, and this time the legislators responded with
the passage of an act to outlaw the importation of slaves for sale
into Louisiana.^
A year prior to the 1836 presidential election, fears of slave
insurrection in Louisiana received a new impetus.

While Louisianans

followed congressional debates over antislavery petitions and the
mailing of abolitionist tracts, a rumored slave conspiracy in
neighboring Mississippi further heightened their anxiety.

In the

95
Dupr§ address in Louisiana House Journal. 10th leg., 1st sess., 1011; Nathan Morse to Andrew Jackson, October 11, 1831, Jackson Papers, LC
(quote); Judith Kelleher Schafer, "The Immediate Impact o f Nat Turner’s
Insurrection on New Orleans," Louisiana History (1982), 159-78; Roman
address in Louisiana House Journal. 10th leg., Extra Sess. , 2-3; The ban
on the importation of slaves into Louisiana was repealed in 1834.
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panic following the uncovering of the alleged Murrell conspiracy, many
whites and slaves were lynched.

This hysteria quickly crossed the

border into Louisiana and resulted in the formation of vigilance
committees and in the arrest and punishment of suspicious strangers.
The New Orleans city government, in its Report of a Conspiracy to
Incite a Rebellion Throughout the Slave States claimed that
southerners needed to worry both about northern abolitionists and "an
organized horde of reckless and blood-thirsty barbarians, who prowl
throughout our own communities."

A month later. New Orleanians formed

the Louisiana Constitutional and Anti-Fanatical Society to combat the
"misguided fanatics" of the North by forming vigilance committees,
enlightening northerners, and enforcing current laws more strictly.

97

In the midst of this tense anti-abolitionist, anti-northern
atmosphere, the presidential campaign began in Louisiana.

While most

southern Whigs celebrated White’s state-rights heritage and his
connection to Andrew Jackson, Louisiana Whigs, with their stronger
attachment to the American System, found little to praise in the antitariff, anti-internal improvement, anti-bank White.

Whig former

Senator Waggaman claimed that White had always opposed any measures
beneficial to Louisiana.

The only exception to this anti-White

feeling occurred in the Florida Parishes, where a diarist expressed

96
For meetings see Bee. August 10, 19, 1835; True American, August
6, 8, 17, 1835; Louisiana Courier. August 15, September 29, 1835; For
arrests and punishments see Bee. September 11, 21, 1835; True American.
August 10, 1835.
^Hackett, "The Days of this Republic Will Be Numbered," 140-42.
(Quote from Report of a Conspiracy—
on p. 142); Constitution of the
Louisiana Constitutional and Anti-Fanatical Society (New Orleans, 1835).
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his satisfaction at voting for the "states rights" White over the
QC
"strong government" Van Buren.' To appease this minority, the Whigs
placed the vocal states-rights proponent Alexander Barrow on their
slate of presidential electors.

Most Louisiana Whigs, however,

preferred not to celebrate White but to attack Martin Van Buren.

Only

days before the election, the largest New Orleans White gathering
chose to call itself the "Great Anti-Van Buren Meeting"— stressing its
opposition to the Democrat candidate over its support for White.
Concurring with this emphasis, the Commercial Bulletin urged its
readers to vote for the "Anti-Van Buren Electoral Ticket" without
mentioning White’s name.

QQ

Because of their distaste for White’s doctrines. Louisiana Whigs
faced a difficult chore in campaigning for him.
White had only two positives:

For most of them,

he lived South of the Mason-Dixon line

and he was not Martin Van Buren.

The Whigs capitalized on both these

traits, and the introduction of slavery into the campaign proved a
godsend for them.

They embraced the issue of whether White or Van

Buren would best protect slavery with an eagerness bordering on
desperation, and it quickly became the focal point of their campaign.
Louisiana Whigs found common ground with their fellow southern
partisans in realizing the importance of protecting slavery and its
force as a campaign weapon.

"Our interests," according to Senator

98

For Waggaman’s anti-White contention see Louisiana Courier. June
22, 1835; Edwin A. Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes
of Louisiana. 1836-1846 as Reflected in the Diarv of Bennet H. Barrow
(New York, 1943), November 8, 1836, p. 183.
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Proceedings of Anti-Van Buren Meeting in True American. October 27,
1836; Commercial Bulletin. November 10, 1836.
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Porter, "imperatively require a Slave holding president.”

Whigs

attacked Van Buren. alleging he possessed "a decided opposition to the
institution of slavery.”

On the eve of the election, an anti-Van

Buren meeting declared that Van Buren’s election would imperil the
South’s domestic institutions.100
Louisiana Democratic leaders recognized the potency of these
charges and worried about the effect they would have on their party’s
voters.

A year before the election, a New Orleanian wrote Van Buren

on "the all important subject of Abolitionism" and urged him to "come
out immediately and declare your sentiments" as "delay will create
suspicions which might be very hard to eradicate."

In New Orleans,

the Bee and the Louisiana Courier led the defense of Van Buren and
published more than thirty editorials explaining his stance.

And,

beginning in June, every issue of the two newspapers included a
statement from Van Buren declaring his opposition to ending slavery in
the District of Columbia and to interfering with it in the southern
states.101
White’s candidacy proved doubly difficult for Louisiana
Democrats to counter.

Like their Whig counterparts, they were

sensitive to the slavery issue.

Unlike most Whigs, however, many

Democrats admired White’s anti-bank, anti-tariff, states rights
doctrines.

Former senatorial and congressional candidate Joseph

I00Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, January 12, 1836, Harrison
and Family Papers, LC; Commercial Bulletin. October 31, 1836; True
American. October 27, 1836.
I01William Christy to Martin Van Buren, September 24, 1835, Van Buren
Papers, LC (quote); Hackett, "The Days of this Republic will be
Numbered," 147-49.
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Walker touched on both these issues in a letter to Senator Gayarre.
Worried that ’'prejudice against northern men is such I fear it will be
impossible to overcome it," Walker added that "The success of White
could not (by me at least) be considered an evil."

Walker lamented

that White's candidacy had produced "a division in our ranks" and the
Bee and Courier echoed this concern, particularly after Democrat James
W. Breedlove, Gordon’s replacement as Collector of Customs, announced
for White.

102

The only concurrent state election, to fill a vacant

state senate seat, provided justification for these fears as a WhiteDemocrat opposed a Van Buren-Democrat. The mixed partisan loyalties
inspired by the senate race led to a tie between White and Van Buren
in Livingston parish— the only time in the antebellum period the
parish did not have a democratic majority.103
Throughout the South, Democrats turned the tables on the Whigs
by alleging that a vote for White and not a vote for Van Buren was a
vote for abolitionism.

They challenged the Whigs to explain the

following: if Van Buren was an abolitionist, then why were almost all
northern abolitionists members of the Whig party.104

Also, they

repeatedly contended that White had no chance to win the election and
that the Whigs were using him take southern votes from Van Buren and
to have the election thrown into the House of Representatives where
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Joseph Walker to Charles Gayarre, November 15, 1835, Charles
Gayarrd Collection, LLMVC (quote); Bee. July 2, 1835, March 30, 1836;
Louisiana Courier. July 17, 1835.
101Bee. November 14, 1836.
HU

Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, 94-5; Bee. June 27,
July 18, 1836; Louisiana Courier. September 13, 1836.
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Whig congressmen would elevate William Henry Harrison to the
presidency.

Thus, White simply served as a decoy for Harrison.

According to the Democrats, a ballot cast for White was a ballot cast
for Harrison, an imbecile whose abolitionist tendencies were further
compounded by his advocacy of seLling whites into slavery.106
Though fears regarding slavery proved the paramount election
topic in Louisiana, other issues surfaced as well.

Both sides claimed

the mantle as champions of democracy and republicanism and accused
their opponents of trying to usurp the people’s choice.

Whigs charged

that Jackson’s selection of Van Buren as his successor represented
executive dictation destroying the freedom of election.

They added

that Van Buren’s caucus nomination signalled the triumph of corrupt
party organization over the people.106 Democrats countered by
reminding the electorate that a vote for White would place the
election in the House of Representatives where, as in the 1824
elevation of Adams over Jackson, the people’s choice would be
defeated.

They alleged that they had uncovered the sinister hand of

Senator Porter behind this wicked plot.

Also, in 1836 and throughout

the antebellum period. Democrats portrayed themselves as the party of
the people and accused the Whigs of aristocracy.107
While slavery dominated Louisianan’s political discourse in
1836, the American System was not completely neglected.

106Bee. August 26, September 26, October 19, 27,
Courier. November 2, 1836.

Though

1836; Louisiana

1Q6L 1Echo. October 16, 1836; True American. October 2, 1836.
107Louisiana Courier, October 26, November 7, 1836; Bee. September
28, 1836.
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admiring Whiters anti-bank and anti-internal improvement stance.
Louisiana Democrats maintained that White had sacrificed these views
because of his unquenchable ambition.

Even if White had not changed

his stance, the rest of the Whig party, including William Henry
Harrison, favored the American System.

Louisiana Democrats claimed

that Harrison was the only Whig with a chance of winning and therefore
considered his advocacy of internal improvements and a national bank
fair game for attack.

Democratic editors stressed that a vote for Van

Buren was a vote against the "a 11-corrupting, all-enslaving BANK and
its Minions!"

108

With the anti-bank states rights wing predominating

in most southern Whig parties, this argument had strong southern
potential for the Democrats.

In Louisiana, however. Whigs gladly

accepted the label of the party of the American System.

The Whig

Commercial Bulletin claimed that Harrison with his broad construction
ideas was indeed the party’s best candidate.

After the election, the

Democratic Bee alleged that if Harrison had won the national bank
would have been recharted.

Whigs in New Orleans may have agreed with

this sentiment, for they gave "Harrison’s decoy” a narrow victory in
the city.105
Despite White’s victory in New Orleans, Van Buren triumphed both
nationally and in Louisiana where he narrowly edged White 3,842 to
3,583.

With only 7,425 people voting, a 31.2 percent decline from the

1834 gubernatorial election, clearly many Louisianans had found both
108

Bee. May 10, July 27,
November 7, 1836 (quote).

October

19,

1836;

Louisiana

Courier.

fQQ
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the northern and the anti-American System candidate unpalatable.

For

those who did exercise their suffrage, the battle between Whigs and
Democrats echoed the contest between Jackson and Clay in 1832.
Sixteen of the twenty-three parishes which voted for Jackson in 1832
went for Van Buren, and all but one of the nine Clay parishes cast a
majority for White.

The combination of the National Republican

origins of Louisiana Whiggery and the emphasis on slavery can be seen
in the results of the pro-tariff sugar region of South Louisiana where
White captured 59.9 percent of the vote.

In the states rights Florida

Parishes, White failed to win a single parish, but his 32.4 percent of
the vote there was greater than any previous pro-American System
gubernatorial or presidential candidate. (SEE APPENDIX A)
In Louisiana, the 1836 presidential election inaugurated what
William Cooper has termed "the politics of slavery," which designates
the interaction among "the institution of slavery, southern parties
and politicians, the southern political structure, and the values of
southern white society."

From 1836 until the civil war, every

presidential race in Louisiana and even some state contests would
include a debate over which party best protected the South’s peculiar
institution.

The labelling of the opposition candidate as an

abolitionist or a tool of the abolitionists became standard campaign
operating procedure.

From this election onward, partisan newspapers

would prominently display candidates’ proslavery quotations for months
at a time.

Almost every national issue, even those such as internal
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improvements or banking without a direct tie to slavery, would be
IIQ

viewed in terms of the slave question.
The 1834 gubernatorial and 1S36 presidential campaign
inaugurated a change in Louisiana politicians’ use of republicanism.
Prior to 1836 campaign, candidates had seen menaces to the republic in
almost every national issue including: the tariff, the national bank,
and intemaL improvements.

After the introduction of the politics of

slavery into Louisianans’ world in 1836, threats to the republic from
the national level came primarily from threats to slavery.

The

gubernatorial campaign had transformed the use of republicanism
political discourse at the state level.

1834
in

This campaign had highlighted

another obstacle to Louisianans achieving their maximum amount of
liberty— the 1812 constitution.

This aristocratic document denied

many Louisianans political rights, and repub 1ican

ism became

increasingly intertwined a movement to amend this

charter.

This

change rested partly on the emergence of Jacksonian democracy— the
idea that all adult white males should enjoy equal political rights.
In state campaigns, republicanism became a synonym for Jacksonian
democracy, and Louisiana politicians, particularly Democrats, would
make a commitment to removing this antiquated, unrepublican blot on
the state’s political record a staple of their rhetoric.
The 1836 presidential campaign not only included the
introduction of the politics of slavery into Louisiana, but along with
the 1834 governor’s race, demonstrated the maturation of Louisiana’s
political parties.

Because of the state’s unique demographics,

llflCooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery, xi.
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however, politicians had to remain aware of factors other than party
membership.

Ethnicity prevailed in the 1835 senate race, as a Whig

legislature elected Charles Gayarre. a Creole Democrat, and it again
proved pivotal in the 1837 senate contest.

Devastated by Van Buren’s

victory. Senator Porter resigned, and with the Democrats controlling
the legislature, the Whigs did not offer a candidate to succeed him.
Instead, two Democrats, former federal District Attorney John Slidell,
an American New Orleanian, and Alexander Mouton, a Creole from
Lafayette Parish, competed for the post.

Slidell received the

majority of Democratic votes, but lost the race, as eighteen of the
twenty-five Whigs backed the Creole Mouton.

Not only did ethnicity

affect politics, but also personal rivalry played a role.

Democratic

efforts to win both the 1833 senate race and the 1834 gubernatorial
campaign were hampered by tension between Slidell and Martin
Gordon.111
Though characteristics such as American-Creole split, personal
animus, and regionalism never disappeared from Louisiana politics,
from the 1830s onward they would always be viewed from within the
prism of party politics.

Richard P. McCormick, in his study of the

rise of the second American party system, asserts correctly that
"After 1836 [Louisiana] politics came increasingly under the
domination of the major parties."

Louisianans had changed from

attachment to a national leader such as Clay or Jackson to allegiance
to a political party.

Joseph Tregle agrees that by the mid-1830s

^Alexander Porter to John Ker, December 1, 1836, Ker Family Papers,
SHC; John Slidell to Martin Van Buren, January 12, 1837, Van Buren
Papers, LC.
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Louisianans no longer based their political decisions on personality,
but now emphasized whether a candidate was a Whig or a Democrat.

In

Louisiana. Whigs and the Democrats primarily divided over economic
issues such as those involved in the American System, and states
rights played a much smaller role than in the rest of the South.

By

the raid-1830s, Louisiana voters considered supporting one’s party a
normal condition and straying from partisan boundaries as a
IP
deviation. "
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Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party Svstem: Party
Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill, 1966), 317; Joseph G.
Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Study of Ego-Politics,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania), 462-63.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRATS AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY, 1837-1845
By 1837, Louisiana’s Whig and Democratic parties had developed
identities based on their attitudes toward the American System.

Whigs

championed it, while Democrats deplored it. Though divided by this
national question, Louisiana parties had not yet offered the
electorate distinct alternatives on state level issues such as
government aid to banks and internal improvement companies or revision
of the state’s 1812 constitution.

The Panic of 1837, a national

economic downturn, would serve as a catalyst for an increasing
divergence between the two parties on state fiscal policy, with
Democrats generally viewing state involvement in the economy as
pernicious and Whigs perceiving it as beneficial.

With Louisiana’s

government heavily in debt for its prodigal policies towards banks and
railroads, a backlash against state aid ensued.

When the state’s

voters called for a constitutional convention in 1844, Democrats took
advantage of this opportunity to include articles mandating the state
government’s withdrawal from the economic sector in Louisiana’s 1845
constitution.
Delegates to the constitutional convention not only changed the
state’s economic policies but also included ideas articles expressing
a commitment to Jacksonian democracy.

They rewrote some of the more

aristocratic and outmoded features of the 1812 charter by removing
property qualifications for suffrage and office-holding.

As with the

economic situation, the Democratic party benefitted from its
association with constitutional revision and its advocacy of greater
democracy.

The expansion of the electorate was part of an overall
127
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trend of the inclusion of sore people in Louisiana’s political
process.

This increased participation was aost visible in the

presidential campaigns of 1840 and 1844, which aobilized the entire
state to a level that earlier campaigns had not approached.

A

seemingly endless round of barbecues, parades, and meetings
incorporated voters and non-voters alike.

Women, a group which

previously had almost no role in Louisiana political culture, attended
rallies, held their own meetings, and even addressed gatherings of
both sexes.
The incorporation of more people in the political process and
debate over state economic policy did not replace but added further
complexity to political issues already discussed in Louisiana
politics.

Disagreement over the American System, division between

Americans and Creoles, state sectionalism, the politics of slavery,
argument over which party best protected liberty, and the enduring
image of Andrew Jackson continued to play roles in the state.

Between

1837 and 1845, Whigs continued to advocate, and Democrats to oppose, a
protective tariff and a national bank.

Both parties remained

sensitive to the feelings of the Creole population, particularly in
gubernatorial races.

Whigs and Democrats claimed to be the best

shields for the people’s liberty.

Presidential and gubernatorial

campaigns featured accusations of abolitionism.

A United States

senator would lose his position because of his stance on a fine
assessed General Jackson almost thirty years earlier.

Thus, by 1845,

new issues had entered Louisianans’ political spectrum and intertwined

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

129

with older ones— a coabination that altered the state’s political
climate.
The first opportunity for Louisiana’s Democrats and Whigs,
previously divided primarily on national matters, to incorporate state
issues in their debates came in the 1838 gubernatorial, congressional,
and legislative campaigns.

In these races, the Democratic party

portrayed itself as committed to reform in the state banking system
and to a revision of the 1812 constitution, particularly the abolition
of the property or tax-paying requirement for voting.

The inclusion

of these new planks did not signal the elimination of traditional
Louisiana issues, such as ethnicity and the country parishes versus
New Orleans, but interacted with them.

Additionally, the 1838 races

witnessed the use of the politics of slavery for the first time on a
state level.

In 1836, Louisianans had accused the competing

presidential candidates of infidelity to the South’s peculiar
institution, and in 1838, Louisianans charged their instate opponents
of being unreliable protectors of slavery.
The 1838 gubernatorial campaign season began with a Democratic
convention in New Orleans in late January.

At its opening delegates

from less than ten of the states thirty-two parishes were present.
Even after allowing members of the legislature from the unrepresented
parishes to be seated, the convention still contained delegates from
only fourteen parishes.

In a close 24-17 vote, the convention

nominated Creole Denis Prieur, who had served ten years as New Orleans
mayor, as its gubernatorial candidate over John B. Dawson, the
Democrats’ 1834 nominee.

The selection of a New Orleans candidate by
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a New Orleans convention with over one-third of its delegates froa the
Crescent City proved unpopular in some sections of the state.
Complaining that the "aristocracy of New Orleans" had intrigued to
place the party "under the heel of city boots," the Deaocratic St.
Francisville Louisiana Chronicle claimed that "the country in full
representation never would so vote as to leave a remote chance of
augmenting the already too great power of New Orleans." Having
previously advocated Dawson’s candidacy, the newspaper transferred its
support not to Prieur but to Whig Henry Johnson.^ The Deaocratic New
Orleans Bee concurred that the convention had been unrepresentative
and alleged that the decision of aany of the country parishes not to
send delegates indicated a desire that the gubernatorial race be non
partisan.

The Bee advocated the candidacy of Whig foraer governor

Andre Bienvenu Roman, while continuing to advance the cause of
Democratic legislative and congressional candidates.*
If the Democratic party could be chastised for holding a poorly
attended nominating convention, the Whig party could be faulted for
not holding one at all.

Instead, two former governors, the American

Johnson and the Creole Roaan, competed for the support of their fellow
party leaders.

After a struggle which lasted the first four months of

1838, Roman’s proponents carried the field.

They persuasively argued

^For proceedings of the convention see New Orleans Louisiana
Courier. January 29, 1838 and Clinton Louisianian. February 2, 1838; St.
Francisville Louisiana Chronicle. February 10, 1838 (quote). (Hereinafter
all newspapers froa New Orleans unless otherwise specified.)
2Bee, January 30, May 17, 1838. In advocating a Whig for governor
and Democrats for the legislature and Congress, the Bee represented a
temporary anomaly in the highly partisan world of antebellum Louisiana
newspapers. It would be sold and would becoae the Whigs' chief organ.
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that the Americans and Creoles had a tacit agreement to rotate the
gubernatorial office between the two populations.

Thus, with Edward

Douglass White, an American, currently governor, his successor should
be a Creole, especially if the Whigs wished to have Creole support in
the 1840 presidential contest. After receiving a letter froa
seventeen Whig legislators requesting that he retire froa the race
because of this ethnic rotation, Roaan’s greater popularity, and the
danger of dividing Whig votes, Johnson withdrew and endorsed Roaan’s
candidacy.3 Most likely, Johnson reaeabered how his persistence in
remaining in the 1829 Senate race against the party leadership's
wishes had led to five years in party purgatory.

He also correctly

surmised that withdrawing froa this race would aake hia the Whigs’
leading gubernatorial candidate in 1842.
In the early aonths of 1838, the legislature’s debate over
reform of the state banking systea overshadowed the gubernatorial
canvass.

Louisiana had chartered banks as early as 1804, and by 1831

the state possessed four banks capitalized at nine Billion dollars.
With President Jackson’s veto of the bill to recharter

the Bank ofthe

United States and his withdrawal of federal funds froa the
institution, the Louisiana legislature went on an extended spree of
bank chartering in the 1830s.

Between 1831 and 1836, the legislature

chartered twelve banks having a total capital of forty-six nil lion
3Bee. January 30, May 12, July 2, 1838; Baton RougeGazette. May 19,
1838; Henry Adaas Bullard to Jaaes G. Taliaferro, April 2, 1838, Jaaes
G. Taliaferro Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collections,
LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; (Hereinafter LLMVC) For a Whig who
believed that Johnson was more popular see Alexander Porter to Jesse
Burton Harrison, July 7, 1837[8], Burton Norvel Harrison and Faaily
Papers, Library of Congress. (Hereinafter LC)
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dollars.

Describing the 1835-1836 legislative session, in which six

of these charters were approved, an observer accurately recounted "a
great indisposition on the part of the wesbers to do anything but sake
banks," and a historian titles his chapter on this period, "Wild
Banking. "*
Debate over these Measures did not follow partisan lines but has
been described as "a aassive tug-of-war" between city and country
legislators.

Soae residents outside of New Orleans characterized this

bank-chartering binge as "a folly," "a curse," or "the joke."5 Most
country legislators, however, struggled not to elininate Louisiana
banks but to have branches established in their parishes and worried
that New Orleans banks had no aoney to spare for country customers.
One commentator recounted a rumor that the legislature was to
establish a bank with a capital of ten million dollars and a branch in
every parish.

"The members of the legislature," according to another

critic of these log-rolling tactics, "are operated on by the promises
of branches to be established in their different parishes so that
Avoyelles is to have one & probably Catahoula another."

Though every

bank had its headquarters in New Orleans, the charters provided for
^George D. Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South:
Louisiana Banking. 1804-1861 (Stanford, 1972), 18-25; Walter Brashear to
Robert Brashear, February 7, 1836, Brashear-Lawrence Papers, Southern
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina (quote); (Hereinafter SHC); Stephen A. Caldwell, A Banking
History of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1935), 42.
5Green, Finance and Economic Development. 30 (first quote); George
Kelso to Josiah S. Johnston, February 11, 1831, Josiah Stoddard Johnston
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (second quote), (Hereinafter
HSP); Alexander Barrow to William S. Hamilton, February 19, 1833, William
S. Hamilton Papers, LLMVC (third quote); H. Dopson to Jacob Bieller,
April 15, 1835, Alonzo Snyder Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
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forty-six branches in twenty-six separate towns, with thirty-six of
these branches actually opening in the wealthiest agricultural areas/
The legislature’s ardor for internal iaprovewents, especially
railroads, equalled its passion for banks.

While the state was

blessed with an extensive river systew, this aethod of travel too
often proved unreliable.

In the 1820s, Louisianans complained about

the length of time for mail delivery, and the difficulty legislators
had in communicating with their constituents.

According to a

congressional candidate, "Our citizens are very impatient to
feel. ..the benefical[sic] effects of internal improvements....[T]hey

want something here.”7 As with bank bills, railroad charters received
bipartisan support with every legislator wanting a railroad to pass
through his district.

Between 1831 and 1837, the legislature

chartered twenty-three railroads, fifteen of these rural lines.
Describing this railroad frenzy, historian Merl Reed contends, "deals,
conflict of interest, and parochial jealousy were the order of the
day" and that this policy "scattered the state’s energy into
meaningless activity.

Green, Finance and Economic Development. 30-1; W. T. Palfrey to
Boyd Smith, June 8, 1834, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC; George Kelso to
Josiah S. Johnston, February 11, 1831; Thomas Butler to Johnston,
February 23, 1832, Johnston Papers, HSP (quote).
7John Moore to John Close, March 5, 1823, John Close Papers, LLMVC;
Edward G. W. Butler to Wife, January 31, 1831, Edward George Washington
Butler Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University; Henry H. Gurley to Henry
Clay, August 20, 1826, in Jaaes F. Hopkins, et al., eds., The Papers of
Henry Clay (11 vols., Lexington, 1959-92), 5:634-635 (quote).
0

Merl Reed, New Orleans and the Railrrwls; fbg struggle for
Commercial Empire (Baton Rouge, 1966), 5-19 (quotes, p. 14, 10).
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The nationwide Panic of 1837 helped bring an end to the
Louisiana legislature’s unconditional approval of banks and railroads.
Throughout 1837 and 1838, commentators coaplained of the scarcity of
money and the stagnation of business in New Orleans as banks suspended
A

specie payment.

By the end of the decade, Louisiana’s banking and

railroad systems would both be on the verge of collapse.

The bursting

of the speculative bubble resulted in a fifteen year struggle to
determine the best way to control banking and internal iaproveaent
practices.

Unlike previous discussions, the debate now took the fora

of a partisan contest.

The Democrats criticized the legislature for

doing little else the past eight years other than granting and
amending charters and wasting the tax-payers’ money by backing these
schemes with state bonds.

They argued that the best solution for

avoiding liberty-threatening consolidations of power was for the state
to outlaw banks and monopolies and remove government support from all
private commercial endeavors.

Also, Democrats believed that the

legislature should more strictly enforce the charters of those
corporations currently in existence and that corporations should be
treated as individuals without the benefit of special legislation.

Henry W. Huntington to William Mercer, April 4, 1837, William N.
Mercer Papers, Manuscripts Department, Tulane University, New Orleans,
Louisiana (Hereinafter TU); F. Wharton to L. Wharton, December 1, 1837,
Edward Clifton Wharton Family Papers, LLMVC; George Fennell to Samuel
Fennell, March 1838, George Fennell Letter, Historic New Orleans
Collection; Edwin A. Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes
of Louisiana. 1836-1846 as Reflected in the Diary of Bennet H. Barrow
(New York, 1943), March 3, 1838, p. 108. (Hereinafter Barrow Diary)
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Thus, if a business violated a law, it should be punished and, if
necessary, its charter revoked.*®
The Whigs proposed a more positive role for the state
government— government aid and investment in both banks and railroads.
They maintained that forcing banks to resume specie payments would
hurt the entire state as the banks pressured rural customers to repay
loans. The Whigs argued that given time the banks would resume
payment and the economy would recover.

They added that the main

culprit in the financial crisis was the federal government’s decision
to remove itself from banking: Andrew Jackson’s veto of the bill to
recharter the Bank of the United States and his removal of federal
deposits from the institution.

In their view, the Louisiana

legislature should learn from Jackson’s mistakes and not repeat them
by rashly withdrawing the government from the state’s financial
system.11
During the Panic of 1837, most Louisiana banks called in loans
and suspended specie payments in violation of their charters, and many
railroads stopped construction.

Governor White focused on the

deteriorating financial situation in his message to the legislature
which met in December 1837 asserting that Louisiana was in a "state of
financial embarrassment that is without comparison." White primarily
blamed the distress on the absence of a national bank, but also

10Clinton Louisianian. March 9, 1838; Edward G.W. Butler to Thomas
Butler, September 9, 1837, Thomas Butler Papers, LLMVC.
11Bee. February 16, 1838. For the best examples of Democratic and
Whig views on banking and internal improvements see the constitutions of
1845 and 1852 respectively.
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advocated an alteration in state banking policy.

Heeding the

governor’s suggestion, legislators, after three eonths of debate,
passed a bank refora act.

Reaction to the Measure varied, with the

New Orleans financial coanninity’s organ, the Whig Co— ercial Bulletin,
urging Governor White to veto and Deaocratic newspapers imploring hia
to sign the bank b i l l T h o u g h Governor White had suggested bank
reform in his opening address to the legislature, he vetoed the
measure.

White contended that the bill was unconstitutional because

it violated the sanctity of the contracts between the government and
the banks, and he charged its proponents with "agrarianism"— a country
parish bias against New Orleans and its coaaercial system.

White’s

opponents held an anti-veto meeting where they alleged that the
governor had prostituted himself to the corrupt and aristocratic New
Orleans bank clique because he needed its support in his bid for the
First District congressional seat which Henry Johnson had vacated to
run for governor.1^
Following White’s veto, Louisiana Democrats and Whigs, who in
prior races had battled over the expediency and constitutionality of a
national bank, now clashed over state banking policy as well.

Though

the bank reform bill had been a bipartisan measure, the Democrats
eagerly embraced it and attacked White’s veto in their legislative,
congressional, and gubernatorial campaigns.

White’s congressional

opponent, John Slidell, repeatedly criticized the governor for his
^Louisiana House Journal. 13th leg., 2nd sess., 2; Commercial
Bulletin, February 15, 24, March 2, 1838; Bee. February 26, 1838.
^Commercial Bulletin. March 3, 5, 1838; Anti-Veto meeting in Bee.
March 6, 1838; Clinton Louisianian. March 9, April 20, 1838.
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veto which went against the wishes of the majority of voters.
Immediately following the publication of an obscure state
representative’s speech in the legislature attacking White’s veto,
Second District Democrats nominated him for Congress.14 Additionally,
Democratic legislative candidates pledged themselves to support
banking reform, and, in the governor’s race, the Democratic Louisiana
Courier frequently attacked Roman for his refusal to take a stance on
the bank bill.15
More divided over state banking policy, the Whigs tried to
distance themselves from the issue.

They argued that Louisiana’s

financial woes were not specific to Louisiana but were part of a
national problem which demanded a national solution— the re
establishment of the Bank of the United States.

Whig candidates ran

with vague pledges such as the necessity for "wholesome and proper
regulations" regarding state banking, while asserting that Democrats
wished to eliminate all banks.

At the same time, they adamantly

declared themselves in favor of a national bank.18 Two of the Whigs’
three congressional candidates made the rechartering of a national
bank a principal plank in their campaigns.

Even in the gubernatorial

14The speech took up five columns of the Clinton Louisianian. March
23, 1838. His nomination appeared in ibid.. March 30, 1838.
^Louisiana Courier. June 2, 9, 1838; Clinton Louisianian. April 13,
June 22, 1838.
16Franklin Planters* Banner. December 10, 1837; Alexander Porter to
John Ker, June 28, 1837, Iter Family Papers, SHC; John Lobdell to the
Electors of the Parish of West Feliciana, 1838 Broadside, Turnbull-Allain
Family Papers, LLMVC (quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. March 31, 1838;
Clinton Louisianian. May 4, June IS, 1838; Louisiana Advertiser in Bee.
May 4, 1838.
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canvass, the Whig True American described the contest between Rowan
and Prieur as "a question of bank or no bank." While equivocating on
the state bank reform debate, Rowan boldly championed the national
bank, rewinding voters that he was a Whig before a party by that nawe
existed.

As early as the 1824 presidential contest, he had backed

Henry Clay and the aiws of the Awerican System.17
Democrats not only campaigned against the bank aristocracy
within the state, but also continued their assaults on the national
bank.

Led by John Slidell, the Democrats incorporated the politics of

slavery, which both sides had used in the 1836 presidential campaign,
in their attack on this institution.

While serving in the

legislature, Slidell introduced a bill to instruct Louisiana’s
representatives in Washington to oppose any act calling for the
chartering of a national bank because the institution would be allied
with northern abolitionists.

He argued that a national bank would be

based in the northeast, a region which "has exhibited such hostility
to [southern] institutions" and that therefore it was "not advisable
and...very dangerous."

Slidell’s argument had some appeal as the

measure passed the Whig-controlled house by one vote before failing in
the senate. 18

Edward Douglass White, address to legislature, Louisiana House
Journal 13th leg., 2nd sess., 4-5; Thomas W. Chinn to the Voters of the
Second Congressional District in Clinton Louisianian. June 15, 1838; In
the Third District, Whig Rice Garland ran unopposed in 1838 and did not
make a statement of his views; True American. July 2, 1838; Commercial
Bulletin. June 1, 1838.
to

Louisiana House Journal. 13th leg., 2nd sess., 27-8.
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Following the introduction of Slidell’s bill, Niew Orleans
Democrats held a convention that resolved to oppose a national bank
both because of its unconstitutionality and because men outside the
South would control southern institutions.
extended Slidell’s argument.

Louisiana Democrats soon

They contended that because all

abolitionists were pro-bank men, and all pro-bank men were Whigs,
therefore all Whigs were abolitionists. 19 Despite its flawed logic,
their argument succeeded in putting Louisiana Whigs on the defensive.
Having gained publicity for introducing this concept into the
legislature, Slidell continued to employ it in his congressional
contest against Governor White.

In the Second District, Democrats

labelled Whig candidate and national bank champion Thomas W. Chinn, "a
political brother of the New England abolitionists.” Even Whig
legislative candidates found themselves forced to explain how an
assertion that they adhered to the nationalistic doctrines of
Massachusetts Whig Daniel Webster did not make them abolitionists.

In

a letter discussing his political views, Roman belittled the
Democratic charges, stating "I am not an abolitionist because it has
pleased a crazy man to say so.
The Whigs proved less inclined to employ abolitionist charges,
but did use them against Slidell and Prieur.

In the First District

contest, they questioned the northern-born Slidell's commitment to the

f9

Democratic Convention in Louisiana Courier. January 25, 1838; Bee.
April 24, 1838; Louisiana Courier. May 24, June 7, 1838.
^Clinton Louisianian. May 4, 1838 (first quote); John Lobdell to the
Electors of the Parish of West Feliciana, 1838 Broadside, Turnbull-Allain
Family Papers, LLMVC; Commercial Bulletin. June 1, 1838 (second quote).
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South.

In the gubernatorial race, Deaocrat Denis Prieur proved

particularly vulnerable.

An unmarried aan, Prieur lived with a free

woman of color in New Orleans.

Possessing a sense of discretion in

racial and sexual matters, Whig newspapers were reluctant to broach
this subject, but by the end of the campaign season they referred to
it, albeit most often in a cryptic manner.

Instead of mentioning

Prieur’s domestic situation directly, the True American worried about
the possibility of a bad example being set in high places, and
mentioned a "taint of abolitionism or amalgamation" without specifying
any details.

Safely outside of New Orleans, the Baton Ro»g*» anrmtt^

mocked Prieur for having a family but not being married, and then
openly acknowledged his involvement in an interracial relationship and
tied it to fears of abolition.21
Not only did the Democrats label their opponents abolitionists,
but they also portrayed them as aristocrats.

In the governor’s race,

the Democrats emphasized that their party had nominated Prieur at a
convention, while Roman’s candidacy steamed from "WHIG DICTATION."
Johnson’s withdrawal from the canvass at the behest of a legislative
clique bolstered their case, and they especially denounced the
assumption that Johnson could "give" his votes to Roman.

They also

questioned whether Roman succeeding his successor violated the spirit
of rotation in office and wondered if the Whigs felt that only
Johnson, White, and Roman were capable of leading the state.22
21Louisiana Courier, June 28, 1838; True American. July 3, 1838;
Baton Rouge Gazette. June 22, 1838.
22Louisiana Courier. May 2, 15, 1838; Donaldsonvi 1le Advocate in
Louisiana Courier. June 1, 1838.
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Democrats’ charges of Whig aristocracy coincided with their opposition
to banks, as they alleged that corrupt Whig bank directors expected
the masses to submit to their will.

Democratic newspapers also

contrasted the parties’ campaign styles.

On one hand, Prieur "The

Friend of the People," toured the state meeting the electorate until
illness forced him to return to New Orleans.

On the other hand,

Roman, an aristocratic planter, only met with gentlemen and expected
them to deliver votes in their parishes.

Similarly, party newspapers

contended that their congressional candidate spoke to the yeomen and
mechanics, while his opponent stood for the rich and well born.

ji

Democrats claimed that their leading principle was opposition to
consolidations of power and privilege, and consequently they not only
fought monopolies but challenged the ultimate symbol of Louisiana
aristocracy, the Constitution of 1812.

As in 1834, Democrats proudly

claimed that if elected they would increase the size of the state’s
electorate by eliminating the property requirement for suffrage.

Both

Democratic congressional candidates pledged themselves to suffrage
expansion, while their Whig opponents remained silent upon the
issue.M

The same situation prevailed in legislative races.

In

Ouachita Parish, a planter-lawyer with no political experience,
Solomon Weathersbee Downs, defeated a three-term Whig state senator by
advancing the cause of universal suffrage. Downs would soon become
the chief legislative spokesman for constitutional revision.

The

Clinton Louisianian and the Democratic candidates who addressed the
23

Louisiana Courier. May 31, June 22, 1838; Bee. May 10, 1838.

24Bee, June 14, 27, 1838; Clinton Louisianian. May 18, 1838.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

142

voters through its columns advocated universal suffrage.

The only

Whig to use the Louisianian’s coluans did not sent ion suffrage, and
the newspaper branded hia an opponent of any expansion of the
electorate.

If publicly Whigs attempted to maintain that suffrage

should not be an issue, privately, retired Whig Senator Alexander
Porter confessed that he ”fear[ed] that men are not capable of selfgovernment.*5
The absence of & Whig stance on universal suffrage did not hurt
the party too much, for it achieved an overwhelming victory.

Whigs

won the governor’s race, all three congressional seats, and control of
the legislature.
regions.

Roman defeated Prieur in all four of the state’s

In North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, two areas which

usually supported Democrats, unfami liarity with Prieur and antipathy
toward a New Orleans candidate contributed to Roman’s victory.

South

Louisiana voted for Roman, one of its favorite-sons, and continued its
support for the party of the pro-tariff American System.

Roman even

won Prieur’s home region of Greater Orleans by one vote.

The Whig

party’s alliance with the commercial sector enabled Roman to overcome
Prieur’s personal popularity in the Crescent City. (SEE APPENDIX B)
Democrats knew exactly where to place the blame for their
defeat: the corrupt banking system in the state and the friends of a
national bank.

Whigs owed their legislative majority to commercial

New Orleans where the party won all eight seats contested.

The

*5C1 inton Louisianian. January 12, May 18, June 22, 29, 1838;
Louisiana Courier. June 30, 1838; Alexander Porter to John Ker, June 28,
1837, Ker Family Papers, SBC; Biography of the Honorable Solomon W. Downs
of Louisiana (Philadelphia, 1852), 5.
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Clinton Louisianian claired that even in the Florida Parishes Rso
great was the bank nania" that Whigs would vote for a pro-bank horse
thief before voting for an anti-bank angel.

The Louisiana Courier

condemned "Bank influence" which had purchased votes and the
cancellation of Prieur’s state tour for the defeat.

Defeated

congressional candidate John Slidell maintained that former Democratic
chief Martin Gordon and his son, who were both involved in Louisiana
banking had deserted the party.

Writing to the National

Intelligencer. A Louisiana Whig concurred that the party had won by
fighting "openly and boldly under the banner of ’a National Bank and
sound currency.’”^
Having used their commitment to a national bank to sweep the
1838 state elections, Louisiana Whigs hoped to elect a Whig president
in 1840 who would recharter such an institution.

Thus, Henry Clay,

the founder of the American System, was their first choice for the
post.

In preparation for the 1840 presidential contest, Clay modified

his nationalist stance to prove more attractive to southern Whigs.
For Louisiana Whigs this step was unnecessary.

They not only

announced their support for Clay, but reaffirmed their commitment to
his American System, especially the national bank.

The New Orleans

Bee, by 1840 a Whig newspaper, acknowledged that while elsewhere Whigs
did not advocate a bank, Whigs of Louisiana, "known for their

26

* Clinton Louisianian. July 20, 1838 (first quote); Louisiana
Courier. July 25, 1838; John Slidell to Martin Van Buren, April 20, 1839,
Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; Washington National Intelligencer. July 17,
1838 (second quote).
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undisguised and shrinking advocacy of such an institution," used the
issue to distinguish between their party and Democrats.^
In 1839, for the first tiae, the national Whig party held a
convention to select a presidential noainee.

In March 1838, Louisiana

Whigs chose delegates to represent the state at the forthcoaing
convention and instructed them to support Henry Clay.

The Whig

party’s choice of delegates reveals its commitaent to & national bank.
The delegates included long-time national bank champion Alexander
Porter and George M. Graham, a self-described "Adaas and Clay Whig."
Only Graham actually attended the 1839 Harrisburg Convention, and on
every ballot he cast Louisiana’s votes for Clay.

Despite having the

backing of Louisiana and the rest of the South, Clay lost the
nomination to William Henry Harrison, one of the trio of Whig
candidates from 1836.

Clay failed because Whigs believed he had too

many enemies and was associated too closely with the American System,
which not all Whigs embraced.

With Harrison being connected with no

particular policies and with the convention not issuing a platform,
each state’s Whig party could campaign in any manner it saw fit.

In

Louisiana, Clay’s failure to capture the nomination caused "feelings
of sorrow and disappointment” for the editor of the Bee, and Alexander

27
For Louisiana Whig meeting in favor of Clay see Commercial
Bulletin. February 6, 1838; Bee. August 19, 1840; For Clay moving away
from economic nationalism and toward the South see William J. Cooper,
Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge,
1978), 121-125.
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Porter, reduced to tears, complained that with Harrison atop the
ticket, the party deserved to lose.
Democrats did not face such surprises with their party’s
nomination as no one seriously contested President Martin Van Buren’s
bid for re-election.

In Louisiana, the battle between the supporters

of Van Buren and Harrison involved three main points: which candidate
best protected the South and slavery, the constitutionality and
expediency of a national bank, and which party best represented the
people.

The 1840 campaign, however, remains famous not for the

substance of its debates but for its spectacle— log cabins, hard
cider, victory balls, parades, and festivals.

Louisiana did not lack

in this aspect of the campaign, and Porter even predicted such
occurrences a year prior to the election, warning that "our political
contests have accustomed the public mind to such exaggeration that
nothing will awaken its attention on anv subject but the strongest
kind of stimulus."2®
Throughout the South, partisans waged an unrelenting war over
whether Van Buren or Harrison would best protect slavery from northern
fanatics.

Upon hearing of Harrison’s nomination, the editor of the

Bee immediately recognized the potency of such barbs, worrying that
"General Harrison should be popular in this latitude, but we have now
IB

Commercial Bulletin. February 6, 1838; Alexander Porter to John J.
Crittenden, March 9, 1838, December 18, 1839, Alexander Bullitt to
Crittenden (quote), December 21, 1839, John J. Crittenden Papers, LC;
"The Autobiography of George M. Graham,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly
XX (1937), 49; Robert Gray Gunderson, The Log Cabin Campaign (Lexington,
Ky, 1957), 57-66.
29

Alexander Porter to Jesse B. Harrison, November 6, 1839, Burton N.
Harrison and Family Papers, LC (quote).
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to consune so much tine in defending him from suspicion of
aboLitionisn." He knew the perfect nethod for relieving this
pressure, ”1 will go to work to show Van Buren’s connection with
abolitionists and try to put the locofocos on their defense."

Charges

of abolitionism had played a role in the 1836 presidential campaign
and in the 1838 state elections, but those races compared to the 1840
campaign neither in terms of the number of accusations of abolitionist
tendencies nor in the animosity of the attacks.

Throughout much of

the summer and fall, both Democrat and Whig newspapers published
stories virtually every day on wh&t the Bee described as the "all
absorbing question of SLAVERY!"^
Within a week of Harrison’s nomination, the Bee was already
defending his record on slavery.

The Democrats’ main allegations

against Harrison were that he had belonged to an abolition society, he
had moved from the slave to the free states, he advocated the selling
of white men into slavery, and he was in favor of emancipation.

Even

if Harrison was not an abolitionist, Democrats charged that his
closest political allies were and without their support he would have
never received the Whig nomination.

Louisiana Democrats explained

that the southern Whigs’ distrust of Harrison had led them to vote
repeatedly against Harrison and for Clay at the national convention.
Only the unrelenting support of New England abolitionists had secured
Harrison’s victory over this solid southern opposition.
^Alexander Bullitt to John J. Crittenden, March 9, 1838, John J.
Crittenden Papers, LC (first quote); Bee. June 12, 1840. (second quote)
31Bee. January 4, 1840; Louisiana Courier. January 16, 20, 25,
February 12, May 12, 1840.
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Democrats claimed that Harrison’s nomination sent the wrong
message to the nation’s black population.

The Louisiana Courier

merged the charges of abolitionism and selling whites into slavery and
explained that if Harrison had his way, a free Negro could buy a white
man and inflict lashes upon his back.

Writing from Washington,

Louisiana’s Democratic Senator Robert C. Nicholas provided more
damaging evidence against the Harrison movement.

Nicholas explained

that he had witnessed a disturbing scene in the nation’s capital— a
parade of free blacks in favor of Harrison’s victory.

The party

claimed that Louisianans had to fear the reactions of slaves as well
as free blacks.

Warning of the slave insurrections which would follow

a Whig victory, the Louisiana Courier advised Louisiana’s planters
that a Whig vote could lead to the "inundations of your rich plains
with the blood of thousands."3*
Regarding slavery, Louisiana Whigs adopted the policy suggested
by the editor of the Bee— a good offense is the best defense.

While

defending the southem-bom Harrison as "the uncompromising advocate
of Southern Rights” and decrying Democratic slanders against the
general, the partisan press spent more time assailing Van Buren’s
record on abolition.

Whigs transformed the Democrats’

characterization of Van Buren as a "Northern man with Southern
principles" to one of a "Northern man without principles," especially
principles regarding the South’s peculiar institution.

They charged

Vein Buren with being an abolitionist, opposing the admission of
32

For Washington procession see Louisiana Courier. May 11, July 17,
1840; For insurrection scare see ibid., June 12 (quote), November 14,
1840.
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Missouri as a slave state, admitting congressional power to eliminate
slavery in Washington, D.C., and voting for negro suffrage while in
the New York legislature.

The Whig Central Committee of New Orleans

reminded Louisiana’s electors that at the same time they voted, black
men in New York enfranchised by Martin Van Buren were casting their
ballots.33
While accusations of abolition produced the greatest number of
campaign articles, the debate over national and state banking occupied
a prominent position as well.

Democrats attacked Whigs as corrupt

"Federal-Bank-o-crats" whose support had been purchased by the
national bank.

Throughout the campaign, Democrat meetings passed

resolutions praising Van Buren’s Independent Treasury policy, which
attempted to divorce the federal government entirely from the nation’s
banking system.

These meetings blamed the nation’s financial distress

not on Van Buren but on Whig speculators and the remnants of the Bank
of the United States.

They ridiculed the idea of rechartering the

institution as a "Whig panacea."3* Campaigning for the July 1840
state elections, Democrats lambasted the Whig-controlled legislature’s
continued refusal to enact any legislation regulating state banks.
Since Governor White’s veto of the 1838 bank bill, no bank measure had

33Commercial Bulletin. February 3, 1840 (quote); Bee. June 12, 17,
1840.
3*Louisiana Courier. March 23 (second quote), June 18, 1840 (first
quote); F.L. Bosworth to Jacob Bieller, July IS, 1839, Alonzo Snyder
Papers, LLMVC; For Democrats’ anti-bank, pro-independent Treasury
resolutions see Resolutions of Democratic Association of West Feliciana,
1840, in Henry A. Lyons Papers, LLMVC; Fourth of July Speech, 1840,
William S. Hamilton Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Courier. February 27, March
16, October 30, 1840.
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passed, and the Democrats campaigned under the banner of state bank
reform.

In New Orleans, they charged that the Whig legislative ticket

was composed entirely of bank directors who would continue to avoid
the problem.3*
Louisiana Whigs held a polar opposite view of the nation’s
financial situation.

Blaming Van Buren’s policies for the nation’s

fiscal problems, they offered an easy solution: vote for Harrison and
a national bank.

A Whig address charged Van Buren with undertaking a

"war on currency” leading to "universal confusion and distress."

In a

letter declining his renomination to Congress, Thomas W. Chinn
contrasted the prosperity of the country under a national bank to the
current situation with "commerce prostrated [and] credit ruined.”
Alexander Porter agreed that Van Buren’s policies had led to pecuniary
distress and in an open letter urged the Whig leadership in Rapides
Parish to campaign on this issue.3* Whigs even answered criticism of
the Whig legislature’s failure to enact bank legislation with the
assertion that if the Democrats had not crushed the Bank of the United
States then there would not be a state banking problem.

They added

that restrictions on Louisiana banks would only lead to a flood of

33Louisiana Courier. June 26, July 3, 1840; Shreveport Caddo Free
Press, April 30, 1840.
^Commercial Bulletin. March 4, 1840; Whig address in Bee. June 17,
1840; Letter of Thomas W. Chinn to Hon. Thomas Gibbs Morgan. President
of the whig convention of the Second Congressional District...
(Washington, 1840), 4-6 (quote p. S); Alexander Porter to Whig Committee
of Rapides, May 9, 1840, in Bee. May 30, 1840.
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currency from banks in other states because of the lack of national
oversight in the absence of the Bank of the United states.17
For both parties, the battle over a national bank directly
connected to the contest over which candidate best protected the
republic, or conversely which party most jeopardized the people’s
freedom.

The Whigs warned the electorate, "Your liberties are in

danger I" and the Democrats readily agreed that voters needed to decide
if they were "FREEMEN OR SLAVES!" The two parties disagreed, however,
on precisely what threatened the people’s liberties.1* Democrats
contended that the battle-lines were drawn between their party and the
bank aristocrats.

They asserted that the nation had always been

divided between democratic champions of the people and federalist bank
men who, in arguing for a national bank, perverted the meaning of the
Constitution to promote the welfare of a few at the expense of the
many.

They mocked the Whig party’s attempt to claim the mantle of the

party of the people by having "BANK MEN who live in MARBLE PALACES"
erect log cabins to deceive the honest working men.

If elected, these

men would re-establish a national bank and destroy the people’s
liberty.19
If the Democrats warned of what might happen with a Harrison
victory, the Whigs pointed to what had already happened under the rule
of Martin Van Buren and his minions who were "grinding the people

17Bee, January 25, 1840; Commercial Bulletin. July 8, 1840.
3ft

Bee, June 12, 1840 (first quote); Louisiana Courier. July 1, 1840
(second quote).
39

Louisiana Courier. July 1, September 24, October 16, 1840.
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under the name of Democrats or friends of the people."

If Democrats

called Whigs "aristocrats," Whigs teraed Democrats "monarchists."40
According to the Whigs* principal argument, President Van Buren, in
the tradition of tyrannical Icings, was attempting to unite the purse
and the sword of the country in his hands.

Whigs warned that already

he had captured the purse with his Independent Treasury scheme, which
they claimed was only "independent" in that sense that it was removed
from the people’s control.

And, they seized upon the secretary of

war’s plan to reorganize the militia system as an effort by Van Buren
to create a two-hundred thousand man standing army answerable only to
him.

Whigs alleged that with purse and sword together, Van Buren

would have "a union, which has never yet failed, to overthrow public
liberty— a union which constitutes the very definition of despotic
power."41
Known as the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign," the
presidential election of 1840 is remembered more for its hoopla than
for arguments over slavery, banking, or threats to liberty.

Observing

the enthusiasm in Baltimore, Alexander Porter exclaimed, "I could not
have imagined...the excitement which prevails on the Presidential
election." He remained disappointed, however, that "It is only in

40R.F. McGuire, Diary (typescript), 1839, p. 16, LLMVC (quote);
Charges of monarchy in Bee. March 7, June 30, 1840; Baton Rouge Gazette.
October 3, 1840.
41Whig newspapers throughout the campaign abounded with these
charges. For creation of standing army see Alexandria Red River Whim.
April 25, 1840; Bee. June 4, 30, 1840; For allegations of uniting purse
and sword see Letter of Thomas W. Chinn to the Honorable Thomas Gibbs
Morgan.... 10; Commercial Bulletin. October 12, 1840; Bee, March 7,
October 28, 1840; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 3, 1840 (quote).
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Louisiana that I fear we are not so active as we should be."

Perhaps

because his first-choice, Henry Clay, had been denied the nomination,
Porter’s depiction of the 1840 canvass in Louisiana was overly
critical.

The campaign season in Louisiana had all of the thrills—

log cabins, a never-ending succession of meetings, parades, and
community-wide participation— that were present in the rest of the
nation.

The Commercial Bulletin more accurately described 1840 as

"The Year of Conventions" which culminated in huge statewide Whig
convention in Baton Rouge in October.

The newspaper proclaimed that,

in Louisiana, "Every citizen seems to have turned politician."

In

1840, "every citizen” included the entire community not just voters.
For the first time, women had an active role in the canvass, and the
Baton Rouge Gazette observed that the "political mania" had extended
even to children.42
In Louisiana, the campaign season began, as it had twelve years
earlier, with a visit from Andrew Jackson to commemorate his victory
in the Battle of New Orleans.

As Jackson’s arrival approached, New

Orleans was "all excitement" and business in the Crescent City
stopped.
wrangling.

As in 1828, the coming of Old Hickory inspired party
The Bee labelled it "a party maneuver,” while the

Louisiana Courier denigrated the Whig-controlled legislature’s refusal
to treat Jackson as an official guest of state.

When Jackson actually

arrived, however, partisan debate receded, and, instead of party
strife, parades and celebration moved to the forefront.

Even a Whig

^Alexander Porter to William T. Palfrey, June 18, 1840, Palfrey
Family Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Commercial Bulletin. October 6, 1840
(second quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. June 20, 1840 (third quote).
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could declare "The glorious 8th, a day

doubly dear to all

Louisianans."*^ A diarist described Louisiana’s obsession with
Jackson as "man worship in all its glory."

The whole community

participated, including women as well as men.

Women waved

handkerchiefs from balconies as the veterans paraded past, and the
diarist recounts one man even bringing his wife up to the stage to
kiss Old Hickory.**
Women may have started 1840 in their traditional role as
handkerchief-wavers, passively participating in a political
celebration, but, by the end of the presidential campaign, they had
assumed and been recognized as having an active political role for the
first time in Louisiana history.

Prior to 1840, newspaper accounts of

political gatherings never mentioned the presence of women, and when
politicians did acknowledge women, it was not to invite them into the
political arena.

For example, the toasts at an 1834 political

gathering included the patronizing, "Woman! Lovely Woman!! The
ornament of man in his happier hours, and solace when smitten with
sudden calamity."

In 1840, this dismissive attitude toward the

political role of women changed dramatically.

As part of the total

political involvement of the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider” campaign,

F.M. Weld and Company to J.G. Weld, January 6, 1840, Weld Company
Correspondence, LLMVC (first quote); Bee. November 16, 1839 (second
quote); Louisiana Courier. February 27, 1840; Samuel J. Peters, Jr.,
diary, January 8, 1840, LLMVC. (third quote)
**Davis, ed., Barrow Diarv. January 1840, p. 178 (quote);
Descriptions of celebration in Commercial Bulletin. January 10, 1840;
Louisiana Courier. January 9, 1840.
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women were addressed in the partisan press and attended political
celebrations.45
Not only did descriptions of political meetings include mention
of the number of women present, but they had a partisan role for the
first time.

One orator even boldly proclaimed, "the ladies all are

Whigs." The Democrats justly objected to this claim, but unarguably
the Whig party made a greater effort to include women.

Women had

their greatest role at the October state Whig convention held in Baton
Rouge, and in the parish meetings leading up to this event.45 Each
parish sent a delegation which included women, and they competed in
the making of political banners.

These banners echoed the themes that

male politicians discussed, such as "The South will maintain her
rights," and the final address of the convention was aimed directly at
the women present.

The Baton Rouge Gazette even printed

correspondence between the city’s Tippecanoe Club and Miss Nicholson
who had presented a banner.

Later that month, the Bee alluded to

another political role for women when it included an article from a
New England newspaper showing how a loyal Whig girl had shunned her
Democratic fiancd until he agreed to vote for a Whig candidate who won
the subsequent election by a single vote.

While none of these

activities were progenitors of a women’s rights movement in Louisiana,

45Louisiana Advertiser. August 5, 1834; For the role of women in the
campaign and their association with the Whig party see Gunderson, The
Log-Cabin Campaign, 135-139; Elizabeth R. Varon, "Tippecanoe and the
Ladies, Too: White Women and Party Politics in Antebellum Virginia,”
Journal of American History 82 (September 1995), 494-521.
45Coamercial Bulletin. June 26, 1840 (quote); Louisiana Courier.
November 2, 1840.
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they did show that woaen had begun to have a political role in the
state. 47
Though not all of Louisiana’s woaen were Whigs, enough or its
voters were Whigs to triuaph in the July elections and to place
Louisiana in Harrison’s coluan in November. In July, the Whig party
achieved a narrow three vote aajority for the upcoaing legislature and
retained two of three congressional seats.
defeated Van Buren 11,296 to 7,616.

In November, Harrison

After the presidential contest,

the Bee hailed New Orleans as the "WHIG CITY,” and this label could
have applied equally well in the legislative elections where the Whigs
captured all eight of New Orleans’s seats.
state races to the national contest.

Both parties had bound the

The phrase "Harrison and Reform"

topped the Whig legislative ticket, and the Whig Bee repeatedly
reminded New Orleans voters of the importance of the upcoaing
legislature having a Whig aajority.

This body would elect a United

States senator, and to recharter a national bank it was imperative
that the Senate have a Whig aajority.

In the congressional races,

Edward White easily held onto his seat, and Whig John Moore narrowly
won the seat vacated by Rice Garland’s appointment to the Louisiana
iS

____

supreme court. (SEE APPENDIX A)
The Democrats put a positive spin on the state results.

They

had reduced the Whigs’ aajority in the legislature and gained a
congressional seat after losing races in all three districts in 1838.
The Democrats even had a aajority of five legislators in the country
47

Baton Rouge Gazette. October 3, 10, 1840; Bee. October 27, 1840.

WBee, November 6, 1840.
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parishes.

They perhaps even consoled themselves that political power

in the state was slowly shifting from the city.

Four of the five

parishes created in the 1830s were in North Louisiana, and the
region’s vote total had wore than tripled frow 1832 to 1840.

In the

1824 gubernatorial race, only 11.7 percent of the ballots cast cane
from North Louisiana, but by 1840 this percentage had nearly doubled
to 21.1 percent.

If the Democrats waited long enough, possibly the

regions outside Greater Orleans and South Louisiana would grow enough
to enable the party to capture the state.

As politicians, however,

Democrats did not have the patience to wait for North Louisiana’s
growth to elevate them into control of the state, so they looked for a
method to obtain greater support from other regions to win Louisiana’s
1842 gubernatorial race.
In an attempt to make inroads into the Whig-dominated sugar
parishes, the Democrats chose their 1842 gubernatorial candidate from
South Louisiana.

The February 1840 convention, which appointed

delegates to the national presidential convention, nominated Alexander
Mouton, a Creole from Lafayette Parish.

A United States senator,

Mouton had previously served in the Louisiana legislature.

The

Democrats reiterated their commitment to Mouton in a January 1842 New
Orleans convention which, for the first time, included a party
platform.

Mixing national and state topics, the platform included

opposition to a national bank and congressional interference with
slavery as well as a desire to reform the state banking system and
amend the state constitution.

These latter two issues along with the
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division between the American and Creole populations became the
primary topics in the gubernatorial campaign.

49

While declining to establish a platform, the Whigs, in a March
1841 state convention attended by delegates from almost every parish,
rewarded Henry Johnson for his withdrawal from the 1838 race and
nominated him as their gubernatorial candidate.

With Johnson having

served as a delegate to the 1812 constitutional convention, as a state
legislator, as governor, and as a congressman, the Whigs considered
him one of Louisiana’s greatest statesmen.*0 The Democrats, however,
viewed Johnson’s experience as a liability not an asset.

They charged

Johnson, Governor Roman, and Congressman White with being an unholy
triumvirate that desired to rotate the state’s most important offices
among themselves.

Also, with the Democrats championing revision of

the aristocratic 1812 constitution, Johnson’s association with the
document made him even less acceptable to them as governor.*1
Although the Democrats had addressed constitutional revision in
both the 1834 and 1838 governor’s races, in 1842 they made it the
focal point of their campaign.

In July, along with voting for a

governor, legislators, and congressmen, the electorate would have the
opportunity to vote for or against the calling of a constitutional
convention.

The 1812 constitution had created a byzantine method for

49

Louisiana Courier. February 27, 1840; Baton Rouge Gazette. January
22, 1842.
*°Bee, March 10, May 11, 1842; Madison Parish Richmond Compiler.
March 15, 1842; Baton Rouge Gazette. June 25, 1842.
^Commercial Bulletin. February 3,
Louisiana Courier, (extra) July 4, 1842.

1842; Bee. June 14,
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amendment which involved both houses of the legislature passing a
convention bill detailing the specific amendments to be aade, the
governor signing the bill, and a aajority of the state’s eligible
voters approving the measure.

This saae procedure had to occur in

consecutive years for a convention to be called.
the entire process had to begin anew.

Any aissed step, and

Led by Soloaon W. Downs,

efforts were aade in the late 1830s to aaend the constitution, and
twice a convention bill passed the house only to be defeated in the
senate.

Finally in 1842, Governor Roaan signed a convention bill

which included amendments providing for universal white aale suffrage,
popular election of the governor, an increase in the nuaber of
elective offices, and reapportionaent.

In July, the electorate would

be given its first opportunity to express its opinion on revision.
Calling constitutional reform a "great and all-absorbing
question,” Democrats portrayed thenselves as its champions, and the
Whigs as its enemy.

Not only did the party include a plank in its

platform advocating revision, but in a well-publicized speech in
Clinton, Mouton attacked the 1812 constitution as oppressive and
tyrannical and contended that it treated freemen as slaves. He
asserted that the best way to rescue the state from the aristocratic
clique, which had long ruled, would be the implementation of "free
suffrage" to its full extent.

In meetings throughout the state,

Democrats passed resolutions declaring their commitment to
^While Louisiana voters had previously voted for governor,
technically the legislators selected from the top two vote-getters. In
every election, they had picked the people’s first-choice; Ted Ferguson,
"The Louisiana Constitution of 1845," (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State
Univers ity, 1948).
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constitutional change, and in New Orleans they distributed a pro
convention pamphlet.

In addition to the expansion of suffrage,

Democrats urged the direct election of the governor, making more
offices elective, and reapportioning the legislature, while charging
the Whigs with opposing any change in the constitution.*3
Though a Democrat meeting in St. Francisville asserted that
"revision of the state constitution will furnish a line of demarcation
between the parties," and Democrats alleged that Henry Johnson had
called the people "too ignorant to judge" whom should represent them,
Johnson and the Whig party challenged these declarations.

A Whig

newspaper claimed that both parties favored constitutional change, and
Johnson maintained that he personally favored revision.

He insisted,

however, that constitutional change was a legislative not: a
gubernatorial issue.

In Ouachita Parish, the Whig challenging Solomon

W. Downs, the Democratic champion of constitutional revision, tried to
explain to voters that the parties agreed on universal suffrage and
contended that the only difference between Downs and himself was their
attitudes toward a national bank.54
Despite these Whig protests, the parties unquestionably differed
in their respective stances on constitutional revision.

While Mouton

53Louisiana Courier. November 16 (quote), 19, 27, December 1, 1841;
Bee. June 24, 1842; Remarks on the Propriety of Calling a. Convention to
Amend the Constitution of the State of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1841).
54St. Francisville Democrat. December 3, 1841; T-ouisiana Courier.
December 18, 1841; Madison Parish Rirharmd Compiler. May 31, 1842; Baton
Rouge Gazette. June 25, 1842; For accusation about Johnson see Henry
Johnson to William Johnson, July 18, 1842, William Johnson Papers,
Mississippi Department of Archives and History (Hereinafter MDAH); Isaiah
Garrett to Mr. Underwood, May 13, 1842, Isaiah Garrett and Family Papers,
LLMVC.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

160

boldly endorsed refora, & Whig recognized that Johnson suffered
because of his half-hearted embrace of the convention question.
Additionally, soae Whigs tried to avoid the argument altogether by
explaining that the voters and not the parties should decide if the
constitution needed revision.
the measure completely.

Other Whigs went further and opposed

Contending that Mouton and the Democrats

wanted to make all offices elective, even the judiciary, the Whigs
warned voters that the Democratic remedy of constitutional change
could hurt more than it helped.

The Baton Rouge Gazette urged the

electorate to oppose universal suffrage because it would give "the
greatest vagabond" the right to vote.

Privately, retired Senator

Porter agreed that "the great cause of evil is universal suffrage."
The mixed message sent by Whigs contrasted sharply with the Democrats’
one voice in favor of a convention.^
As in the 1838 gubernatorial race, Louisiana’s financial
situation, especially its banking problems, overshadowed much of the
campaign.

In both 1838 and 1842, the main issue involved what should

be done with banks that had illegally suspended specie payments.
Since the Panic of 1837 when, in violation of their charters, all
Louisiana banks had suspended specie payment, the legislature had
debated bank reform.
vetoed.

In 1838, it passed a bill which Governor White

Because the banks had resumed specie payment, the issue was

avoided in the 1839 session, but when the banks suspended payment
S5Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. February 8, 1842; Bee. June 16,
17, 1842; Baton Rouge Gazette. June 25, July 2, 1842 (first quote); Henry
Adams Bullard to James G. Taliaferro, July 22, 1842, Taliaferro Papers,
LLMVC; Alexander Porter to Isaac Morse, 1842, in Edward C. Morse, Blood
of an Enyilshiwn (Abilene, Texas, 1943), 117 (second quote).
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again in January 1840* the legislature resuaed debate on what to do.
In both the 1840 and 1841 sessions, disagreement amongst legislators
prevented the passage of any bill. By December 1841, the situation
compelled action as the economic uncertainty "was crippling the
commercial life of the state."**
In 1842, the legislature passed, and Governor Roman signed "The
Louisiana Bank Act of 1842.” This bill reflected a bipartisan
agreement that something needed to be done about the banking crisis.
Voting on the measure did not split along party lines, but with a Whig
governor and with the Whigs having a legislative majority, the act was
associated with that party.

In the short run, the bill proved

disastrous, and in New Orleans, one of the effects was a two-day riot.
The Whigs continued to blame the state’s dire financial straits on the
absence of a national bank, but many voters had grown tired of this
refrain.

Democrats, including Mouton, crusaded against the injustice

of the state’s banking aristocracy and contended that with Whigs
controlling the presidency, the governor’s office, and the legislature
the fault must lie with their party. 57
Not only did the Democrats brand Johnson as opposed to
constitutional change and blame him for the state’s financial crisis,
they also denigrated his attachment to Louisiana and Louisianans.
Democrats claimed that the Virginia-born Johnson looked down upon

*fiGeorge D. Green, "The Louisiana Bank Act of 1842," Explorations in
Economic History VII (1970), 399-412 (quote, p. 403); Irene D. Neu,
"Edmund Jean Forstall and Louisiana Banking,” ibid., 383-398.
57

Opelousas Gazette. July 2, 1842; Louisiana Courier. July 4, 1842;
Bee. July 4, 1842.
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Louisiana’s Creole population, while Mouton served as its leader.
They attributed a quote to Johnson in which he supposedly said that he
did not care what the Creoles did in the election because he could win
without their votes.

Ridiculing the Democrats’ use of the "Creole

hobby,” Whigs denied the quote and pointed out that Johnson had lived
in Louisiana for more than forty years, and that in 1838 he had
withdrawn from the race to allow Roman, a Creole, to become governor.
Despite these Whig efforts, after the election, Johnson admitted that
"the Creole question...operated powerfully in several [F]rench
parishes," and, for the first time, a Democratic gubernatorial
candidate won the predominantly Creole South Louisiana region. 58
In addition to winning South Louisiana, Mouton defeated Johnson
9,650 to 8,221 in the state.

One Whig succinctly attributed Johnson’s

loss to "Creolism, the Bank question & the convention question."
Johnson agreed that these three causes, along with the accusation that
he, White, and Roman had tried to rotate the state’s offices among
themselves, had led to his defeat.

Louisiana Whigs assured national

leaders that the result was attributable to local causes and did not
signal a diminishment of the party’s popularity in the state.

Though

losing the governor’s race, the Whigs maintained their majority in the
legislature and won two of the three congressional races.

As in 1840,

New Orleans proved the key to Whig control of the legislature.
Evidently, either voters in the commercial city did not entirely blame
the Whigs for the financial crisis or they feared the Democratic
S8Opelousas Gazette. June 11, 1842; Bee. May 4, July 4, 1842;
Louisiana Courier. July 2, 1842; Henry Johnson to William Johnson, July
18, 1842, William Johnson Papers, MDAH (quote).
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solution, as Whigs swept the eleven legislative seats in the city.
Additionally, Johnson won 54.9 percent of the votes in Greater
Orleans, and the region's voters opposed a constitutional
convention.*9 (SEE APPENDIX B)
The rest of the state did not share Greater Orleans’s aniaosity
toward a new charter as 76.9 percent voted in favor of the neasure,
including over ninety percent in the Florida Parishes and North
Louisiana.

A new constitution with universal suffrage proved so

popular in North Louisiana that it was later alleged that by 1842 the
area had already stopped enforcing the property requirement for
voting.

Even in South Louisiana, a Whig stronghold, two-thirds voted

for the convention.

These overwhelming pro-convention percentages

undoubtedly exaggerate the appeal of constitutional revision.
According to the law, the convention had to be approved by over onehalf of eligible voters, so simply by not voting, one cast his vote
against the charter.60 (TABLE 3.1)
Whigs could confidently assert that despite Mouton’s victory and
the overwhelming demand for a constitutional convention, their party
remained strong by pointing to Louisiana’s four United States Senate
elections in the early 1840s.

In the 1830s, Whigs had not

59

Henry Adams Bullard to James G. Taliaferro, July 22, 1842,
Taliaferro Papers (quote); Henry Johnson to William Johnson, July 18,
1842, Johnson Papers, MDAH; Henry Clay to John Crittenden, July 21, 1842,
Crittenden Papers, LC; Election results in Bee. July 12, 19, 21, 1842.
^Constitutions of the State of Louisiana. Art. VII, Sec. 1, p. 562;
For North Louisianans voting despite not meeting qualifications see
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention which Assembled at the Citv of
New Orleans. January 14, 1844rsicl (New Orleans, 1845), 446, 448 , 456.
(Hereinafter Debates)
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TABLE 3.1

Vote on Constitutional Convention

FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOOTH LA

PERCENT
IN FAVOR

1843
YES

PERCENT
IN FAVOR

1842
YES

NO

2843
5013
1451
4089

289
124
1550
2067

90.8
97.6
48.4
66.4

2187
4111
2043
2888

174
130
1199
1264

92.6
96.9
63.0
69.6

13396 4030

76.9

11229

2767

80.2

NO

consistently supported their party’s nominee for the Senate, but in
each year from 1841 to 1844 a Whig legislature elected a Whig senator.
In 1841, with Democratic Senator Nicholas’s term expiring, the Whigs
offered Alexander Barrow as their candidate, while the Democrats
countered with the incumbent.

Perhaps fearing party defections, the

Whig party selected Barrow, a former Democratic states-rights
proponent, and he defeated Nicholas by six votes on the first
ballot.61 When Senator Mouton resigned in 1842 in order to campaign
for governor, the Whigs again turned to a former Democrat, New
Orleanian Charles M. Conrad, who had left the party after Jackson’s
bank veto and his withdrawal of funds from the institution.

Conrad

ran virtually unopposed, gaining thirty-five votes with his closest
competitor receiving nine.6*
Having only been elected to fill the remainder of Mouton’s term,
Conrad hoped for re-election to a full six-year term in 1843.

During

his brief senatorial career, however, Conrad undermined his own

61Louisiana Senate Journal. 15th leg., 1st sess., 16.
6*Louisiana Senate Journal. 16th leg., 1st sess., 60; Baton Rouge
Gazette. March 12, 1842.
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chances by blaspheming Louisiana’s savior, Andrew Jackson.

In 1842,

Congress debated remitting the fine which Judge Hall which levied on
Jackson in 1815 for his refusal to remove New Orleans from martial
law. Conrad’s vote against this measure raised the ire of both
Democrats and Whigs in Louisiana, and friends of Jackson swore they
would defeat his re-election.

A minority, Democrats in the

legislature could not elect one of their own, so they announced that
they would back retired Whig leader Alexander Porter who easily
defeated Conrad on the first ballot.*3 Democrats had voted for Porter
partially because they felt that illness would soon compel him to
resign his seat, and perhaps enable them to fill it with a member of
their party.

They had correctly predicted that sickness would force

Porter to resign, but they had underestimated his political savvy.
Porter carefully timed his resignation for a period when the Whigs
controlled the legislature and when the disruptive Conrad was absent
in Europe.

In January 1844, the Whigs elected perennial candidate

Henry Johnson to the Senate, as a reward for his loyal service to the
party.M
Control of the legislature in 1842 proved doubly important for
the Whigs, for not only did this body have to power to elect a United
^Edward G.W. Butler to Andrew Jackson, July 17, 1842, James W.
Breedlove to Jackson, July 18, 1842, October 20, 1842, January 27, 1843,
Jean B. Plauch6 to Jackson, November 2, 1842, Andrew Jackson Papers, LC;
New Orleans Jeffersonian. May 30, 1842; Daily Picayune. January 10, 1843.
MHenry D. Piere to Andrew Jackson, January 9, 1843, Jackson Papers,
LC; John Slidell to Martin Van Buren, February 2, 1844, Van Buren Papers,
LC; Alexander Porter to John J. Crittenden, December 2, 1843, Crittenden
Papers, LC; For the importance of any Whig senator but Conrad see
Alexander Porter to Walter L. Brashear, February 2, 1844, BrashearLawrence Papers, SHC.
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States senator but also, with the addition of a fourth congressional
seat in Louisiana, it was vested with the authority to redistrict the
state.

Using what an opponent called "the strictest gerrymandering

principles," Whig legislators hoped their party would have majorities
in every district but the third.

In July 1843, Louisiana voters went

the polls to fill the redistricted congressional seats until the
regularly scheduled 1844 election.

Anticipating victories in three of

the races, Whigs were stunned when the Democrats, who had never
captured more than one of Louisiana’s three districts, won all four
contests.**
Negative reaction to the gerrymander contributed to the result,
but anger over Conrad’s course regarding Jackson’s fine, and party
attitudes toward constitutional change were probably more significant.
Resenting the rebuke that Conrad had given to their hero, Louisianans
were appalled when the Whigs considered running him as a candidate in
the First District.

Though Conrad withdrew, Democrat John Slidell

continued to campaign against this traitor to Louisiana, and he easily
won the race.** Throughout the state, Democrats benefitted from the
Alexander Walker to Martin Van Buren, August 6, 1843, Van Buren
Papers, LC (quote); Thomas Curry to John Liddell, June 2, 1843, Moses and
St. John R. Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; The redistricting plan was:
First District— Orleans Parish below Canal Street and the parishes of
Plaquemines and St. Bernard; Second District— Orleans Parish above Canal
Street and the parishes of Jefferson, St. John, St. James, Ascension,
Assumption, Lafourche, and Terrebonne; Third District— Florida Parishes
plus the parishes ofCarroll, Madison, Tensas, Concordia, Catahoula,
Avoyelles, Fointe Coupee, Iberville, and West Baton Rouge; Fourth
District— the rest of North Louisianaplus the parishes of St. Martin,
St. Mary, Lafayette,
St. Landry, and Calcasieu; Baton Rouge Gazette.
August 12, 1843; Daily Tropic. November 24, 1843.
**John Slidell to Andrew Jackson, July 12, 1843, John Claiborne to
Jackson, July 5, 1843, Jackson Papers, LC.
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congressional election coinciding with the second vote on whether to
call a constitutional convention.

They continued adamantly to deaand

change, while Whigs reaained lukewarm.

With the constitutional natter

requiring not a majority of the ballots cast but of all eligible
voters, staying away froa the polls was equivalent to voting against
the measure. Many Whigs chose this option and soae even reportedly
left the state to defeat the convention call.

Thus, realizing the

importance of each pro-convention vote, Democratic turnout probably
exceeded that of Whigs and aided in winning close races.67 (TABLE 3.1)
With a majority of the electorate voting in favor of a
convention, the constitution-aaking process in Louisiana finally caae
to fruition in 1844.

In July, an election for convention aeabers

was held and in August the body aet in the small town of Jackson in
East Feliciana Parish.

Despite the payment of lip-service to the idea

of a non-partisan convention, Whig and Democratic parish meetings
nominated candidates and offered the voters a choice of programs.

The

electorate played a significant role as the caapaign generated an
unprecedented number of candidates’ letters to voters.

These letters

detailing aspirants’ views on revision filled newspaper columns.

Both

parties also modified their original planks to cater to the voters’

67Jeremiah Y. Dashiell to James K. Polk, July 27, 1844, in Herbert
Weaver and Wayne Cutler, eds., Correspondence
Jawes K. Polk
(Knoxville, Tenn., 1969-1996); 7:405-407.
68

For a discussion of the 1845 constitution see Judith K. Schafer,
"Reform or Experiment? The Louisiana Constitution of 1845," in Warren M.
Billings and Edward F. Haas, eds., In Search of Fundamental Law:
Louisiana’s Constitutions. 1812-1974 (Lafayette, La., 1993), 21-36; For
a view with a greater eaphasis on partisanship see Ferguson, "The
Louisiana Constitution of 1845."
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dictates.

Within the convention, however, the parties did divide on

several important Measures, particularly those regarding the extent of
democracy, apportionment, and views toward corporations.

Though

partisan rivalry shaped auch of the convention, hostility between the
country parishes and New Orleans also played a key role with the
country parishes insisting that the city’s power be restricted.
Though at least one candidate "[did] not consider [the
convention] a proper subject for the interference of Party
Conventions," nost partisans disagreed.

With the election for Members

of the constitutional convention coinciding with the July legislative
and congressional elections, Democratic and Whig parish meetings
nominated convention slates at the same time they chose men for those
offices.

While agreeing on the need for universal white male

suffrage, reapportionment, and the increase in the number of elective
offices, the parties did offer the voters a choice of programs.

The

Democrats favored more sweeping changes including having only minimal
residency requirements for voters, making all offices including the
judiciary elective, abolishing the state banking system, and making it
illegal for the state to go into debt.

They also reminded voters that

they had long advocated revision, especially universal suffrage, while
the Whigs had continually tried to maintain restricted access to the
ballot.

Charging Democrats with wanting to fashion radical changes

such as an elective judiciary, Whigs alleged their opponents sought to

69

James Dunlap to Alonzo Snyder, November 18, 1843, Snyder Papers,
LLMVC (first quote); Louisiana Democratic Association Address, 1844, John
A. Quitman Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Courier. January 12, February 10,
March 1, April 2, 1844.
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destroy and not to aaend the constitution.

In contrast, their party

would protect the people from this anarchy by minimizing changes in
the 1812 charter.

A few Whigs even claiaed that the convention only

had the power to aake the specific changes mentioned in the bill
calling for the convention.

The party also wanted longer residency

requirements, fewer elective offices, and fewer restrictions on
business than the Democrats.7®
In this campaign, the Louisiana electorate played a greater role
than it had in any previous contest.

In prior races, candidates had

issued circulars and written letters to their constituents but not to
the extent witnessed in the convention election.

In New Orleans, the

resolutions of a Democratic convention included a list of the specific
changes that the party recommended, and at least one country newspaper
analyzed the 1812 constitution section by section.^

In Madison

Parish, in response to a list of questions printed in the Richmond
Compiler, seven candidates wrote letters detailing their views.

Only

one competitor did not publish a letter, insisting that he had
articulated his position at a parish court meeting.

This explanation

apparently proved unconvincing to the electorate, for, in the
subsequent week’s issue, he answered the questions.
Parish, the same situation prevailed.

In St. Landry

The Opelousas Gazette included

an inquiry into the nominees’ positions on several key matters, and

70Opelousas Gazette. January 20 , 29, 1844; Vidalia Concordia
Intelligencer. September 30, October 21, 1843; Baton Rouge Gazette.
January 20, Much 19, 1844; Bee. May 23, June 1, 1844.
77Louisiana Courier. January 12, 1844; St Francisville Democrat.
December 3, 1841.
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seven dutifully replied in the following weeks.

Discussing

campaigning, one aspirant wrote, "I am so worn down that I can hardly
write this letter,” while another explained that despite his disdain
for canvassing he would do so at his friends’ insistence. 72
Not only did the parties respond to the questions presented in
newspapers, but as the campaign progressed, they modified their
stances on several key issues with the positions of the Whigs and the
Democrats coming closer together as the election neared.

After

receiving the candidates’ responses, the Richmond Compiler observed
that "there is a general concurrence of public sentiment" in regard to
most of the changes.

Fearing being branded as radicals, most

Democrats dropped their demand for an elective judiciary.

More

significantly, all but the most conservative Whigs acknowledged that
the convention was not limited to making only the changes prescribed
in the bill which passed the legislature but had full power to rewrite
the constitution.

This shift in Whig views clearly illustrates the

increasing power of the electorate, for the 1812 constitution
explicitly stated that any amendment must appear in the convention
bill.

Thus, the Whigs who objected to wholesale revision

unquestionably read the law correctly, but in an effort to gain
control of the convention, they agreed to accept a more liberal
interpretat ion.^
72Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. February-June 1844; Opelousas
Gazette. June 15, 22, 29, 1844; Henry W. Huntington to Moses Liddell,
June 17, 1844, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (quote); Edward G.W. Butler
to Thomas Butler, June 5, 1844, Thomas Butler Papers, LLMVC.
72

Madison Parish Richmond Compiler. May 31, 1844; John Moore to
Charles M. Conrad, December 13, 1843, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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The July election for constitutional convention delegates
overshadowed the concurrent legislative and congressional races.

A

Whig declared it "by far the aost important thing that will coae
before the people for years" and the Democratic Louisiana Courier
74
agreed.
While over twenty-five letters from convention candidates
appeared in the newspapers, few letters from either legislative or
congressional nominees were published.

Preferring to channel its

energy into the convention contest, the Whig party did not offer a
candidate to oppose Slidell in the First District, and in the Third,
declinations by Thomas Butler and the venerable Philemon Thomas left
Democrat John B. Dawson unopposed as well.

The Whigs did obtain one

congressional seat, as Bannon G. Thibodeaux defeated incumbent Alcee
Labranche in the Second District, and the party’s nominee lost a close
race to Isaac Morse in the Fourth.
legislature.

The Whigs also won control of the

Because of their long association with constitutional

change, however, the Democrats prevailed in the most significant
battle by electing a majority of their delegates to the constitutional
convention. 75
Gathering in Jackson in August, the seventy-seven convention
members included forty-two Democrats, thirty-two Whigs, and three of
unknown affiliation.

Immediately, the delegates assumed a power to

rewrite the entire constitution.

On this measure and many others, the

parties concurred, with one delegate proclaiming "We came here as
MHenry W. Huntington to Jaaes G. Taliaferro, September 18, 1843,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (quote); Louisiana Courier. February 21, April
2, May 8, 1844.
7SBaton Rouge Gazette. May 25, June 10, 1844; Bee. August 17, 1844.
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Louisianians, not as partisans." Whigs even expressed relief that
though their party did not control the convention, the body had a
majority of non-radical delegates with its composition guaranteeing
that the judiciary would not be made elective and that the state would
not repudiate its debt.76 The delegates symbolically expressed their
commitment to removing the aristocratic provisions of the 1812
constitution by changing the preamble from "We, the representatives of
the people" to "We, the people of the State of Louisiana.” Whigs and
Democrats concurred on eliminating the property qualification for
suffrage which "by universal consent [was] denounced and abandoned."
Additionally, popular election of the governor, election of parish
officers other than judges, and the prohibition of state aid to
corporations engendered very little opposition. 77
While the two parties’ positions had become more closely
aligned, an examination of the votes of the convention demonstrate
that differences still remained.

Democrats exceeded Whigs in their

commitment to Jacksonian democracy— making suffrage and office-holding
as broad as possible.

Democrat Solomon W. Downs, the Ouachita Parish

legislator responsible for initially championing the convention bill
in the legislature, directed the "radical" contingent in favor of the
lowest possible residency requirements and making all offices
elective.

Desiring to keep the 1812 constitution intact, Whig former

76Debates, 63 (quote); C. G. Forshey to John Liddell, 14 July 184[4],
Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; Opelousas St. Landry Whig. February 6,
1845.
^For an article-by-article comparison of the constitutions of 1812
and 1845 see Constitutions of the State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1930).
The respective preambles appear on p. 7; Debates. 64.
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Governor Andre B. Roman, who believed "most of the states have
extended too far the elective franchise," represented the other
extreme.

On six major votes regarding residency requirements and

placing power closer to people, the Democrats and Whigs consistently
opposed one another.

On these bills, the index of party disagreement-

-the absolute value of the difference between the Democratic and Whig
percentages on each measure— averaged fifty-three percent.78 (TABLE
3.2)
Partisan conflict, however, was not limited to conflicts over
democracy.

The Democratic Louisiana Courier had proclaimed that the

most important issue in the convention involved divorcing the state
from direct involvement in the economy, especially banking.
government involvement in the economy had proved disastrous.

State
By 1843,

the state was responsible for 1.2 million dollars in bank bonds, and
the treasury had defaulted on interest payments on state bonds
totalling 1.273 million dollars.

Democrats and Whigs agreed that the

state should no longer purchase or guarantee bonds in corporations but
disagreed on whether banks should be outlawed entirely and whether the
state should be allowed to go into debt.

The index of party

disagreement on the prohibition of banks in Louisiana was forty-six
percent and on the permitting of a state debt of up to one hundred
thousand dollars was fifty-eight percent.

While the Democratic

78

Andre B. Roman to Henry Clay, December 2, 1844, Clay Papers.
10:169-70. For a description of the index of partisan disagreement see
Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York, 1978), 2627.
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TABLE 3.2
184S Constitutional Conveniton
Index of Partisan Disagreement
"Yes" vote on
issues of democracy

Whig
Percent

Democrat
Percent

Index
of Party
Disagreement

17
7
17
54
85
59

70
57
67
94
17
3

53
50
50
40
68
56

Elective Judiciary
Against two years voter residency
Elective Secretary of State
Elect governor with plurality
Five year residency for legislators
Use of property in apportionment

Average Index of Party Disagreement
"Yes" vote on
issues of government
involvement in economy

53

Whig
Percent

Prohibition of banks
Authorize debt of $100,000

Index
Democrat
of Party
Percent Disagreement

43
91

89
43

46
48

55
86
48
77

97
13
63
47

42
73
15
30

Other issues
Vote on constitution
Limit voters on new constitution
Move capital away from New Orleans
Total population basis in senate

PARTY PARTICIPATION BY REGION
WHIGS
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

2
8
18
4

(84.6%)
(50.0%)
(58.1%)
(28.6%)

32 (43.2%)

DEMOCRATS
11
8
13
10

(15.4%)
(50.0%)
(41.9%)
(71.4%)

42 (56.8%)
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majority succeeded in outlawing banks, a united Whigeffort led by
Roman succeeded in legalizing a limited state debt.
Wrangling between Whigs and Democrats persisted even as the
convention came to a close.

Ninety-seven percent of the Democrats

voted in favor of the constitution as a whole, but only fifty-five
percent of the Whigs concurred.

Roman voted against the measure

arguing that voters had not believed that the 1812 constitution would
be put down entirely and that the delegates had set aside every
conservative principle.

Having voted in favor the constitution, the

delegates had to decide on who should approve the constitution.

The

parties differed on whether this group should include those men who
were currently disfranchised but would be granted the right to vote
under the new constitution.

Again, the parties sharply diverged.

Eighty-six percent of the Whigs wanted to restrict the ballot to those
who could vote under the old constitution, but this measure failed as
only thirteen percent of the Democrats agreed.

Consequently, men who

would receive the right to vote in the constitution of 1845 were
allowed to cast their votes on the charter.
Though tension between Democrats and Whigs played a role in the
convention, animosity between the country parishes and New Orleans
often overcame party affiliation.

Throughout the debates, delegates

much more frequently referred to the conflicting interests of the
country and city than they did controversies between Democrats and
Whigs.

79

State sectionalism and partisan affiliation did overlap as

Louisiana Courier. May
Experiment?" 35.

8,

14,

1844;

Schafer,
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Whig delegates primarily came from South Louisiana and Greater
Orleans.

The country parishes had long resented New Orleans.

This

indignation had even led to the capital being briefly moved froa the
Crescent City to Donaldsonville in the early 1830s before a want of
accommodations soon forced its return to New Orleans.

Fear of the

corrupting influence of the city contributed to the legislature’s
decision to locate the constitutional convention in the distinctly
non-urban setting of Jackson.

Within two weeks* however, the

delegates after a "desperate struggle” succuabed to the siren song of
the city and agreed to adjourn to aeet in New Orleans in 1845.

80

Relocation to New Orleans seemed only to heighten country
members’ "near-paranoid fear of the Crescent City,” particularly
regarding its corruption and intrigue.

And, they exhibited a

determination to place as many constraints as possible on the city.
They almost unanimously agreed to move the capital out of New Orleans
but could not agree on where to place it. A cynical observer claimed
that the ideal solution would be to build a steamboat large enough to
hold both houses and have it travel throughout the state.

In lieu of

choosing a location for the capital, the country delegates instead
passed an article prohibiting the capital from being located within
sixty miles of New Orleans. 81

80

Hilary B. Cenas to Margaret 0. Pierce, August 22, 1844, Cenas
Family Papers, Louisiana State Museum.
8!Schafer, "Reform or Experiment?" 27; Henry W. Huntington to James
G. Taliaferro, September 24, 1845, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC. The
subsequent legislature passed a bill moving the state capitol to Baton
Rouge where it remained for the rest of the antebellum period.
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The most vexing issue in the convention proved to be the
apportionment of seats in the house and senate.

In apportioning the

legislature, the country delegates feared that, under the new less
restrictive suffrage provisions, the city with its overwhelming white
population, would control Louisiana.

While basing representation in

the lower house on qualified electors, in the senate they used total
population with each slave counting the same as a white person.

More

importantly, the delegates arbitrarily liaited Orleans Parish to oneeighth of the senators and one-fifth of the lower house.

New Orleans

delegates complained that "Restrictions, upon restrictions, have been
piled upon her” and pleaded unsuccessfully that the interest of the
city and the state were indivisible.

Not only was the index of

partisan disagreement lower on these measures, but much of it can be
easily explained, as the areas around New Orleans had elected more
Whigs than Democrats to the convention.

82

In November 1845, the electorate overwhelming voted in favor of
the new constitution 12,277 to 1,395 as every parish passed the
constitution which included universal suffrage, a greater number of
elective offices, the government’s divorce from the economy, and the
multiple restrictions on New Orleans.

Even in Greater Orleans, the

region stigmatized by many of the constitution’s provisions, the
charter because of its democratic features passed with over eighty
percent of the voters in favor.

This vote, however, did not signal

universal delight in the measure.

A diarist tersely recorded,

^Debates. 154, 162, 611 (first quote);M. Prescott to John Moore,
April 1, April 10, 1845, Weeks Papers.
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"accepting the new constitution, a poor one at that." Though the 1845
constitution was not an ideal docuaent, voters preferred it to the
antiquated 1812 charter, or as a Whig explained, "I may yet vote for
ft

it, as I would take a leaky boat, when in the power of pirates.
Between the constitutional convention's adjournaent in August
and its reconvening in January, Louisiana’s parties battled one
another in the 1844 presidential election.

The state had been

preparing for the contest for several years.

Upon President

Harrison’s death in 1841, Vice President John Tyler had ascended to
the nation’s highest office.

Soon a break ensued between the states-

rights Tyler and the nationalistic Henry Clay that resulted in Tyler
being read out of the Whig party.

Louisiana’s Whigs did not have to

debate over which man to support in this struggle.

Clay’s personal

connections along with the appeal of his American System had made him
for years the their first choice for the presidency.

Even in "the

heart of the great cotton-growing region" Rapides Parish, a Clay Club
maintained that Tyler’s departure from the American System had hurt
the South.
In the winter of 1842-1843 and in early 1844, Clay travelled to
Louisiana for personal and business reasons and to attend dinners and
balls given in his honor.

A Louisiana Whig described his visit as

Davis, ed., Barrow Diary. November 3, 1845, p. 375-6 (first quote);
Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, June 23, 1845, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (second quote).
Of

For discussion of 1844 presidential election see Charles Sellers,
"Election of 1844," in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of
American Presidential Elections 4 vols. (New York, 1971), 1:747-861; Clay
Club of Rapides to Henry Clay, June 1842, quoted in Clav Papers. 9:741.
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"enough to convince us all of his being the greatest Ban in the
world," and the longest entry a woman’s diary recounted trekking
through the mud to see Clay.

In contrast, to the excitement which

Clay engendered, Whigs viewed Tyler as a traitor or, according to
Porter, "a juggling mountebank." Louisiana’s Whig party formally
endorsed Clay’s candidacy at a February 1844 convention in New
Orleans.

Resolutions recommended a national bank and celebrated Clay

as the champion of a protective tariff on sugar cane.

A national Whig

nominating convention concurred, and Clay was unanimously selected as
the party’s presidential candidate. 85
Democrats throughout the nation and in Louisiana faced a greater
difficulty in agreeing upon a candidate.

Former president Martin Van

Buren was the decided favorite, but his candidacy foundered on the
shoals of his opposition to Texas annexation.

Texas, which had

achieved independence from Mexico in 1836, desired inclusion in the
United States.

With only the Sabine River separating Louisiana from

Texas, "Texas Fever" gripped the state.

A Louisianan warned Van Buren

that the state’s entire Democratic party and many of its Whigs
demanded annexation and urged him to write a letter in favor of the
measure.

Van Buren, however, joined Clay in declaring that Texas

OC

F.D. Richardson to John Liddell, January 1, 1843, Liddell Papers,
LLMVC (first quote); Ellen McCollam, diary, January 16, 1844, LLMVC;
Alexander Porter to John J. Crittenden, July 21, 1842, Crittenden Papers,
LC (second quote); Bee. February 24, 1844; Baton Ronffg
March 23,
1844; St. Francisville Louisiana Chronicle. May 6, 1843.
86

Alexander Walker to Martin Van Buren, April 25, 1844, Van Buren
Papers, LC (first quote); James F. Winston, "Louisiana and the Annexation
of Texas," Louisiana Historical Quarterly XIX (January 1936), 89-118; and
Thomas E. Redard, "The Election of 1844 in Louisiana: A New Look at the
Ethno-Cultural Approach," Louisiana History XXII (1981), 419-33.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

180

annexation should not be an issue in the presidential contest.

Many

southerners shared the view of a New Orleans Democrat that the Texas
question "has killed Clay and Van [B]uren in the South."

Reacting to

Van Buren’s public letter on Texas, Solomon W. Downs, designated a
North Louisiana delegate to the national convention and a Van Buren
presidential elector, resigned these posts in protest of Van Buren’s
abandonment of the South.87
Hoping that public opinion regarding Van Buren’s letter would
subside, the Louisiana Courier explained that it was only a question
of time before Van Buren, as president, would annex Texas. An angry
writer disagreed and declared that the Democratic party’s commitment
to measures and not men mandated dropping Van Buren from the ticket.
Tyler’s pro-Texas Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, a South
Carolinian state-rights champion emerged as the choice of some
disgruntled Democrats.

Even prior to Van Buren’s anti-annexation

letter, Louisianans had strongly considered Calhoun as a candidate.
In 1842, pro-Calhoun newspapers were established in New Orleans and
Natchitoches, and party leaders considered him a viable alternative to
Van Buren.

In January 1844, the Louisiana convention to select

87

William G. Austen to John C. Calhoun, May 16, 1844, (quote) in
Robert L. Meriwether, et al., eds., The Papers of John C. Calhoun 18
vols. (Columbia, SC, 1959- ), 18:516-7; Jean B. Plauchd to Andrew
Jackson, June 2, 1844, Jackson Papers, LC; Speech of S.W. Downs on the
Annexation of Texas (New Orleans, 1844), 3-4; For a Whig woman fearing
that Texas would doom Clay’s candidacy see Dell Upton, ed., Madeline:
Love and Survival in Antebellum New Orleans (Athens, Ga., 1996), May 6,
1844, p. 92; Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery. 189-219.
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delegates to the national convention naaed Calhoun as its second
choice behind Van Buren.

11

When Van Buren declined to cone out in favor of Texas
annexation, the Calhoun movement blossomed.

in Louisiana, support of

Calhoun’s candidacy was based sore on Texas than on an adherence to
the South Carolinian’s states rights doctrines.

A non-partisan

Calhoun for president seeting "connected with all absorbing question
of the reannexation of Texas," was held in New Orleans and the Morning
Herald dropped Van Buren’s naae and endorsed Calhoun’s candidacy.

The

question of Texas annexation disrupted the national convention, and
Van Buren was unable to achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for the
nomination.

Because of northern opposition and his withdrawal from

partisan consideration, Calhoun had no chance, but Louisiana’s
delegation gave him five of his six votes on the first ballot.

A

number of aspirants took turns in the lead, until on the ninth ballot,
the party nominated a dark horse— Tennessean Janes K. Polk s staunch
advocate of Texas annexation.

10

Louisiana Democrats celebrated when their party dropped Van
Buren in favor of Polk and Texas.

In New Orleans, a Democrat claimed

that "Democracy has risen a hundred percent in this market within the
last hundred days.” Meetings throughout the state praised Polk and
®8John Slidell to Robert Walker, December 2, 1842, John Slidell
Letters, TU; William A. Elmore to Robert Barnwell Rhett, November 10,
1842, Robert Barnwell Rhett Letter, SHC; James W. Breedlove to Andrew
Jackson, December 7, 1842, Jackson Papers, LC; Daily Picayune. January
11, 1844.
0Q

Eustis Prescott to John C. Calhoun, May 11, 1844, (quote) in The
Papers of John C. Calhoun. 18:489-90; James H. Campbell to Calhoun, May
14, 1844, in ibid.. 18:504-4.
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passed pro-annexation resolutions.

A delighted partisan wrote the

candidate that in Louisiana all Democrats and aany Whigs interested in
the Texas question had welcomed the news of his nomination.

Having

been absent from the state since illness had forced him to resign from
the Senate eight years earlier, Charles Gayarrd, now running for the
state legislature, concurred that the state almost unanimously favored
annexation, and he made it the keystone of his campaign.

ftA

For Louisianans, Texas annexation was inextricably bound with
slavery.

A diarist made the connection explicit when he wrote, "The

main question is slavery & anti-slavery & Texas."

Democrats contended

that the acquisition of Texas would provide the South with new slave
states and would help maintain the region’s strength in Washington.
They added that if the United States did not annex Texas then Great
Britain would obtain it, abolish slavery there, and then use it as a
base to menace southern slavery with Louisiana being the first state
that would be threatened.

Others charged that Henry Clay’s opposition

to Texas annexation stemmed from his unquenchable ambition, contending
that Clay had sold himself to northern abolitionists and had agreed to
destroy southern slaveholders in order to fulfill his lifelong dream
of becoming president. 91
90

W.F. Vason to Henry Marshall, September 13, 1844, Marshal 1-Furman
Papers, LLMVC (quote); Louisiana Courier. June 24, 26, August 1, October
1844; For more pro-annexation meetings see Speech of S.W. Downs...on the
Annexation of Texas (1844); R.R. Barrow, Au Comite Central Democratique
de la Pariosse Ascension (1844).
91

Davis, ed., Barrow Diary. June 20, 1844, p. 330, October 2, 1844,
p. 340 (quote); Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, November 7,
1844, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Jean B. Plauch6 to Andrew Jackson, June
2, 1844, Jackson Papers, LC; Louisiana Courier. June 27, September 17,
1844.
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The Texas annexation question proved extremely difficult for
Louisiana Whigs.

Soae partisans valiantly struggled to explain how

Clay’s position on Texas annexation protected the South better than
Polk’s stance.

They distributed copies of the anti-annexation speech

of Thomas Hart Benton, a prominent Democratic senator from Missouri,
and published a letter from Senator Barrow in which he explained that
annexation would lead to an unjust war with Mexico and possibly
England and France.

Other Whigs joined Barrow in claiming that the

introduction of competition from Texas would decrease the value of
Louisiana’s sugar and cotton plantations and its stock and grazing
business.

Unswayed, Democrats responded to Barrow’s letter by

demanding his resignation for betraying his constituents.92

In areas

where Whigs did not think that Barrow’s argument would work, they
tried a different course.

They claimed that the Whig party and Clay

were in favor of Texas annexation "if compatible with the honor of the
country and the stability of the Union."

Democrats accused the Whigs

of western Louisiana of issuing a "garbled edition" of Clay’s anti
annexation letter which implied that Clay actually favored the
acquisition of Texas.

A correspondent from that area asserted that

Whig legislative candidates had cone out in favor of Texas, and that

92

Address of Mr. Barrow, of Louisiana, to His Constituents upon the
Annexation of Texas. (Washington, 1844); J. J. Sanford to James G.
Taliaferro, June 13, 1844, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Janes McFarlane to
James K. Polk, November 11, 1844, Polk Correspondence 8:305-306; For
anti-Barrow meetings see Louisiana Courier. June 24, 1844; Speech of S.W.
Downs— on the annexation of Texas. 57.
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the Whigs’ Fourth District congressional noainee had been "compelled
to shout ’huzza’ for Texas.
Opposition to Texas annexation, however, did not aean that Whigs
forfeited the title as the party that best protected slavery.
Accusations of antislavery sentiaents aaong presidential contenders
had become so routine that a Whig newspaper could refer to Deaocratic
charges as "The Old Story." Before Folk’s noaination, Whig newspapers
had reprinted earlier stories of Van Buren’s votes opposing Missouri
statehood and favoring Negro suffrage.

94

When the race was reduced to

two southern slaveholders, Clay and Folk, abolition charges became
less frequent but did not vanish as both sides accused their opponents
of an alliance with abolitionists.

Appearing in both the New Orleans

Bee and the Baton Rouge Gazette, an article entitled "Coalition of
Locofocos and Abolitionists: People of the South Read!!" warned
readers that while Democrats in the South slandered Clay as opposed to
slavery, their northern brethren joined with abolitionists in
AC

attacking Clay as a cruel southern slaveholder.
As in 1840, Louisiana Whigs campaigned not only as defenders of
slavery but also as the party of the American System.

Whigs

castigated the Democrats’ use of Texas annexation as a "humbug"

W.F. Vason to Henry Marshall, September 13, 1844, Marshal 1-Furman
Papers, LLMVC; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 12, 1844 (first quote);
Louisiana Courier. August 31, 1844 (second quote).
94

Bee. August 24, 1844 (quote); Louisiana Courier. February 12, 28,

1844.
95Bee, October 2, 1844; Baton Rouge Gazette. October 19, 1844.
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designed to distract voters froa aore important issues.

9€

While still

portraying a national bank as the best way to Maintain a sound
currency, Louisiana Whigs decreased their use of the tera "bank" and
instead eaphasized their coaaitaent to a stable currency.

This switch

probably occurred because of the increasing antipathy toward banks in
the state, an enaity which would soon result in the outlawing of banks
in the 1845 constitution.

In this caapaign, Louisiana Whigs placed

more emphasis on the tariff— ’’the great rock of our strength."

In

1842, Congress had passed a compromise tariff which preserved a duty
on sugar.

Whigs contrasted Henry Clay’s protection of the sugar cane

industry with Polk’s ruinous free trade doctrines, especially his
declaration that the sugar cane tariff only benefitted a few nabobs.
In South Louisiana, the St. Landry Whig pleaded "SUGAR PLANTERS
REMEMBER" that Polk opposed the sugar cane duty and reminded its non
cane growing readers that the tariff was beneficial to the whole
country. 97
Though preferring to debate Texas annexation, Louisiana
Democrats acknowledged the American System as a caapaign issue.
Democratic Congressman John Slidell recognized the potency of the
tariff issue and implored Polk to make a declaration in favor of a
revenue sugar cane duty.

A West Feliciana Democrat, however, urged

Polk to continue his free trade doctrines observing that as cotton
prices went down and the price of goods went up, people had come to
Baton Rouae Gazette. July 20, September 14, 1844.
97

Baton Rouge Gazette. October 12, 1844 (first quote); Opelousas St.
Landry Whig. September 26 (second quote), October 3, 1844; Bee. June 8,
September 27, 1844.
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blame the Tariff of 1842 and its protectionist doctrines.

G&yarrd

complained the tariff only existed to drain money from the South to
the North.

Democrats also claimed to see through Whig subterfuge

regarding a national bank.

The Louisiana Courier reminded its readers

that despite the Whigs’ silence on the issue, everyone knew that "The
Bank is the beginning and the end of Whig principles," and the
Democratic State Convention declared, "A National Bank is a National
Curse."

The newspaper added that a national bank would establish

branches in Louisiana negating any restrictions that the new
constitution placed on state banks.

Democrats wore badges informing

Louisianans that they could have Polk, and the Republic without the
Bank, or Clay, and the Bank without the Republic.

ae

In 1844, both Louisiana parties sought to outdo the spectacular
aspects of the 1840 race.

In a year with elections to the

legislature, Congress, and the constitutional convention, in addition
to the presidential contest, Louisianans were inundated with political
pamphlets, letters, pole raisings, barbecues, banners, badges, and
meetings.

According to a North Louisianan, the "intense excitement

— penetrated the remotest regions [of the state]." The presidential
race culminated with both parties holding statewide conventions in
Baton Rouge in the weeks preceding the presidential election.
Hyperbole proved the order of the day with the Whigs boasting over
twelve thousand in attendance at their gathering doubling the

98

John Slidell to James K. Polk, June 1, 1844, Polk Correspondence
7:179; Collin S. Tarpley to Polk, October 26, 1844, ibid.. 8:231-232;
Louisiana Courier. January 12 (second quote), April 16, August 16,
September 14, 24 (first quote), October 1, 21, 1844.
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Democrats own extravagant claim of six thousand at their convention.
As in 1840, participation in these political events extended beyond
the electorate with women playing a role and with children wearing
99
partisan badges.
If women had made a slight foray into Louisiana’s political
culture in the Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign, they extended their
role in 1844. As in 1840, women played a more prominent part in the
Whig party, and Clay won a mock election in the Ladies’ Cabin of a
steamboat, sixteen to five.

In her diary for 1844, a New Orleans

woman recounted avidly reading partisan newspapers, painting a
partisan illustration, debating politics with male associates, and
attending a torchlight procession.

The "Whig Ladies of East and West

Baton Rouge" held their own meeting in preparation for the statewide
Baton Rouge convention and, in the manner of men’s political meetings,
they elected a chairperson, appointed a secretary, established a
committee, passed resolutions, and had the proceedings printed in the
party newspaper.

These resolutions announced a competition among the

parishes for the best banner at the convention and for the parish
which had the greatest representation.1®0
Whig observers counted as many as two thousand ladies at the
October convention, including a delegation from Iberville Parish that
had a plan for obtaining votes.

Wearing badges bearing the motto,

99

Zenas Preston Diary, 1844, LC; For Catahoula Parish preparations
for Whig events see Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, AugustOctober 1844, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Debates. 757 (quote).
100Bee, May 7, 1844; Upton, ed., Madeline. 75-202; Baton Rouge
Gazette. September 7, 1844.
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"Clay or no Husband," the woaen apparently agreed with an earlier
newspaper article which contended that woaen controlled one-half the
state’s votes.

No longer related to passive participation, a woaan

addressed a statewide convention for the first tiae.

Mary Gayle, the

grand-daughter of the aged Phileaon Thoaas who was serving as
president of the Whig convention, procl&iaed "the principles and
policies of the Whig party to be the true principles and policy of the
Federal Constitution."1®1
The Deaocratic party again denied that all ladies were Whigs.
As in 1840, woaen, had a less pronounced role in the party. No
Democratic women’s meetings were held nor did a woaan address the
assembly at the party's state convention.

The party did, however,

specifically invite women to its gatherings and soaetiaes listed the
number in attendance.

If denied an overt role, Rowena McGiasey, "a

thorough going Democrat" gave herself a partisan function.

She joined

her husband, a Democratic doctor, on his rounds and made several
converts to the Democratic faith.

A letter from her husband to Polk

even indicates that women had adopted one of the less attractive
features of antebellum politics.

The doctor explains how, while

debating politics with several other females, his wife quieted a Whig
lady braggart by offering to bet a house-servant on the election’s
outcome.102

^Convention proceedings in Bee. October 9, 1844; Baton Rouge
Gazette. October 9, 1844 (quote).
IM

John W.P. McGimsey to Jaaes K. Polk, September 27, 1844 (quote),
November 1, 1844, Polk Papers, LC; For a woman betting on Texas
annexation see Upton, ed., Madeline. April 30, 1844, p. 91.
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The Whig woaan aade the right decision in declining to accept
the wager, for Polk and Texas triunphed in the United States and in
Louisiana where Polk out-polled Clay, 13,782 to 13,083.

As in prior

races, the Democrats performed best in the Florida Parishes and North
Louisiana, receiving over fifty-five percent of the vote in each
region.

Clay and the sugar tariff had their greatest appeal in South

Louisiana where he received 56.7 percent of the ballots.

Polk’s

victory rested on Greater Orleans where the Democrats triumphed in a
presidential election for the first tine.

Traditionally elections in

this section had inspired charges of fraud from both sides, but none
of the previous irregularities equalled the John Slide 11-orchestrated
"Plaquemines Frauds" of 1844.

Six weeks before the election

Congressman Slidell was in New York, but after expressing the desire
that "I shall not feel satisfied with myself were I absent from my
post on the day of the battle," returned to Louisiana.

Slidell’s

"post" turned out to be a steamboat that shuttled Democrats with
questionable voting qualifications from New Orleans to Democraticcontrolled Plaquemines Parish where they voted without objection.
Polk won Plaquemines Parish, which had cast only 290 ballots in the
1840 election, by an astounding 1,007 to 37 margin, enabling him to
win Louisiana.

Whigs cried fraud, and the state legislature

investigated, but the results stood.103 (SEE APPENDIX A)
103His political acumen steadily improving, Slidell found a loophole
in the 1812 constitution which allowed voting anywhere in the county (not
parish) of Orleans, (counties were larger administrative districts
primarily used to describe state senate regions) which included
Plaquemines Parish; John Slidell to James Buchanan, September 22, 1844,
James Buchanan Papers, HSP (quote); A.B. Roman to Henry Clay, December
2, 1844 in Clay Papers. 10:169-70; Ursin Bouligny, Jr., to Clay, December
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With Polk’s election in 1844 and more importantly with the
ratification of the constitution in 1845, Louisiana Democrats had
reason to be sanguine.

A partisan declared, "I can safely assert that

democratic views and feelings predominate throughout Louisiana."

In

addition, the party controlled the governor’s office and three of the
four congressional seats.

Perhaps, the only negative for Democrats

was the declination of an invitation for Jackson and Polk to visit the
state after the elect i o n . I n contrast, the Whig party in Louisiana
had reached a low point.

Not only had it lost several elections, but

its future appeared bleak as the men newly enfranchised seemed more
likely to join the Democrats, who had championed constitutional
change, than the Whigs, who had been lukewarm.

Additionally, the most

prominent Louisiana Whig, Alexander Porter, died soon after resigning
his Senate seat in 1844.

The Whigs’ best hope would be that the

Democrats would find holding power and making policy more difficult
than challenging the Whigs.
In 1836, Democrats and Whigs in Louisiana had divided primarily
over national policy, particularly the American System.

In subsequent

years, while retaining their differences on national issues, the two
parties’ differences regarding state policy became more apparent with
Democrats preferring greater democracy and less government involvement
in the economy than Whigs.

In the 1845 constitution, Democratic ideas

6, 1844 in ibid.. 10:173; Journal of the Special Committee Appointed bv
the House of Representatives of Louisiana to Investigate the Frauds
Perpetrated in the State. During the Last Presidential Election (New
Orleans, 1845).
IMPeleg B. Phelps to James K. Polk, July 17, 1844 (quote); Polk to
Felix Bosworth, December 31, 1844, Polk Papers, LC.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

191

concerning the role of the state prevailed.
concentrations of power had been reduced.

Fears regarding

A larger proportion of the

state was eligible to vote and to hold office.

The capital would so

be moved beyond the corrupting influence of New Orleans.

And, the

state had divorced itself from the business sector— prohibiting state
aid to business, outlawing banking, and making incorporation virtually
impossible.
In Louisiana from 1838 to 1845, not only did Democrats prevail
but so did Jacksonian democracy.

The period saw an expansion of the

politically active portion of Louisiana’s populace.
constitution formally instituted this change.

The 1845

It allowed for

universal white male suffrage, removed property qualifications for
office, and increased the number of elective positions.
occurred not in law but in practice.

Other changes

Children wore party badges and

the disfranchised participated alongside the enfranchised at mammoth
political conventions.

Previously denied any political role, women

were now specifically included in party gatherings, occasionally even
addressing the crowds.

The ideas of the political culture had crossed

gender lines with women holding their own meetings, betting on
elections, and voting in mock elections.

If in the 1830s, Louisiana’s

political universe consisted almost exclusively of white male
property-holders, by 1845, it had expanded far beyond this minority.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTITTOTONS AND COMPROMISES: WHIG RESURGENCE. 1845-1852
In November
constitution.

1845.

Initially,

Louisianans

began

living under

their

new

Democrats benefitted from their association

with the document, but in less than a decade, the charter would become
their party’s albatross.

Although the constitution had clearly improved

upon the state’s original charter, many of its fiscal provisions, written
in reaction to the economic downturn of the 1830s, proved ill-suited for
an improving economy,

and Whigs exploited this flaw.

despite

being

the

document

considerably

more

Additionally,

democratic

than

its

predecessor, the people of Louisiana soon felt that it was not democratic
enough.

Since the Democrats had written the 1845 constitution, desire

for change profited their opponents— the Whigs.
Whig party had used

By the early 1850s, the

its advocacy of constitutional revision to gain

control of both the legislature and a new 1852 constitutional convention.
If reaction to the 1845 constitution shaped state politics, the
increasing sectional controversy over slavery dominated Louisianans’
discussion of national politics.

In the 1848 and 1852 presidential

elections, differences over the American System moved to the background
as the parties’ stances on the Wilmot Proviso and the Compromise of 1850
moved to the foreground.

Discussion of a national bank and federally

sponsored internal improvements disappeared from party newspapers, and
even

debate

decreased.

over

Louisiana

Whigs’ pillar,

the

protective

tariff,

Instead, each party claimed that its candidate best protected

slavery and that its adversaries were either abolitionists or allied with
abolitionists.

Despite growing talk of secession in other southern

states, Louisianans continued to stress the value of the Union,
192
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opponents to the Compromise measures found themselves in the minority and
condemned by both parties.
Not only did debate over the American System decrease in importance
but two other campaign staples, connection to Andrew Jackson and the
Creole-American split, also received less emphasis,

memories of the

as

Battle of New Orleans and French rule in Louisiana faded, politicians
talked less of these topics, but they did not disappear from campaigns.
Though Creol e-American tension received less stress, ethnicity still
remained an issue.
towards

The debate now centered on the parties’ attitudes

immigrants.

A

gubernatorial election,

nativist

candidate

competed

in

the

1846

and accusations of nativism surfaced in most

campaigns during the period.

With both the Democratic and Whig parties

still courting immigrant voters, neither one openly identified themselves
with nativism.
The

first

partisan

battle

following

constitutional ratification came in January 1846.
tin election of a

the

November

1845

The charter called for

new slate of state officers including the entire

legislature, a governor, and, for the first time, a lieutenant governor.
The proximity of ratification and the election truncated the campaign
season.

Instead of having a year or more to debate the candidates, the

parties only officially had slightly more than two months to canvass the
state.

Foreseeing the difficulties that this narrow time frame would

cause for campaigning, and correctly anticipating the passage of the
constitution,

both

parties

nominated

their

candidates

canvassing prior to the official call for an election.

and

started

Even with this

advanced preparation, the campaign season was briefer than usual.
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In July 1S45, the Democrats held a statewide convention in Baton
Rouge.

Partisan newspapers had discussed three possible gubernatorial

candidates: Joseph Walker, president of the constitutional convention.
Isaac Johnson, a popular judge from the Florida parishes, and Trasimond
Landry, an Ascension Parish sugar planter.

Prior to convention. Landry

withdrew his name from consideration for governor, and instead announced
his desire to be nominated as lieutenant governor.

At the convention,

neither the advocates of Johnson nor of Walker would yield.

After four

hours of debate, Johnson attained a slim 71— 61 decision.

With their

choice receiving most of his support from the North Louisiana, Walker’s
disgruntled

friends

maintained

that

Johnson

had

only won

because

representatives from three northwestern parishes had failed to arrive at
the convention.

The selection of a candidate for lieutenant governor was

less acrimonious as the delegates unanimously chose Landry.1
Two weeks after the Democrats met in Baton Rouge, the Whigs held
their own convention in the same city.

Their convention also had nearly

full attendance with only eight parishes missing.

Demonstrating the

Whigs’ continued failure to obtain support in the Florida parishes, three
of the missing parishes were from this region even though the convention
was held there.
attendance,
nominees.

Though similar to the Democrats in terms of location and

the Whigs differed in their lack of division over their

For their gubernatorial candidate, the Whigs unanimously chose

William DeBuys, a New Orleans Creole who had held multiple state offices.
They also did not split over their choice of Edward Sparrow, a Carroll

lNew Orleans Louisiana Courier. July 8, 12, 15, 16, 1845; Baton
Rouge Gazette. July 19, 1845. (Hereinafter all newspapers from New
Orleans unless otherwise indicated)

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

195
Parish planter

and

lawyer,

as

the party’s

nominee

for

lieutenant

governor^
The Democrats attempted to run a single issue campaign.
repeatedly

reminded

voters

that

their

party

had

long

They

advocated

constitutional revision and that they had controlled the constitutional
convention.

Thus,

constitution,

they should trust the party to put it into operation.

Making

this

if

the

people

connection explicit,

a

trusted

Democrats

New Orleans

to

write

Democratic

the

meeting

resolved that "the recent Convention to amend the Constitution of the
State was the work of the democracy, and that justice and fair dealing
require that they should be allowed to carry the new Constitution into
effect.’’3
Democrats argued that Whigs had opposed the call of the convention
and had voted against reforms there.

They contended that only the

tireless work of Democrats had enabled the convention to take place and
electing Whigs

to office now would nullify its work.

A

Democratic

legislative candidate warned voters that improvements would be ’’defeated”
if the government fell into "impure hands."

Even if individual Whigs

such as DeBuys and Sparrow favored constitutional change, the majority
of their party did not.

And, regardless of the Whig candidates’ personal

9
Opelousas St. Landrv Whig. July 17, 1845; Baton Rouge Gazette. July
12, 19, 26, 1845; Commercial Bulletin. July 23, 1845.
Louisiana Courier. July 23, August 6, September 23, December 23,
1845 (quote).
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views, everyone who had voted against ratification supported the Whig
nominees.

4

Recognizing the effectiveness of the Democrats’ association with
the popular new constitution,
with the document as well.

the Whig party tried to identify itself

Under the Whigs’ revisionist interpretation.

the constitution was not a partisan measure but a joint effort of Whigs
and Democrats.

The editor of the Baton Rouge Gazette even argued that

while the Democrats claimed authorship of the charter, the document’s
positive attributes stemmed from an alliance of Whigs and conservative
Democrats who had limited the radical designs of most Democrats.
and Sparrow directly addressed the constitutional

DeBuys

issue in a circular

which claimed that they both had "cheerfully co-operated with a majority
of their fellow citizens in calling the late Convention" and had voted
for its adoption.

The pro-constitution circular asserted

that

the

"excellence of most of its provisions" overshadowed its few defects.

The

Whigs also tried to turn the tables on the Democrats by spreading a rumor
that Landry, the Democratic nominee for lieutenant governor, had opposed
the constitution.*
Despite these attempts to campaign on the constitutional question,
most Whigs realized that their best plan involved moving the focus of the

^Terence Carriere "To the Voters of the Parish of St. Tammany,"
August 15, 1845, in Pierre Soule Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke
University (quote) (Hereinafter DU); Louisiana Courier. August 13, 1845,
January 12, 1846.
*Baton Rouge Gazette. August 16, 1845; Bee. November 1, 1845; "To
the People of Louisiana from William DeBuys and Edward Sparrow," December
18, 1845 in Alonzo Snyder Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley
Collections, LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana (quote) (Hereinafter
LLMVC); Louisiana Courier. November 24, 1845.
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campaign away from the new charter.

DeBuys and Sparrow’s circular not

only discussed the charter but also addressed the economy,
improvements,

education,

and.

most

importantly,

the

internal

tariff.

They

attributed "the general prosperity of our People at this time" to the
virtues of the Whig-authored 1842 tariff, which benefitted both sugar
cane planters and cotton growers.

The independent New Orleans Weekly

Delta labeLled Sparrow, "a tariff protection mein to the hub," and the
Whigs gladly assumed this title.

They alleged that since the parties had

settled the constitutional question, the tariff was the primary issue
dividing them.

The Whigs contrasted their united front

in favor of

protection with the Democrats who offered a "mongrel" ticket including
the anti-tariff Johnson and the pro-tariff sugar-planter Landry whose
views were at a variance with North Louisiana Democrats.6
The

Democrats

tried

to

keep

the

campaign

focused

on

their

authorship of the 1845 constitution but recognized that they must address
the tariff question.
supported a

revenue

As

in prior contests,

tariff

Democrats claimed they

for sugar cane but opposed

protection.

Considered one of the Democrats’ foremost orators, New Orleans lawyer
Pierre Sould carried his fiery style throughout the state on Johnson’s
behalf maintaining that the tariff "devour[ed] the substance of the
people."
that

Soul6 also connected the tariff to a national bank asserting

the Whigs

championed both of

these oppressive measures.

The

Louisiana Courier repeated this connection between the tariff and the

6"To the People of Louisiana— ," December 18, 1845, in Alonzo
Snyder Papers, LLMVC; Baton Rouge Gazette. November 15, 29, 1845; New
Orleans Weekly Delta. December 8, 1845 (quote); Bee. November 18,
December 19, 1845.
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bank.

It mocked

the Whigs’ connection of

"every thing

happy and

fortunate to the tariff," observing that previously they had attributed
all beneficial occurrences

to the national bank.

In his

speeches,

Johnson, the Democrats' nominee, emphasized the parties’ differences over
the national bank and
constitutional stances.

the tariff

in addition

to their contrasting

7

If the Whigs could not win the campaign on policy, they hoped to
achieve victory based on DeBuys’s superior qualifications and his Creole
lineage.

DeBuys had served as a

postmaster, and state treasurer.

legislator,

speaker of the house,

In contrast, Johnson lacked extensive

political experience, having served only a single term in the legislature
more than ten years before.

Since 1839, Johnson had served in a non

elective judicial position in the Florida Parishes.

The Whigs also hoped

to capitalize on the historic Anglo-Creole split.

They asserted that

because he was a Creole, DeBuys had a greater attachment to the state
than Johnson, who, though born in Louisiana, was not of Creole heritage.
The Whigs hoped that DeBuys’s Creole birth would benefit him, and they
tried to bolster this support with the assertion that the Democrats had
criticized DeBuys simply for being a Creole.
the historic potency of this argument

The Democrats recognized

and denied attacking DeBuys.

Johnson even tried to court the Creole vote by speaking a few words of
0
French at an Iberville Parish Democratic meeting.
7

Louisiana Courier. August 19 (second quote), October 10 (Soule
quote), October 24, December 29, 1845; Arthur Freeman, "The Early Career
of Pierre Soule,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly (1936).
g
Oualifications-Baton Rouge Gazette. July 5, 1845; Bee, January 13,
1845; Creole argument-Baton Rouge Gazette. July 5, 26, 1845; Louisiana
Courier. July 26, September 13, 1845, January 13, 1846.
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Ethnicity entered the gubernatorial campaign in another form as
well.

For the first time in Louisiana history, a third party entered the

race for the governor's office.

Advocating a revision of naturalization

laws, a Native American Party based in New Orleans nominated Charles
Derbigny for governor.

The party had little effect itself, as Derbigny

received only 2.5 percent of the votes,
coming in Greater Orleans.

with over half of his votes

Even so, the party did serve as a catalyst

for a debate between the Whigs and Democrats over naturalization.
Whigs agreed with the doctrines of the Native Americans.
tended to vote for Democrats,

Many

Immigrants

and every Whig knew the story of the

Plaquemines frauds— how illegal immigrant voting in Plaquemines Parish
had cost Clay Louisiana’s electoral votes in 1844.

Many Whigs agreed

with the St. Landry Whig’s proclamation, "Our naturalization laws must
be altered."

The Whigs, however, saw the existence of a party dedicated

to nativism as a movement which could only take votes from their party.
The Bee argued that it did not object to efforts to keep the franchise
pure but asserted that it must be done within the framework of the two
party system.

9

Not only did the Whigs prefer to keep nativism within a two party
system,

but

campaign.

they also wished

to keep it

in the background of

the

While the Whig party contained a nativist element, it hoped

to g a m e r votes from naturalized citizens, and it ran an Irish immigrant
for lieutenant governor.

Thus, many Whigs preferred to downplay the role

of nativism in their party.

Sensing Whig apprehension over nativism as

Q

'Baton Rouge Gazette. September 6, 27, 1845; Opelousas St. Landry
Whig. November 28, 1844 (quote); Bee. October 2, December 6, 1845,
January 19, 1846.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

200

a campaign topic. Democrats cheerfully threw fuel onto this fire by
introducing it into the campaign repeatedly.

They claimed that DeBuys

had been elected vice-president of an 1841 nativist convention, and that
in 1835 he had advocated the censure of Whig Governor White for promoting
too many naturalized citizens to office.

The Whigs denied that DeBuys

had been a member of the Native American convention and claimed that more
Democrats than Whigs had voted to censure White.
election, New Orleans Whigs responded in kind.

On the eve of the

In the Crescent City,

they circulated pamphlets attributing anti-Irish quotes to Johnson.10
The candidates of both parties took their message throughout the
state.

After the narrow split at the state convention, the Democrats

especially felt the need to placate the entire state party.

Prior to the

convention, Isaac Johnson had worried about jealousy within the party and
reminded a Democratic editor that "We must canvass in harmony
by harmony triumph."

& then

The close race between Johnson and Walker at the

convention disrupted Democratic harmony.

In an effort to retain party

accord, Johnson travelled to Walker’s plantation in Rapides Parish and
met amicably with him before they both attended an Alexandria Democratic
meeting.

The Whigs also campaigned throughout the state, with one Whig

pleasantly surprised with the enthusiasm that South Louisiana displayed
for Sparrow, a North Louisiana resident.11

^ Louisiana Courier. October 14, December 11, 1845, January 19, 1846;
Bee, January 12, 17, 1846.
^Isaac Johnson to John F.H. Claiborne, May 18, 1845, John F.H.
Claiborne Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives and History (quote)
(Hereinafter MDAH); Louisiana Courier. October 24, 1845; Baton Rouge
Gazette. November 15, 1845; Bee. September 10, November 14, 1845; Henry
W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, August 21, 1845, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
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After

the campaigning had ended,

the voters

agreed with

the

Democrats’ contention that the party which wrote the constitution should
put it into effect, and Johnson and Landry carried the election.

Despite

his own legislative victory, a Whig complained, "Our defeat throughout
the state will be overwhelming."

This assessment proved accurate as for

the first time, the Democrats controlled the governor’s office,
senate,

and the house of

representatives at the same time.

the

Unlike

previous races, the legislative contests did not occupy much space in the
partisan press.

Democratic candidates for the legislature undoubtedly

echoed the contention that their party should be allowed to enact the
1845 constitution.

With the legislature having the power to pass laws,

this argument applied in these races perhaps even to a greater extent
than it did in the gubernatorial contest.
The Democrats again achieved their greatest margin of victory in
the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana where Johnson obtained over
sixty percent of the ballots.

Whigs had pinned their hopes on South

Louisiana and especially Greater Orleans, DeBuys’s home.

Prior to the

election, a North Louisiana Whig had optimistically observed that though
the 1845 constitution restricted the size of the New Orleans legislative
delegation, it had not curtailed its vote for governor.
backlash against restrictions on the city,

Anticipating a

he predicted that a New

Orleans fire would burn up Johnson’s chances.

Even Greater Orleans,

however, opted for Johnson over its native son.

Whigs blamed their loss

12

Duncan F. Kenner to William J. Minor, January 22, 1846, Duncan F.
Kenner Papers, LLMVC (quote). For a Democrat reminding voters of the
importance of selecting Democrats to put the constitution into practice
see Terence Carriere, "To the Voters of the Parish of St. Tammany," Sou 16
Papers, DU.
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in New Orleans on bad weather, bad luck, and the impact of the Native
American candidate.

More likely, voters in the Crescent City, many of

whom did not own property, probably welcomed the removal of a property
qualification for voting even more than the residents of the rest of the
state.!j (SEE APPENDIX B)
The Democrats

had won the election despite party

Slidell’s absence from the state.

leader John

Congressman Slidell, at the behest of

his close friend Secretary of State James Buchanan, had resigned his seat
in the House of Representatives and accepted a mission to Mexico in an
attempt to avert a war between the two countries over the annexation of
Texas by the United States.

Although Slidell worried that his opponents

would make political capital out of his abandonment of his seat,

the

election to fill this vacancy instead, reinforced Slidell’s power within
the party and the state.

Slidell hand-picked his successor, Emile La

Sere, a wealthy, trilingual New Orleans merchant who had been Slidell’s
associate in the Plaquemines frauds.

After the Democrats nominated La

Sere, the Whigs, recognizing the futility of running their own candidate
in the heavily Democratic district, declined to contest
officially,

and

instead supported a

the election

disgruntled Democrat.

La Sere

achieved an overwhelming victory in the election which occurred two weeks
prior to the gubernatorial contest.

14

^Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, September 24, 1845,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
14

John Slidell to James Buchanan, October 23, 1845, James Buchanan
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Hereinafter HSP); Louisiana
Courier, December 16, 17, 24, 27, 1845; Bee. January 6 , 1846; A.L. Diket,
"Slidell’s Right Hand: Emile La Sere.” Louisiana History IV (1963), 177205.
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A similar situation prevailed in the 1846 senate contest to replace
Whig Alexander Barrow whose term would end in 1S4 7 .

Possessing a clear

majority, the Democrats again realized the value in connecting the race
to the new constitution.

The party caucus selected Solomon W. Downs, the

north Louisianan who had achieved statewide fame for his championship of
constitutional reform.

Realizing that a candidate from their party had

no chance, the Whigs threw their support behind John R. Grymes a moderate
New Orleans Democrat.

They hoped that they could persuade enough New

Orleans Democrats to place city loyalty ahead of party loyalty.

As in

the election to replace Slidell, the Whigs failed in their attempt to
divide the Democrats, and Downs easily won the election.

Barrow died in

1847 shortly before his term ended, and after Downs and Slidell declined
to be considered, the Democrats selected Pierre Soul§ to fill the last
two months of Barrow’s lame duck term before Downs would take the seat.^
State issues, especially the new constitution, had dominated the
1846 gubernatorial campaign with the tariff the only national topic
debated.

During the rest of 1846, the tariff remained a prominent issue.

The national Democratic party, which controlled both the legislative and
executive branches,
significantly

passed the non-protectionist Walker tariff which

lowered

the

duties

on

imported

sugar.

Louisiana’s

Democratic representatives voted for the bill, and the Louisiana Courier
celebrated

it as a victory

different reaction.

for free

trade.

Louisiana Whigs had a

Estimating that the 1846 tariff lowered duties by

15W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, February 15, 17, 1846, W.W. Pugh
Family Papers, Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin
(Hereinafter UT); James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly XII (July 1929), 420.
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almost

seventy percent,

one planter speculated that many sugar cane

growers might turn to cotton, and another observed, "the new tariff bill
has fallen like a thunderbolt here.”16
Louisianans would soon receive another thunderbolt from Washington.
In the 1846 gubernatorial election, the parties’ positions on slavery
received no mention.

In the months following the election, slavery would

leap back into Louisianans’ political debate and would remain there for
the rest of the antebellum period.

The Mexican War proved the catalyst

for the rise of the slavery issue.

In 1846, despite Slidell’s efforts

at negotiation, war with Mexico erupted in May.

In August, David Wilmot,

a relatively unknown Democratic congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced
a measure into the House of Representatives declaring that slavery could
never exist on any
Proviso,

land obtained from Mexico.

this measure would never become

Known as the Wilmot

law, but

it would

sharply

increase sectional tension and fuel political debate for the next fifteen
years.

In Louisiana and the rest of the South, both Whigs and Democrats

attacked the measure as anti-southern.

Among extreme southern rights

men, talk of secession increased, but in Louisiana this group amounted
to no more than a handful .*7
The Mexican War

not only

led to the

produced a Louisiana military hero.

Wilmot Proviso but

also

After defeating the Mexican army in

*6Louisiana Courier. July 13, 16, 22, 1846; Moses Liddell to John
Liddell, July 27, 1846, Moses and St. John Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC;
Alfred Weeks to John Moore, August 3, 1846, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC
(quote); Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., "Louisiana and the Tariff, 1816-1846,"
(Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1941), 163-182.
*7WilliamJ. Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856
(Baton Rouge, 1978), 232-44; Bee. March 4, 1847.
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several battles. General Zachary Taylor, who resided in East Baton Rouge
Parish,

became a national

prominence as a possible
partisan

Taylor

movement

hero.

Many in Louisiana viewed

springboard
developed

to the presidency,
in

the

state.

Taylor’s

and a

Though

non
Whigs

predominated in the movement, prominent Democrats such as former Senator
Robert C. Nicholas,

state

legislator Maunsel White,

banker Jacob Barker aLL backed Taylor’s candidacy.

and New Orleans

In April 1847,

the

Commercial Bulletin placed his name at the head of their columns,

and

three

was

months

later,

the

Rough

established in Iberville Parish.
and.

to

emphasize

and Ready. a

Taylor

newspaper,

It nominated Taylor for the presidency,

its non-partisanship,

William 0. Butler for the vice-presidency.

endorsed

Democratic General

The Taylor boom increased in

December and January when Taylor, on his return from Mexico, was feted
IS

in New Orleans and Baton Rouge.

Louisiana Democrats eyed the non-partisan Taylor movement with
suspicion, especially during the 1847 congressional campaign season.

In

the Third and Fourth districts, where the Whig party was weak, the Whigs
made no nominations, and instead Taylor candidates opposed Democrats.
In the Second District, a Whig stronghold, however, Whigs made no mention
of Taylor, and made a regular Whig nomination.

The Democratic Louisiana

Courier labelled the nomination of Taylor candidates as Whig trickery and

(0

Commercial Bulletin. April 1847; Maunsel White to George McWhorter,
September 20, 1847, Maunsel White Papers, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina (Hereinafter
SHC); Frances Parke Butler to Col. Edward G.W. Butler, July 26, 1847,
Butler Family Papers, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter HNO);
Incidents in the Life of Jacob Barker of New Orleans. Louisiana
(Washington, 1855), 227-8; Bee. December 1, 6 , 1848; Baton Rouge Gazette.
December 11, 1847.
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urged voters not to be beguiled.

Democrats questioned the sincerity of

Taylor candidates and repeatedly pointed to the Second District where an
independent convention had nominated Jacob Barker, a Taylor Democrat.
If the Whigs professed loyalty to Taylor was sincere,
Courier claimed that

then

the Louisiana

they should support Barker over the Whig

nominee who had made no commitment to the general.

Regardless of their

opponents’ label. Democrats fared well, only losing to the regular Whig
nominee

in

the Second District.

The Alexandria Western Democrat’s

description of the Fourth District

results,

"Old Rough and Ready’s

honored name — could not save them," applied equally well in the First
and Third Districts.
Though the 1847 congressional campaign produced no change in the
composition of Louisiana’s delegation,
campaigning in the state.

it did spawn a new method of

Congressional nominees had toured the state

before but never in the manner of the race in the Fourth District.
Democratic incumbent Isaac Morse describes travelling more than twelve
hundred miles during the campaign.

More significantly, he traversed many

of these miles in the company of his Whig opponent.

According to Morse,

"we agreed upon a program, and made appointments to speak every day for
some six weeks, making each day at least one, and sometimes two or more,
speeches."

Never before had opposing candidates canvassed together, but

after 1847 this method of campaigning became standard

in Louisiana.

Throughout the 1848 presidential race, Whigs and Democrats crossed the
state together engaging in debates in front of large crowds.
19

The process

Baton Rouge Gazette, June 5, September 11, 1847; Louisiana Courier,
July 2, 21, August 4, 19, September 10, October 25, November 11, 1847;
Alexandria Western Democrat quoted in ibid.. November 15, 1847.
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culminated in what one partisan newspaper described as "an Eight Hours'
Cannonade between the Great Guns of Whiggerv and Democracy'" held in Baton
Rouge

in

September

before

an audience of

several

thousand

people

including a significant number of women, who followed the debate as
closely as the men.^°
If 1847 had seen a rise in non-partisanship in Louisiana, the first
month of 1848 would provide
drawing partisan lines.

a

lesson in the importance of

strictly

In the legislative elections which coincided

with the 1847 congressional races, the Whigs achieved a slim two vote
majority in the forthcoming session.

One of the first acts of this

legislature involved the selection of a United States senator.

With one

Whig legislator pledged to vote for a Democrat the race was a dead heat,
and both Whig and Democratic newspapers stressed the need for party
unity.

The capital was rife with rumors of under-handed tactics, and

after witnessing

"the open

and

undisguised efforts

at

conniption,

intrigue, and management," one aspirant left the city in disgust.
party held a caucus two days prior
choosing Ascension

Parish

sugar

Each

to the election with the Whigs

planter Duncan

Democrats selecting party chieftain John Slidell.

F.

Kenner

and

the

11

20

Franklin Planters’ Banner. October 28, 1847; Isaac Morse Diary
quoted in Edward C. Morse, Blood of an Englishman (Abilene, Tex., 1943),
118-9. For debates in 1848 see Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer. November
4, 1848; Louisiana Courier. August 14, September 7, November 6 , 1848; New
Orleans Weekly Delta. September 11, 1848 (quote); Balie Peyton to John
J. Crittenden, August 29, 1848, Crittenden Papers, Library of Congress
(Hereinafter LC).
21

Vidal ia Concordia Intelligencer. January 8 , 1848; Baton Rouge
Gazette. November 20, 1847; Commercial Bulletin. January 24, 1848; James
M. Elam to James E. Elam, January 23, 1848, James Elam Letter Book, LLMVC
(quote).
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Believing that he had secured the commitments of two Whigs. Slidell
anticipated winning a narrow victory.

On the first two ballots, however,

he and Kenner deadlocked at sixty-four votes apiece.
Slidell,

another

Whig was mysteriously absent,

One Whig voted for

and Taylor

Democrat

Maunsel White, refusing to cast a ballot for the anti-Taylor Slidell,
wasted his vote on fellow Taylor Democrat Robert C. Nicholas.

Following

the second ballot, the legislature adjourned, and the parties re-caucused
with the Democrats switching their nominee from Slidell to Pierre Soule.
On the subsequent ballot, Soule defeated Kenner with four Whigs voting
for the Democrat.

This result caused an uproar in the Whig party which

included allegations of vote buying, a scuffle on the house floor, and
an official investigation.

The Whig "traitors” defended their vote by

arguing that a Whig could not win, and Senator Soule was preferable to
Senator Slidell.^*
The outcome shook up the Democratic party, too.

Slidell maintained

that only party loyalty prevented him from defeating Sould’s election.
Having maneuvered for over a year to capture the post, he confessed that
he was "not a little annoyed at the result” and complained that Sould had
reaped the benefit of his exertions.

A Whig less charitably observed

that "Slidell is disgusted at the election of Soul€ when he was at the
expense of bribing two members of the Legislature to elect him."
contest contributed

to a growing enmity between the

This

two Democratic

11

Louisiana Courier. January 25, 26. 27, 1848; Commercial Bulletin.
January 25, 26, 1848; Report of the Committee— Toni the Investigation
of the Case of the Breach of the Privileges of the House of at the
Election of a United States Senator
(New Orleans, 1848).
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leaders which wouLd disrupt Louisiana’s Democratic party for the rest of
n
the antebellum period.'"'
Surprisingly, the same Whig newspapers which chastised partisans
for abandoning the Whig party in the senatorial contest trumpeted the
call for a non-partisan Taylor convention in February.

Delegates from

more than three-quarters of Louisiana’s parishes met on February 22. the
anniversary of the birth of George Washington another military hero and
president.

Only the impassibility of the Red River prevented greater

attendance.

The meeting nominated Taylor for president "without regard

to party distinctions" but did not
presidencv.

express an opinion on the vice-

Stressing that "the people have nominated Genl. Taylor."

delegates opposed

the

calling

of

a

national

convention.

Despite

professions of non-partisanship, Whigs predominated at the meeting and
of the twelve Taylor electors chosen (six electors and six substitutes)
1/

only one, Robert C. Nicholas, was a Democrat.
Not all Louisiana Whigs celebrated the non-partisan nomination of
Taylor.

Sergeant

S.

Prentiss

compLained,

"I

have,

I

repeat,

no

confidence in the independent no-partyism, which has lately exploded in
[New O r l e a n s ] W h i le many Whigs, including Prentiss, respected Taylor,
they preferred the candidacy of the party’s traditional standard-bearer
Henry Clay.

Comparing the candidates, Prentiss asserted that Clay was

->3

John Slidell to James Buchanan, February 4. 1848, James Buchanan
Papers, HSP; Balie Peyton to John J. Crittenden, October 21, 1848,
Crittenden Papers, LC; Louis M. Sears, John Slidell (Durham, NC, 1925),
77-79.
24

Baton Rouee Gazette. February 26, 1848; Commercial Bulletin.
February 24, 1848 (first quote); A.T. Burnley to John J. Crittenden,
December 12, 1847, Crittenden Papers, LC (second quote).
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"a thousand times better fitted than Gen. Taylor, for the first office
in the nation.”

Clay had only lost the 1844 election

because of the Plaquemines frauds,

in the state

and these Whigs saw no reason to

abandon him or their party label in 1S48.

Clay Whigs called for a March

convention to select delegates to the national Whig convention.
Clay and Taylor Whigs attended, and,

Both

in an effort to maintain harmony,

the platform did not pledge the state's votes to a particular candidate.
At the June national convention, the Whig party chose Taylor over Clay
as its candidate for the presidency and balanced the ticket by selecting
New Yorker Millard Fillmore for the vice-presidency.

Louisiana Whigs

celebrated Taylor’s nomination with a "Monster Ratification Meeting” in
1C
New Orleans with as many as fifteen thousand people in attendance.
The Bee contended that the March state Whig convention had ended
Taylor no-partyism in Louisiana.
convention certainly did.
partisan

ratification

If

it had not,

then the national

Taylor Democrat Jacob Barker held a non

meeting

simultaneously

with

the

"Monster

Ratification Meeting." While thousands attended the latter only fourteen
people

attended

nomination,

Barker’s

Robert

meeting.

Nicholas,

the

Shortly
only

after

Democratic

announced that he maintained his advocacy of Taylor.

Taylor’s
Taylor

Whig

elector,

But, citing his

disgust with the partisan nature of the campaign, he resigned his post
as elector.

Though Democrats such as Barker and Maunsel White continued

1C

S.S. Prentiss speech, February 22, 1848 in George Prentiss, ed.,
A Memoir of S.S. Prentiss 2 vols. (New York, 1856), 2:451 (first quote);
S.S. Prentiss to George Prentiss, May 22, 1848, ibid., 2:451-3 (second
quote); W.C.C. Claiborne, Jr. to Henry Clay, April 26, 1848. in James F.
Hopkins, et al., eds., The Papers of Henry Clay (11 vols., Lexington,
1959-92), 10:446-7; Commercial Bulletin. March 15, June 14, 26, 1848.
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their zealous championship of Taylor, most others returned to the party
fold, and White admitted that he "most deeply regretted" the contest
becoming partisan.

By November,

party newspapers would find Taylor

Democrats an endangered species in Louisiana.^
Louisiana Democrats held their own convention on March 15, the
anniversary
counterparts,

of

the

birthday

they did

not

of

Andrew

pledge

Jackson.

their delegates

candidate at the national convention.

Like
to a

their

Whig

particular

Instead, the convention passed

resolutions in favor of the 1846 tariff and condemning the Wilmot Proviso
as "an attack on the constitutional rights of the siaveholding states.”
Slidell,
earlier

a member of the delegation to the national
written

that

"our

party here

is unanimous

convention,
in

had

favor of

a

presidential candidate from a free state opposed to the Wilmot Proviso."
If this description were accurate, then Louisiana Democrats had their
wish granted as the party nominated Michigan’s Lewis Cass and passed a
resolution condemning the Wilmot Proviso.

The Democrats balanced the

ticket with General William 0. Butler, a Kentuckian who had served in the
Mexican War and alongside Jackson in the Battle of New Orleans.

A

northern Democrat attending a New Orleans ratification meeting informed
Cass that "you would think that [Louisianans] would not have supported
any one than yourself."

27

26
Bee, March 15, 1848; Description of Barker meeting in New Orleans
Weekly Delta. November 20, 1848; Louisiana Courier. July 6 , September 5,
7, 1848; New Orleans Weekly Delta. July 17, 1848; Maunsel White to
unknown, October 17, 1848, Maunsel White Papers, SHC (quote).
27

Louisiana Courier. March 16 (first quote), May 31, 1848; John
Slidell to James Buchanan, November 13, 1847, Buchanan Papers, HSP
(second quote); Stephen A. Douglas to Lewis Cass, June 13, 1848, in
Robert Johannsen, ed., The Letters of Stephen A. Douglas (Champaign,
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The nomination of Whig and Democratic candidates and the failure
of Taylor’s non-partisan campaign demonstrates the strength of party
commitment in the antebellum United States including Louisiana.

The

independent Taylor movement had begun auspiciously, and in December of
1847. a Democrat observed without animus that "I don’t know a man in this
Parish (a democratic one) of both parties that won’t vote for [Taylor]."
Antebellum voters, however, viewed the world through their attachment to
the Whig or Democratic party, and it was easier to have Taylor conform
to this dichotomy than to dissolve party lines.
explained, "Party politics

As the Louisiana Courier

are as essential to the vitality of the

republic, as is the unchecked circulation of the blood to that of the
animal body."

More importantly, the protection of the South’s peculiar

institution required that the South have northern allies
which an independent candidate would not have.

in Congress

The turmoil surrounding

the Wilmot Proviso heightened this need, and southerners were unwilling
to risk campaigning outside the bounds of party even to elect a southern
slaveholder such as Taylor.

1Q

The 1848 presidential campaign illustrates the magnitude of the
slavery issue in Louisiana, where debate over the candidates’ commitment
to defense of the institution dwarfed all other topics.

Both Whigs and

Democrats acknowledged that protecting slavery was paramount.

In March,

a Democratic meeting in Sabine Parish had resolved that "we regard all

111., 1961), 160-1 (third quote); Leslie Chase to Franklin Pierce, June
11, 1848, Franklin Pierce Papers, LC.
28

James D.B. DeBow to John C. Calhoun, December 26, 1847 (first
quote), in Chauncey S. Boucher and Robert P. Brooks, eds., Correspondence
Addressed to John C. Calhoun. 413-5 (Washington, 1930); Louisiana
Courier. March 18, 1848 (second quote).
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who would

endanger

the union of the States by agitating

question as enemies to the country and her interests."

the

slave

A Baton Rouge

Whig meeting agreed that all attempts to excite passions against the
South were "dangerous to the Union, and injurious to the public good."
A Taylor Democrat concurred that "It has long been my opinion that the
old issues would all fall away before the new absorbing one of North &
South."

During the eight hour debate

regardless

of

partisan

persuasion

in Baton Rouge,

stressed

the

every speaker

importance

of

the

candidates’ stances on slavery, and accusations of unfaithfulness to the
South filled the columns of partisan newspapers throughout the fall.
Of course, the parties disagreed over which candidate’s election
most threatened slavery in the South.

The Democrats concentrated their

venom on the Whig vice-presidential candidate Millard Fillmore.

Arguing

that northern Whigs were antislavery and in favor of the Wilmot Proviso,
Democrats reminded voters that they could not vote for Taylor without
voting for Fillmore, an "avowed and notorious abolitionist."
orators denied they slandered Fillmore with this

Democratic

label because

they

possessed evidence that Fillmore proudly called himself an abolitionist.
The publication of a pamphlet detailing Fillmore’s

long anti-slavery

congressional career highlighted their anti-Fillmore campaign.

This

document, which the Louisiana Courier claimed struck the Whigs ranks like
"a twenty inch shell,"

inaugurated a pamphlet war.

The Whig party

violently denounced it in their own pamphlet, The Crisis, which the

29

Louisiana Courier. March 13, 1848 (first quote); Baton Rouge
Gazette. August 5, 1848 (second quote); Maunsel White to Henry M. Hyams,
August 7, 1848, Maunsel White Papers, SHC (third quote); New Orleans
Weekly Delta. September 11, 1848.
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Democrats followed with another tract repeating that ’'Fillmore is in
favor of every measure of the anti-slavery party."315
At first glance, Taylor, a Louisiana slaveholder, appeared immune
to attacks regarding his loyalty

to the South.

In the emotionally

charged atmosphere of the 1848 campaign, however, even these credentials
did not preclude Democrats from challenging his willingness to protect
slavery.

They

emphasized

Taylor’s

statements

unwillingness to use the veto power.

which

stressed

his

While the northerner Cass had

pledged to veto the Wilmot Proviso, Taylor the southerner had refused to
issue such a pledge.

The Democrats presented a scenario where a northern

Whig-controlled Congress

would pass

the Wilmot

Proviso

and Taylor,

because of his scruples regarding the use of the veto power, would sign
the document though he might personally oppose it.
Taylor

for his

refusal

They also attacked

to make his opinion known on

any

subject.

Democrats asserted that the only stand which Taylor had taken was his
refusal to run as party candidate.

Taylor had violated this pledge, and

they speculated that a man unreliable in one instance could be unreliable
in all instances.31
While

finding

the southern

slaveholder Taylor

unsound on the

slavery issue, Louisiana Democrats avowed that the South could not be in
safer hands

than those of Lewis Cass.

They proudly quoted Cass’s

declaration that "the principle [the Wilmot Proviso] involves should be

30Louisiana Courier. June 14 (first quote), July 1, 29, August 4
(second quote), September 4, November 7, 1848; Mr. Fillmore’s Views on
Slavery: Answer to ’The Crisis’ (New Orleans, 1848), 2 (third quote).
31Louisiana Courier. June 30, July 14, September 5, 30, 1848; Facts
to the People of Louisiana on the Presidential Question: Contradictory
Letters of General Zachary Tavlor (New Orleans, 1848).
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kept out of the national government.”

The Louisiana Courier published

nearly as many articles defending Cass's loyalty to the South as articles
condemning Fillmore’s abolitionist tendencies.

Starting on July 6 . and

periodically thereafter, the newspaper published seven pro-slavery quotes
attributed to Cass

including his pledge

According to Democrats,

to veto the Wilmot Proviso.

this pledge to protect

the South contrasted

sharply with Fillmore’s advocacy of the measure and Taylor’s willingness
37
to sign it. “

Not surprisingly. Whigs disagreed with Democrats’ contention that
Lewis Cass would protect slavery.

Whigs reminded Louisiana voters that

while Cass might oppose the Wilmot Proviso in 1848, previously he had
advocated the measure.

A Taylor supporter found Cass’s views on slavery'

"radically unsound," and a meeting in Catahoula Parish condemned Cass as
a "sectional and exclusively Northern man with Northern prejudices."

The

Whigs alleged that Democrats had produced two campaign biographies of
Cass— a southern version declaring Cass’s opposition

to

the Wilmot

Proviso, and a northern one asserting that he championed the measure.
Whig attacks reached a crescendo after the northern Free Soil
party,

which adopted the Wilmot

Proviso

as the

main plank of

platform, nominated Martin Van Buren for the presidency.
of Louisiana Whigs, Cass and Van Buren became twins.

its

In the words

In 1836 and 1840,

52

Facts to the People of Louisiana on the Presidential Question. 2;
Louisiana Courier. June 30, July 6 , 14, 28, September 18, 1848.
33Maunsel White to unknown, October 17, 1848, Maunsel White Papers,
SHC (first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. August 14, 1848; Baton
Rouge Gazette. July 22, August 26, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. July 13,
October 18, 1848 (second quote).
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Van Buren had campaigned as a northern Democrat with southern principles,
but in 1848 he revealed his true anti-southern principles.

In 1S4S. Cass

echoed Van Buren’s slogan that he was a northern Democrat with southern
principles.

Whigs contended that just as Van Buren’s avowal of fealty

to the South eventually proved false, so would Cass’s declaration.

They

argued that the contest had become sectional with the only true options
being the southerner Taylor and slavery or the northerner Van Buren and
the Wilmot Proviso.

Thus, a vote for Cass would be a vote for Van Buren

and his abolitionist friends.3*
For Whigs, their candidates unquestionably better protected slavery
than the Democratic nominees.
did not need to make

According to their logic, Zachary Taylor

pledges regarding his political stances.

His

residency in Louisiana and his ownership of slaves rendered absurd any
attempts to taint him with abolitionism.

Whigs observed that while

southern Democrats claimed that Taylor would not protect the
northern Democrats decried him for being a slaveholder.

South,

The Whig party

placed Zachary Taylor in a class with two other southern military heroes
who had ascended to the presidency— George Washington and Andrew Jackson.
These men had protected their section as president and so would Taylor .33
With

their belief

in the

self-explanatory nature of Taylor’s

loyalty to the South, Whigs concentrated on defending Millard Fillmore

JI>Bee. August 25, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. October 14, 28, 1848.
The Free Soil party actually held a meeting in Louisiana, and though a
Louisianan assured Van Buren that "thousands” shared his opinions, only
six members attended the meeting. Alexander Walker to Martin Van Buren,
August 28, 1848, Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; New Orleans Weekly Delta.
August 21, 1848; Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, August 2,
1848, Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
33Bee. September 15, 1848; Baton Rouge Gazette, November 4, 1848.
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from charges of

abolitionism.

The yeoman exertions of Sergeant

S.

Prentiss helped allay fears regarding Fi 11more's commitment to the South.
Prentiss. one of the antebellum South's greatest orators had moved from
Mississippi to New Orleans in 1845.

He had campaigned for the Whigs in

Louisiana in the previous two presidential races, and in 1848 he devoted
his energy to demonstrating the slanderous nature of the Democratic
accusations of abolitionism against Fillmore.

Prentiss, who had served

alongside Fillmore in Congress, proclaimed him "as good a friend of the
South as any north of Mason’s and Dixon’s line."
efforts to remove
swimming across

Prentiss’s strenuous

the taint of abolitionism from Fillmore

a river

to attend a

rally,

engaging in a

included
physical

confrontation, and making numerous speeches which ultimately rendered the
orator hoarse and contributed to an illness from which he would never
recover.

While other Whigs might not have equalled Prentiss’s labors,

the party did devote much of the space in its newspapers columns to
denouncing Democratic allegations as falsehoods and contending that no
man was safer for the South than Fi1lmore.^
Although slavery dominated political discourse in the contest, the
traditional

debate

over

disappear completely.

the value

of

the American

System did

not

The Democratic party told voters that the Whigs

had hidden their principles behind Taylor’s military glory.

Democrats

wondered why the Whigs no longer talked of internal improvements, a
national bank, and a tariff.

They asserted that in an effort to delude

^Prentiss, A Memoir of S.S. Prentiss, 2:451-5; Sergeant S. Prentiss
to George Prentiss, October 17, 1848, in ibid., 2:455 (quote); Dallas C.
Dickey, Sergeant S. Prentiss: Whig Orator of the Old South (Baton Rouge,
1945); Baton Rouge Gazette. August 26, September 2, 9, 1848; Commercial
Bulletin, July 22, August 3, 5, 1848.
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voters, the Whigs had temporarily removed these issues from view, but if
Taylor would win the race, the Whigs would quickly try to institute them,
and with his unwiLlingness
measures.

to use the veto,

Taylor would sign

the

The Democrats claimed that in contrast they had openly avowed

their positions at the June Democratic ratification meeting which passed
resolutions in favor of the tariff of 1846 and against a national bank
and federally sponsored internal improvements.
Louisiana Whigs suppressed debate over the American System in their
campaign for Taylor for three main reasons.

First, Taylor’s position on

the Whig program remained unclear, and his declaration that he was a Whig
but not an ultra Whig did little to clarify this attitude.

Second, the

Whigs hoped to g a m e r support from Taylor Democrats, and emphasizing the
traditional differences between the parties undermined this goal.

For

instance, Maunsel White, Louisiana’s leading Taylor Democrat, disagreed
with most Louisiana Whigs on the value of the 1846 tariff.

While most

Whigs condemned the measure, White believed "the tariff as it now stands
seems to work well

enough."

Third,

the party felt

that

stressing

Taylor’s loyalty to the South over Cass’s fealty to the region provided
a winning strategy which would only be disrupted by discussion of the
American System.

19

While avoiding extensive debate

on

the American

System,

some

Louisiana Whigs could not resist addressing the tariff of 1846 which had
37

Louisiana Courier. June 9, 16, October 16, 1848; New Orleans Weekly
Delta. June 12, October 23, 1848; Facts to the People of Louisiana on the
Presidential Question.... 13-23; Samuel Skofieid to George W. Chase, May,
1848. George W. Chase Correspondence, LLMVC.
^Maunsel White to Hamilton Smith, September 17, 1848, Maunsel White
Papers, SHC (quote).
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lowered duties on imported sugar.

The Commercial Bulletin asked if the

electorate could vote for Cass who favored the tariff which "is at this
moment breaking down

the interest

and prosperity of

Louisiana."

A

Louisiana sugar planter expressed the wish that Taylor’s election "may
bring about— a heavier duty required on foreign importations.” and the
Rough and Ready, a Whig pamphlet, maintained that Taylor’s election would
lead to an increase in the tariff.
protective

1842 tariff,

Whigs called for a return to the more

and the Commercial Bulletin argued that

the

state’s sugar planters owed the former congressman Millard Fillmore a
IQ

debt of gratitude for his advocacy of that measure.
In the final

two months of the campaign,

another element to the campaign.
wanted

to

attack Fillmore’s

Butler’s legislative

Whigs decided that if the Democrats

congressional

career was

Louisiana Whigs added

fair

game

record,

then

William

0.

for examination as well.

According to Louisiana Whigs, an analysis of Butler’s speeches revealed
that he had condemned the conduct of Louisiana Creoles for their role in
the Battle

of New Orleans.

In

the

1843 congressional

debate over

refunding Jackson’s fine, Butler, who had served under Jackson during the
battle, allegedly called Creoles cowards and traitors.

Louisiana Whigs

published a pamphlet, A Defence of the Creoles of Louisiana and Andrew
Jackson vs. the calumnies of W’illiam 0. Butler, that included excerpts
from Butler’s speeches.

Democrats, who in their ratification meeting

called Butler "an old and beloved friend of Louisiana," charged that

IQ

Commercial Bulletin. July 17 (first quote), August 10, September
30, 1848; Louisiana Courier. September 22, 1848; Moses Liddell to John
Liddell, November 12, 1848, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote).
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Whigs had deliberately misquoted Butler and maintained that Creoles would
irt
not be misled by this insult to their intelligence.
Whether this tactic gained Taylor any votes is questionable, but
on November 5. 1848. the nation selected Zachary Taylor as its twelfth
president.

If the Louisianan did well across the United States,

he

proved equally popular in his home state, where he received 54.6 percent
of the vote.

The candidacy of a favorite son, however, did not alter

Louisiana’s voting patterns significantly.

Though Taylor, a resident of

the Florida Parishes, received a higher percentage of the vote in that
region than any previous Whig candidate, he still could not capture this
traditionally Democratic region.

The same situation prevailed in North

Louisiana where Taylor outperformed previous Whig candidates but did not
defeat Cass.

Not surprisingly, Old Rough and Ready did best in Greater

Orleans and South Louisiana,
sections.

Taylor’s best

traditionally the Whigs’ two

results

came

strongest

in South Louisiana where

received almost two-thirds of the votes cast.

he

This pro-tariff, Creole

region with its high slave population continued its championship of the
Whig cause. (SEE APPENDIX A)
Following the presidential race, Louisiana voters barely had a
chance to catch their breath before entering into another campaign.

A

governor and four congressmen would be elected the following November,
and a month after Taylor’s victory, lists of possible candidates began
to appear in party newspapers.

A cholera scare and flooding of the

40St. Martinvilie Creole. October 14, 1848; Franklin Planters’
Banner. October 5, 1848; Commercial Bulletin. September 26, October 10,
1848; New Orleans Weekly Delta. June 12, 1848 (quote); Louisiana Courier.
October 7, 9, 12, 1848.
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Mississippi River tempered some of the spirit in early 1849. but in May
both the Democrats and the Whigs held nominating conventions.
as

a

reward

to North

Louisiana,

which

had

loyally

Partially

supported

the

Democratic party but had never had candidate from its region nominated
for governor, the Democrats chose Joseph Walker.

A Rapides Parish cotton

planter.

Walker had narrowly lost the party’s nomination four years

before.

The party platform opposed banks, tariffs, monopolies, and the

Wilmot

Proviso,

while

announcing

its

support

amendment to make the Judiciary elective.

for

a

constitutional

The Whigs looked to Edward

Sparrow who had run for lieutenant governor in 1846, but on the first day
of the convention,
consideration.

a delegate

from Sparrow declining

Instead, the Whigs selected Alexander Declouet, a Creole

lawyer from St. Martin Parish.
resolution

read a letter

in favor of

A member urged

the elective

the body to pass a

judiciary but

the measure was

defeated / 1
Each party looked to its most recent victory in Louisiana for
encouragement in the gubernatorial campaign.

For the Whigs,

Zachary

Taylor’s triumph provided inspiration, and a Whig newspaper urged voters
to "Stand by the President" by voting for Declouet.
resolutions

praising Taylor

in

addition

candidate.

When Democrats attempted

to

Whig meetings passed

those

supporting

to exploit the

their

forty year-old

Deciouet’s relative inexperience, the Whigs invoked Old Rough and Ready’s
name in response.

During the campaign a Democratic orator derisively

**New Orleans Weekly Delta. December 11, 1848; Louisiana Courier.
December 8 , 1848; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 16, 1849; Bee, May
16, 1849; Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, January 30, 1849,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
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asked. "Who is General Declouet?"

Declouet. who had only served two

brief terras in the state senate, had a quick retort.
to Taylor.

Declouet asserted that

like Taylor,

He compared himself
he did not have an

extensive legislative background, but like Taylor, his principles and
honesty would enable him to govern the state effectively.**
For the Democrats, their victory in the 1846 gubernatorial election
provided them with a blueprint for success.
had

defeated

the

Whigs

by

constitution.

In

1849,

they deemed

Taylor’s 1848 triumph.

campaigning

In that election. Democrats
as

this

champions

the

1845

lesson more germane

than

Their nominee provided a direct

of

link to the

charter, for Walker had served as the president of the constitutional
convention.

Advancing democratic reforms had proved effective for the

Democrats in the

1842 and 1846 gubernatorial campaigns,

Democrats continued along this path.

and in 1849

In addition to running Walker, the

party’s resolutions condemning banks and monopolies
outlawing of these measures in the 1845 constitution.

referred to the
Democrats claimed

that they wished to make the constitution even more democratic by making
the judiciary elective.**
The debate over making the judiciary elective dominated political
discourse

in the

1849

race

with both

Democrats

and Whigs

calling

themselves champions of the measure. The Democrats campaigned throughout
the state telling voters that their platform called for a constitutional
amendment to make

the judiciary elective,

while the Whigs

42

remained

Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September 5, October 31 1849 (quote);
New Orleans Weekly Delta. July 16, 1849: Moses Liddell to John Liddell,
August 19, 1849, Liddell Papers, LLMVC.
43

Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 16, 1849.
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silent.

They charged Declouet not only with opposition to an elective

judiciary but also with having fought against many other democratic
reforms.

When Democrats charged the Whigs with resisting the measure.

Whigs not only claimed that they welcomed the change. but they falsely
asserted that

they had advocated it before the Democrats did.

Whig

newspapers claimed that Declouet, like many Democrats, had changed his
mind on an elective judiciary,

and the Whig candidate for lieutenant

governor denied that it could be considered a partisan topic.
The parties’ reaction to the elective judiciary illustrates the
power of the electorate in antebellum Louisiana politics.

Prior to the

1844 constitutional convention, voters had deemed an elective judiciary
too radical, and the Democratic party retreated from its advocacy of the
measure.

In 1844 and 1845, the Whigs parlayed their opposition to the

election of

judges

into

a competitive

minority

in the

convention.

Furthermore, they considered the absence of a clause providing for this
change one of their victories at the convention.

With the voters having

changed their mind about the issue, however, the Democrats returned to
the topic and

the Whigs,

followed in lock-step.

who feared being branded as undemocratic,

With voters adamantly demanding this alteration,

the Franklin Planters’ Banner correctly argued "neither party would dare
retreat from it."**
Though the elective judiciary issue dominated political debate,
Louisianans continued to bang the traditional drums of ethnicity and ties

it
Bee, June 12, July 10, 1849; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. June 27,
October 3, 1849.
**Franklin Planters’ Banner. February 14, 1850.
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to Andrew Jackson.

The

Whigs

took advantage of Declouet’s Creole

heritage and charged Democrats with slurring him as "the Gumbo and Frog
Candidate.

Trying to capture votes from both Creoles and Americans, the

Whigs added that Declouet spoke both French and English, while Plauche.
the Democratic candidate for lieutenant governor, could not speak English
and therefore could not preside over the senate.

The Democrats continued

to campaign on the coattails of Andrew Jackson.

With fewer and fewer

voters having memories of the Battle of New Orleans, the party did not
employ its connection to the victory as much as it had in the past.

In

choosing Plauche, a veteran of the battle and in passing a resolution
celebrating Jackson's victory, the Democrats did hope to inspire some
nostalgia for the great triumph.
With over one-quarter

of

the

state’s population

foreign-born

including more than half the population in Greater Orleans, immigration
continued to grow in importance in Louisiana politics.

The Democrats

portrayed themselves as the friends of naturalized citizens and the Whigs
as their enemies.

They reminded naturalized citizens that many of them

owed their vote to the 1845 constitution, which had given the right to
vote to propertyless white males— a category which included many New
Orleans immigrants.

In the weeks immediately preceding the election, the

Whigs of New Orleans went on the offensive in trying to gain immigrant
votes.

They repeatedly charged that Walker, after losing a United States

Senate contest to Alexander Porter in 1833, cal led his opponent "a damned
Irishman."

Asking

"Which of

the candidates

is

the Friend of

the

^Franklin Planters’ Banner. October 18, 1849 (quote); Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel. October 3, 1849; Bee. October 1, 1849.
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Naturalized Citizen?'" Whigs circulated copies of Walker's
votes

which

immigrants.
The

they

contended

proved

that

Walker

had

legislative

long

opposed

q
1849

election

demonstrated

involvement in the political process.

Louisiana's

voters

increasing

In the 1S4S presidential election,

many voters had cast their ballots because Taylor lived in the state, but
more people voted in the 1849 contest and the concurrent congressional
elections than had in any prior race including Taylor’s presidential bid.
Turnout exceeded eighty percent

in each of the state’s regions.

The

result was close, but the voters apparently agreed with the Democrats
that

the

1846 gubernatorial

contest

provided

the

more

yardstick, and Walker won with 51.6 percent of the vote.

appropriate

Walker achieved

his greatest majorities in the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana where
he received slightly less than sixty percent of the vote.

The Whigs

continued to dominate South Louisiana with Greater Orleans remaining the
most evenly balanced region. (SEE APPENDIX B)
In addition, the Democrats captured three of the four congressional
seats contested.
dominated

the

Since

First,

the

Third,

1843
and

controlling the Second District.

redistricting,
Fourth

the Democrats

Districts

with

the

had

Whigs

In 1849, the parties continued their

sectional division in these contests.

With the Whigs’ stranglehold on

the sugar cane-producing Second District, the Democrats attempted to
enlist ambitious former Whig governor Henry Johnson in an effort
disrupt the Whigs.

to

Johnson declined their offer, and Whigs Charles M.

^ Seventh Census-1850. 61, 243-9; Bee. October 13, 15, 17 (quote),
19 , 24 , 25, 1849; William H. Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana
(Lafayette, La., 1973), 188-9.
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Conrad easily defeated an independent Democrats.

In the First and Third

Districts, the Whigs’ cause was as hopeless as the Democrats* chances
were in the Second, and they only made token nominations.

Only in the

Fourth District, which included portions of Democratic North Louisiana
and Whig South Louisiana, did the parties have a competitive campaign.
with the Democratic incumbent winning a slim majority.

4g

At the national level, conflict between the North and the South
over slavery continued to increase. A Louisianan worried that "News from
Washington

is

gloomy.

Dissolution

of

the

Union

is

threatened."

Southerners in favor of uniting against northern depredations called a
regional convention to be held in Nashville in the summer of 1S50.
outgoing Governor
Louisiana's

Johnson

participation

and
in

the

recently elected

the meeting.

Walker

Sensing

Both

favored

constitutional

objections to this southern assembly, Johnson made the controversial
statement, "It is far better to be lawless than to live under lawless
rule."

In his

inaugural address, Walker concurred

that antislavery

agitation was "about to reach a crisis," and that Louisiana must be
"prepared to make common cause with our neighbors."

Following Walker’s

suggestion, the Democratic-controlied senate passed a bill calling for
the election of delegates to Nashville.
majority,

and members

unconstitutional.

In the house, the Whigs had a

of the party attacked the convention bill

With

the

Whigs’

announced

opposition

to

as
the

iff

Henry Johnson to John F.H. Claiborne, June 1, 1849, John F.H.
Claiborne Papers, MDAH; Daily Picayune. November 11, 14, 1849.
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convention, the measure never came to a vote, and Louisiana did not send
delegates to Nashville.'
While some southerners
attacks on slavery,
tensions.

sought a regional

solution to northern

others looked to Washington to

reduce sectional

In Congress, Henry Clay attempted to end sectional controversy

by introducing a series of measures known as the Compromise of 1850.
President Taylor opposed the Compromise, but after his death in 1850,
pro-Compromise
presidency.

Vice-President

Millard

Fillmore

succeeded

to

the

Southerners had decried Fillmore’s commitment to the South

in the campaign of IS48, but as president, he made many of them re-think
their opinion of him.

Even Louisiana Democrat John Slidell admitted that

Fillmore’s ascension to
sectional differences.
a number of

the presidency improved chances of settling

Initially, Clay’s Compromise bill, consisting of

separate measures bound together,

failed.

Later,

when

shrewdly introduced by Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas as individual
bills, Congress passed the measures, which Fillmore signed.*®
The

controversy surrounding

Louisiana’s political parties.

the Compromise

played

prominent

roles

1850

disrupted

Louisiana’s delegation to Washington

consisted of five Democrats and one Whig.
senators

of

in the

The state’s two Democratic
debate

with

Senator

Downs

championing the Compromise and Senator Soule leading the attack against

49

Franklin Planters’ Banner. March 28, 1850; Greer, "Louisiana
Politics, 184-5-1861," 574; James M. Elam to James E. Elam, March 10,
1850, James Elam Letter Book, LLMVC; Louisiana House Journal. 1st sess.,
3rd leg., 11 (Johnson quote), 26 (Walker quote).
John Slidell to James Buchanan, July 13, 1850, Buchanan Papers,
HSP; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848-1861 (New York, 1976),
90-120.
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In the House, only two of Louisiana’s four congressmen voted on the

Compromise.

In August. Whig Charles M. Conrad vacated his seat to become

Fillmore’s secretary of war. and Third District Democrat John Harmanson
was absent from the capitol because of a severe illness which would lead
to his death in October.

Like Soule. Isaac Morse,

representing the

Fourth District, forcefully voiced his opposition to the measures.

First

District congressman Emile La Sere voted like Morse but remained silent
on the Compromise.51
Though the state’s delegation had not given the Compromise of 1S50
its endorsement, Louisiana Whigs, and most Louisiana Democrats, praised
it as a solution to the nation’s sectional problems.

A Carroll Parish

cotton planter asserted, "I am content with the compromise arrangement.
In my humble opinion the South has obtained a triumph."

In the Second

District,

measures

the

Whigs

passed

resolutions

endorsing

the

selected a pro-Compromise candidate to succeed Conrad.

and

The district’s

Democrats divided over the Compromise and made no nomination, but some
persisted in voting for Whig Henry Johnson.

Whigs cheered

Senator

Downs’s support of the measure, and Whig newspapers praised the action
of their partisan enemy, calling him "a patriot, a representative, and
a statesman."

Most Democrats joined in the celebration of Downs and,

along with Whigs, greeted his return to the state with a one hundred gun
salute.

To thank Downs for his devotion to the South and the Union, pro-

compromisers held a giant bipartisan Union Meeting in New Orleans and

SIMary E. Welborn Prichard, "Louisiana and the Compromise of 1850,"
(Master’s thesis, 1929), 24-44; Leslie M. Norton, "History of the Whig
Party in Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation, 1940), 315-335; For voting
results see Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict; The Crisis and
Compromise of 1850 (Lexington, Ky., 1964), 191-200.
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smaller gatherings

throughout

the

state.

thousand people attended the Crescent
members of both parties,

Between

seven and

City assembly,

and

prominent

including Democratic Governor Walker,

speeches in favor of Downs's course.

eight

made

52

If some Louisiana Democrats celebrated the Compromise and Downs,
others felt that the Compromise measures favored the North.

Congress mem

Morse called it "a suicidal step for the South" and wondered how it could
be called a compromise when one side gave up everything, and the other
side gave up nothing.

In the Senate, Pierre Soule delivered one of the

strongest anti-Compromise speeches and later asserted that submission to
the oppressive measures would bring "dishonor, disgrace, and ruin to the
South.”

The breach between Louisiana’s Democratic Senators split the

state’s Democratic party.

Already disliking Soule for

stealing his

Senate seat. Slidell charged him with ”produc[ing] fatal dissensions in
our party,” for his opposition to the Compromise, and another objected
to

Soule’s

"several

inflammatory. ..speeches.”

Only

one

Louisiana

newspaper openly supported Soule’s actions, and the Southern Rights
meeting held to celebrate his return to the state paled in comparison to
the Union meeting.

The almost universal hostility toward Soule’s course

eventually forced his advocates to publish a pamphlet explaining that he

Hiram B. Tibbetts to John C. Tibbetts, 1850, John C. Tibbetts
Correspondence, LLMVC (first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sent ine1«
September 21, 1850 (second quote); Franklin Planters’ Banner. October 17,
1850; Daily Picayune. September 13, 1850; Bee. May 30, November 21, 28,
1850; Joseph Fitch to J.G. Weld, November 20,, 1850, Weld Company
Correspondence, LLMVC; John Liddell to Moses Liddell, May 7, 1851,
Liddell Papers LLMVC; Greer, "Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861" 573-89.
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and Downs differed only in degree and that their votes on the compromise
had actually been very similar.
Support for the Compromise of 1S50 among southern Whigs and among
some southern Democrats contributed to the formation of Union parties in
three southern states: Mississippi. Alabama,

and Georgia.

In

these

states, Whig parties had ceased to be competitive, and an alliance with
pro-Compromise Democrats appeared to be a method to obtain power.

Formed

in IS50. Union parties accepted the compromise as a final settlement and
eschewed traditional party labels.

Because of the complex interaction

of state and national politics, all attempts to form a Louisiana Union
party failed.
establish a

A Louisiana Whig
compromise

party,"

''thought it
and

the Bee

bad policy to
preferred

distinctive and well-understood political landmarks."

try

to

"maintaining

Louisiana Whigs

considered the establishment of a Union party "bad policy" because in
their state, the Whig party was not a non-competitive minority.

The Whig

party’s program had popularity in New Orleans and especially in the sugar
cane growing parishes,
statewide election.

and the

Whigs had been

competitive in every

54

Morse Diary, 1850, in Morse, Blood of an Englishman. 123 (first
quote); Soule speech quote in Bee. December 2, 1850 (second quote); John
Slidell to James Buchanan, December 16, 1850, Buchanan Papers, HSP (third
quote); Mr. Sould’s Speech at Opelousas. Louisiana Delivered on the 6 th
of September 1851 (New Orleans, 1851); Pierre Soule to John F.H.
Claiborne, September 24, 1850, Claiborne Papers, MDAH; Thoughts on the
Slavery Question and the Clav Compromise, with the Final Action of the
Louisiana Delegation in Congress. Thereon (New Orleans, 1851); Greer,
"Louisiana Politics, 1845-1861,” 574-78.
Adams, Whig Party of Louisiana. 223; John Ray to John Moore 11
February 1852, Weeks Papers (first quote); Bee. December 6 , 1851 (second
quote); For a discussion of Union parties in the South see Cooper, South
and the Politics of Slavery. 304-20; Arthur C. Cole, The Whig Party in
the South (Washington, 1913), 183-203; J. Mills Thornton, Politics and
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In Louisiana, not only did the Whigs benefit from their stance on
the Compromise of 1850, but also they used their advocacy of revision of
the Democratic-authored 1845 constitution to maintain a strong position
in the state.

William H. Adams, in The Whig Party of Louisiana, argues

that "the adoption of the new [1S45] constitution would ultimately mean
the [Whig] party’s demise."

The charter, however, actual ly provided the

Whigs with an opportunity to reinvigorate their party.
support

Much of the

for the 1845 constitution had stemmed from disgust with the

constitution of 1812 and not from enthusiasm for the new document.

While

an improvement, the constitution of 1845, "still contained features that
were unsuitable

to

the political

and economic milieu of

antebellum

Louisiana."55
Arguing that "virtually all agree some change is necessary," the
Whigs repeatedly called for a convention to write a new constitution in
the late 1840s and early 1850s.
house

passed a bill

In February of 1850, the Whig-controlled

authorizing

the

formation of a

constitutional

convention, but the Democratic senate defeated the bill by ten votes.
By 1850, the public attitude had turned against the 1845 constitution
and, consequently, in favor of the Whigs.

The commercial interests of

New Orleans detested the "absurd" constitution’s severe restrictions
which had "shackle[d]

and fetter[ed]"

business.

At the same

Power in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1800-1861 (Baton Rouge, 1978),

time,

165-

200.
Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 149 (first quote); Wayne M.
Everard, "Louisiana’s ’Whig Constitution Revisited: The Constitution of
1852," in Warren M. Billings and Edward F. Haas, eds., In Search of
Fundamental Law: Louisiana’s Constitutions. 1812-1974 (Lafayette, La.,
1993), 37 (second quote).
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residents of northern Louisiana complained that voting restrictions in
the

1845 constitution,

especially

residence, were still too severe.
provisions

of

the

1845

those

regarding state

and parish

Whigs complained that many of the

constitution

originated

from

’’temporary

excitement" and consequently possessed "a degree of ultraism."

As the

party advocating a revision of the constitution, the Whigs benefit ted
from the widespread desire for change.^
In the

1851 congressional and legislative campaigns,

exploited both national and state issues.

the Whigs

At their state convention,

they wrote a party platform which presented their party as the author of
the Compromise of 1850 and the protector of southern interests.

The

platform also called for a constitutional convention to write a new state
charter that would be more democratic and more responsive to the needs
of business

interests.

In New Orleans,

the Whig party called upon

prominent businessmen, including lawyer Judah P. Benjamin and railroad
promoter James Robb, to inconvenience themselves temporarily and run for
the legislature to advance the commercial prosperity of the state.
contrast, because of
Compromise of

1850

internal disagreements
and

the

need for

over

constitutional

Democratic party declined to issue a party platform.
Walker,

who

had

served

as

president

the merits

of

the

of

revision,

In
the
the

Democratic Governor
1845

constitutional

convention, steadfastly opposed a convention and could not "see any good
ground in what has passed

for a change of our organic law."

The Daily

^Bee, February 11, 1850, May 20, 1851 (first quote); George D.
Green, Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana
Banking 1804-1861 (Stanford, 1972), 131-3; Daily Picayune. February 21,
1850, March 8 , 1850; Commercial Bulletin. March 22, 1852 (second quote);
Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer. February 7, 1852 (third quote).
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Picavune more correctly described pro-convention sentiment as "nearly
unanimous.” and the Whigs used their advocacy of the Compromise and
constitutional revision to sweep to their largest legislative majority.^
Additionally, the party captured a second congressional seat for
the first time since prior to the failed gerrymander of 1S43.

The Whigs

used their pro-Compromise stance to add a victory in the Fourth District
to their traditional control of the sugar cane-growing Second District.
In the Fourth District, the respective platforms revealed the differences
between the two parties.

Democrats claimed only the South made any

compromises in 1850, while Whigs asserted that the Compromise of 1850
settled the nation’s most dangerous questions.
incumbent Democrat

Whig John Moore attacked

Isaac Morse for his opposition to the Compromise.

Calling Morse a secessionist, Whigs contended,

"the question in this

district is whether the doctrines of Gen. Downs or Pierre Soule shall be
sustained."

Fearing that Morse would lose the election, Democrats sent

the pro-Compromise Downs to the district to stump for him and to try to
heal divisions within the party.
Morse.
disunion.

Moore’s friends

Despite Downs’s effort, Moore defeated

celebrated his victory as

"a

triumph over

58

S7G.B. Duncan, et al. to James Robb, October 10, 1851, George Peabody
to Robb, January 5, 1852, James Robb Papers, HNO; John Slidell to James
Buchanan, December 16, 1850, November 17, 1851, Buchanan Papers, HSP;
Address of Jacob Barker Delivered before the Members of the Jefferson
Club (New Orleans, 1852), 4; Bee. October 9, 1851; Louisiana House
Journal. 1st sess., 4th leg., 10-11 (Walker quote).
58

Franklin Planters’ Banner. September 6 , 20, October 4
quote), 18, 1851; Bee. August 6 , October 9. November 13, 1851;
Liddell to Mary Liddell, November 17, 1851, Liddell Family Papers,
John H. Dinkgrave to John Moore, November 28, 1851 (second quote),
Clark to Moore, December 31, 1851, Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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Having added a congressman to Louisiana's delegation in Washington,
the Whig party hoped that its control of the 1852 legislature would allow
it to add a senator as well.
the 1848

Senate election,

Four years after the scandal surrounding

when a Whig majority

legislature elected

Democrat Pierre Soule, Whig newspapers swore that they would not allow
the repeat of such a disgraceful event.

A number of Whigs aspired to the

office, but the party caucus united behind Judah P. Benj'amin, a New
Orleans legislator who had been elected as an advocate of commercial
reform.
Downs.

The Democrats nominated the pro-Compromise incumbent Solomon W.
They hoped to obtain the votes of several Whig legislators who

either had pledged their vote to Downs because of his stance on the
Compromise or who represented Democratic constituencies.
however, proved in vain.

Their efforts.

Three Whigs crossed party lines, but Benj'amin

defeated Downs on the first ballot.

59

The Whigs also employed their legislative maj'ority to pass a bill
allowing the state’s voters to decide on whether to call a constitutional
convention.

Newspapers throughout the state advocated a constitutional

convention at the beginning of 1852.
deemed

"a

new constitution

The New Orleans Commercial Bulletin

absolutely

necessary,

and

the

Franklin

Planters’ Banner pronounced the 1845 constitution as "unworthy of the
genius of our people."

The Plaquemine Southern Sentinel argued that "the

Randel 1 Hunt to F.D. Richardson, December 1, 1851, F.D. Richardson
Papers, SHC; For Whig pledged to Downs see B.H. Payne to John Moore,
January 22, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC; For controversy over a Whig
reneging on pledge to Downs see S.W. Downs to John Liddell, November 8 ,
1851, E. Warren Moise to Liddell, November 25, 1851, and John Liddell to
unknown, December 10, 1851, all in Liddell Papers, LLMVC; For opinion
that Downs’s nomination actually hurt the Democratic party see Pierre
Soule to Isaac Morse, February 1, 1852, in Morse, Blood of an Englishman,
129-30.
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expression throughout the state seems to us almost universal, in behalf
of a new constitution.”

Despite Governor Walker's opposition,

most

Democrats acceded to the people's demands, and the convention bill easily
passed with seventy-six votes in favor and only seven against .60
The January

meeting of

the

legislature

inaugurated

what

one

Louisianan described as a "perfect war of politics throughout the year"
including municipal,
battle between the

statewide,

and national contests.

Leaders of both parties acknowledged

the importance of this campaign as

a

Democratic stalwart John

succeed we shall

initial

Democrats and Whigs occurred in the New Orleans

municipal elections on March 22.

strengths.

The

litmus test of their
Slidell

relative

contended that

carry the state in November."

"if we

Speaking at a Whig

ratification meeting the night before the city elections. Senator-elect
Benjamin concurred in the magnitude of the New Orleans elections and in
their connection to the national contest.
the resolutions

Additionally, the preamble to

adopted by this Whig gathering emphasized

success of the Whig party in the city election "will

that

the

insure a Whig

Convention, a Whig Constitution, a Whig legislature, and the vote of the
state for a Whig president."6*

Commercial Bulletin. February 20, 1852; DaiIv Picayune. January 21,
23, 1852; Franklin Planters’ Banner. April 10, 1852; Plaquemine Southern
Sentinel, January 24, 1852; Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer. January 24,
1852.
6IWilliam C. Carr to John Moore, July 13, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC;
John Slidell to James Buchanan, March 19, 1852, Buchanan Papers, HSP
(first quote); Pierce Butler, Judah P. Beniamin (Philadelphia, 1907),
103; Whig meeting preamble in Commercial Bulletin. March 22, 1852 (second
quote).
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Before 1852.

the New Orleans municipal elections had

not been

contested on strictly partisan grounds, and party leaders had not placed
much stress on them as harbingers of statewide races.
conflict

in

tension.

From 1S36 to 1S52 animosity among the city's ethnic groups had

led

to

the

the Crescent

physical

City

separation

autonomous municipalities.

had revolved

Instead, political

of

the

around

city

into

Creole-American

three

virtually

In February 1S52 the legislature mandated

consolidation, calling a March election to unify the city under a single
board of aldermen.

Prior to 1852, ethnicity and personality had shaped

New Orleans elections,

but with consolidation,

the historic

Creoie-

American contest took on more the form of partisan politics.

Leon C.

Soule, in his study of New Orleans politics, asserts that consolidation
saw "the emergence of the political party as the dominant factor in
municipal politics." Democrats and Whigs agreed with this assessment and
placed a greater emphasis

on

the municipal

contests

than

in prior

years.^
At

first

glance,

the

municipal

campaign

appeared

to

be

an

unqualified Whig triumph: the party captured the mayoralty, treasurer,
comptroller, and elected a majority of the Board of Aldermen.
further examination, however, the election had exposed chinks
party’s armor.

Upon
in the

With partisan attachments in the city not solidified, a

third-party movement emerged despite the best efforts of both Whig and
Democratic newspapers to dissuade their members from straying from the
fold.

Writing in his diary, a prominent Whig observed that "Mr. James
CA

Leon C. Sould, "The Creol e-American Struggle in New Orleans
Politics, 1850-1862.” Louisiana Historical Quarterly XL (January 1957),
54-83. (quote on p. 61).
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Robb got up an independent ticket with a view to injure (it is said) the
Whig party
efforts

The Whigs will not forget it though [the independents]

prove[d]

of

little use."

Robb,

a Whig

state

senator

and

Louisiana’s most prominent railroad promoter, represented a faction that
considered

commercial

affiliation.

advancement

Claiming

to

more

represent

the

important
business

than

partisan

communit\%

the

independent reform movement’s success is difficult to gauge, for though
they elected seven of the city’s twelve aldermen, ail of their victorious
candidates were also either Whig or Democratic nominees.63
A month after the city election, in a referendum marred by poor
turnout, Louisiana voters called for a constitutional convention.

Only

voters in the Florida Parishes, fearing that the capital might be moved
back from Baton Rouge to New Orleans,
measure.

cast a majority against

the

Discussing the selection of delegates to the convention, the

Daily Picayune state, "The interest in these questions is not mixed up
with ordinary electioneering." The people and the parties disagreed with
this sentiment

and

instead

concurred

with the

Plaquemine

Southern

Sentine 1 that "electing delegates irrespective of their politics
moral impossibility."

is a

The Whigs benefitted from their party’s unified

position in favor of a convention.

In the 1851 legislative campaign, the

Whigs had declared in favor an elective judiciary, free banking, state
aid to internal

improvement companies,

and public education.

Party

newspapers also reminded voters that the Democrats were responsible for

63Samuel J. Peters, Jr., Diary, March 23, 1852, LLMVC; Harry H.
Evans, "James Robb, Banker and Pioneer Railroad Builder of Antebellum
Louisiana." Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXIII (January 1940), 191-3;
Daily Delta. March 12, 1852; Commercial Bulletin. March 8 , 1852;
Louisiana Courier. March 13, 1852; Daily Picayune. March 20, 24, 1852.
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the "the miserable edifice" of the 1S45 constitution which "hung like an
fit

incubus upon the state's prosperity.”
Because

of

their

party's

split

on

the

necessity

of

a

new

constitution, Democrats had campaigned in IS51 without a platform.

Some

Democrats

1845

believed

that

the

commercial

restrictions

in

the

constitution should remain in place, while others echoed Whig calls for
reforms designed to facilitate commerce.

The Louisiana Courier warned

voters that the Whig call for an elective judiciary was simply a trick
with the party’s real goal being to remove restrictions on state spending
and plunge Louisiana into debt.

The newspaper asserted that in the 1845

constitutional convention the Whigs had opposed almost every democratic
reform, and yet now they tried to convince the electorate that they were
the party of
included an

democracy.

Democrats stressed that

amending process

that

could

the

be used

to

1845 document
make

it

more

democratic without removing restrictions on government involvement in the
economy and without calling an expensive convention.^
In the June election, voters chose the Whigs’ united front in favor
of a convention over the Democrats’ mixed message.

The

Commercial

Bulletin called the Whig triumph "unparalleled," as the party captured
a majority of approximately 30 to 40 of the 125 seats contested.

A

Democratic newspaper admitted that the absence of a pro-convention plank
had hurt the party, and W.W. Pugh, a Democratic delegate, lamented that
the results left his party in a position where it could "only object to
64

Baton Rouge Gazette. April 17, 1852; Daily Picayune, May 12, 1852;
Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 1, 1852: Commercial Bulletin. April 24,
1852.
^ Louisiana Courier. June 1, 5, 1852.
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disagreeable
obstacle."

measures,

without

the

power

to

interpose

any

The Whigs* victory was particularly impressive in commercial

New Orleans which had the
provisions

having

of the

most

to complain about the anti-business

1S45 const itution.

In the Crescent

City.

Whigs

captured twenty-six of the twenty-seven seats.00
The convention assembled on July 5, 1852. with the Whigs employing
their overwhelming majority

to write a constitution based on

platform of positive government:
improvements,

state aid to business and

more liberal banking

their

internal

laws, and public education.

The

succeeded in legalizing state government purchase of stock in internal
improvement projects, an article which Pugh saw as the "one great and
controlling

desire

of

the

whigs

of

New

Orleans"

"graft...solely for the promotion...of speculators."

and

decried

as

They also passed

measures that raised the maximum state debt from one hundred thousand to
eight million dollars, permitted free banking— the formation of banks
with either general or special laws— and removed limits on the life of
corporations

and monopolies.

Not

only Whigs

found

these

measures

attractive, for the constitution passed by an overwhelming 98-8 vote.
Many of the delegates probably agreed with R.A. Hargis’s assessment. "I
vote yes, not because I like the new Constitution in all of its details,
but because I like it better than the constitution of 1845. ”67

^ Commercial Bulletin. June 15, 16 (quote) 1852; W.W.
Josephine N. Pugh, July 5, 1852, Pugh Family Papers, UT.

Pugh

to

67W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, July 11, 1852 (second quote) and
July 28, 1852 (first quote), Pugh Family Papers, UT; Journal of the
Convention to Form a New Constitution for the State of Louisiana (New
Orleans, 1852). Text of the constitution, 91-9, vote on constitution, 989; (Hargis quote on p. 100); Everard, "Louisiana’s ’Whig’ Constitution
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The IS52 constitutional convention possessed a far greater spirit
of cooperation than the 1845 assembly.

The index of disagreement in the

approving the constitution was only twenty-five percent with both parties
voting strongly in favor of passage.

The elective judiciary, which had

engendered so much animosity seven years earlier, passed with the only
arguments over the length of terms and the number of districts.

Also,

the duration of the convention indicated less partisan controversy or at
least less debate than the 1S45 convention.

In 1S44 and 1845. delegates

met for over 140 days, while in 1S52 revision took only 27 days.

In his

study of the process. Wayne Everard cites the bipartisanship of the
convention as evidence that the label "Whig constitution" is a misnomer.
Though Everard exaggerates the extent of the partisan cooperation, he
does accurately portray the parties in the 1852 constitutional convention
£9

as less antagonistic than in 1845.
Whig papers were ecstatic about the proposed constitution, and the
Baton Rouge Gazette exclaimed that the Whigs "now have it in our power
to place Louisiana beyond the reach of Locofocoism and to retain its
government in our hands for years to come."

The electorate still had to

ratify the constitution, and Democratic opposition to the document soon
developed over an issue which had nothing to do with the Whigs’ primary
goals.

The charter included an article which based representation in

both houses

of

the

legislature

upon

counting the same as free people.

total

population,

with

slaves

Thus, a parish with one thousand

Revisited," 37-51.
^ Journal of the Convention. 60-70, 99; Everard, "Louisiana’s ’Whig’
Constitution Revisited," 37-51.
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whites and nine thousand slaves would have the same number of legislators
as one with ten thousand whites and no slaves.

In the antebellum period,

no other southern state used this basis of representation in both houses
of the legislature."
Residents

of

parishes.

including

Orleans.

which

had

low'

concentrations of slaves objected to this measure which would create a
nobility of planters and, according to one delegate, would "place the
African and white

man on a

Louisiana

asserted

Courier

level.”
that

Opposed

"no

white

to

ratification,

man

can

constitution] without being faithless to his race.”
population in their opposition to the constitution.

the

accept

[the

In seizing total
Democrats acted

disingenuously because the charter merely extended to both houses the
method of apportionment

that

the

1845 constitution,

written by Democrats, had used for the senate.
index of partisan disagreement

of

population did not pass solely as

less

than

which had been

Additionally, with an
twenty percent,

a partisan measure.

total

Instead,

it

emerged as a sectional compromise among the parishes with high slave
concentrations, parishes with few slaves, and New Orleans.

The Whig

delegates form Orleans Parish supported this measure by a vote of 16 to
10 because they feared that any other method would include a limit on the

number of legislators from the city, while the total population method
did not place a ceiling on the size of any parish’s delegation.

Some

delegates from parishes with low concentrations of slaves supported the
compromise

because,

for

the

first

time

in

Louis iana

bQ

history,

a

Baton Rouge Gazette. July 10, 1852; Donald E. Fehrenbacher,
Constitutions and Constitutionalism in the Slaveholding South (Athens,
Ga., 1989), 12-3.
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constitution

guaranteed

each

parish

a

representative

in

the

legislature.^
Pro-constitution Whig newspapers argued that voters should accept
the new constitution with one objectionable article rather than remain
under the present one with its ''many odious clauses.”

The commercially-

oriented Democratic Dailv Delta concurred that "the choice is between the
old and new Constitution.

It is not. whether you entirely approve both,

but which do you prefer.”

John Slidell possessed a different opinion.

He argued that all of the necessary changes could have been quickly
attained through an amendment process and would be made the next year
even if voters rej'ected the constitution.

The electorate apparently

disagreed with Slidell’s assessment. On November 2, Louisianans accepted
the 1852 constitution by a vote of 19.286 to 16,004.

In no region did

the pro-constitution vote exceed sixty percent, but only voters in North
Louisiana rej’ected the measure.

Their vote reflected the strength of the

anti-constitution Democratic party there and the region’s fear of the
influence of New Orleans.71 (TABLE 4.1)
In 1852, the meeting of a constitutional convention and debate over
the

charter’s

ratification

presidential campaign.

occurred

simultaneously

with

a

heated

Four years earlier, Louisiana Whigs had spent a

significant amount of the presidential canvass defending their northernborn vice-presidential candidate Millard Fillmore from attacks regarding
70

Journal of the Convention. 65 (vote on total population), 100
(quote); Louisiana Courier. October 30, 1852. Whigs voted 51-19 and
Democrats 25-22 in favor of total population.
7'Baton Rouge Gazette. August 14, 1852 (first quote); Dailv Delta.
November 2, 1852 (second quote); Bee. November 24, 1852; Slidell letter
in Louisiana Courier. October 14, 1852.
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T A B LE 4 . 1

VOTE ON 1S52 CONSTITUTION

YES
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

25S4
4731
7046
5489
19850

his loyalty to the South.

PERCENT
IN FAVOR

NO
2060
5071
49SS
3714

43.6
43.7
48.6
53.6

15833

55.6

By 1852, Fillmore had emerged as the first

choice of Whigs in Louisiana.

One proclaimed. "There had not been a

better President since the days of Madison," and another agreed that
"Fillmore is our strongest man.”
most doubts about his principles.

His conduct as president had removed
Fillmore had named Louisiana Whig

Charles M. Conrad as secretary of war,

but more importantly he

had

embraced the Compromise of 1850 and enforced its Fugitive Slave Act.
Because of the president's association with the Compromise,

Louisiana

Democratic kingpin John Slidell acknowledged that "if Fillmore be the
Whig candidate we shal 1 have a very even and doubtful contest in this
state."72
Even prior to the Whigs’ March nominating convention,
newspapers had hoisted Fillmore’s name to their mastheads.

partisan
Unlike in

1848, when the party divided between proponents of Henry Clay and Zachary

Taylor, in 1852,

the Whigs united in favor of Fillmore.

By 1852, Clay

was seventy-four years old and ill, and most Louisiana Whigs agreed with

72

E.B. Carr to John Moore, April 9, 1852 (first quote); John Ray to
Moore, February 11, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC (second quote); John
Slidell to James Buchanan, May 22, 1852, Buchanan Papers, HSP (third
quote).
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the sentiment. ,?CIay would be my man now. but I suppose his day is past."
Nationally,

two other candidates were

spoken of: Daniel

Massachusetts and General Winfield Scott.

Webster of

Webster’s candidacy had some

popularity in Louisiana because of his championship of the Compromise of
1S50.

Discussing Webster’s prospects, however, a Louisianan accurately

described Whig opinion. "Webster cannot get half the vote in the slave
states

that

Fillmore

would

but

is probably

stronger

than

General

Scott.”7'
Despite his birth in Virginia. Scott’s candidacy had very little
support in the South including Louisiana.

Taylor’s presidency had left

Louisiana Whigs skeptical about war heroes and friends of New York freesoiler William Seward— two categories into which Scott fit.

His silence

on the Compromise of 1850 also contributed to their distaste for him, and
one went

so

far as

to contend that

"annihilate the Whig party here."

the nomination of

Scott

would

While demonstrating to the North their

strong disapproval of Scott’s candidacy, they had to leave the door open
if Scott became the national nominee.

An editorial

in the Whig Bee

demonstrates the difficulty of their position:
The Bee has never said that no Southern Whig can or should
support Genl. SCOTT...What we have said, once, twice, and
twenty times was that Southern Whigs would not and could not
support Genl. Scott unless his opinions touching Slavery and
the Compromise should be distinctly known, and should accord
with the South.
At the March nominating convention,
Fillmore explicit.

Whigs

made their

commitment

to

The state platform announced that Louisiana endorsed

W. Bledsoe to John Moore, May 3, 1852 (first quote), A.J. Sandidge
to Moore, March 4, 1852 (second quote), E.B. Carr to Moore, April 9,
1852, all in Weeks Papers, LLMVC; Dailv Picayune. January 1, May 21,
1852;
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Millard Fillmore for the presidency and John C. Crittenden of Kentucky
for the vice presidency.

The platform also declared the Compromise of

1850 the final settlement of the nation's sectional problems.?i
At the June national convention held in Baltimore, southern Whigs
won the battle over the platform, which accepted the Compromise of 1850.
but lost a protracted contest over the nominee as Winfield Scott received
the nomination on the fifty-third ballot.
Whigs reacted unenthusiastically.

Not surprisingly, Louisiana

A Whig legislator complained that

Scott’s "most disastrous" nomination "will be death" to the state’s Whig
party.

Writing about Scott, the Plaquemine Southern Sentinel declared

"that [Scott] has previously been distrusted by southern Whigs

cannot

be denied," and the Commercial Bulletin, describing its own editorial
position,

reported that

it was

standard of General SCOTT."

"not

a volunteer

recruit

under

the

Speaking at a ratification meeting, Senator-

elect Benjamin added that he had opposed Scott’s nomination but had
changed his mind with the candidate’s acceptance of the party platform.
Two of the six Whig electors reacted more extremely and resigned their
positions in protest of the nomination.7*
While Louisiana Whigs had entered the 1852 presidential campaign
united,

the state’s Democrats realized they needed to heal

within their party to

ruptures

reaffirm their ascendancy in the state.

In

7*WilliamH. Sparks to John Moore, May 17, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC
(first quote); Bee. March 18, 1852 (second quote).

'*Wi 11 iam E. Gienapp, "The Whig Party, the Compromise of 1850, and
the Nomination of Winfield Scott," Presidential Studies Quarterly XIV
(Summer 1984), 399-415; F.D. Richardson to Moses Liddell, June 28, 1852,
Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentinel.
June 26, 1852 (second quote); Commercial Bulletin. June 23, 1852 (third
quote); Butler, Judah P. Beniamin. 104.
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January. Slidell worried that "a very great majority of our party approve
of the compromise: yet those who were opposed are sufficiently numerous
to make our defeat certain in any contest when their support shall be
withheld."

He realized that before challenging the Whigs, the Democrats

must put their own house in order and hoped that the state convention
would provide the party this opportunity.
Democrats

remained

sundered.

At the convention, Louisiana

Slidell’s

wing

favored

his

friend

Pennsylvanian James Buchanan, while Soule’s faction preferred Illinois
Senator Stephen A. Douglas.

Though Douglas and Soule disagreed over the

merits of the Compromise of

1850,

Soule supported him partially to

counter Slidell’s championship of Buchanan.

A third group led by Senator

Downs, whom Slidell believed had reneged on a commitment to Buchanan,
advocated a return to 1848 presidential candidate Lewis Cass .76
To retain party harmony at the March convention,
not

express a preference

for

the members did

the presidency and sent

delegation to the national convention.

an unpledged

Louisiana Democrats agreed to

abide by the choice of the national party as long as it endorsed the
Compromise of

1850.

At the Baltimore national convention,

Democrats

returned to their winning strategy of 1844, when they nominated the dark
horse James

K.

Polk.

Instead of

nominating one

of

the

prominent

candidates, the party turned to the obscure governor of New Hampshire
Franklin Pierce and sanctioned the Compromise of 1850.

Heeding calls for

76John Slidell to Howell Cobb, January 28, 1852, (quote) in U.B.
Phillips, ed., "The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander Stephens,
and Howell Cobb," American Historical Association. Report vol. 2 (1911),
276; Slidell to unknown, February 15, 1852, John Slidell Letter, LLMVC;
Slidell to James Buchanan, February 26, March 19, April 15, 1852,
Buchanan Papers, HSP; Pierre Sou 16 to Isaac Morse, February 1, 1852, in
Morse, The Blood of an Englishman. 129-30.
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party unity,

all

factions of

the Louisiana Democratic party

together and endorsed the nominee.

joined

Soule called Pierce "a man of great

merit.” and Slidell declared that he would "heartily support Pierce."
At the June ratification meeting,

Slidell

stressed the necessity of

restoring "the ancient discipline of the Democracy.”^
Louisiana Democrats quickly realized that their best tactic to win
the election was to attack Scott as an opponent of slavery.

Letters to

John F.H. Claiborne, an editor of the Louisiana Courier, indicate the
unanimity

in favor

of this

strategy.

Writing

from Washington,

a

Louisiana Congressman urged that "it would be most prudent, not to attack
the Whigs as a Party—

but confine our attacks —

and abolition tendencies."

upon Scott’s free-soil,

Slidell echoed this viewpoint.

"Our true

policy," according to Slidell, "will not be to attack the whigs as a
party,

but confine ourselves to commentaries

upon Scott’s

political

heresies & the character of his original & confidential supporters."
Slidell’s rival Pierre Soule congratulated Claiborne for adopting this
course but implored him to be even more aggressive.

78

Louisiana’s Democratic editors did not need to do much research to
challenge Scott on his loyalty to slavery.
copies of Whig newspapers from earlier

They simply could pick up

in the year.

Preparing for a

77

John Slidell to James Buchanan, April 15, June 23, 1852 (second
quote). Buchanan Papers, HSP; Address of Jacob Barker delivered before
the Members of the Jefferson Club (New Orleans, 1852); Pierre Soule to
Charles Gayarre, August 2, 1852, Charles E.A. Gayarrd Collection, LLMVC
(first quote); Slidell’s speech at the ratification meeting in New
Orleans Weekly Delta. June 13, 1852 (third quote).
78

A.G. Penn to John F.H. Claiborne, June 25, 1852 (first quote), John
Slidell to Claiborne, July 6 , 1852 (second quote), Pierre Soule to
Claiborne, August 15, 1852 (third quote), all in John F.H. Claiborne
Papers, MDAH.
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debate in South Louisiana, a Democrat obtained pre-convention quotes from
Whigs questioning Scott's fidelity to the region.

Everyday during the

campaign season, the Louisiana Courier prominently displayed an antiScott quote from a May edition of the Whig Commercial Bulletin.

Also.

Democrats made immense political capital from the defection of two Whig
electors.

One of the Whig electors not only resigned from the Scott

ticket but endorsed Pierce and made speech in the candidate’s behalf.
Allegations of partisans crossing party lines appeared in almost every
antebellum race, but these prominent defections lent credence to reports
of widespread desertions from the Whig ranks and forced the Whigs to
spend valuable time countering them.

The Louisiana Courier even asserted

that the backbone of the Whig party, sugar planters, had defected in
favor of Pierce.
While

)G

questioning

Scott’s

loyalty

to

the

celebrated Franklin Pierce’s commitment to slavery.

South,

Democrats

They cited letters

detailing Pierce’s faithfulness to the Compromise and claimed that with
Pierce’s election, "the rights of the South would be safe."

Below its

anti-Scott quotes, the Louisiana Courier included a quote from Pierce
accepting the pro-Compromise Democratic platform.

A Democratic orator

stressed that a southern slaveholding state, Virginia, had introduced
Pierce’s name at the national convention.

If Virginia felt confident in

Pierce’s stance regarding slavery, then so should Louisiana.

According

to Democratic newspapers, not only had Virginia declared Pierce sound,

79

James Muggah essay for debate, September 20, 1852, Muggah Family
Papers, HNO; W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, July 5, 7, 12, 1852, Pugh
Family Papers, UT; Louisiana Courier. July through November, 1852; Dailv
Delta, October 31, 1852.
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but Louisiana Whig Judah P.

Benjamin had called

him

"true

to the

South."80
During

the

fall

campaign

season,

Louisiana

Whigs

suddenly

discovered that Scott was more loyal to the South than they previously
had believed.

Regarding Winfield Scott’s attitude toward slavery, Whigs

stressed the theme that Scott and not southern Whigs had changed their
positions.

Earlier anti-Scott editorials and speeches could be dismissed

because they spoke only of a General Scott silent on the compromise
issue. In contrast, the new Winfield Scott, who had accepted the Whig
platform, was no longer a friend of the free-soil Whigs but instead a
champion of the Compromise and, therefore, of the South.

For Whigs, a

re-examination of Scott’s writings revealed that he opposed interference
with the South’s peculiar

institution.

Whig planter

Joseph

Moore

admitted that he had initially opposed Scott, but ’’on hearing of his
nomination,

I examined myself the grounds upon which were based the

charges of faithlessness to the South.”

After this scrutiny, he "found

that the conclusion drawn from them is entirely erroneous.”

Whigs also

reminded Louisiana voters that since 1850 their party had united in favor
of the Compromise,
measure.

while

the

state’s Democrats had

divided on the

CI

Louisiana Whigs did more than defend Scott.

They attacked the

northerner Pierce’s fidelity to the South calling him a free-soiler and

flfl

James Muggah essay, September 20, 1852, Muggah Family Papers, HNO
(first quote); Louisiana Courier. July 14, 30 (second quote), 1852.
Of

Baton Rouee Gazette. July 3, 31, 1852; Joseph Moore to John Moore,
August 21, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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alleging that he was ’'tinctured with abolitionism."

While perhaps Scott

possessed free soil friends, the Baton Rouge Gazette boldly stated that
southerners did not have to worry about Pierce’s friends, they had to
worry about Pierce.

The newspaper unequivocally declared

Pierce Hates and Deplores Slavery."

"Franklin

During the campaign. Whig newspapers

carried quotations beneath their mastheads contrasting the candidates’
stances on slavery.

Attributed to Pierce, the first two quotes included,

"I consider slavery a social evil” and "I
law].”

loathe [the fugitive slave

In third quote, Scott counters, "I am dead for the Constitution—

82
dead for the Union— dead for the Compromise.”

In addition

to

trading accusations

of

infidelity

to

slavery,

Louisiana Democrats and Whigs charged each other with hostility towards
immigrants.

Against Pierce, the Whigs employed nativism and its brother

in bigotry, anti-Catholicism.

Regarding the banning of Catholic office-

holding in Pierce’s home state of New Hampshire, the Whigs charged, "When
religious liberty needed a champion General Pierce was found— wanting."
In a further effort to deter Irish voters from choosing Pierce, Whigs
labelled him an anglophile.

Louisiana Whigs, however, faced the same

dilemma they had in the slavery debate.

As with the slavery issue, the

Democrats brought forward quotes attacking Scott as a nativist from Whig
newspapers earlier in the year.

In this instance, they asserted that

82

Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September II, 1852; October 1S52;
Bee. October 1852; Abner L. Duncan to John Moore, September 2, 1852,
Weeks Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. July 31, August
14 (second quote), 1852.
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Scott, a nativist. desired that naturalized citizens never receive the
- ,
right to vote."

Unlike in most other southern states where the traditional debate
over the American System had disappeared, in Louisiana, the Whigs still
stressed

two

planks:

improvements.
protect

a

tariff

and

federally

sponsored

internal

The Whig platform maintained a commitment to a tariff to

against

"the

competition

of

half-paid[,]

half-fed

paupers’' and to government aid to internal improvements.

foreign

A Whig editor

declared, "If you want your rivers and harbors improved vote for SCOTT.”
while another partisan claimed that, though the Democrats hoped no one
knew Pierce,

his views opposing federal aid to internal

would soon become known to all.
concurred with the Whigs.

In these arguments,

improvements
the Democrats

Pierce did favor the lower tariff of

because it benefitted the whole country, particularly the South.
candidate

also

justly

rejected

federal

expenditures

for

1S46
Their

internal

improvements because they were both unconstitutional and wasteful.

g

I

Discussion of immigrants and tariffs did not challenge the hold
that slavery had on voters’ minds, and on the same day that Louisiana
Whigs celebrated the passage of the new constitution, Pierce defeated
Scott

in the state

and across

the nation.

According

to

the Bee.

Louisiana Whigs were "barely beaten" and had "not been routed

and

Bee. August 17, 1852 (quote); Baton Rouge Gazette. October 30,
1852; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September 11, 18, 1852; Louisiana
Courier. July 24, 1852.
For a discussion of the absence of traditional Whig measures in
southern platforms of 1852 see Cole, Whig Party in the South. 219-221;
Baton Rouge Gazette. March 20, 1852 (first quote); West Baton Rouge
Capitolian Vis-A-Vis. October 27, 1852 (second quote); A.F. Rightor to
Andrew McCollam, June 20, 1852, Andrew McCollam Papers, SHC.
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shattered into fragments."

This description, however, did not apply to

the national Whig party as Scott only won four states.

In most southern

states, fears regarding the Whigs' position on slavery proved devastating
to

the

party’s

chances.

In

Louisiana,

however,

Scott

won

the

historicaliv Whig South Louisiana and lost a close race in New Orleans.
He even made a respectable showing in North Louisiana and the Florida
Parishes.85 (SEE APPENDIX A)
Whigs, with their constitution ratified, and Democrats, with their
victory in the presidential contest, could both look optimistically to
the state elections scheduled for December 27, 1852.

Regarding state

issues. Louisiana parties had come full circle from November 1845
November 1852.

In

Democratic-authored

the

former year,

constitution,

the voters

while

in

the

electorate had approved a Whig-authored charter.

had

to

just passed a

latter

year.

the

The Whigs hoped to

further the parallel and emulate the Democrats’ domination of the ensuing
elections.

The Democrats still maintained that their party favored

democracy more than the Whigs, and hoped that their success in the past
three gubernatorial campaigns would continue their reign in the state.
While the state situation may have appeared similar in 1845 and
1852, the national political climate had changed dramatically.
always

a force

in presidential

politics,

slavery had

increased

importance, and southern firebrands openly talked of disunion.
the

Democrats

combined

their

possession of the presidency.
situation as

authorship

of

the

Though
in

In 1845,

constitution

with

In 1852, Whigs faced a more precarious

they combined their constitution with a party sharply

85Bee, November 12, 1852.
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divided over slavery.

The national electorate had just repudiated the

Whig nominee, and in many southern states the Whig party had collapsed.
Louisiana Democrats hoped and Louisiana Whigs feared that this disease
could spread to their state.
In the wake of the pair of November

1852 contests.

Louisiana

Democrats and Whigs appeared more similar than ever before.

Regarding

national issues, both of the state’s parties championed slavery and the
Compromise of 1850.

The ratification of the Constitution of 1852 settled

state differences as

well.

distinctions had also

At the same

receded.

Political

time,

traditional

partisan

campaigns engendered

less

debate over the American System and the towering figure of Andrew Jackson
than ever before.
Americans

and

immigrants.

The ethnicity issue had moved from tension between

Creoles

to

a

debate

over

the

political

rights

of

Louisiana Democrats and Whigs had not yet adjusted to this

new political world, and with an election less than two months away, they
would have to make quick decisions on how best to adapt.
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CHAPTER FIVE
PARTIES. CAMPAIGNS. GOVERNMENT. AND JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY
During the antebeilum period, the politicaL process in Louisiana
did not remain static.

The provisions of the LSL2 constitution

reflected a distrust of the common people.

It created a small

electorate with sharply proscribed powers, granting most power to the
governor.
positions.

Wealth and age restrictions limited access to these
Most people remained separate from the government which

neither collected many taxes nor spent much money.

If many

Louisianans were isolated from their state government, the state was
almost as isolated from national politics.

Political campaigns

revolved around ethnicity and personality more than policy or party.
But. even in the early years of statehood, the government did have
democratic elements: aspirants to office recognized the necessity of
campaigning; the majority of eligible voters went to the polls on
election day; and the tax rate was progressive.
The ideals of Jacksonian democracy transformed the state.
Louisiana’s subsequent antebellum constitutions, the charters of 1S45
and 1852. transferred more power to more people.
expanded as did the number of elective positions.

The electorate
Reduced

qualifications for office opened the campaign field to more
participants, and candidates’ unceasing efforts to get their message
to every voter illustrated their commitment to the people.

Political

parties served as the engines for this transformation, and Louisiana
developed a remarkably balanced party system.

The parties held

conventions, nominated candidates, organized campaigns, and published
newspapers.

As the early period contained democratic elements, the
254
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party era retained vestiges of iess-democratic elements.

Despite the

removal of property requirements for office, wealthy men continued to
dominate the legislature.

Also, partisan practice did not always

match the democratic ideal, and party members often charged that their
opponents' corruption had thwarted the will of the people.
The development of political parties represents perhaps the
greatest change in Louisiana politics between the state's entrance
into the Union in IS12 and its secession in 1S61.

In 1SI2.

Louisianans based allegiance to a particular candidate on what
language he spoke and where he lived.

Less than twenty-five years

later. Louisianans would see themselves first and foremost as
partisans: Democrats. Whigs, and, in the 1850s, Know Nothings.

Yet.

the importance of regionalism did not disappear, and the parties did
not receive equal support across the entire state.

To examine the

regional strength of Louisiana political parties, the period from 1824
to 1861 can be divided into four phases: (1) 1824-1832— an era
characterized by non-partisan contests, (2) 1S34-1844— Whigs and
Democrats during the period of restrictive suffrage, (3) 1846-1852—
Whigs and Democrats with universal white male suffrage, (4) 1855-1860-Democrats and different opponents after the decline of the Whigs.
The pre-party era from 1824 to 1832 was characterized by the
absence of partisan nominations, a multiplicity of candidates, extreme
regional variations in support, and the importance of ethnicity as a
campaign topic.

In the absence of an organized nominating process,

four or more candidates received votes in each of the three
gubernatorial races during this period.

Moreover, Louisianans did not
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connect state contests to national contests, especially with
gubernatorial elections in July and presidential elections in
November.

During this period, candidates would often obtain the

overwhelming majority of their votes in a single region.
Philemon Thomas ran for governor in both IS24 and LS2S.

For example.
Considered

the founding father of the Florida Parishes. Thomas, in 1S2S. received
50.2 percent of his home region's votes which represented 78.5 percent
of his total.

Outside of this section. Thomas garnered only 4 .~

percent of the ballots cast and finished fourth in the race.

In 1S30.

another resident of the Florida Parishes. William S. Hamilton,
suffered a similar fate.

While winning over two-thirds the votes in

the Florida Parishes and North Louisiana. Hamilton secured only 12.S
percent of the votes in Greater Orleans and 11.6 percent in South
Louisiana, dooming his candidacy. (SEE APPENDIX B)
The sectional voting pattern revealed in the votes of both
Thomas and Hamilton illustrates the importance of ethnicity and
personality during the pre-party period.

In the three gubernatorial

campaigns during this period, Democrats did not face Whigs.
Louisianans did not identify themselves with parties; instead. Creoles
opposed Americans.

In the Florida Parishes, an American stronghold,

Creole gubernatorial candidates’ total never exceeded 30.9 percent of
the votes.

At the same time, the Creoles dominated South Louisiana,

receiving at least 65.5 percent of the ballots in each of the
contests.

From 1824 to 1832. a small population combined with a

property requirement for voting kept vote totals low and made personal
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relationships extremely important.

Especially at a parish Level, the

support of a few key men and their families often ensured victory.
From LS34 to IS44, Louisiana campaigns and elections changed
into competitive battles between Democrats and Whigs.

The parties

divided the six major statewide elections: the Whigs won two of the
three gubernatorial races, and the Democrats captured two of the three
presidential contests.

Overall, the Whigs received 51.9 percent of

the ballots and prevailed in 110 parishes with the Democrats obtaining
105 parishes in these six party battles.

The results in terms of

total votes, elections, and parishes captured conveys the impression
of a balance in the state.

This overall symmetry, however, hid a

series of uncompetitive regional and parish contests.

Of the 217

total parish contests. 134 (61.7 percent) saw one party receive over
sixty percent of the votes, and in 71 (32.7 percent), the victorious
party garnered over seventy percent.
same party repeatedly.

Parishes tended to support the

Of the forty-five parishes which had returns

for at least one of these contests, thirty-one (68.9 percent) backed
either the Whigs or Democrats at least 80 percent of the time.1
(TABLES 5.1. 5.2, 5.3)
Louisiana Whigs received their most vigorous backing in South
Louisiana with its pro-tariff sugar cane growers.

The electorate in

South Louisiana gave 60.3 percent of its votes to Whig candidates, who
won the region in five of the six contests— only in the 1842

‘For the purposes of this section, parishes won refers to those in
which a party’s candidate received the majority of votes in presidential
and gubernatorial elections. Legislative and congressional elections have
not been included.
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TABLE 5.1

Votes by Region
I834-IS44

WHIG
VOTES

DEM
VOTES

PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WHIG % DEM % OF WHIG OF DEM OF TOTAL

FLORIDA
6519
NORTH LA 104'T5
ORLEANS 1 2 4 "
SOUTH LA 20488

10064
11618
11093
13499

39.3%
47.4%
52.9%
60.3%

60.7%
52.6%
4". 1%
39.7%

49959
TOTAL VOTES:

46274
96233

51.9%

48.1%

13.1%
21 .0%

25.0%
41.0%

21. S%
25.1%
24.0%
29.2%

17.2%
23.0%
24.5%
35.3%

1S45--1852

WHIG
VOTES

DEM
VOTES

PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WHIG % DEM % OF WHIG OF DEM OF TOTAL

FLORIDA
7677
NORTH LA L9133
ORLEANS 26728
SOUTH LA 25825

10192
24727
28837
1972S

43.0%
43.6%
48.1%
56.7%

57.0%
56.4%
51.9%
43.3%

79363 S3484
TOTAL VOTES:
162847

48.7%

48.1%

9.7%
24.1%
33.7%
32.5%

12 .2%
29.6%
34.5%
23.6%

11 .0%
26.9%
34.1%
2S.0%

1855- 1860

OPP
VOTES

DEM
VOTES

OPP %

PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
DEM % OF OPP OF DEM OF TOTAL

FLORIDA
8540
NORTH LA 26892
ORLEANS 28105
SOUTH LA 20386

10134
37831
16299
28993

45.7%
41.6%
63.3%
41.3%

54.3%
58.4%
36.7%
58.7%

83923 93257
TOTAL VOTES:
177180

47.4%

48.1%

10 .2%
32.0%
33.5%
24.3%

10.9%
40.6%
17.5%
31.1%

10.5%
36.5%
25.2%
27.9%
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parish Results
1S34— 1S44

PARISHES PARISHES
PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WON BY
WON BY
OF WHIG OF DEM
OF TOTAL
WHIGS DEMOCRATS WHIG % DEM ^PARISHES PARISHES PARIESHES
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

7
24
15
64

110
TOTAL PARISHES:

34
35
9
27

l~.l
40."
62.5
70.3

S2.9
59.3
37.5
29.7

105
215

51.2

48.8

6.4
2 1 -S
13.6
5S.2

32.4
33.3
S.6
25.7

19.1
27.4
11.2
42.3

1845-1S52

PARISHES PARISHES
PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WON BY
WON BY
OF WHIG OF DEM
OF TOTAL
WHIGS DEMOCRATS WHIG % DEM ^PARISHES PARISHES PARIESHES
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

3
22
7
54

86
TOTAL PARISHES:

32
72
13
28

8.6
23.4
35.0
65.8

91.4
76.6
65.0
34.2

145
231

37.2

62.8

3.5
25.6
S.l
62.8

22.1
49.7
9.0
19.3

15.2
40.7
S.7
35.5

1855-1860

PARISHES PARISHES
PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
WON BY
WON BY
OF OPP
OF DEM
OF TOTAL
OPPOSITION DEMOCRATS OPP % DEM ^PARISHES PARISHES PARIESHES
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

7
11
S
19

45
TOTAL PARISHES:

21
69
8
49

25.0
13.7
50.0
27.9

75.0
86.3
50.0
72.1

147
192

23.4

76.6

15.6
24.4
17.8
42.2

14.3
46.9
5.4
33.3

14.6
41.7
8.3
35.4
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TABLE 5.3

Parishes m which Democrats Won
a Given Percent of Elections'"
1834-1844
PARISHES
IN
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

PERCENTAGE OF ELECTIONS WON BY DEMOCRATS
0-19
20-39
40-59
60-^9
80-100

R E G I O N -------------------------------------------7
3
4
17
4
1
2
2
8
4
2
1
1
17
9
2
3
3

45
% OF ALL PARISHES

15
33.3

4
S.9

5
II.1

o
11.1

16
35.6

1845-1852
PARISHES
PERCENTAGE OF ELECTIONS WON BY DEMOCRATS
IN
0-19
20-39
40-59
60-79
80-100
REGION ---------------------------------------------FLORIDA
7
1
6
NORTH LA
20
2
1
2
1
14
ORLEANS
4
1
1
2
SOUTH LA
17
8
2
1
2
4
48
% OF ALL PARISHES

10
20.8

3
6.3

5
10.4

4
8.3

26
54.2

1855-1860
PARISHES
IN
REGION
FLORIDA
7
NORTH LA
20
ORLEANS
4
SOUTH LA
17

PERCENTAGE OF ELECTIONS WON BY DEMOCRATS
0-19
20-39
40-59
60-79
80-100

4S
% OF ALL PARISHES

1
2.1

1
1
1
3
6
12.5

1

2

9

4

3
13

2
4
6
12.5

12
25.0

23
47.9

"Example: From 1834 to 1844 in 3 or the 7 Florida Parishes,
Democrats won between 60 and 79 percent of the contests, and in 4 the
party won between 80 and 100 percent of the races.
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gubernatorial race did. Democrat Alexander Mouton. a native of South
Louisiana’s Lafayette Parish, narrowly edge his Whig competitor.
Whigs won 70.3 percent of South Louisiana's parishes in the six
elections.

South Louisiana also supplied the Whigs a disproportionate

amount of their statewide support.

The region accounted for 35.3

percent of the total votes cast in Louisiana from IS34 to IS44 but
provided the Whig party with 41 percent of its votes.

In terms of

parish results. 42.3 percent of the state's contests occurred in the
region, but the Whigs won 5S.2 percent of their victories here, and in
nine of South Louisiana's seventeen parishes. Democrats won less than
twenty percent of the elections from 1S34 to 1844.
If between 1834 and 1844 South Louisiana represented one extreme
of partisan allegiance, the Florida Parishes represented the other.
Democratic candidates captured every election but one in this region—
in the 1838 gubernatorial contest. New Orleans Democrat Denis Prieur
lost in the Florida Parishes probably because of a bias against
candidates from the city.

In the other five races, the Whigs suffered

defeat in thirty-one of the thirty-five parishes.

During this period.

Democrats received 60.7 percent of the ballots cast in the Florida
Parishes and never lost in three of the region’s seven parishes.
Casting 17.2 percent of the total ballots in the state, the area gave
Democrats 21.8 percent of their total votes.

Though the region

provided less than one-fifth of the total parish returns, it accounted
for almost one-third of the Democrats’ victories.
The other two regions, Greater Orleans and North Louisiana,
provided more competitive arenas.

In North Louisiana, Democrats
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captured 52.6 percent of the votes but evenly split the six elections
with the Whigs.

The Whigs benefit ted from their dominance in the

heavily slave parishes along the Mississippi River— triumphing in all
eleven contests in Concordia. Tensas, and Madison Parishes.
of these three, they lost 72.9 percent of the parishes.

Outside

In Greater

Orleans, the Whigs triumphed in four of the six races and garnered
52.9 percent of the ballots.
extremely balanced support.

Greater Orleans gave the parties
Accounting for 24.5 percent of the

state's votes, the section gave Whigs 25.0 percent of their votes and
provided Democrats with 24.0 percent of their ballots.
In the subsequent period, from 1846 to 1S52. the small Whig
majority in Louisiana disappeared.

The Democratic proportion of

Louisiana's electorate grew from 4S.1 percent to 51.3 percent, and
this seemingly minor increase had a profound effect on election
results.

Whig candidates lost all three gubernatorial contests, and

one of the two presidential battles, only gaining Louisiana’s
electoral votes for native-son Zachary Taylor in 1848.

The Democrats

triumphed in 145 of the 232 parish battles (62.5 percent)
elections.

in the five

In 23 of the 48 parishes (47.9 percent), the Democrats

swept every gubernatorial and presidential race from 1846 to 1852.
Although the Whig party became a minority, it was not without support,
and Whig candidates received 48.7 percent of Louisiana’s votes.

While

competitive in many parish races (in 53 percent of the parishes
involved in these elections, the winning candidate received less than
60 percent of the votes), by the end of 1852, the Whigs were a
minority party in Louisiana.
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From IS46 to 1S52. the Whig party's strength became increasingly
concentrated in South Louisiana.

Whig nominees received 56.” percent

of South Louisiana's votes, and it was the only region which gave them
a majority.

South Louisiana continued to provide the Whig party a

disproportionate amount of its support.

The section accounted for 28

percent of Louisiana's votes and 35.5 percent of its parish contests
but furnished the Whig party with 32.5 percent of its votes and fiftyfour of its eighty-six (62.S percent) parish victories.

Conversely,

in eight of South Louisiana's seventeen parishes, the Democratic party
won less than 20 percent of the contests during this period.

In

contrast, the Democrats won less than 20 percent of the votes in only
two of Louisiana's other thirty-one parishes.
Outside South Louisiana, while the Whigs may have won some races
and remained competitive in most parishes, they clearly had been
reduced to a minority party.

In the five elections from 1846 to 1S52,

Democrats captured 78.5 percent of the parishes in the other three
regions.

This total includes 91.4 percent of the contests in the

Florida Parishes where the Whigs mustered three victories in St.
Tammany Parish but none in the other six parishes.

A similar

situation prevailed in North Louisiana where the minimal Whig support
remained highly concentrated.

As in the earlier period, Whigs relied

on Concordia, Tensas, and Madison Parishes.

These parishes, when

combined with Morehouse Parish, supplied a Whig majority in seventeen
of their twenty contests.

In the other sixteen parishes of North

Louisiana, the Democratic party dominated— triumphing in sixty-nine of
seventy-four parish elections (93.2 percent).

North Louisiana and the
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Florida Parishes, which accounted for 55.S percent of the state's
parish contests, provided Whigs with only 29.1 percent of their
victories, and in twenty of their twenty-seven parishes Democrats won
SO percent or more of the elections.
state's most balanced region.

Greater Orleans continued as the

The Democrats* voting support did rise

from 4~.l percent to 51.9 percent in this section.
After 1S52. with the disappearance of the Whig party, analyzing
Louisiana’s voting patterns becomes more complicated.

In the 1S55

governor's race and the 1S56 presidential election. Democrats faced
Know Nothing opponents.

In 1S59. however, an anomalous Opposition

party including renegade Democrats and former Know Nothings challenged
the regular Democrats.

In the 1S60 presidential election, Louisiana

voters picked among two Democrats and a Constitutional Unionist.
Despite the confusing nature of these races, some conclusions can be
drawn.

The regular Democrats, a group most closely linked to Senator

John Slidell, controlled the state.
four of the elections.
parish battles,

Their candidates triumphed in all

Slidell Democrats won 76.6 percent of the

including a remarkable forty-six of the forty-eight

parishes in the 1859 gubernatorial election.'
With the collapse of the Whigs and the rise of the KnowNothings, sectional voting patterns did not mirror the Whig-Democratic
pattern of earlier periods.

South Louisiana, where the Whig party had

received its strongest backing, switched its allegiance to the

JFor 1S60, Democratic victories include those parishes where the
Slidel 1-supported Democrat John C. Breckinridge won a plurality of the
votes. The three parishes where Democrat Stephen A. Douglas captured a
plurality are included with the Opposition.
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Democrats.

The Democrats had only captured South Louisiana for

favorite-son Alexander Mouton in 1842. but they received a majority of
its votes in the first three elections of this period— including over
60 percent in two of the elections— and achieved a plurality in the
1S60 presidential race.

Religion provides the best explanation for

the region's switch to the Democracy.

The Know Nothings' anti-

Catholic proclivity did not resound well in South Louisiana which,
according to the 1S50 census, had 76.4 percent of its church seating
capacity in Catholic churches.

Faced with a choice between their old

opponents and the Know Nothings, many South Louisianans chose the
former, and the Democrats obtained 52.6 percent of the region's
ballots /
If the opposition to the Democrats foundered in South Louisiana,
it flourished in Greater Orleans.

The Know Nothings' anti-immigrant

message played well among the American-born in this region which in
1S50 contained 89.9 percent of the state's foreign-born population.
In New Orleans, the Know Nothings left little to chance.

They

combined their opposition to immigrants with threats and violence
which dissuaded many Democrats from coming to the polls.

The

Democratic party lost all four elections in the region and received
only 36.7 percent of Greater Orleans’s votes— the lowest total any
party received in any region during the antebellum era.

In 1856,

Democrats received only 29.9 percent of the votes in Greater Orleans,
and in 1S60 their presidential candidate garnered just 25.0 percent of
its ballots.

The region accounted for 25.1 percent of Louisiana's

''Seventh Census. 1850. 489-91.
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voces during this period but provided the Democrats' opposition with
33.5 percent of its support.
In North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes, voting patterns did
not change significantly.

The two sections continued their loyal

allegiance to the regular Democratic party.

Democratic candidates

triumphed In both these regions in all four elections.

Furthermore,

they captured 5^.5 percent of the votes and ninety of the one hundred
and eight parishes (S3.3 percent)

in these six years.

In sixteen of

the twenty-seven parishes in North Louisiana and the Florida Parishes.
Democrats swept all four contests, and the party won at least one
election in each of the parishes.
suffered in North Louisiana.

The opposition particularly

The parishes of this region held 41.7

percent of the elections in the four races, vet North Louisiana
supplied the opposition with only 24.4 percent of its total support.
In addition to examining partisan allegiance on a regional
basis, party support can be examined on economic and social bases.
Louisiana Whigs have been depicted as aristocratic planters and

C
Democrats as small farmers and laborers.J
simplistic, though it has some merit.

This portrayal is too

Leaders of all of antebellum

Louisiana’s political parties were wealthy men.

The Whig leadership

did include prominent planters such as Alexander Porter and Andre B.
Roman.

But, Democratic chieftains from John B. Dawson and Martin

Gordon in the 1830s to John Slidell and Thomas Overton Moore in the
1850s also numbered among the richest Louisianans.

^Roger W. Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle
Rouge, 1966 reprint, orig in 1939), 152.

Conversely, no

in Louisiana. (Baton
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parcy could win elections in Louisiana relying solely on the votes of
planters.

Democrats may have called themselves the party of the

people, but Whigs and Know Nothings did not abdicate their claim to
this title.

Their candidates campaigned for and received the votes of

all classes of citizens just as the Democrats did.
A division of Louisiana’s parishes into groups based on the
percentage of slaves in their population reveals that the higher the
concentration of slaves the greater the likelihood of a parish voting
for Whig candidates.

The Whigs captured 5S.4 percent of the races

contested in the parishes with the highest slave concentrations, and
these twelve parishes accounted for 37.2 percent of the party's
victories.

But. more importantly, this categorization also

demonstrates that a one-to-one correspondence between slave percentage
and Whig vote certainly did not exist.

Even among these heavily slave

parishes. Whigs lost 41.6 percent of the contests between 1S34 and
1S52.

Additionally,

four of the these twelve parishes voted for

Democrats in at least 80 percent of the elections.
concentration decreased, so did the Whig vote.

As slave

But. even in the

parishes with less than 40 percent of their population enslaved, Whigs
managed to win 30 percent of the races, and two of these parishes
voted for Whig candidates over 80 percent of the time.6 (TABLE 5.4)
Louisiana’s antebellum agricultural production also belies the
idea that the presence of staple crops equated to Whig victory.

The

parishes which produced the largest amount of cotton actually voted in

sThe data for variables such as slave concentration, cotton, sugar
cane, and church seating come from Seventh Census. 1850. 481. 484, 486,
4SS-91.
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T A B LE 5 .4-

Parish Results Based on a Given Variable'

Slave Percentage
Percent of
Slaves in
Population

fc of
Par. Whig Dem. Whig %

6S. 9-90.0%
55.1-68.5%
41.7-54.1%
15.1-38.8%

12
12
12
11

/J
55
41
27

52
55
74
63

58.4
50.0
35.7
30.0

Percent
of Whig
Votes
37.2
2S.1
20.9
13.8

Percent
of Dem.
Votes
“t1

"*

22.5
30.3
25.S

Over
80%
Whig
6
3
3
2

Over
S0%
Dem.
2
3
—

Sugar Cane Production

O

9000+
4000-9000
1-2700
0

»(•

Hogsheads
of Sugar

Par. Whig Dem. Whig %
10
10
11
16

75
57
32
32

29
51
67
96

72.1
52.S
32.3
25.0

Percent
of Whig
Votes
3S.3
29.1
16.3
16.3

Percent
of Dem.
Votes
11.9
21.0
27.6
39.5

Over
S0%
Whig
6
4
■>
1

Over
S0%
Dem.
1
3
6
10

Cotton Production
400 lb.
Bales of
Cotton
o000+
2400-4999
100-3999
0-100

# of
Par. Whig Dem. Whig %
9
12
13
13

32
41
22
100

57
63
90
35

36.0
39.4
19.6
74.1

Percent
of Whig
Votes
16.4
21.0
11.3
51.3

Percent
of Dem.
Votes
23.3
25.7
36.7
14.3

Over
80%
Whig
2
3
1
8

Over
80%
Dem.
4
6
10
1

Catholic Church Seating Capacity
% of Seats

in Catholic f of
Churches
Par. Whig Dem. Whig %
100%
40-86%
6-29%
0

7

8
11
7
21

49
73
28
45

31
43
40
130

61.3
62.9
41.2
25.7

Percent
of Whig
Votes
25.1
37.4
14.4
23.1

Percent
of Dem.
Votes
12.7
17.6
16.4
53.3

Over
80%
Whig
3
5
2
4

Over
80%
Dem.
2
1
3
15

Election data from presidential and gubernatorial races, 1834-52.
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favor of the Democratic party in 64 percent of the erections.

In

fact, the Whig party received its greatest support in those parishes
which produced the least, not the most cotton.
percent of the races in this group.

Whigs captured T4.l

The parishes which had a yield of

less than 100 bales of cotton accounted for over half of the parishes
won by Whig candidates between 1S34 and 1S52.

The parishes which

produced the least cotton had a Whig tendency, however, not because
they produced very little cotton but more likely because they produced
a large quantity of sugar cane.

Of the thirteen parishes with the

lowest cotton production, eight of them were among Louisiana’s top ten
sugar cane parishes.
The presence of sugar cane,
associated with Whig victories.

like that of slaves, can be
The ten parishes which accounted for

the most hogsheads of sugar cane voted for Whig candidates in 72.1
percent of the gubernatorial and presidential elections between 1S34
and 1852.
increased.

As the amount of sugar cane decreased the Democratic vote
In sharp contrast to Whig victories in the sugar cane

areas, the sixteen parishes which produced no sugar cane returned
Democratic majorities in 75 percent of these races.

As with the

presence of slaves, the presence or absence of sugar cane does not
explain every parish’s voting pattern.

For instance, at the mouth of

the Mississippi River, Plaquemines Parish produced 16,835 one-thousand
pound hogsheads of sugar, the fifth largest amount in Louisiana, yet
returned a Democratic majority in all eleven elections from 1834 to
1852.

Conversely, Morehouse and Madison Parishes, which produced no

sugar cane, voted for Whig candidates in fourteen of the fifteen
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contests.

On an individual level. Thomas Overton Moore, elected as a

Democratic governor in IS59. cultivated the largest sugar plantation

in Rapides Parish, and he was one of the top fifteen producers in the
state.*
Louisiana’s parishes did not split solely in terms of crops or
slaves, but they also divided religiously.

Catholics predominated in

South Louisiana, but in North Louisiana, the majority of parishes did
not have any Catholic churches.

GeneralIv. the greater the percentage

of a parish's church seats in Catholic churches, the more likely a
parish would vote for Whig nominees.

The eight parishes which had

Catholic churches but no Protestant churches voted in favor of the
Whigs 64.3 percent of the time.

In contrast, the twenty-one parishes

without a Catholic church returned Democratic majorities in “4.3
percent of the elections, and fifteen voted for Democrats in at least
80 percent of the elections.

Like agricultural production.

Catholicism did not precisely equate to Whiggery.

Democrats captured

3S.7 percent of the races in parishes with only Catholic churches, and
four of the twenty-one parishes without Catholic churches supported
Whig candidates in over 80 percent of the elections.
Factors

such as the presence of sugar cane, cotton. Catholic

churches, and

the number of slaves undoubtedly influenced voting

patterns, but

they cannot entirely explain why antebellum Louisianans

supported a particular party.

Examining these variables demonstrates

the presence of general trends but they fail to account for all

3

For Moore’s crop see P.A. Champomier, Statement of the Sugar Crop
Made in Louisiana in 1858-59 (New Orleans, 1859), 1.
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partisanship.

Though the proportion of staves in the population

indicates a tendency to vote Whig. in each of the groupings at least
one parish voted Democratic and at Least one voted Whig in over SO
percent of the contests.
examined.

This caveat applies to each of the variables

In each division of each of the four variables at least one

parish voted for each of the parties over SO percent of the time.

A

closer Look at the voting behavior of four North Louisiana parishes—
Ouachita. Morehouse. Carroll, and Madison— buttresses the contention
that other local forces such as personality must also must have shaped
contests.
In 1S44. the legislature split Ouachita Parish into two separate
parishes:

leaving one with the name Ouachita and designating the other

one Morehouse.
5,008

By 1850, Ouachita Parish had a total population of

including 2,708 slaves (54.1 percent); produced 3.4S6 bales of

cotton and no sugar cane; had no Catholic churches; had a Protestant
church seating capacity of 300 people; and had livestock valued at
5140,745.

Its neighbor to the north, Morehouse Parish, had a

population of 3.913 including 2,006 slaves (51.3 percent); produced
3,303 bales of cotton and no sugar cane; had no Catholic churches; had
a Protestant church seating capacity of 300 people; and had livestock
valued at $131,760.

Despite their exceedingly similar

characteristics, the two parishes had opposite voting patterns.
Between its formation in 1S44 and 1852. Morehouse Parish participated
in six contests— three presidential and three gubernatorial— and it
had backed the Whig candidate in every race.
percent of their ballots for Whigs.

Its voters had cast 61.7

In these same six party battles,
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the Ouachita Parish electorate had never returned a majority for the
Whig candidate and had given the Democratic party 5~ percent of its
votes r
Located next to one another along the Mississippi River in North
Louisiana. Carroli and Madison Parishes, both of which had once been
part of Concordia Parish, exhibit a parallel pattern.

In 1S50. they

possessed almost the exact same total population: S.7S9 (Carroll) to
S. 7 " 3 (Madison).

Both parishes had high concentrations of slaves

(73.3 and 83.3 percent respectively): numbered fifth and sixth in
terms of cotton produced in the state (15.544 and 12.771 bales): and
had strikingly similar livestock value (S252.982 to S23~.500) and
total farm value (S2.712.SS2 to S2,666.046).

Like Morehouse and

Ouachita Parishes, however, their statistical resemblance did not lead
to a correspondence in party loyalties.

In the six elections from

1S44 to 1852, five times Carroll Parish returned Democratic majorities
and five times Madison returned Whig majorities.^
The voting pattern of these four parishes underscores the
complexity of politics in antebellum Louisiana and warns against
simple explanations of voting behavior.

If parishes with the same

characteristics could vote in a manner completely opposite of each
other, then undoubtedly voters did not just count the number of
slaves, measure crop production, or calculate church seating capacity
when deciding how to vote.

The narrowness of party triumphs also

shows the danger of broad generalizations of voting patterns.

^Seventh Census. 1850. 475-91.
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Of the

449 parishes races between 1S34 and 1852. in 206 of them (45.S
percent), the victorious party received less than sixty percent of the
votes.

So. even within parishes voters disagreed over which party to

support, and the data does not exist to examine either voting or
demographic factors at sub-parish levels.
Another explanation of antebellum voting behavior emphasizes the
role of personality within the parishes.

As late as 1S5S. thirty-five

of Louisiana's forty-eight parishes possessed less than one thousand
voters.

Extended families, close friends, business partners, or

settlers who had travelled together from another state could control
enough votes to change the political complexion of a parish.

For

example, in Carroll Parish, the settlement of Tennessee Democrats
probably contributed to its Democratic bent.

The influence of the

prominent Mouton family helped make Lafayette Parish a Democratic
island in the Whig sea of South Louisiana sugar cane parishes.
Throughout his study of Louisiana during the early Jacksonian period.
Joseph G. Tregle stresses the role of personality, bloc voting, and
the presence of "strong men" who "reputedly could marshal hundreds of
voters to march to their command."11
Just as Louisiana’s parishes and regions did not provide the
state’s parties with equal support, they did not themselves receive
equal representation in the state legislature.

Apportionment methods

changed, but the writers of all three antebellum constitutions kept a

1Tennessee Democrats in Carroll Parish see Felix Bosworth to James
K. Polk, June 12, 1844, June 15, 1844, Polk Papers, Library of Congress;
Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., Louisiana in the Age of Jackson: A Clash of
Cultures and Personalities (Baton Rouge, 1999), quote on p. 70.
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wary eye on Nrew Orleans because they feared its corruption could be
contagious.

By basing apportionment on qualified voters and/or total

population, they successfully- ensured that Greater Orleans’s
representation would never equal its share of Louisiana’s white
population.

During the antebellum era. North Louisiana made the

greatest strides in apportionment.

In 1S30. the region had the least

seats (17.9 percent), but by i860 its expanding white population and
extensive slaveholdings combined with changes in apportionment had
enabled it to elect more legislators than any other section of
Louisiana.
Contradicting itself, the 1812 constitution stipulated "equal
and uniform” representation in the entire legislature while making
senate seats "which shall forever remain indivisible."

The

constitution called for the lower house to be reapportioned on the
basis of qualified electors every four years, and this process
occurred on schedule until 1826.

After that year’s redistricting. the

legislature failed to pass an apportionment bill for the next fifteen
years.

The 1845 constitution kept the number of voters as the basis

of apportionment in the lower house but for the Senate changed the
method to total population with slaves counting the equivalent of
white people.

The 1852 constitution again altered the apportionment

method, making total population the basis in both houses and
guaranteeing each parish a representative.

Surprisingly, despite

these varied apportionment methods, regional representation in
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Louisiana remained fairly proportional throughout the antebellum
era."
In IS30. South Louisiana had more than twice as many
representatives as any other section.

The section elected twenty-nine

of the state's sixty-seven legislators, and its representation closely
corresponded to its share of the total population, white population,
and electorate.

Restricted to three of the seventeen senate seats.

Greater Orleans at first glance appeared to suffer from the
constitution’s provisions.

In 1830.

it possessed 29.9 percent of the

Louisiana's total population and 27.7 percent of its white population,
yet only 19.4 percent of the state’s legislators represented the
region.

In terms of eligible voters, however. Greater Orleans’s

representation was correct, for because of property and residency
requirements it possessed only 19.9 percent of the electorate.

Both

the Florida Parishes which elected thirteen legislators and North
Louisiana which chose twelve had representation that corresponded to
their fractions of Louisiana’s population and voters.

(TABLE 5.5)

With the legislators unable to pass an apportionment bill in the
1830s, the regions elected exactly the same number of legislators in
1840 that they had in 1830.

Although Louisiana’s white population had

expanded 77.6 percent in the decade, apportionment still closely
corresponded to an estimate of qualified voters taken in 1841.

South

Louisiana continued to elect the most representatives, and its 43.3
percent of the seats precisely equaled its proportion of Louisiana’s

p
‘For a comparison of apportionment methods see Constitutions of the
State of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1930), 33-7: Emmett Asseff, Legislative
Apportionment in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1950), 10-30.
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TABLE 5.5
Legislative Apportionment by Region'
1S30 Lesisiature
Percent % of White % of Total Voters
Seats of Seats Population Population 1S29
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

13
12
13
29

19.4
17.9
19.4
43.3

16.3
14. ~
27.7
41.3

15.2
13.7
29.9
41.1

19-3
13.1
19.9
47.7

1S40 Legislature
Percent % of White % of Total Voters
Seats of Seats Population Population 1341
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

13
12
13
29

19.4
17.9
19.4
43.3

11.0
IS. 5
42.2
28.3

12.5
21.1
34.3
32.1

16.7
16.7
23.3
43.3

1850 Legislature
Percent % of White % of Total Voters
Seats of Seats Population Population 1847
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

13
35
37
46

9.9
26.7
28.2
35.1

8.9
22.2
44.3
24.6

10.9
27.5
30.1
31.5

10.3
24.7
32.1
32.9

1860 Legislature
Percent % of White % of Total Voters
Seats of Seats Population Population 1858
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

13.5
43
33
40.5

10.4
33.1
25.4
31.2

7.2
25.3
45.7
21.8

9.0
33.8
28.6
28.6

9.3
35.8
33.7
31.2

^Senate seats which overlap regions are counted as
region.
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.5 for each

electorate.

Greater Orleans's white and total population had

increased at a rate higher than the rest of the state.

In 1S40 42.4

percent of the state's white population and 34.3 percent of its total
population lived in the region.

Because of suffrage requirements,

these percentages continued to exceed Greater Orleans’s share of the
electorate (23.3 percent) which came fairly close to its 19.4 percent
of the seats.
Between 1S40 and 1S50. Louisianans ratified a new constitution
which like the 1S12 constitution uses qualified voters as the basis
for representation in the lower house but made total population the
basis for the senate.

In 1850, South Louisiana continued to possess

the largest percentages of total population and voters and
consequently elected the most representatives, though its proportion
declined from 43.3 percent to 35.1 percent.

The Florida Parishes

still elected thirteen representatives but since the legislature had
almost doubled in size, the region’s proportion had been sliced nearly
in half.
growth.

This reduction reflected the section’s relatively slow
The 1845 constitution easing of suffrage requirements aided

Greater Orleans as its percentage of Louisiana’s voters increased from
23.3 percent to 32.1 percent.

Both because of the inclusion of slaves

in the basis for senate representation and a cap on the number of
senators from New Orleans, the section’s fraction of the seats
persisted in lagging sLightly behind its proportions of white and
total population and voters.

North Louisiana benefitted from: the

liberalization of suffrage, population growth, and the use of total
population as the senate’s apportionment method.

The section’s
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proportion of the legislature grew from I- .9 percent in LS40 to 26.~
percent in 1850.
In IS52. the electorate approved another constitution which
again changed the method of apportionment in the Louisiana
legislature.

Both houses would be apportioned according to total

population with each parish guaranteed a representative in the lower
house.

The distribution of seats in the I860 legislature corresponded

to the total population figures of the 1860 census and also closely
paralleled the number of voters in each region.

Using this method.

North Louisiana replaced South Louisiana as the region with the most
seats.

In 1S30. North Louisiana had only 13.~ percent of Louisiana's

population and 13.1 percent of its voters.

By 1S60. the region held

33.8 percent of the population and 35.S percent of the electorate.
Apportionment reflected this growth, and North Louisianans elected
33.1 percent of the representatives in 1S60.

South Louisiana elected

31.2 percent of the legislators which equaled its percentage of the
voters and slightly exceeded its proportion of the total population.
Greater Orleans’s white population still surpassed its share of the
total population, voters, and legislators, and the Florida Parishes
continued to straggle behind in all areas.
The sections of the state not only struggled against each other
for seats during apportionment debates, but also competed to have men
from their regions nominated for elective offices.

Prior to the

development of organized parties, several prominent regional
candidates would oppose one another at elections.

After parties

formed and backed a single nominee for office, partisan devotion
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overshadowed competing regional claims.

Following nominating

conventions, partisans stressed party loyalty over any other claims of
aLlegiance. In 1S45. a candidate for lieutenant governor articulated
this partisan sentiment declaring that "he who would let his feeling
of personal attachment influence more than his regard for his party,
is not— a true Whig."

"True" Democrats shared this party-first

attitude, and by the end of the antebellum era. Louisianans lived in
what a West Baton Rouge newspaper derisively termed as "An Age of
Party Spirit."

Most Louisianans would agree with this description but

would probably disagree with the editor's negative attitude toward the
,l
development of parties.lT
The nomination and election process changed substantialIv during
the antebellum period.

The Creole majority at the 1812 constitutional

convention placed state elections in a three day period in July in
order to keep Louisiana elections separate from national contests
which were held in November and to reduce the power of the American
vote.

Fleeing from diseases such as cholera and yellow fever, many

Americans left their Louisiana homes during the summer months,
particularly if they resided in New Orleans.

In contrast, Creoles,

who were believed to be resistant to disease, remained in the state
year-round, and thus July elections would help them maintain control
of the state.

Addressing the difficulty of keeping people in the

state for July elections, the Whig party in 1840 passed a resolution
imploring "every true whig” to "remain in his parish or district until

14

Opelousas St. Landry Whig. August 21, 1845 (first quote); West
Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. May 3, 1856 (second quote).
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2S0
after the July elections, and return before November next [for a
presidential election].’*1'
Ultimately, both of the Creole framers* goals succumbed to the
pressures of Jacksonian democracy.

By the middle of the 1830s.

Louisianans had become enmeshed in the national party system with
Whigs and Democrats replacing Americans and Creoles as the main
divisions in the state.

The migration of Americans from other states

also eventually overcame any Creole stratagems to maintain power.
These newcomers, along with many native Louisianans. objected to the
lack of democracy in the 1S12 charter.

Although Creoles had made

amendment of the 1S12 constitution difficult, after years of trying,
detractors of the instrument in 1844 succeeded in calling a
constitutional convention.

The resulting document, the Constitution

of 1S45. articulated the transformations in Louisiana’s political
climate.

The charter provided for periodic redistricting of both

houses to reflect changes in population, and all subsequent state
elections were moved to a single day in November to coincide with
national contests .50
With the development of political parties in Louisiana, the
nominating process changed.

In the 1820s, prior to the maturation of

Louisiana’s political parties, prominent men, or more likely a group
of men, sent letters to newspapers suggesting nominees for office.

A

field of perhaps ten to fifteen men would be whittled down by private

I;>Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 55-9; Baton Rouge Gazette.
May 30. 1840 (quote).
^ Constitutions of the State of Louisiana. 36-9.
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agreements or candidates withdrawing from the field because they
believed that they could not win.

Stubbornness and overly optimistic

reports from friends unwilling to transmit bad news usually kepc too
many men in the race.

Also, competitors might encourage a weak

opponent to stay in the field if they felt that this aspirant would
take votes from a chief rival.

This irregular process did not easily

allow for the reduction of the field and contributed to the
multiplicity of candidates receiving votes in early elections.
Once parties became involved in the nominating process, it
became more organized, and party conventions— state, district, and
parish— formally nominated men for office.

Describing the selection

of candidates in 1S36. the New Orleans Bee declared. "Some system of
[party] discipline had now become absolutely essential for the welfare
of democracy."

By LS55, a Morehouse Parish Know Nothing could observe

without surprise that "The Democrats have nominated everything from
constable up."

An acceptance of party nominations ultimately became a

dependence upon them.

For instance, despite pleas for non-

partisanship, the election of delegates to constitutional conventions
and to the judiciary became partisan because no other effective
apparatus existed.

Election post mortems demonstrate this emphasis on

partisan organization.

After losses or at the start of campaigns,

partisan newspapers would stress that only a want of organization had
prevented the victory of their candidates in the last election.

17

This

Tregle, Louisiana m the Age of Jackson. 74. Five men received
votes in the 1824 gubernatorial election: 4 in 1828: and 4 in 1830.
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lament inevitably would be accompanied by pleas for better
organization in forthcoming contests.^
Even after parties developed, the initial step in campaigns
remained the same,

in the months, or sometimes more than a year,

prior to an election, partisan newspapers or parish meetings would
suggest men for office— usually a prominent partisan from the region
that the newspaper served.

Sometimes candidates preferred to have

their name placed in front of the people as early as possible to
dissuade other aspirants.

Other hopefuls, though equally desirous of

office, preferred to have their names held back hoping that the people
would draft them as candidates.

As more aspirants entered the field,

debate would begin over where and when to hold a nominating
convention.

Parties generally chose to held their gubernatorial

conventions in Baton Rouge because of its central location, because
many delegates distrusted New Orleans, and because, after 1847, it
served as Louisiana’s capital.

The site for congressional nominating

conventions proved a much greater source of friction and could on
occasion lead to two conventions of the same party meeting on
different dates in different parishes.

19

IQ

New Orleans Bee. October 21, 1835 (first quote); J.D. Richardson
to John Liddell, September 4, 1855, Liddell Family Papers, Louisiana and
Lower Mississippi Valley Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State
University (Hereinafter, LLMVC): For want of organization see William F.
Weeks to John Moore, August 8 . 1844, David Weeks Papers. LLMVC; New
Orleans Louisiana Courier, July 11, 1840; and New Orleans Bee. October
9, 1851. Hereinafter all newspapers from New Orleans unless otherwise
noted.
19
For example, prior to the Democrats’ 1855 gubernatorial convention
northern Louisiana interior parishes suggested Congressman John Sandidge
of Caddo Parish, the northern Louisiana river parishes called for W.S.
Parham of Madison Parish, the Florida Parishes urged Robert C. Wickliffe
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The method of selecting parish delegates to a state or district
convention varied depending on party organization within a parish and
the perceived importance of an election.

On one hand, sometimes

parishes would send no delegates to a convention or would designate
its legislators as delegates or grant their votes by proxy to another
parish's delegation.

On the other hand, some parishes practiced the

democracy that ail Louisiana politicians preached.

These more

organized parishes might even go to the extent of having ward meetings
or holding ward elections to select men to the parish convention.

The

men elected to the parish convention would in turn vote for delegates
to the district or state convention and possibly instruct them on
which candidate to support there.
The operation of state and district conventions varied as well.
In some years, a single candidate, especially a congressmen running
for re-election, would stand out and receive a unanimous vote on the
first ballot.

Or, perhaps party leaders would have worked out an

agreement prior to the convention and only one name would be put
forward.20

In other years, heated debate would ensue over how to

allot votes to each parish and several ballots would be necessary in
order to agree on a nominee.

Usually after one person had received a

majority of the votes, one more vote would be taken to make the choice

of West Feliciana Parish, and southwestern Louisiana championed former
Governor Alexander Mouton of Lafayette Parish— Baton Rouge Democratic
Advocate. April, May 1855; For a candidate’s desire to be nominated but
not have "exclusive ground" taken for him prior to the convention see
Isaac Johnson to John F.H. Claiborne, May 18, 1845, Claiborne Papers,
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, MS.
7(1

Bee, August 6 , 1851.
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unanimous.

On occasion, congressional nominating conventions would

adjourn without making a nomination and reschedule a convention for
later in the year.

This occurrence could arise when delegates either

had no specific instructions on whom to support or when they feared to
deviate from instructions they had received-

In these cases, parish

conventions would reconvene in order to provide their delegates with
further instructions before the convention met again.
The conventions themselves represented a combination of
dictation and democracy.

Behind the scenes "wire-pulling’' could

reduce the field to a single candidate prior to the convention or
could secure an aspirant enough votes that the delegates did not
really have a choice.

The opposing party and occasionally disgruntled

members of the party itself made allegations such as this Whig
editor’s description of an IS52 Democratic convention: "Matters were
’cut and dried* and decided ’in chambers’ before the meeting
assembled."

22

In contrast, other evidence such as the number of votes

taken or the close nature of the selection indicate a more democratic
process.

Normally, parties printed fairly short synopses of their

conventions in partisan newspapers.

In 1845, however, St. Landry

£At the 1855 Democratic state convention, five men’s names were put
forward for governor. Robert Wickliffe won the nomination on the first
ballot but with only 52.1 percent of the 215 votes. Eight men received
votes for attorney general, and three ballots were necessary to nominate
a superintendent of public education, Louisiana Courier. June 22, 1855.
Other conventions see Clinton Louisianan. February 2, 1838; Bee, March
10. 1841. For delegates not deviating from instructions in congressional
nominating convention see John Ellis to Tom Ellis, August 20, 1855, Ellis
Family Papers, LLMVC.
»m
^Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. May 22. 1852.
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Parish Whigs, in an effort to refute charges that a few influential
men had controlled the nominating process, published a more detailed
version of their parish convention.

The Whigs* report showed that

representatives from each of the parish’s twelve wards had cast votes
for two senators, five representatives, one sheriff, and one parish
clerk.

Five men received votes for senate, twelve for the state

house, and two each for sheriff and clerk..

With each ward

representing approximately seventy of St. Landry Parish's Whigs, this
case demonstrates the level of democracy which could be achieved in
convent ions.“
After their nominations. Louisiana candidates began the arduous
process of canvassing their districts.

The lack of an adequate

transportation network made campaigning difficult, but the demands of
the voters made it necessary.

From 1822 to I860, the number of

Louisianans eligible to vote increased from less than ten thousand to
more than fifty thousand.

To reach this expanded electorate,

campaigning became more essential and more organized.

Even in 1824,

however, a concerned friend counseled an aspirant to the legislature,
"I think it is advisable that you should visit the citizens of Bouef
Prairie. Dear Creek, & Bayou Mason [precincts of his parish] prior to
the election."

Campaigning would be imperative since his opponent had

already "taken the rounds."

In 1840, the Bee hoped that the Whig

state convention would only select candidates "who will mingle freely
with the people —

take the stump, traverse the different sections of

^Opelousas St. Landrv Whig, August 28, 1845.
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the state." adding that "this policy has every thing to recommend
•
*
,l
it.
By the iS40s and the IS50s. the willingness to campaign was an
assumed condition of receiving a nomination.

A Whig congressional

convention required that its nominee pledge "to canvass the whole
District. Parish by Parish, and cabin by cabin, and to use all
honorable means to ensure his triumphant election."

In IS52. a Whig

newspaper declared. "It is by practice made absolutely necessary that
the State should be thoroughly canvassed in order to ensure that
success which is within our reach."

A transplanted New Englander

found the extent of campaigning worth commenting upon: "In political
contests it is usual for men here who are prominent or well acquainted
with the subject to take the stump

This practice of stump speaking

is pursued even by the parish candidates for every office."

Realizing

the necessity of an active canvass, candidates whose personal or
pecuniary interests prevented them from taking to the stump declined
party nominations.

To alleviate some of the financial burdens of

campaigns, parties would solicit contributions from wealthy members to
help sustain their nominee in the field.

25

2*

'G.W. Lovelace to James G. Taliaferro, June 5. 1824, James G.
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (first quote): B e e . February 29, 1S40 (second
quote); For the importance of campaigning even in the 1820s see Tregle,
Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 76: Samuel C. Hyde, Jr.. Pistols and
Politics: The Dilemma of Democracy in Louisiana's Florida Parishes. 18101899 (Baton Rouge, 1996), 62.
2C

JDailv Tropic. February 29, 1844 (first quote); West Baton Rouge
Capitolian Vis-a-Vis, September 1, 1852 (second quote); T.V. Davis to
Alonzo Snyder and T. Scott, April 24, 1844, Snyder Papers, LLMVC; F.M.
Kent to Moody Kent, February 19, 1857, Kent Family Papers, LLMVC (third
quote); For declinations because could not campaign see Maunsel White to
David Shephen, March 27, 1849, Maunsel White Papers, Southern Historical
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After party conventions, nominees and their fellow partisans
went to great extremes to present their message to the voters.

In his

IS46 reelect ion bid. Isaac Morse, a Democratic congressman from
Louisiana’s Fourth District, which stretched from the Arkansas border
to the Gulf of Mexico, rode his pony over twelve hundred miles during
a six-week tour of his district.

Relatives and friends often worried

about the toll that this travelling took on candidates.

One nominee’s

son wrote to his sister. ”1 am not sorry that [father] declined.

It

will save him a great deal of disagreeable riding and annoyance."
Another candidate's son worried of the ’’animosities and heart burners"
that campaigning inflicted upon his father.

Many candidates shared

their relatives* distaste for the strain of canvassing.

In 1S44.

succumbing from hunger and claiming to be almost too weary to pick up
his pen and write a letter, a Whig nominee for the constitutional
convention considered withdrawing "from a laborious and thankless
duty” but his friends persuaded him not to desert the party.^

Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. North Carolina
(Hereinafter, SHC); L.V. Reeves to John Perkins, June 14, 1S55, Perkins
Papers, SHC; For campaign contributions see Joseph P. Horner to Thomas
Overton Moore, October 8 , 1S60, Thomas Overton Moore Papers. LLMVC; Henry
Marston to James Perkins, August 2S, 1853, Marston to John Buhler,
September 3, IS53, Marston to George C. McWhorter, September 4. 1853,
Marston Papers, LLMVC.
*1C

L Isaac Morse Diary in Edward C. Morse, Blood of an Englishmen
(Abilene, Texas, 1943) 118-9; Worries about illness see A.M. Lobdell to
Lewis Stirling, June 3, 1838, Lewis Stirling Papers, LLMVC; Richard E.
Butler to Anna Butler, June 10,
1844. Anna and Sarah Butler
Correspondence. LLMVC (first quote); Robert Brashear to Fanny Brashear,
August 20, 1836, Brashear-Lawrence Papers, SHC (second quote); Henry W.
Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, June 17, 1844, Taliaferro Papers,
LLMVC (third quote).
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Politicians often adopted ambitious speaking schedules.

During

his six-week journey in 1846. Morse and his adversary- made at least
one speech each day and sometimes two or more.

In the weeks preceding

the IS56 presidential election, a know N'othing spoke at ten locations
in three parishes over thirteen days.

During the midst of the IS60

presidential campaign, the West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter published
the correspondence among adherents of the three presidential
candidates.

Their letters are enlightening because the men disagreed

not on the necessity of debating repeatedly before the people but only
on the specific dates, places, and speaking arrangements.

Canvassing

seven parishes, the Breckinridge elector wanted to speak seventeen
times in less than four weeks.

Unable to keep this specific

appointment schedule, the Beil proponent made a counter offer to
debate nineteen times in twenty-six days.

The Bell man published this

correspondence in an effort to refute accusations that he had refused
to appear before the people.

Instead, he simply could not keep the

other speaker’s schedule but did wish to bring the people his
message.4'
Generally, partisans’ appointments consisted of speaking before
the community for several hours.

The candidates, however, did not

rely solely on their oratorical skills and issue-oriented messages to
attract crowds.

Inevitably, the local party organized a barbecue to

accompany campaign speeches.
a political function.

These rallies served a social as well as

In sparsely settled sections of the state,

^Broadside (1856), Ellis Papers, LLMVC; Morse, Blood of an
Englishman. 118-9; West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. September 27, 1860.
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barbecues provided not oniy an opportunity to meet candidates but to
spend a day visiting with neighbors and seldom seen friends.
Steamboats often brought
excitement.

loyalists from other parishes to add to the

Most importantly,

to free food and alcohol.

the parties treated those in attendance

In the twentieth century, a Baton Rouge

resident recollecting the excitement of these gatherings wrote of the
days of food preparation and added that at the event, "liquor was
abundant and fully indulged in.'' and consequently a barbecue without a
few fights [was] a dull affair indeed.”4'
Not only did the attendees receive free food and drink, but also
the events provided an opportunity to mingle with the opposite sex.
Barbecue announcements often included specific invitations to women,
and frequently seats were reserved for them.

Prior to political

gatherings, women often cooked or made partisan banners.

At the

event, they joined men in listening to hours of speeches and. on rare
occasions, addressed the gatherings.

Orators praised women's devotion

to their cause, and parties, especially the Whigs, claimed to have the
support of a majority of Louisiana’s women.

To add to the social

aspect of rallies, in many cases, dances followed the speeches and
eating.

While women most likely attended these barbecues with their

male relatives, a Democratic diarist recounts his wife and her best
friend going to a barbecue while he remained home.

29

JO

John McGrath Scrapbook, newspaper clipping from New Orleans StateTimes. December 3, 1920 (quote), LLMVC: For steamboat for $3 see A.F.
Rightor to Andrew McCollam, June 28, 1852, Andrew McCollam Papers, SHC.
1C

■ Emile Watts to Neppie, October 8, 1852, William S. Hamilton Papers,
LLMVC; Edwin A. Davis, e d . , Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of
Louisiana. 1S36-1844 as Reflected in the Diarv of Bennet H. Barrow (New
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Many Louisiana women took an active interest in political
campaigns beyond their attendance at rallies.

In 1S46. Madeline

Edwards wrote a poem for the N'ative American which urged women to ”Be
up electioneering."

Despite women being denied accessed to the

ballot. Edwards claimed that women could and should influence men's
votes.

Women closely followed politics.

They read political

newspapers, gambled on elections, discussed political topics, and
referred to themselves as partisans.

In the weeks preceding the 183S

election, a woman exclaimed. "I don't hear a word besides the election
of our governor."

Women’s letters also expressed preferences such as.

"If my wish could control the election [Zachary Taylor] would be
president."

Living with President Taylor's family in Washington. Anna

Butler anxiously awaited the returns from Louisiana's state elections,
and she attended Congress at every opportunity.

Another women

accurately analyzed the importance of campaigning.
election of a candidate," she argued,

"I think the

"does not depend on his merit or

abilities but on his skill in electioneering.”30
Many male politicians corresponded with their female relatives.
In addition to discussing family topics, these letters also addressed
political matters.

Some women did more them read letters from men

describing political events— they wrote back offering their opinions.

York. 1943), November 1, 1844, 342-3.
30Dell Upton, ed., Madaline: Love and Survival in Antebellum New'
Orleans (Athens, Ga., 1994) (first quote): Rosella Parker to unknown,
July 2, 1838, Brashear-Lawrence Papers, SHC (second quote); Sarah Gibson
to Mrs. George L. Guion, November 1848, Gibson and Humphrey Papers, SHC
(third quote); Anna Butler to Robert Butler, November 1849 to April 1850.
Butler Family Papers, LLMVC; Eliza Taylor to Louisa Millard, July 7.
1S44, Miles Taylor Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
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Writing to her brother in 1S28. Caroline Bell provided prescient
political appraisai of state and national elections.
ethnicity, bloc voting-

She analyzed how

the connection between state and national

issues, and election day chicanery affected the outcome of both the
gubernatorial and presidential races in Louisiana.
Moore,

In 1S52- Mary

the wife of a congressman, not only reported the content of

several newspaper editorials regarding her husband's actions in
Congress but also took the opportunity to render her judgment.
Although the newspapers approved of Congressman Moore's performance,
his wife criticized him for occupying "the very same ground [his] late
congressional opponent took."^1
In the days following barbecues, partisan newspapers recorded
the number of women and men in attendance.
in describing the events.

They spared no hyperbole

On almost every occasion their own party’s

gatherings had the largest crowds ever seen in the parish or the
state.

Announced attendance figures gave the impression that a

parish's entire population had turned out.

Possibly, the greatest of

all the state's antebellum gatherings took place during the 1844
presidential campaign when the Whigs claimed twelve thousand people,
including two thousand women, attended a rally in Baton Rouge.

In

contrast, partisans portrayed their opponents’ functions as suffering
from disappointing attendance, and often added that even those few

%»
Caroline Bell to Edward G.W. Butler, August 3, November 7, 1828,
Butler Papers, HNO; Mary Moore to John Moore, May 13, 1852, Weeks Papers,
LLMVC (quote).
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people present either had come only out of curiosity or were not
eligible voters.”
In trying to spark the electorate's interest,
not limit themselves to barbecues.

the parties did

In 1844. a Democrat asserted, that

his party was "reIuct[antJ to omit any means that may conduce to the
success of our cause." and this message could apply to Louisiana
parties throughout the antebellum era.

Torchlight processions,

parades, booming cannons, campaign songs, and the formation of
countless clubs stimulated the populace.

Especially in New Orleans,

elaborate parades often accompanied by fireworks drew large crowds.
Local party members also competed in pole raisings, such as in 1S52.
when Democrats in Alexandria built a 117 foot pole, only to have the
competing Whig pole exceed it by 24 feet.

While rarely openly

encouraged by candidates and illegal during most of the period,
gambling on elections also aroused interest in campaigns.

Newspapers

carried lists of possible bets based on the majority a candidate would
obtain in Louisiana or the nation.

A typical campaign tactic involved

12

B e e , October 3, 1844; For party comparisons see Henry Marston,
Diary, 1S56. A supporter of Millard Fillmore’s presidential aspirations,
Marston records three to four thousand at a pro-Fillmore, Jackson
barbecue, September 13, 1856: five to seven thousand at a pro-Fillmore,
Baton Rouge torchlight procession, October 1, 1856: only one thousand
("Considered it a complete failing” ) at a Democratic barbecue which ended
when a man was killed in a fight, October S, 1856, Marston Papers, LLMVC.
A.F. Pugh, Diary. A Breckinridge advocate, Pugh admits that a pro-John
Bell meeting had a "fair sized meeting" but it was composed of "the
lowest dregs of society," August 1, 1860, LLMVC.
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asserting that o n e ’s opponents had boldly predicted victory but then
refused to accept bets.”
Regardless of the ambitious nature

of

a candidate'sspeaking

schedule, he could not reach every voter in his district.

Thus, in an

attempt to have their message conveyed to the entire electorate,
office-seekers did not limit themselves to speeches.

Parties flooded

Louisiana with pamphlets and circulars during campaign season hoping
to get documents into every voter's hands.

A Congressman described

his mornings as running about Washington

attending to his

constituents’ interests and his evenings

as writing and sending

documents to them.

In 1S44. the Whigs even tried to obtain complete

voter lists in order to conduct a direct mail campaign in the remote
areas in northern Louisiana.

In LS5I, the N’ew Orleans Bee called upon

ward organizers to "learn the name, residence, and opinion of every
voter," and to "stir up and arouse the lukewarm."

Partisan newspapers

printed extra editions and often included lengthy addresses from
either the party or the candidate himself.

"J.Y. Daishel to Alonzo Snyder. April 24, 1844, Snyder Papers. LLMVC
(quote); Alexandria pole raising in P.H. Deffenworth to James E. Elam.
September 29, 1852, James Elam Letterbook, LLMVC; Baton Rouge pole
raising see John W.P. McGimsey to Polk, September 27, 1844, LC: For
betting on elections see John Smith to John Moore, November 19, 1S51.
LLMVC; M. Watson to Henry Marston, September 25, i860, Marston Papers;
Vidalia Concordia Intelligencer, December 23, 1847 claims that of 40 men
indicted for betting— 38 had their cases postponed and the other 2 were
acquitted.
^L. Knox to John Perkins, June 6, 1855, Perkins Papers, SHC; Roland
Jones to Anne N. Jones, January 25, 1854 in J.W. Cadenhead, Jr., ed.,
"The Correspondence of Congressman and Mrs. Roland Jones, between
Shreveport, Louisiana and Washington, D.C. (December 1853— September
1854)" North Louisiana Historical Association Journal VI (Winter 1975),
47; J.J. Sanford to James G. Taliaferro, May 7, August 19, 1S44,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC; Bee. October 9, 1851 (quote).
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Newspapers provided the lifeblood of antebellum Louisiana's
parties and campaigns.

In la50 the state possessed thirty-four

political newspapers which printed over eight million copies annually.
By 1S60 the number of political newspapers had doubled to sixty-eight.
Outside New Orleans, and in the later period Baton Rouge, most
newspapers were four-page weekIies almost exclusively devoted to
politics.

They included announcements of candidates, meetings,

barbecues, and parades.

Afterwards, they printed the proceedings of

party meetings and the platforms of party conventions.

During

campaign season, prominent politicians used their columns to publish
letters to their constituents.

Editors pulled no punches in dealing

with their adversaries, and the barbs hurled during a heated campaign
season often led to duels.

In 1S43 in one of the most notorious

examples, the editor of the Whig Baton Rouge Gazette mocked the
courage of a Democratic congressman-elect.

Insults were exchanged,

and ultimately the two men resorted to a duel where the editor died
from shotgun wounds.^
Election day culminated the campaign process.

Prior to 1845.

election day was actually three days beginning the first Monday in
July.

The 1845 constitution moved elections to a single day in

November.

Throughout the antebellum period, Louisianans selected

congressmen, the entire house of representatives, and one-half the
senate every two years.
governor.

Each fourth year, they also voted for

Parish judges and election commissioners selected the

^ Seventh Census. 1850, 487; Eighth Census.
Gazette. August 12, 26, 1843.

1860. 321; Baton Rouge
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number and location of polling places in a parish.

Parties usualiy

provided voters with ballots and often transported them to the polls
where they submicted their ballot to poll commissioners.
Commissioners matched the voters name against a list of eligible
voters, and if the name did not appear, the voter could produce a tax
receipt or swear an oath attesting to his el igibii ity.’’5
Not limited to the campaign trail, the social aspects of
politics continued on election day.

Candidates and their allies often

provided voters with free food and drink.

This treating not only

brought men to the polls but hopefully influenced their votes.

Though

illegal, this method of bribery was widely practiced and mostly
tolerated.

After the IS44 presidential election, a Whig complained

that a reverend had persuaded drunken men to continue drinking "with
the hope probably that with the utter loss of reason they might be
caused to vote for [James K. J Polk."

Following election day in the

1S46 gubernatorial contest, a New Orleans laborer solemnly recorded in
his diary, "attended the General elections

enjoyed myself very Weil

and Rather to[o] Merrily for a man of my circumstances

I am hereby

resolved to drink no ardent Spirits.”77
Election day corruption was not limited to purchasing liquor for
voters.

Other charges included providing fraudulent tax receipts,

starting false rumors about the presence of yellow fever, or printing
bogus ballots to trick careless or illiterate voters.

Charges and

76Tregle, Louisiana in the Ase of Jackson. 59-61.
77Henry W. Huntington to James G. Taliaferro, November 7, 1844,
Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Walter Nichol, diary, January 19,
1846, SHC (second quote).
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countercharges of fraud accompanied the results of many close
elections in Louisiana with tne presidential election of 1844 che most
infamous example.

In 1S44 John Slidell, in what came to be known as

the Plaquemines Frauds, transported immigrant voters from New Orleans
to Plaquemines Parish.

Their votes provided the margin of victory in

Louisiana for James K. Polk over Henry Clay*.

Slidell's tactics were a

variation on a process so common that it had a name— colonizing.
Colonizing consisted of a party, in the week proceeding an election,
recruiting the purchasable voters in a parish with promises of free
meals and liquor.

The "colonists” would be taken to a remote area and

guarded until they could be led to the polls on election day.

In

close races, the votes of these twenty to thirty purchasable men could
make a difference.
Historians have disagreed both on the number of Louisianans who
had the right to vote and on the proportion that actually went to the
polls on election day.

All women, blacks, and children were excluded

from the electorate as were many white males.

Roger Shugg, the first

historian to examine suffrage in the state, tried to prove that
antebellum Louisiana was an aristocracy of slaveholders.

In his

Marxist-influenced study Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana, Shugg
contends that the 1812 constitution barred two-thirds of Louisiana
freemen from the polls, while actually 42.2 percent could vote in 1820
jg

Tregle, Louisiana in the Age of Jackson, 77; For Democrats alleging
Whig corruption in 1844 see James G. Bryce to James K. Polk, November 15,
1844; Felix Bosworth to Polk, November 6, 1844, James McFarlane to Polk,
November 11, 1844, Polk Papers, LC; For Whigs charging Democrats in same
contest see Andre B. Roman to Henry Clay, December 2, 1844, Clay Papers,
LC; For good descriptions of "colonizing" see Baton Rouge Weekly Morning
Comet, November 2, 1S56; McGrath Scrapbook, p. 33, LLMVC.
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and 44.3 percent In the IS30.

Outside Greater Or Leans a higher

fraction of the population owned property, and 55.9 percent of adult
white males could vote in IS30.

Shugg correctly disputes the idea

that the 1S4-5 constitution provided for universal white male suffrage.
But. his claim that residency requirements "left the franchise in the
hands of two-fifths the adult freemen" Is highly exaggerated.
fact. 5S.5 percent of adult white males could vote in 1S50.

In
Again,

outside Greater Orleans, where residency requirements had their
greatest impact, suffrage was more extensive, and SI.6 percent of
aduIt white men couid vote. ( TABLE 5.6)
Most historians of the period have correctly disagreed with
Shugg's assertions about voter eligibility, but they have
underestimated the turnout at Louisiana’s elections.

Turnout is

simply the ratio between the votes cast at a given election and the
total number of voters.

While Shugg underestimated the size of the

electorate, most scholars of antebellum Louisiana politics have
overestimated it and compounded their error by miscounting the number
of ballots cast.

Derek L.A. Hackett has persuasively demonstrated

that historians, w'hile realizing Shugg’s mistakes, have erroneouslycontended that the number of voters in Louisiana equalled the number
of white males who were at least twenty-one years old.

This

definition ignores the constitutional restrictions on voting which

Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle m

Louisiana. 122. 130 (quote).
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T A B LE 5 . t>

Voter Eligibility and Turnout

IS20
WHITE MALES
OVER IS
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

IS22
VOTERS

PERCENT
ELIGIBLE

IS24
VOTES

ESTIMATED
TURNOUT

3627
3476
858"
5572

2022
1520
1817
3620

43-7
21-2
65.0

1278
313S

6".9
50.S
~0.3
"3.1

21262

S9"9

42.2

6560

73.1

1372
~~~>

IS30
WHITE MALES
OVER 21
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

IS29
VOTERS

PERCENT
ELIGIBLE

3912
3735
9471
8842

2222
1748
22SS
5250

56.8
46.8
24.2
59.4

1842
1159
1611
3698

S2.9
66.3
70.4
70.4

25960

11508

44.3

S310

72 -2

1S30
VOTES

ESTIMATED
TURNOUT

1840
WHITE MALES
OVER 21

1841
VOTERS

PERCENT
ELIGIBLE

1840
VOTES

ESTIMATED
TURNOUT

50110

24500

48.9

20212

82.5

TOTAL

1850
WHITE MALES
OVER 21
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

1850
VOTERS

PERCENT
ELIGIBLE

1852
VOTES

ESTIMATED
TURNOUT

5766
13801
39867
14643

4111
11367
15165
12423

71.3
82.4
38.5
84.8

4042
9881
12217
9762

98.3
86.9
80.6
78.6

73597

43065

58.5

35902

S3.4
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(TABLE 5.6 cont.)
I8 6 0

I85S
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

VOTERS

I860
VOTES

ESTIMATED
TURNOUT

4644
1"945
IIS59
15626

494S
1S655
13ISI
13425

106.:;
104.0

500~4

50209

100.3

111.1

S5.9

Include a tax-paying requirement (tantamount to property ownership)
tr

and residency restrictions.*'"
Though Hackett accurately addresses the problem of exaggerating
the number of eligible voters, he undercounts the number of votes cast
in five of the six elections between IS34 and 1S42 because he relies
on incomplete returns.

In some elections, the results in the official

journals of the legislature omit parishes that did not turn their vote
counts into the secretary of state in time to be published.

In the

cases when parish vote totals are not extant, one cannot assume that
no one in the parish voted in that election, but instead estimates of
the votes should be included or eligible voters from that parish
should be removed from computations of turnout.

In 1S40, the

presidential election returns omit four parishes, but New Orleans
newspapers indicated that each of them held elections.

Hackett

asserts that 77.5 percent of Louisiana’s electorate participated.
IQ

Derek L.A. Hackett, " ’Vote Early! Beware of Fraud! ’ A Note on Voter
Turnout in Presidential and Gubernatorial Elections in Louisiana, 18281844," Louisiana Studies XIV (Summer 1975), 179-88. Despite Hackett’s
work, historians continue to assert mistakenly that turnout in Louisiana
was extremely low. For example Samuel C. Hyde claims a 39.4 percent
turnout in 1840 and 43.0 percent in 1844, while the actual percentages
nearly doubled these figures, Hyde, Pistols and Politics, 47-8.
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When the four missing parishes are included this figure increases to
*
S2.5 percent.'1
t

Louisiana's antebellum turnout, when adjusted for voting
constraints and the absence of official returns, was actually high
throughout the period and rose in almost every decade.
the 1S29 census of voters.

According to

IL.50S Louisianans possessed the franchise.

The following year, in a governor's race. S.310 (72.2 percent)
exercised this right.

The Florida Parishes had the highest turnout

with S2.9 percent of the region's eligible voters casting ballots.

In

L840. after the excitement of the Log Cabin and Hard Cider campaign,
approximately 20.211 (S2.4 percent) of the estimated 24.500
Louisianans eligible to vote went to the polls on election day. and
again the Florida Parishes led the way with a turnout exceeding 80
percent.
In the spirit of Jacksonian democracy, the 1845 constitution
removed property requirements for voting, and by 1850 Louisiana had
43,065 eligible voters.

Turnout remained high.

In the 1852

presidential election, 83.4 percent of the electorate cast ballots,
and every region had a turnout of over 75 percent.

Turnout remained

highest in the Florida Parishes where over 95 percent of the voters
exercised their suffrage right.

According to the 1858 census of

electors, Louisiana’s electorate had increased to 50,036 people.

One

year later, when Democrat Thomas Overton Moore defeated an Opposition
party candidate in Louisiana’s least-competitive antebellum election,
turnout dipped but only slightly to 82 percent.

With the excitement

4*
'Louisiana Courier. November 12, 1844; B e e . November 12. 1844.
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of the IS60 presidential election, however, the electorate returned to
the polls in record numbers with 50.509 Louisianans casting ballots,
which exceeded the number of eligible voters in IS5S.
Intensive campaigning over extensive areas and high turnout at
elections contributes to a portrait of a democratic antebellum
Louisiana.

An examination of the slaveholdings. wealth, and

occupations of the men that Louisianans elected to the state
legislature, however, provides a different perspective.

Though many

Louisianans participated in the electoral process, elective positions
were reserved for the select few.

Property qualifications limited

access to these posts prior to the writing of the 1S45 constitution.
After the ratification of the IS45 charter, property requirements for
office-holding were eliminated.

Yet, throughout the antebellum

period, the electorate continued to elect to the statehouse a group
that one European visitor characterized as ”a very' respectable class
of men.”*"
The census did not begin to record the value of property
holdings until 1850. but despite the absence of precise figures, the
wealth of men who served in earlier years can be estimated.

First, in

order to meet requirements, all legislators had to hold property worth
five hundred dollars to be elected to the House and one thousand
dollars to be elected to the Senate.

More importantly, the census did

include an important barometer of wealth in the antebellum South—
slaveholdings.

In 1830, fifty-seven of the sixty seven legislators

19

“G.W. Feat hers tonaugh. Excursion through the Slave States. 2 vols.
(London, 1844). 1:265 (quote).
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could be located in the census*

Of these, only two did not own

slaves.

Twenty-nine (43.3 percent) owned between one and nineteen

slaves.

Twenty-six (45.6 percent) owned twenty or more with fifteen

of these men having more than fifty slaves.

An examination of the

fifty-six members of the 1840 legislature who can be found in the
census uncovers an even greater concentration of wealth.

While the

number of members without slaves increased from two to five, twentynine legislators (51.8 percent) owned more than twenty slaves.
these men held more than 100 slaves.

Ten of

In IS30 and 1840. as suggested

by its higher property requirements, the state Senate contained a
higher percentage of large slaveholders than the House.

In these two

legislatures, only one of the thirty-one senators owned no slaves,
while fifteen (4S.4 percent) held fifty or more bondspeople.

(TABLE

5.7)
The 1850 census began to list the real wealth of heads of
households, and the 1860 census added a listing for personal property.
In his study of antebellum southern legislators, Ralph Wooster finds
that 49.4 percent of the members of the 1850 Louisiana legislature
possessed at least five thousand dollars in real property, and in
1S60, 68 percent did.

In addition to their real property, 67 percent

of the members owned at least five thousand dollars worth of personal
property in 1860.

Louisianans persisted in electing slaveholders,

particularly owners of large slaveholdings, to office/3

In 1856,

ij
Ralph A. Wooster, The People in Power: Courthouse and Statehouse
in the Lower South. 1850-1860 (Knoxville. 1969), 137; Wooster provides
data on slaveholding in the 1850 and 1860 legislature but his placement
of all members he could not find in the census in the no slave category
undermines the usefulness of his charts. For instance, Wooster did not
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TABLE 5-7
Siaveholaing in the Legislature

1S30 Legislature
# of
Slaves

House

Percent

Senate

Percent

Total

Percent

0
1-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
100+

1
14
12
8
S
1

2.3
31.8
27.3
IS.2
18.2
2.3

1
3
0
3
5
i

j -

0

23.1
0.0
23.1
3S.5
7.7

1"
12
II
13
2

3.5
29.8
21.1
19.3
22.8
3.5

1840 Legislature
# of
Slaves
0
1-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
100+

House

Percent

Senate

Percent

Total

Percent

5
11
8
4

12.5
27.5
20.0
10.0
17.5
12.5

0
1

0.0
6.3
12.5
25.0
25.0
31.3

5
12
10
S
11
10

S.9
21.4
27.9
14.3
19.6
17.9

nl
5

4
4
5

1861 Secession Convention

# of
Slaves
0
1-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
100+

Members
17
31
IS
19
20
20

Percent
13.6
24.8
14.4
15.2
16.0
16.0

find anv information (birthplace, occupation, age, etc.) on thirty-s
legislators in 1850 yet assumes that these men owned no slaves.
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twenty men who owned more than fifty slaves attended the session, and
in 1S60 seventeen of these large planters participated in the
legislature.

Wealthy planters had their greatest role at the IS6 I

secession convention.

The mean slaveholding of the delegates exceeded

sixty per person with forty members owning more than fifty and half of
tnose owning more than one hundred slaves.

a

With so many of Louisiana's antebellum legislators owning
slaves, the preponderance of planters and farmers in the state capitol
«c
is not astonishing.
In 1827, the New Orleans Argus published a list
of occupations represented in the legislature, and it found 65."
percent of the members engaged in agricultural pursuits.

In later

sessions, planters did not control to this extent, but they continued
to occupy approximately half of the seats.

This figure actually

underestimates their true influence since it only includes the
occupation recorded in the census.

Many legislators who listed their

profession as lawyer or merchant undoubtedly engaged in large-scale
agricultural operations as well.

For example, the list of planters

excludes such men as R.C. Downes, a representative in the 1S56
legislature from Iberville Parish who appeared in the 1S60 census as a
lawyer but who owned seventy-eight slaves, and Zebulon Pike, a member

Joseph Karl Menn, The Large Slaveholders of Louisiana-1860 (New'
Orleans, 1964): Ralph Wooster, "The Louisiana Secession Convention."
Louisiana Historical Quarterly XXXIV (April 1951). 112-8.
While in historical scholarship the term planter connotes a person
with twenty or more slaves and farmer a. person owning fewer than twenty,
it appears that census workers and legislators often used these terms
synonymouslv. Therefore. I have grouped them together in my examination
of the legislature.
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of the secession convention from Concordia Parish, who is also listed
as a Lawyer despite owning sixty-seven slaves who produced 435 bales
of cotton in lS60.io (TABLE 5.S)
Like planters, lawyers also had a significant presence in the
capitoi.

Approximately 20 to 25 percent of all Legislators considered

themselves primarily lawyers, but as with planters, this figure
undoubtedly excludes men who listed themselves as planters or farmers
but also practiced law.

Perhaps because of the important legal issues

involved. lawyers had a greater than usual presence at the secession
convention where they occupied 32.3 percent of the seats.

In the

1330s. a traveller described the members as "principally* planters and
lawyers.” and this description could have
antebellum era.

applied throughout the

Their combined total was a majority in both

houses

each of the legislatures examined, and they dominated the Senate.

in
In

each legislature analyzed, at least seventy-five percent of the
senators were lawyers or planters, and in 1827 only the presence of
two doctors prevented them from holding every seat in that body.
With lawyers and planters occupying

as muchas seventy to eighty

percent of the seats in the legislature, no other profession had a
notable presence, though generally five percent of the Legislators
listed their occupation as doctor and another five percent as
merchant.

One of the most noticeable transformations during the

antebellum period involved an increase in the number of members who

*aArgus quoted in Baton Rouge Gazette, March 3, 1827; 1S56 data from
William F. Foster, Statistical Chart of the 44th Session of the Louisiana
Legislature (New Orleans, 1856), W.W. Pugh and Family Papers, LLMVC.

n

Feat hers tonaugh, Excursion through the Slave States. 1:265 (quote).
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TABLE 5.8
Occupations of Legislators*'

1827
House
Planters
Lawyers
Doctors
Merchant

34
11
3

Senate

Total

Percent

10

44
16
1•T
3

65."
23.9
6.0
4.5

Senate

Total

Percent

10
6
2
1

40
19
4
4
19

46.5
2 2 .1
4.7
4.~
2 2 .1

Senate

Total

Percent

IS

66
34
7
5
8

55.0
28.3
5.8
4.2
6.7

Senate

Total

Percent

12

56
19
6
4
13

57.1
19.4
6.1
4.1
13.3

5
*>
0

1850
House
Planters
Lawyers
Doctors
Merchant
Other

30
13
2
3
19

1856
House
Planters
Lawyers
Doctors
Merchant
Other

48
22
4
3
8

12

3
2

1856
House
Planters
Lawyers
Doctors
Merchant
Other

42
16
2
4
13

3
2

48

Legislators who listed two occupations are included in both
categories. Men who grew large quantities of staple crops, but who did
not list an occupation are included with planters.
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(TABLr 5.8 cont.}

1S61 Secession Convention

Members Percent
Planters
Lawyers
Doctors
Merchant
Other

were neither planters,

40
5
S
14

46.0
32.3
4.0
6.4
11.3

lawyers, doctors, nor merchants.

In 182r. the

legislature did not include men of any other occupations.

In the

legislatures of IS50. i860, and the LS6 L secession convention,
however, between ten and twenty percent of the members listed other
professions.

The elimination of property requirements for office-

holding in the IS45 constitution probably helped elevate such men as
an engraver, a carpenter, a brick mason, a cooper, a blacksmith, and a
ferryman to the statehouse in 1850.

In the House, the percentage of

men from other occupations exceeded fifteen percent in I860 and twenty
percent in 1850, while it remained much lower in the more prestigious
state senate.
Just as planting remained the most common career among
legislators throughout the antebellum period, Louisiana remained their
most common birthplace.

In 1827, thirty-four of the sixty-six

legislators were native sons.

Though this percentage declined.

Louisianans always made up the largest group in the capitol.

That

their highest proportion occurred in 1827 is not surprising.

First,

in that year the Creole-American split still overshadowed party
politics, and many men campaigned, and others voted, with birthplace
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as an important consideration.

Second, the growing influence of North

Louisiana in the state capitot tended to reduce the percentage of
Louisiana-bom legislators as the period progressed.

From 1830 to

1S60. North Louisiana's proportion of seats increased from l“.9
percent to 33.L percent.

This region contained the state's largest

percentage of residents born outside of Louisiana but within the
United States.

Thus, as North Louisiana's proportion grew, so did the

number of Legislators b o m in the South but not in Louisiana.

From

1S2~ to LS60. the proportion of members b o m in the South outside of
Louisiana increased from 19.. percent to 39.8 percent.

(TABLE 5.9)

The northern states and the border states each supplied about
ten percent of Louisiana's legislators.
fluctuated.

The foreign-born membership

In 1827. 12.1 percent of the legislators were born

outside of the United States, reflecting both Louisiana's French
heritage and the presence of refugees from Santo Domingo.

In the mid

IS50s. at the height of the anti-immigrant fervor created by the Know
Nothing party, no foreign-born members sat in the House and only two
in the Senate, and both of these had been elected in IS53.

By 1860

and 1861, after the Know Nothing party had disappeared and the power
of the anti-immigrant message had dissipated, this percentage had
increased slightly with five naturalized citizens serving in the i860
legislature and nine in the 1S61 secession convention.3®
i9
' The South includes the states which seceded from the Union. The
border states include the slave states which did not secede and
Washington, D.C.; Seventh Census. 1850. 488.
3®For a foreigner realizing the impossibility of winning a race in
1855 see John Kingsbury Elgee to James Robb, June 14, 1S55, James Robb
Papers. Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection.
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TABLE 5.9
Birthplace of Legislators

1S2. Legisiature

Louisiana
South
Border
North
Foreign

House

Senate

Total

Percent

2S
9
5
4
4

6
4
1
L
-1
r

34
13
6
5
8

51.5
19.7
9.1
7.6
12.1

1850 Leg isiature
Leg is 1ators
Louisiana
South
Border
North
Foreign

Percent
33.7
39.5
11.6
10.5
4.7

29
34
10
9
4

1856 Leg isIature
House
Louisiana
South
Border
North
Foreign

35
30
/
13
0

Senate
14
10

5
0
2

Total

Percent

49
40
12
15
2

41.5
33.9
10.2
12.7
1.7

1860 Legislature
Legislators
Louisiana
South
Border
North
Foreign

38
39
7
9
5

Percent
38.8
39.8
7.1
9.2
5.1
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(TABLE 5.9 cone.)

1S61 Secession Convention
Legislators
Louisiana
South
Border
North
Fore ign

Percent

4~
39
14

39.2

11

9

Conclusive data regarding Legislators' age and marital status
are unavailable for much of the period.

Throughout the antebellum

era. members of the lower house only had to be twenty-one years old.
but until the 1S52 constitution removed age restrictions, state
senators had to be at least twenty-seven.

Apparently, most

legislators had no trouble meeting these age requirements.

In IS50.

1S56. and I860, the median age of members of each house was
approximately forty with senators slightly older than representatives
in each year.

And, in each case, less than fifteen percent of the

legislators were below the age of thirty.

Marital status is less

available, but in a survey of men serving in the capitol in 1856, 67.7
percent listed themselves as married, 2S.8 percent as single, and 3.4
percent as widowers .^1
Thus, the typical Louisiana legislator was a married forty-year
old planter or a lawyer.

He owned slaves and had been born in the

South, probably within Louisiana’s borders.

His profession and wealth

stood him apart from the rest of his community.

The elite status of

5lFor median age in 1850 (39 in house, 42 in senate) and 1S60 (41 in
house. 43 in senate) see Wooster, Politics and Power, 19: For 1856 (37
in house. 40 in senate) see Foster, Statistical Chart of the
Louisiana
Legislature. LLMVC.
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members of the legislature raises the question of how these men
continued to have a dominating presence after the onset of Jacksonian
democracy— the introduction of universal white male suffrage and the
reduction of office-holding requirements.
explanation.

There is an easy

Whether because of deference or because the affluent

have more time and money to devote to politics or because they have
greater name recognition. American voters have continually elected
prominent members of their community to public office.

So. in that

sense, the above-average wealth and social status of Louisiana's
antebellum legislators seems more typical than extraordinary.
Also, both the willingness of candidates to campaign and the
intensity of these campaigns demonstrates that prominent men did not
rely on their wealth and stature to achieve office.

Instead, a

successful candidate would meet and treat the voters and would make
every effort to portray himself as one of the people.

The C o m m e r c i a l

Bulletin acknowledged that "the democratic form of the government
gives a consequence to the meanest citizen, about the time of the
election."

With candidates generally wealthier than those whose votes

they solicited, stump speaking and treating served as a method to
connect with the voters.

Of course, with the relatively small number

of people voting in a legislative contest, a prominent candidate
probably already had contact with much of the electorate.

Some voters

were relatives through blood or marriage and others probably knew a
candidate from business dealings or attendance at church services.

^‘Commercial Bulletin. February 21, IS3S (quote).
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Almost routinely, a candidate would couple his own claim as one
of the people with accusations of aristocracy and snobbery against his
opponent.

In 1843. a congressional candidate who had retired from the

canvass because of illness returned to the field to counter reports
that he was "a nabob to proud to shake a poor man by the hand" and
"that he hates poor people and will not permit one to live near him.”
Louisiana Democrats, following the lead of their hero President Andrew
Jackson, tried to establish their party as the party of the people
engaged in a battle against silk-stocking Whig aristocrats.

In 1S49.

the Democratic Louisiana Courier described a Whig nominee as a "rich
[man] not wanting in ambition, [who] stands well with his order, the
rich sugar planters of the state."

Whigs did not forfeit the title of

"party of the people" to the Democrats.

In another campaign, the

Concordia Intelligencer described a Whig candidate for the legislature
as ”a plain bacon and greens man " in contrast to "those aristocratic
democrats who mingle with the people only during a canvass."^'
In his 1S55 novel The Master’s House. Thomas Bangs Thorpe, a
prominent Louisiana Whig who edited the Concordia Intelligencer,
depicted this aspect of antebellum campaigns.

In the novel, two

candidates battle for a vacancy in the legislature: Mr. Moreton. a
wealthy planter, and Duffy White, an illiterate yeoman.

Recognizing

the need to appear as one of the people, Moreton campaigns in an old
carriage, wearing homespun clothes, and his overseer’s hat.

White’s

■'Maria Marshall to Mary Taylor, October 6, 1843, Marshal 1-Furman
Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Louisiana Courier, October 30, 1849; Vidal ia
Concordia Intelligencer, October 2, 1847 (third quote); Other examples
Jefferson Parish Lafavette Citv Advertiser. July 3, 1842.
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supporters label their candidate "the poor man's friend" and the
”pin[e]v woods pom'.’*

They issue an extra edition of a newspaper

accusing Moreton of refusing to shake hands with poor men. denying
them seats at his table, and not allowing them in his presence unless
they acted like slaves.

Moreton attempts to combat the effect of

these charges by treating the voters to liquor, barbecued beef, and
biscuits on election day.

Accurately portraying the solicitation of

votes, Thorpe's novel departs from the reality of antebellum campaigns
when the voters select White, the actual common man. and not Moreton.

^*

the upper class man parading as a commoner, to the legislature."

Wealthy legislators did not rely solely on claims of attachment
to the voters to gain office.

In this era of Jacksonian democracy,

Louisiana politicians practiced the democracy that they preached, and
they continually allocated more power to the people.

From 1S24 to

1861. politicians expanded both the size of the electorate and the
number of elective positions.

In 1S24, only property-owners possessed

the right to vote, and even this group’s power was circumscribed.
These men directly elected only legislators and congressmen and
expressed a preference for governor.

The legislature chose the

governor from the two candidates with the highest vote totals and cast
the state’s vote for president.

The governor possessed vast patronage

powers, and he appointed almost all of the other state officers from
secretary of state to judges to parish sheriffs.

By 1861, the onset

of Jacksonian democracy had revolutionized the situation in Louisiana.
An enlarged electorate included all white males who met a minimal

^Thomas B. Thorpe, The Master’s House (New York, 1855), 326-45.
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residency requirement.

This broader electorate had broader powers.

Voters now chose the governor directly and selected Louisiana's
presidential electors as well.

Additionally, many offices which had

been appointed by the governor now were elective including sheriffs,
the attorns}' general, the state treasurer, and even judges.■“
Additionally. the tax structure of Louisiana undoubtedly
contributed to the legislators' ability to maintain the support of the
voters.

Prior to 1S4S. Louisiana taxes were low. and planters and

professionals paid the bulk of them.

The state collected

approximately fifty thousand dollars per year in property taxes.

Each

parish had a quota writh Orleans Parish responsible for about thirtypercent of this total.

Other than the property tax. the rest of the

tax rates affected only the most wealthy of Louisianans or those
involved in commerce.

Slaveholders paid one dollar per slave

regardless of the slave's age or value.

Cows and horses were taxed

but with owners of twenty-five or fewer cows and ten or fewer horses
exempt, small farmers did not have to pay a levy for their animals.

A

luxury tax was also placed on the ownership of carriages, billiard
tables, and stock in corporations.

Professionals such as doctors,

lawyers, merchants, retailers, tavern owners, peddiars, brokers, and
auctioneers paid yearly licensing fees.

A tax on gambling

establishments and lotteries also contributed a significant sum to the
state.33

"^Tregle. Louisiana in the Age of Jackson. 57.
^Henry A. Bullard, ed., A New Digest of the Statute Laws of the
State of Louisiana, from the Change of Government to the Year 1S41.
inclusive (New Orleans. 1S42.), 699-735.
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All of these taxes did not add up to a tremendous sum of money.
In IS33- the treasurer predicted total revenue of S3G“ .0G0.

With

approximately 110.000 slaves in the state, the one dollar per slave
levy proved the largest source of state income 135.S percent).

The

S50.000 property tax represented 16.2 percent of total revenue but
amounted to only S.56 per white Louisianan. and this small levy was
the only tax that many Louisianans paid.

Taxes on professions and on

corporate stock contributed another S50.G00 to the state.

Gambling

added to Louisiana’s coffers with gaming licenses providing S53.000 to
the government.

Duties on auction sales amounted to another S30.000

in income with the remaining S14.000 split among various other
sources."' (TABLE 5.10)
Obviously, with the government receiving only a minimal revenue
in the iS20s and. lS30s. it did not spend much money either.

In 1S33.

the state treasurer predicted expenses of $284,000 with most of this
sum allocated to keeping the government functioning.

The executive

department budget, which included governmental salaries and the
expenses of collecting taxes, accounted for 5101,001 (35.6 percent),
and 540,000 (14.1 percent) was slated to cover the operating costs of
the legislature.

Expenditures for schools, hospitals, and asylums

amounted to another 587,000 (30.6 percent).

The only other

significant budget item, payments relating to the prosecution of
criminals, was estimated to be 535,000 (12.3 percent).

58

^ Louisiana House Journal. 11th leg., 1st sess.. 14.
53ibid.
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TABLE 5.10
Revenues and Expendi tures
1833

REVENUES
Amount Percent
Slave taxes
SI 10.000
Property taxes
50.000
Occupation taxes; 50.000
Auction duties
30.000
Gaming licenses
53.000
Other
14.000

35.S
16.3
i6.3
9.S
I".3
4.6

EXPENSES
Amount
Percent
Executive Dep. S 101.000
Legislature
40.000
Schools
5~.000
Hospital/Asylum
30.000
Crime prosecution 35.000
Other
21.000

$307,000

35.6
14.1
20.1
10.6
12.3
7.4

S2S4.000

IS5S

REVENUES
Amount Percent
Slave taxes
S440.000
Property taxes
730,000
Licenses
240.000
Swampland sales 355,000
Bank loan
300,000
Other
435.000

17.6
29.2
9.6
14.2
12.0
17.4

EXPENSES
Amount
Percent
Exec./Leg Dept. $350,000
Internal Imps.
S20.000
Education
570.000
Bond sale Int.
150,000
Loan repayment
110.000
Other
450,000

$2,500,000

14.3
33.4
23.2
6.1
4.5
IS.5

$2,450,000

In 1848, Louisiana simplified its tax code.

Now ali property,

including land, slaves, animals, carriages, and stocks in
corporations, would be taxed at an ad valorem rate.

Thus,

instead of

allocating property tax quotas to each parish and counting the number
of slaves and horses, assessors would ascertain the total value of
property owned and assign a tax based on this amount.

This process

seemingly made the tax system uniform and less progressive, but it
continued to tax most Louisianans only insignificantly.

In 1852, the
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ad valorem rate was Sl.iO per SI.000 of property and by IS56 it had
only increased to $L.6~ per Si.000.

The tax burden did grow as

Louisiana's Legislature, in an effort to improve the state's deficient
school system, instituted a poll tax of SI on every white male twentyone years or older and then a one percent mill tax.

To develop public

works, the legislature in the 1850s instituted another .25 percent
mill tax with the proceeds earmarked for the state's internal
improvement fund.

Certain professions and the owners of hotels,

taverns, theaters, warehouses, and businesses also continued to have
to pay a yearly licensing fee.^?
Because of the state’s commitment to the development of schools
and internal improvements, the tax burden of all Louisianans rose.

By

1S59. the state’s tax receipts had increased to over S2.5 million in
taxes (more than eight times the LS33 amount), which equalled just
over seven dollars per white person ($3.60 per total population).
Possessing both valuable slaves and valuable land, slaveholders paid
the greatest sums.

For example, the 1.384 white residents of North

Louisiana’s Concordia Parish, who owned 10.990 slaves, paid $42,733.25
in taxes or $30.88 per white person.

In contrast, the white

population of the same region's Winn Parish which numbered 4.314 and
owned i,00S slaves paid only $4,379.20 in taxes or $1.02 per white
person-

Though not possessing a high concentration of slaves, Orleans

Parish because its residents possessed expensive property and
businesses also contributed a significant sum to the state.
_________________ -x _____

With only

•'"Consol idation and Revision of the Statutes of the State of
Louisiana, of a General Nature (New Orleans, 1852),’485-7; U.B. Phillips,
ed., Revised Statutes of Louisiana (New Orlearns, 1856), 458-462.
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36.3 percent of Louisiana's white population, the parish paid 40.2
percent of the taxes and 6c.::, percent of the professional fees.5'
An examination of the S2.5 million in revenue received by the
Louisiana government in IS5S demonstrates the changes in Louisiana's
tax system.

Some sources were similar to 1S33 budget.

The tax on

property excluding slaves contributed the largest proportion of
revenue 5x30.000 (29.2 percent).

The slave tax produced another

5440.000 (1“ .6 percent) and licensing fees S240.000 (9.6 percent).
Other significant revenue sources in 185S did not exist twenty-five
years earlier.

Sales of swampland provided 5355.000 (14.2 percent)

and a bank loan that nearly equaled the entire 1S33 budget furnished
the state with another 5300.000 (12 percent).51
Louisiana's expenditures reflected the state's dedication to
schools and internal improvements.

Whereas expenses associated with

the legislature and salaries of public officials had been the largest
budget items in the 1840s, by 1858, they occupied just 14.3 percent of
the budget.

This change did not mean that the amount of money spent

on these administrative functions had decreased.

Their totals had

increased from 5141,000 to 5350,000, but their growth did not match
the ballooning budget.

Total expenditures expanded from 5284,000 in

1S33 to S2.4 million in 1858.

Not appearing in the 1833 budget,

internal improvements, including both aid to railroads and allocations
for levees totalled 5820,000 (33.4 percent) in the 1858 budget.

^"Report of the Auditor of Public Accounts,'' 107-8 in Legislative
Documents. 1859 (New Orleans, 1859).
61ibid.
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Education occupied the second largest expenditure, accounting for
S5~0.00Ci (23.2 percent).

The only other state expense which

represented over five percent of the budget also tied to internal
improvements.

Interest on state bonds which had been issued to

finance these projects accounted for about six percent of the
expend itures .Ci
The tax structure, both before and after the ad valorem rate,
demonstrates that the Louisiana legislature responded to its
constituents.

Although the tax burden increased during the period, it

remained low for most Louisianans with the wealthy, especially
slaveholders, continuing to bear the brunt of it.

In 1S52. the

electorate expressed its desire to have better schools and a better
transportation network by electing a Whig majority to the
constitutional convention and then ratifying its work.

Democrats

controlled every subsequent legislature, but with the electorate
having spoken, they continued to pledge Louisiana’s tax dollars to
institute the Whig program.

Especially prior to the 1S4S change to

the ad valorem rate, slaveholders paid the majority of taxes.

The one

dollar levy per slave contributed the largest portion of Louisiana’s
revenue, even before their real estate and luxuries were taxed.

After

the institution of the ad valorem rate, the tax on slaves continued to
represent one-half the property tax revenue outside of Orleans Parish.
Roger Shugg’s study of suffrage and representation in antebellum
Louisiana begins by claiming that "slavehoiding Louisiana never
pretended to be a democratic state” and concludes that "Louisiana was,

62ibid.
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truth to tell, a slave state policed by gentlemen, and the masses,
having no real voice in the government received from it no benefit."
Shugg entitles his chapter. "Government by Gent Ieraen." and his title
is literally accurate as Louisiana voters throughout the antebellum
period elected prominent men to office.

The chapters assertions that

these men neglected the people and that the people did not have a
voice in the government, however, cannot be sustained.

The expansion

of suffrage, the increase in the number of elective positions, the
removal of restrictions for ascending to these posts, vigorous
campaigning, and high turnout on election day demonstrate that
Louisiana's governing bodies, its political parties, and. most
importantly, its people did more than pay lip-service to the ideals of
democracy.CJ
Between 1824 and 1S61, the ideals of Jacksonian democracy
triumphed in Louisiana.

Whether Democrats. Whigs, or Know Nothings,

party leaders stressed the importance of individual voters and
committed themselves and their parties to getting their message to
each one of them.

At their best, parties not only provided voters

with information, but also gave them a role at nominating conventions
and a choice on election day.

The onset of Jacksonian democracy did

not cause deference and dictation to disappear.
political parties could thwart democracy.

At their worst,

Leaders could rig

nominating conventions, and purchasable voters could change results on
election day.

Overall, however, the development of parties, the

B^Shugg, Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana. 121-56; quotes on
pp. 121 and 156.
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writing of new constitutions, the regional breakdown of votes, the
apportionment of the legislature, the stress on the necessity of
campaigning, and the conduct of legislators demonstrates that during
the antebellum period Louisianans discarded most of the aristocratic
ideas of the IS 12 constitution and embraced the tenets of Jacksonian
democracy.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LOUISIANA KNOW NOTHING PARTY. 1S52-LS56
The years following the passage of the 1852 constitution would
witness many significant changes in Louisiana politics.

The state’s

Whig party, which had appeared to be riding a wave of success,
suddenly collapsed.

A combination of the national Whig party’s

weakness and agreement on the Whig program of activist government in
Louisiana contributed to the party's disappearance.

In Louisiana and

the rest of the United States, the Know Nothing party soon filled the
role of chief opponent to the Democracy.
rise of anti-immigrant sentiment.

This party capitalized on a

In Louisiana, the Know Nothings won

several local races in 1854, narrowly lost the state’s governorship in
1S55, and fell just short of capturing the state’s electoral votes for
their presidential candidate in 1856.

Like the Whigs, however, the

national Know Nothing party could not hold together.

And, as quickly

as the party had arisen, it vanished almost as rapidly.

Even after

its national collapse, the Know Nothing party remained in control of
New Orleans politics, but by 1857, the Democratic party dominated the
rest of Louisiana.
Both the national Whig and Know Nothing parties disappeared
because their northern and southern wings could not forge an agreement
on the most important political topic of the 1850s— slavery.

Prior to

the 1850s, conflict over slavery had appeared in Louisiana political
debate with partisans in presidential campaigns almost ritualistically
accusing their enemies of being tainted by abolitionism.

Slavery find

abolitionism had always been one of several competing issues in
political campaigns.

Louisiana politicians combined discussion about
322
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slavery with debates over tariffs, government’s role in the economy,
republicanism, ethnicity, and the extent of democracy.

In the mid-

1850s, however, most of these subjects faded from political exchanges,
and slavery became the sole topic of political debate.

Tension

between northerners and southerners contributed to the emergence of
the antislavery Republican party and led Louisianans to address
seriously for the first time the subject of secession from the Union.
In the aftermath of Franklin Pierce’s victory and the passage of
the state constitution on November 2, 1852, Louisiana politicians
entered upon their final campaign of 1852.

Under the new

constitution, a full slate of state officers including a governor, a
lieutenant governor, and one hundred and twenty-nine legislators would
be elected on December 27.
November results.

Both parties placed a positive spin on the

The Democrats focused on their overwhelming success

in the presidential race, and the Louisiana Courier proudly quoted the
New York Tribune’s assertion that "the whig party [is] not merely
DISCOMFITED but ANNIHILATED," adding that Whig partisans "talk about
the re-organization of the whig party!

Why, the whig party is dead!"

Despite the national rout of General Scott, many Louisiana Whigs
remained optimistic.

Whig journals stressed that party members should

accent the great Whig constitutional victory not Scott’s defeat.

Whig

newspapers urged, "Exult then in your triumph— you have a Constitution
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which will soon go into operation" and reassured their readers that
"the Whig party is at this day as strong as ever.”'
Louisiana’s Whig party faced two apparently contradictory
difficulties: (1 ) the weakness of its national organization, and (21
its success at the state level.

With Scott’s resounding defeat, some

questioned the national Whig party’s viability, especially in the
southern states.

Throughout the South, including Louisiana, political

parties presented themselves as the best defenders of slavery in the
national arena.

Winfield Scott’s perceived unsoundness on the slavery

question was a primary explanation for his disastrous performance in
the region.

While the Whig party’s traditional appeals may have

worked better in Louisiana than elsewhere in the South, Louisiana
Whigs were as sensitive to the slavery issue as their sectional
allies.

They, too, feared that Free-Soilers had corrupted the

northern wing of their party making it unreliable on the slavery
issue.

Aware that their fellow southerners had rebuked Scott and the

Whig party as unsound regarding slavery, the state’s Whig leaders
realized that they faced an uphill battle to convince the rank-andfile to continue to rally around the name "Whig.”
Unfortunately for Louisiana Whigs, the decline of the national
Whig party occurred simultaneously with the disappearance of many
prominent differences between the two parties at the state level.
During the preceding two years, Whigs had used their advocacy of

*New Or 1eans Louisiana Courier. November 30, 1852 (first quote);
Baton Rouge Gazette. November 6 , 1852 (second quote); New Orleans Bee.
November 30, 1852 (third quote). (Hereinafter all newspapers from New
Orleans unless otherwise specified.)
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constitutional change to differentiate themselves from Democrats
within the state, but this option was no longer available to them.
Writing three years after the campaign, independent New Orleans
politician Charles Gayarre asserted that in December 1852 the Whigs
and Democrats "looked like twin brothers struggling for the love
of

’popularity.’"

Discussing the host of state constitutional

revisions in this period, Michael Holt argues that this situation "was
a classic case where political parties benefitted much more from the
conflict over an issue than from its peaceful resolution."

In

Louisiana, this "peaceful resolution" occurred when the Democrats
accepted the 1852 constitution and joined the Whigs in promoting a
more activist government.2
The Whigs’ first opportunity to demonstrate that their party
still possessed political vigor and differed from the Democrats came
at the state nominating convention on November 29.

The president of

the convention declared that the Whigs were "a party which although
apparently conquered was never subdued."
problems immediately surfaced.

Yet, despite his optimism,

Twenty-six of Louisiana’s forty-eight

parishes, mainly from the northern regions, sent no delegates.

The

difficulties continued as the three most prominent candidates for
governor declined consideration.

Congressman John Moore instructed

his proponents to withhold his name from consideration, and later an
ally congratulated Moore on his failure to obtain the nomination.
Another Whig celebrated his "narrow escape" from receiving the party’s

Charles E. A. Gayarrd, Address to the People of Louisiana on the
State of Parties (New Orleans, 1855), 2; Michael F. Holt, The Political
Crisis of the 1850s. (New York, 1978), 107.
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nomination as lieutenant governor.

The convention instead selected an

unspectacular but loyal partisan, state auditor Louis Bordelon, for
governor and nominated John Ray for lieutenant governor.J
In contrast, the Democratic gathering two days later proceeded
smoothly.

The party had stressed the importance of the country

parishes sending delegates, and as a result only six parishes had no
representation.

Additionally, although in the months preceding the

convention as many as eighteen names had been put forward for
governor, by the time of the party gathering, the delegates no longer
divided on their choice .4

On the first ballot, they overwhelmingly

selected sugar planter Paul Hebert as the party’s gubernatorial
nominee.

The nomination of Hebert was a brilliant political stroke.

Hebert had served as a state official, graduated first in his class at
West Point, fought in the Mexican War, acted a delegate to the 1852
constitutional convention, and possessed the additional benefit of
being of mixed Creole and American heritage.

At the constitutional

convention, Hebert had signed the document but had voted against the
unpopular total population clause, which counted slaves for

Official Proceedings of the Whig convention in Bee, December 3,
1852; B. H. Payne to John Moore, December 11, 1852, W. F. Weeks to Moore,
January 4, 1853, David Weeks Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi
Valley
Collections,
LSU
Libraries,
Louisiana
State
University
(Hereinafter LLMVC); F.D. Richardson to Moses Liddell, December 24, 1852,
Moses and St. John R. Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC (quote).
I
For party organization see Solomon W. Downs to Alonzo Snyder,
November 20, 1852, Alonzo Snyder Papers, LLMVC; For multitude of
candidates see W. Wilson Matthews to Henry Lyons, August 26, 1852, Henry
Lyons Papers, LLMVC; McMillan to Isaac Morse, October 28, 1852, Morse
Family Papers, Library of Congress (Hereinafter LC); John Perkins to
Charles Gayarr6 , January 20, 1853, in Charles C. Jones, Autograph Letters
and Portraits of the Signers of the Constitution of the Confederate
States (Augusta, 1884).
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representative purposes.

Hebert argued against the measure, asserting

that "the only true democratic basis of Representation" was the number
of qualified electors.

Also, learning from their mistake of November

1S51. the Democrats issued a forceful party platform declaring that
they stood in favor of free banking, internal improvements, public
education, and amendment of the total population basis of
representation.

As the Daily Delta observed, the Democrats had

"reversed positions with the Whigs.

They have at last awoke to the

necessity of laying down a platform of State Reform."^
At the same time, the Whigs, who in the November 1851 elections
had used a pro-Compromise of 1850 and strong pro-convention platform
to catapult them to a large legislative majority, forgot this lesson
and declined to define their program in 1852.

While the Bee argued

that "the Whigs established their platform two years ago, when
locofocoism was afraid to open its lips," a more logical reason for
the absence of a platform lay in party disagreement over the total
population clause.

If the party were to present a platform, it would

have to take a stand on the constitution find thus, at least
implicitly, on this constitutional issue.

In some parts of the state,

especially New Orleans, a plank supporting the clause would have meant
political suicide, but formal objection to a clause in a constitution

Journal of the Convention to Form a New Constitution for the State
of Louisiana (New Orleans, 1852), 65-66, 100 (first quote, 6 6 ); For a
description of Hebert’s qualifications see Paul Hebert to John F.H.
Claiborne, December 7, 1852, John F.H. Claiborne Papers, Mississippi
Department of Archives find History (Hereinafter MDAH); Democratic
platform in Louisiana Courier. December 26, 1852: Daily Delta, December
4 (second quote), December 15, 1852.
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which the Whigs wanted to take sole credit for would have caused
political embarrassment for many other Whigs.8
While sidestepping the issue of representation, the Whigs
proudly claimed the rest of the constitution as their own.

They

asserted that the constitution was the work of a Whig-controlled
convention and had been resisted by the Democrats.

According to the

Bee's editor, the Whig party had carried this question against the
opposition of the Democratic party including its current slate of
candidates.

He added that a Whig electoral defeat now "would be like

beginning to build a house, and not finishing it."7

Furthermore,

addressing the Democrats’ pro-constitution platform, another Whig
editor contended that the Democrats were "running Whig principles into
the ground."

Democrat John Slidell admitted that "popular will is in

favor of a cooperation on the part of the state in public improvement"
and that his party would "carry it out in a proper spirit."
Democrat took a different view of partisan congruity.

Another

Focusing on the

expansion of democracy in the charter, he asserted that Whigs "have
0
paid us the compliment to adopt our views.”

6Bee, December 8 , 1852 (quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentinel.
December 18, 1852. For an example of the problems that the total
population clause caused the Whigs see West Baton Rouge Capitolian Vis-AVis. December 22, 1852. This Whig newspaper feebly alleged that the
clause was not a Whig measure but a Democratic trick just to get the
constitution rejected. Every New Orleans paper regardless of political
allegiance opposed the total population clause during this campaign.
7Bee, December 6 , 20, 22, 23, 1852 (quote).

0

West Baton Rouge Capitolian Vis-A-Vis. December 8 , 1852 (first
quote); John Slidell to James Robb, December 3, 1852, James Robb Papers,
Williams Research Center, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter
HNO) (second quote); W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, July 11, 1852, Pugh
Family Papers, Barker Texas History Center, University of Texas at Austin
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By December both Louisiana parties had come to champion an
activist government, and the Baton Rouse Gazette could proclaim that
Louisiana was "whig to the back bone.”

Ironically, while the Whigs

had been the primary advocates of these measures, they suffered more
from this convergence of views.

The Whigs had used these issues to

revitalize their party after passage of the 1845 constitution and to
suppress all talk of forming a Union party in 1850.

But. as the

measures lost their salience, the Whig party lost some of its vigorous
backing, particularly in New Orleans.

The city?s delegation to the

constitutional convention, including twenty-six Whigs and only one
Democrat, demonstrated its strong support for the Whig program in
July.

By December, however, the Whigs could no longer use the same

measures to distinguish between their party and the Democrats.

But,

the Democratic party had found a point on which to differentiate
itself from the Whig party— formal opposition to the total population
clause.

a

Having worked so hard for the passage of the constitution, many
New Orleans Whigs wished to retire from the political scene and reap
the benefits of their labors.

The difficulties that the Whigs had in

finding candidates in New Orleans where "it is asking a great deal of
a man of business to absent himself during the busiest period of the
year" illustrate this change in attitude.

Not only did the party in

1852 have to settle for its fourth choice as gubernatorial candidate,
but also three of its four New Orleans senate nominees and one of

(Hereinafter UT) (third quote).
a

Baton Rouge Gazette. December 25, 1852.
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their replacements declined their nominations.

The Bee's editor

declared, ’'it is no easy matter to find four capable gentlemen
willing...to surrender the claims of their business avocations in the
behests of party .”1

James Robb, who had served as a Whig in the

previous state senate, now viewed his political work as complete.
Considered "first, last, and always a banker," Robb wanted to return
to his business interests.

After being assured by Slidell that his

prospective Democratic opponent would support the new constitution.
*f

Robb rejected his Whig renomination for the senate.
The difficulty in finding men to accept a nomination for state
office was not limited to the senate or to the Whig party.

In an

article entitled "The City of Declinations," the independent Dailv
Delta reported, "at least half the gentlemen who were originally
nominated [in New Orleans] have declined."

The Democrats, however,

did not suffer as much as the Whigs did from this problem, for not
only did they have fewer refusals, but also they handled their
difficulties with greater political acumen.

By discovering a man’s

interest in holding office before nominating him, the Democrats did
not suffer the Whigs’ ignominy of having to change their mastheads
repeatedly when their formal nominees rejected the offer.

In

addition, the declinations hurt the Whig party more than the Democrats
because of the political climate in which they occurred.

At a time

I0Dailv Delta. December 7, 1852 (first quote); Bee. November 26. 1852
(second quote), December 3, 1852.
^Harry H. Evans, ’’James Robb, Banker and Pioneer Railroad Builder
of Antebel lum Louisiana," Louisiana Historical Quarterly. (January 1940)
XXIII, 243 (quote); John Slidell to James Robb, December 3, 1852, Robb
Papers, HNO.
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when the national Whig party was seen as teetering on the verge of
collapse, Louisiana Whigs could not afford the presence of any sign
that they were going to join this trend.

In the state campaign, the

party was attempting to do everything in its power to show both its
members and its opponents that it still possessed political
viability.

*2

The results of the December 27 election confirmed the Whigs’

worst nightmares as "Locofocoism

triumphed to its heart's content.”

Paul Hebert defeated Louis Bordelon in the race for governor, and.
likewise, the Democrats triumphed in the battle for the other five
statewide elective positions.

Hebert captured fifty-three percent of

the votes and won three of the Louisiana’s four regions, only
close race in traditionally pro-Whig South Louisiana.

losing a

ThoughBordelon

performed competitively, the legislative results devastated the Whigs.
Their representation in the state legislature fell from between fiftyfive and sixty percent to thirty-eight percent.

Since the appearance

of the Whig party in the mid-1830s, neither party had ever been
reduced to such a minority presence in the state capitol.13 (SEE
APPENDIX B)
The outcome in New Orleans provides the key to understanding the
Whig defeat.

Greater Orleans had cast only 4,244 of its 9,751 votes

^Dailv Delta. December 7, December 16, 1852 (quote). For a Whig
declination outside New Orleans see G. F. Connely to Andrew McCollam,
December 14, 1852,
Andrew McCollam Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. (Hereinafter
SHC)
^Franklin Planters’ Banner. February 17, 1853 (quote); Estimates of
the Democrats’ legislative majority appear in Louisiana Courier, January
6 , 11, 1853? Daily Delta. January 6 , 12, 1853.
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in the governor’s race. 43.3 percent, for Whig Louis Bordelon-

The

city’s support of the Democratic party stands out even more when its
legislative delegation is examined.

With the Democrats capturing all

four senate seats and nineteen of the parish’s twenty-seven
representatives, the Bee lamented that "the loss in New Orleans [was]
too great to be overcome by our gains in the interior."

This

Democratic victory stands in stark contrast to preceding Whig triumphs
in the city.

In previous gubernatorial and presidential elections,

the Whigs had oniy once before received less than 48.8 percent of the
vote in New Orleans.

In the preceding legislature, three of the

city’s four senators were Whigs as were eighteen of the city’s twentyfive representatives.

In 1852, the Whigs had swept the municipal

elections and had overwhelmingly controlled the city’s delegation to
the constitutional convention.

And, in November, the city had favored

the adoption of the Whig constitution— 5,463 to 3,832, and even Scott
had performed respectably in the city garnering 49.4 percent of the
vote.
The Plaquemine Southern Sentinel commented, "It would take a man
with a wise head to account correctly for the political vagaries of
New Orleans."

The Whigs’ problems in New Orleans, however, were not

so mysterious and were evident as early as the municipal elections of
March 1852 when the Independent Reform Movement appeared.

The actions

of this group demonstrated that partisan attachments in the city,
especially among Whigs, were not solidly fixed.

Scott’s defeat in the

**Bee, December 29, 1852, January 5. 1853 (quote). In 1846, the Whig
gubernatorial nominee had received 46.1 percent of the vote.
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presidential election reinforced the idea that men in New Orleans had
lost some of their enthusiasm for the Whig party.

Additionally, the

Whigs' effort to win immigrant support alienated many of the party's
traditional supporters.

Furthermore, the Democrats' use of the total

population issue especially hurt the Whigs in Orleans Parish which
would suffer more than any other from its enactment.

In 1850. the

parish contained 39.8 percent of the state?s white population but only
25.2 percent of its total population.

The Louisiana Courier's

unceasing efforts to remind voters of this disparity and the avowal of
Democrats to remove the total population clause helped ensure a solid
|C

Democratic turnout, which contrasted sharply with Whig apathy.
The newspapers offered a broad spectrum of reactions to the Whig
defeat.

Comparison to the Whig national disaster in November could

not be avoided, and, according to one Whig stalwart, "Nothing else
could be expected so soon after the election of General Pierce."

A

partisan editor lamented,
Similar to the sweeping current of destruction which
swallowed up the Whigs on the 2nd of November last
throughout nearly the entire country, is the flood which
submerged them in the State, undoubtedly, on Monday last.
The Democratic Louisiana Courier concurred that the people had
punished the Whigs for "their alliance with Sewardism in the national
contest."

The collapse of the Whig party throughout the nation left

many Louisiana Whigs with the impression that the party was dead and
this perception contributed to their reluctance to campaign actively

^Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. January 1, 1853: Statistical View of
the United States . . . Being a Compendium of the Seventh Census
(Washington, 1854), 487 (Hereinafter Seventh Census): Louisiana Courier.
November 4, 7, December 26. 1852.
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in December.

Trying to put a more positive spin on the results, some

Whigs insisted that the Democrats had won only by adopting Whig
principles.

The Baton Rouse Gazette chose to take this optimistic

approach when assessing the Democratic victors, "so long as they will
support that portion of their platform, [internal improvements and
banks]—

we are satisfied, believing as we do that a rose will smell

as sweet by any other name."10
The Democrats' performance in the 1853 legislative session did
not disappoint many Whigs.

Possibly realizing that any alternative

apportionment method would anger some portion of the state, enough
Democrats objected to the repeal of the total population clause of the
constitution to prevent any change in the measure.

Also, a majority

of Democrats united with the Whigs to forestall an effort to nullify
Judah P. Benjamin’s 1852 election to the United States Senate.

Some

Democrats had argued that, according to the constitution, the 1853 not
the 1852 legislature possessed the right to elect a senator.

With the

Democrats now in the majority, this new senator would be a member of
their party, but the party split over the expediency of this attempt.
One legislator asserted it would place his party in "a disreputable
position" but worried enough about his apparent agreement with the
Whigs to have his speech published for his constituents.

Others

W.F. Weeks to John Moore, January 4-, 1853, Weeks Papers, LLMVC
(first quote); Plaquemine Southern Sentine1. January 1, 1853 (second
quote); Louisiana Courier, January 11, 1853 (third quote); Baton Rouge
Gazette. January 1, 1853 (fourth quote).
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probably feared the precedent that overturning the election of a
senator would set for future legislatures, and the attempt failed.''
More important than their refusal to overthrow Benjamin's
election, the Democrats' enactment of an activist government program
satisfied many Whigs.

Although, prior to its ratification, a Democrat

had expressed the fear that the Whig framers of the 1S52 constitution
"wanted banks to steal the money of the people, and

railroads to run

away with it.” the legislators did not act upon this apprehension.
The state had not chartered a bank in sixteen years, but the 1853
legislature passed a general banking law which led to the creation of
seven banks between 1S53 and 1857.
state's banking capital.

These banks more than doubled the

Democrats and Whigs alike advocated banking

bills with the index of disagreement between the two parties on
banking topics falling from 69.9 percent in 1850 to 40.3 percent in
1853.

A country Whig newspaper expressed its satisfaction with the

free banking laws, and a year later a Whig editor voiced his delight
that the banking question had "swallowed up the support of both
parties!"18

uWilliam H. Adams. The Whig Party of Louisiana (Lafayette, La.,
1973), 249-50; Speech of Mr. Wickliffe in the Senate of Louisiana
on
a Joint Resolution to go into the Election for a Senator
(New Orleans,
1853), 3 (quote); Leslie M. Norton, "A History of the Whig Party in
Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1940), 357.
t8Pailv Delta. October 24, 1852 (first quote); George D. Green,
Finance and Economic Development in the Old South: Louisiana Banking.
1804-1861 (Stanford, 1972), 23-27; Data for index of disagreement from
Kirk Pilkington, "Interparty Conflict in the Louisiana House of
Representatives, 1848-1854," (Unpublished seminar paper, University of
Virginia, 1978), 27; Franklin Planters’ Banner. May 5, 1853; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel. February 11, 1854 (second quote).
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The Democratic party proved equally generous in its support of
railroads.

Like banks, railroads had suffered from the restrictive

provisions of the 1S45 constitution, and in IS52 Louisiana actually
had less mites of track in use than ten years earlier.

In 1853.

however, legislators from New Orleans and the country parishes joined
together to grant charters and to give state aid to railroads.

The

IS53 legislature inaugurated an era of railroad expansion in Louisiana
which saw the state’s railroad mileage quadruple over the rest of the
decade.

Its members pledged S3 .8 million of state aid to four

projects, though because of restrictive conditions the state actually
only paid the railroads one-half this amount.

Votes in the

legislature on the three most important railroad projects indicate an
index of partisan disagreement of only 17.9 percent.

The combination

of virtually unanimous Whig backing, and solid pro-railroad sentiment
among Democrats made for easy passage as each railroad received at
Jf l

least 84.2 percent of the legislators’ support.
The action of prominent Democrats further demonstrates the
bipartisan nature of Louisiana’s commitment to state support of
internal improvements.

In 1846, James D.B. DeBow, a New Orleans

Democrat and editor of the commercial journal De Bow’s Review, spoke
out against "the public crib" being pillaged by "the ruinous system of
19

' E- Moise to James Robb. March 22 and April 14, 1853, James Robb
Papers, HNO; Merl E. Reed, New Orleans and the Railroads: the Struggle
for Commercial Empire, 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge, 1966), 68-87; Edwin D.
Odom, "Louisiana Railroads, 1830-1860: A Study of State and Local Aid,"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1961), 36, 84-112; Voting data
from Richard N.G. Means, "Louisiana Politics and Internal Improvements,
1850-1859," (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1997), 106-112.
96.3 percent of Whigs and 78.4 percent of Democrats voted in favor of
railroad aid.
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pledging public faith for works more properly belonging to individual
enterprise."

By the end of 1S52. DeBow had done an about-face and

sounded Whiggish in asserting "with all the liberal appropriations by
states in aid of railroads. I know of no instance in which the public
weal or credit has suffered."

Also. Democratic party leader John

Slidell tried to help the state’s railroad movement.

In 1853. he

joined the state’s foremost railroad promoter. Whig James Robb, on an
unsuccessful trip to England to obtain European buyers for Louisiana
railroad bonds.

20

While Slidell may have enjoyed a harmonious relationship with
some prominent Whigs, he had enemies within his own party.

The

tension between Slidell and Pierre Soule, which had begun when the
iatter won the 1848 Senate contest and persisted as each championed a
different contender for the Democratic presidential nomination in
1852, continued to divide the party.

Slidell maintained that the

Democrats’ December victory was a triumph for Slidel 1-Democrats but a
defeat for the SouId faction which had "strenuously exerted [itself]
to defeat two of our Senatorial ticket.”

Slidell confidently added

that in a Democratic legislative caucus, he would out-poll Sou Id "at
least five to one."

When President Pierce offered Slidell a Central

American mission, Slidell shrewdly declined it because he realized the
value of remaining in Louisiana.

Senator Sould, however, found the

De Bow’s Review. (May 1846) I, 436 (first quote), (May 1852) X, 498
(second quote); John Slidell to James Buchanan, May 27 and June 28, 1853,
James Buchanan Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Hereinafter
HSP); Louis Sears, John Slidell (Durham, NC, 1925), 101-4.
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offer of a post in Spain too attractive to pass up and resigned his
Senate seat to accept the office ."1
Slidell saw Soule's resignation as an unexpected opportunity,
and immediately set his sights on obtaining the vacated Senate seat.
With the Democrats having an overwhelmingly majority in the
legislature, the victor in the Democratic caucus would assuredly win
the post.

Perhaps realizing his mistake in providing his rival with

such a fortuitous chance. Soule attempted to defeat Slidell.

Denying

stories that he and Slidell had arranged Slidell’s succession to his
seat. Soule declared in a New Orleans newspaper that "I am not. and
cannot be, in favor of his election."

In a transparent effort to

challenge Slidell. Soule’s faction argued that the new senator should
come from outside of New Orleans and suggested several names including
former Senator Downs. Governor Hebert, and Lieutenant Governor W.W.
Farmer.

In the week prior to the caucus, Baton Rouge was rife with

rumors and electioneering, and in the caucus, a bitter battle ensued.
Through six ballots, Slidell and Hebert traded the lead, but then
Hebert's supporters withdrew his name.

Two ballots later, Slidell won

the nomination, and easily defeated the Whig nominee.
Slidell and Soule would battle over control of Louisiana’s
Democratic party for the rest of the antebellum period with the former

^John Slidell to William Marcy, March 10, 1853, William L. Marcy
Papers, in Sears, John Slidell. 99 (first quote): Slidell to James
Buchanan, December 31, 1852 (second quote), February 13. March 30, 1853,
Buchanan Papers, HSP.
i2W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, April 20, 1853, Pugh Family Papers,
UT; George W. Morse to John Moore, April 23, 1853, Weeks Papers. LLMVC;
Weekly Delta April 24, 1853 (quote); James K. Greer, "Louisiana Politics,
1845-1861," Louisiana Historical Quarterly (April 1930) XIII, 72-3.
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generally triumphing over the latter.

A transplanted New Yorker.

Slidell had amassed a fortune in New Orleans and abetted his political
rise by marrying into the city’s Creole elite.

B o m in France, Soule

achieved a nationwide reputation as a lawyer and as a orator.

Though

they possessed some divergent political views, their battle rested
more on personality than policy.

While some Democrats, including a

congressman who claimed that Slidell and Soule "have no rights to make
their enmities the test of political orthodoxy," sought to remain
aloof from the power struggle, most partisans found they could not
avoid taking sides.

Slidell welcomed opposition, for according to his

philosophy a politician could not have friends without having enemies.
and he realized he had "very bitter enemies & hosts of staunch
friends."J His adversaries referred to him as "King Slidell," "an
unscrupulous demagogue," "a Dictator." "the Van Buren of southern
politicians," and "a wire puller
stage."

who moves the puppets on the public

His friends offered a counter assessment.

They called

Slidell a man who "in point of ability has few equals," and the
"sharpest, and most sagacious politician in the United States."
Obviously, Slidell did not have to worry about lacking opponents or
allies either within or without the Louisiana Democratic party.

24

1John Perkins to John F.H. Claiborne, July 14-, 1854- (first quote),
John Slidell to Claiborne, November 21, 1857 (second quote), Claiborne
Papers, MDAH; For Slidell’s early years see Sears, John Slidell. 5-23.
24

West Baton Rouge Capitolian Vis-a-Vis. November 23, 1853 (second
quote); Plaauemine Southern Sentinel. Apri1 23, 1853 (third quote); A.
OakeyHall, The Manhattener in New Orleans. (New York, 1851), 96 (fourth
quote); London Times December 10, 1861 quoted in Eli Evans, Judah P.
Beniamin. The Jewish Confederate (New York, 1988), 27 (fifth quote);
Louisiana Courier, March 15, 1856 (sixth quote); Dai 1v Crescent, February
7, 1856 (seventh quote), April, 20, 1856 (first quote).
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If the Whigs hoped to exploit this Democratic division to return
to power, the 1853 elections disabused them of this notion.

In March

1853. the Whigs suffered a tremendous defeat in the New Orleans
municipal races which had launched their early success in the previous
year.

The new constitution scheduled state judicial elections for

April in an effort to separate them from partisan politics.

Both

parties, however, offered tickets, and the election resulted in a
convincing Democratic triumph with Thomas Slidell, the brother of
Senator Slidell, winning the battle for Louisiana’s highest j'udicial
post, chief j'ustice of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

The Democrats

also captured the four associate j'ustice seats on the court.

The

summer brought news of a Whig defeats in the rest of the country which
further disheartened the party faithful.

25

At the Whig party’s August convention to nominate candidates for
state treasurer, state auditor, and superintendent of public
education, efforts to regroup were thwarted as only seven of
Louisiana’s forty-eight parishes sent delegates.

The party had no

vitality left except in the Second Congressional District, the party’s
traditional stronghold of the pro-tariff sugar parishes, which sent a
Whig to the House of Representatives in 1853.

In the other three

districts, including the first where the Whigs did not nominate a
candidate, Democrats easily triumphed.

Democratic candidates also

carried every state office contested, and the Whigs saw their already
small fraction of legislative seats became even smaller.

25Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 253-55.
26ibid., 255-7.
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The congressional elections highlighted the split within the
parties as much as the division between them.

In the Second District,

where Whigs predominated, partisans feuded over the method of voting
at the nominating convention.

The party divided between country and

city members, with Theodore G. Hunt of the city winning the nomination
after an acrimonious battle.*'

Sectional division also entered into

the Democrats' selection process in the Third District.

Here. John

Perkins of Carroll Parish based his claim for the nomination on the
failure of the party to acknowledge the northern portion of the state.
Perkins successfully argued that "it would be neither just nor sound
policy for the party to nominate any one...except [someone from] North
Louisiana.”

Perkins won the nomination, and the subsequent campaign

demonstrated the Democrats’ overwhelming majority in the district.
While Perkins remained at home, his Whig opponent, who was better
acquainted with most of the district, campaigned throughout the
region.

Despite the Whig’s strenuous efforts, Perkins easily won the

contest.
The most vitriolic intraparty dispute occurred among the
Democrats of the First District.

In this district, which included all

of Greater Orleans except the portion of the Crescent City above Canal
Street, Charles Gayarre ran an independent campaign against William

L John Moore to J. Aristide Landry, May 21, 1853, Landry to Moore,
July 7, 1853, T.G. Hunt to Moore, December 16, 1853, all in Weeks Papers,
LLMVC.
John Perkins to John F.H. Claiborne, May 14, 1853 (quote), October
20, 1853, Claiborne Papers, MDAH; For Whig Preston Pond’s exertions see
Henry Marston to James Perkins, August 28, 1853, Marston to John Buhler,
September 3, 1853, Marston to George C. McWhorter, all in Henry Marston
Papers, LLMVC.
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Dunbar, the regular Democratic party nominee.

A lifelong Democrat.

Gayarre. a former United States senator and Louisiana secretary of
state, claimed that a John Slidell— led clique, not the voters, had
selected the obscure Dunbar.

Thus, according to Gayarre. Dunbar's

nomination was not binding on the party as a whoLe.

Dunbar’s

subsequent victory did not end the battle between Gayarre and the
Democratic party but only added to the animosity.

Gayarre had already

divorced himself from Soule’s wing of the party because he believed
that Soule had stolen the Spanish mission from him.

Now, Gayarre

distributed a pamphlet openly accusing Slidell’s branch of the
Democracy of fraud.

He expressed his surprise that the city could

cast more votes than in the preceding November despite the presence of
a devastating cholera epidemic earlier in the year.

He attributed

Dunbar’s victory to Democrats "spending immense sums of money" and
"multiplying five or six hundred stipendiaries...who voted as often as
it was thought proper by their chiefs."

29

Though Gayarre never specified who had illegally voted, all
readers of his pamphlet understood that immigrants provided the tools
for Slidell’s schemes.

Gayarre’s charge automatically had credence.

Most politically-aware Louisianans were familiar with Slidell’s
IQ

Address of Charles Gavarre to the People of the State on the Late
Frauds Perpetrated at the Election Held on the 7th November. 1853. in the
City of New Orleans (New Orleans, 1853), 8 (first quote), 13 (second
quote); For agreement on fraud charges see Samuel J. Peters, Jr., diary,
November 7, 1853, LLMVC; For tension between Gayarre and Soule see Edward
M. Socola, "Charles E.A. Gayarr6 , a Biography," (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pennsylvania, 1954), 113-126; Charles Gayarre to Evert A.
Duyckinck, November 26, 1854, in "Some Letters of Charles Etienne Gayarrd
on Literature and Politics, 1854-1885," Louisiana Historical Quarterly
(April 1950) XXXIII, 225-6; and Edward G.W. Butler to John Perkins, July
22, 1855, John Perkins Papers, SHC.
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complicity in the Plaquemines Frauds of 1844. when he arranged for the
transport of Irish immigrants from New Orleans to Plaquemines Parish.
where they cast spurious ballots.

Complaining about the purchase of

elections in New Orleans, a Baton Rouge newspaper asserted that "a
dead foreigner is not dead, as long as his immigration papers can be
found."

The Bee protested the shameless corruption of the election.

and the Plaquemine Southern Sentinel hyperbolically contended that the
Democrats’ foreign political vote "controls the political destinies of
this country."

30

New Orleans served as a major port of entry for Immigrants.

In

the 1830s. over 50,000 immigrants arrived in the Crescent City, and in
the 1840s, this number increased to 161,657.

In the first five years

of the 1850s, immigration exploded with approximately 250.000
foreigners entering New Orleans.

Though not all of these immigrants

stayed in Louisiana, according to the 1850 census over one-quarter of
the state’s white population was foreign bom.
not evenly divided in the state.

The immigrants were

Almost ninety percent of them lived

in Greater Orleans where over one-half the white population had
emigrated to the United States.

The other three regions presented a

sharp contrast with over ninety percent of their population having
been born in the United States.

In 1850, Louisiana possessed the

highest concentration of foreign b o m in the South.

Despite

JliBaton Rouge Weekly Comet. November 19. 1853 (first quote); Bee.
November 9, 1853; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. December 10, 1853 (second
quote).
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containing oniy 5.9 percent of the South's white population. Louisiana
possessed 45.6 percent of the region's immigrant population.'
Perceived as unclean, drunken, criminal, and most importantly as
dupes to scheming politicians,
Louisiana.

immigrants were not entirely welcome in

The anti-immigrant diatribes of 1S53 followed a long

tradition of nativism in the state, and antebellum Louisiana has been
called "a veritable hotbed of nativism."

The opposition to immigrants

in Louisiana surfaced as early as the 1830s.

In the 1834

gubernatorial contest, Edward Douglass White, a man of Irish ancestry,
achieved victory.

In response to White's election and to a perception

that he favored naturalized citizens in his appointment policy,
nativists in New Orleans formed the Louisiana Native American
Association which opposed the election of naturalized citizens and
advocated a twenty-one year naturalization requirement.

The following

year, nativists established the True American, a New Orleans newspaper
dedicated to their cause.

In 1839, another nativist newspaper, the

Native American, began publication, and a Florida parish diarist
recorded, "the Native American cause appears to be on the increase."
Its opponents countered with their own newspaper, the Anti-Native
American. Tensions ran so high that the founder of the Louisiana
Native American Association and his sons attacked the Anti-Native

William J. Bromwell History of Immigration to the United States.
(New York, 1856); Seventh Census. 45, 61. For comparison by region within
Louisiana see TABLE 1.1.
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Americarr s office with axes.

The attackers were shot, but despite

their wounds, they succeeded in shutting the newspaper down.J:
As immigration increased in the 1840s. so did nativism.
1841. nativists held a state convention in New Orleans.

In

Louisiana's

Senator Alexander Porter, himself a wealthy Irish sugarcane planter,
complained that "the mass [of immigrants] who come are of the poorer &
more ignorant classes."

With this "mass of ignorance" serving as

pawns for demagogues, he hoped that immigrants would be forced to wait
fourteen years before receiving the right to vote.

AdditionalIv,

opposition to immigrant voting contributed to Whig hostility to
calling a constitutional convention which would eliminate the
property-holding requirement for suffrage.

At the 1S45 constitutional

convention, though unable to maintain the property requirement,
conservative delegates succeeded in expanding the state residency
requirement from one to two years, partially in an effort to limit
immigrant voting.1
Throughout the decade. Whigs and Democrats accused their
opponents with using fraudulent immigrant votes to win elections.

32

For the best discussion of nativism in Louisiana see Marius
Carriere, "The Known Nothing Movement in Louisiana," (Ph.D. dissertation,
Louisiana State University, 1977), 14-47; W. Darrell Overdyke, The Know
Nothing Party in the South (Baton Rouge, 1950), 45-72, 91-126. (first
quote, 13); and Earl F. Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans, 1800-1860
(Baton Rouge, 1965), 71-83. The information for my discussion of the
development of nativism in Louisiana in the following paragraphs comes
primarily from these sources. True American. August 3, 1835; Edwin A.
Davis, ed., Plantation Life in the Florida Parishes of Louisiana. 18361846 as Reflected in the Diary of Bennet H. Barrow (New York, 1943).
October 10, 1839, p. 166 (second quote).
^Alexander Porter to John J. Crittenden, January 2, 1841, Crittenden
Papers, LC.
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These charges and countercharges culminated in the Plaquemines fraud
allegations surrounding the 1344 presidential election.

II legal ly

cast immigrant votes provided Polk's margin of victory in Louisiana,
etna led former Governor A.B. Roman to decry the system where "almost
every foreigner who lands on our shores is manufactured into an
American elector."

These accusations of fraudulent immigrant voting

contributed to nativists establishing a Native American party and
running their own candidate. Charles Derbigny. for governor in 1S46.
After Derbigny finished a distant third in the balloting, receiving
only 2.6 percent of the votes, the Native American party disappeared,
but nativism did not.J*
Though immigrants generally favored the Democratic party and
nativists primarily preferred the Whig party, nativism did not
precisely parallel partisan lines.

Both Whigs and Democrats joined

nativist associations, and both parties appealed to immigrants in
elections.

Before Slidell organized the Plaquemines Frauds, New'

Orleans Whigs had skirted the election law by allowing Irish
immigrants who had paid for cab licenses to vote in 1842.

In the 1852

presidential election, both parties attempted to g a m e r the immigrant
vote with the Whigs making their greatest effort to shed their
nativist label.

To woo voters, they emphasized Scott’s advocacy of

granting citizenship to immigrants who joined the army, passed out

A.B. Roman to Henry Clay, December 2, 1844, in James F. Hopkins,
et al., eds.. The Papers of Henry Clav (11 vols., Lexington, Ky. 195992), 10:169-70.
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campaign biographies in German, and stressed the conversion of Scott's
daughter to Catholicism, but their appeals proved fruitless.'''
Although the Whig party had voluntarily forfeited its title as
the nativist party in Louisiana in the 1S52 campaign, the increase in
hostility toward immigrants in following years appeared to provide a
possible issue which the party could employ to differentiate itself
from Democrats and return to power.

More simply, the abandonment of

nativist appeals in 1852 did not preclude a return to them later.

The

interaction between national and state politics must be examined to
explain the inability of Louisiana Whigs to employ nativism to
resurrect the party in the 1850s.

The viability of political parties

in the antebellum South was based upon their ability to defend the
South and slavery in a national arena.

The presidential election in

November 1852 indicated that the Whig party had virtually ceased as an
organized political force in most southern states.

No longer trusting

each other on the slavery issue, the southern and northern members of
the Whig party began to look for other political parties.
In Louisiana the passage of the 1852 constitution marked the
disappearance of the Whigs’ most successful issue— advocacy of
activist government— suddenly leaving the party as vulnerable in
Louisiana as it was elsewhere in the South.

The combination of the

resolution of state issues and the weakness of the national party
resulted in the sudden collapse of the Louisiana Whig party.

From

^For Whig efforts to garner immigrant support in 1852 see Bee.
August 17, 1852: Baton Rouge Gazette. October 30, 1852; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel. September 11, 1852; Abner L. Duncan to John Moore.
September 2, 1852, Weeks Papers, LLMVC.
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control of the 1S52 legislature and constitutional convention, the
party quickly* devolved into an uncompetitive minority unable to hold a
successful statewide convention.

By 1S54. because of the

disintegration of the national party and the Louisiana Democrats''
adoption of the Whig program, even staunch partisan journals admitted
that the Louisiana Whig party was dead.^
With the Whig party throughout the nation moribund, nativists
had to look elsewhere for a party, and the Know Nothing party soon
filled the breach left by the Whigs’ collapse.

The Know Nothing

party, also known as the American party, was a national organization
dedicated to nativism and anti-Catholicism.

The party blamed the

nation’s ills on the immigration of Catholics which had sharply
increased in the 1840s and early 1850s.

Its members charged that

Catholics placed allegiance to the Pope over allegiance to the
American government and were incapable of assimilating into the
American political process.

The party received the label Know Nothing

because of its penchant for secrecy.

When asked about the

organization, its members responded, "I don’t know."

The order began

in New York in 1853 and quickly spread to New England and then
17

throughout the United States, including Louisiana.

^Plaquemine Southern Sentinel, August 13, 1853; Bee. June 10, 1S54;
Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 246-264.
37For examinations of the national Know Nothing organization see
Michael F. Holt, "The Antimasonic and Know Nothing Parties” in Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of U.S. Political Parties (New York,
1973), 4 vols., 1:593-620; and Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The
Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850s (New York, 1992),
20-74. The Know Nothing party also called itself the American party. For
the sake of consistency, I will refer to them .as the Know Nothings
throughout the chapter.
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Running on a platform of reform and nativism. the Know—Nothings,
calling themselves the Reform Party, achieved a surprising victory in
the 1854 New Orleans municipal elections in March and engaged in antiIrish riots the following September.

The party followed up on its

success in the New Orleans election with victories in several races
across the state in late 1854 and early IS55.

Know Nothing candidates

won local elections in East Feliciana. Union. Morehouse. Iberville,
and St. Landry parishes.

A Know Nothing also won a special election

for the state legislature in East Baton Rouge Parish in November 1854.
Additionally, the election of a Know Nothing candidate to the
Louisiana supreme court in April. 1855, demonstrated the party’s
growing statewide popularity.
In addition to anger over immigration, another element of the
Know Nothings’ appeal stemmed from their championship of reform.

In

Louisiana this issue dovetailed with the perception that the
Democratic party had become an oligarchy.

Many Louisianans believed

that intrigue and corruption had contributed to Slidell’s Senate
victory in 1853, and that his money had purchased the fraudulent votes
used to defeat Gayarre in his congressional race.

After Gayarre’s

defeat, a Whig newspaper had lamented that Democracy had "descended to
the oligarchy of a few," and a Democrat told Gayarre that he had voted
for him because he "object[ed] to wearing the convention collar."
Complimenting his New Orleans friends on victory in the 1854 municipal
elections, a Know Nothing from the Florida Parishes observed, "Where

38Adams, The Whig Party of Louisiana. 265-7; Carriere, "The Know
Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 65-77; Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans.
87-90.
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Democracy Rules there is generally room for Reform."

.And, following:

the triumph, a Baton Rouge nevspaper expressed delight that honest
citizens of the Crescent City had finally broken through party
corruption.'
The portrait of the Louisiana Democratic party as an oligarchy
received a further boost in 1854 when Gayarre published The School for
Politics: a Dramatic Novel. Gayarre, angry with both the Soule and
Slidell wings of the Democracy, presented a satirical view of the
election of a United States senator which roughly paralleled Slidell’s
victory in the 1853 Senate contest.

Gayarre’s depiction of scheming

politicians who see political morality as "an obsolete idea"
illustrates his disgust with the attitudes of Louisiana’s Democratic
leaders.

The politicians in The School for Politics ridicule the idea

of democracy and treat the people with scorn.

One aspirant declares.

"the Science of politics — consists in buying or being bought, in
using tools— or being used as such."

Another politician describes the

easiest path to victory— buying newspapers and packing party
conventions.

Tn the final scene, a character articulates Gayarre’s

view of the current political situation in Louisiana: "Although our
government is apparently, constitutionally, and on paper a democracy,
m

reality and in practice, it is an oligarchy."

40

39

Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. December 24, 1853 (first quote);
James Aburton to Charles Gayarre, November 7 1853, Charles Gayarrd
Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Henry Marston to Payne & Harrison, March
21, 1854, Henry Marston Papers, LLMVC (third quote); West Baton Rouge
Capitolian Vis-a-Vis, April 5, 19, 1854.
40

Charles Gayarre, The School for Politics: A Dramatic Novel (New
York, 1854), quotes from pages 79, 121, and 124 respectively.
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Though Gayarre publicly denied that his novel targeted any
particular individuals or any political party, Louisiana readers
easily identified his bulls-eye as John Slidell and the Democratic
party.

Referring to the 1S53 congressional campaign, the Democratic

Louisiana Courier claimed Gayarre"s novel represented merely the
outcry of a spurned partisan.

It alleged that he had "deserted and

denounced [the party] when his own arrogance and vanity caused his
defeat before a convention of political friends.”

Gayarre responded,

"I have refused allegiance to a clique in the party, and not to the
party itself.”

The distinction between Slidell and the Louisiana

Democratic party, however, had disappeared, and the Bee could refer to
Slidell as the "very incarnation of Democracy.”

Gayarre soon

abandoned his charade of party loyalty and cast his lot with the Know
Nothing party.^
Slidell’s control of the Louisiana Democratic party encountered
a test when he faced re-election to the Senate in January 1855.
Slidell told a close friend that he believed his victory would be more
gratifying if he remained outside of Louisiana during the contest.
After his unexpected defeat in the 1848 Senate contest, Slidell had
learned an important lesson and remained wary of leaving anything to
chance.

"Fully aware of the necessity of continued vigilance,”

Slidell asked John F.H. Claiborne, an editor of the Louisiana Courier.

*!For denials that the novel attacked any party see ibid., 5: and
Charles Gayarre to Evert A. Duyckinck, September L2, 1854, in "Some
Letters of Charles Etienne Gayarre," 224; Louisiana Courier. October 4,
1854 (first quote); Charles Gayarre to the Editor of the Washington Union
October 23. 1854 (New York, 1854), (second quote, p. 10); Bee, January
13, 1855 (third quote).
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and James Robb, the Whig railroad promoter, to go to the statehouse in
Baton Rouge to manage his campaign.

Despite his expressed desire to

stay in Washington. Slidell's inclination to micromanage the situation
proved too great for him to overcome.

Prior to the election, he

returned to New Orleans, so that he could make it to Baton Rouge in
less than a day if necessary-

Slidell correctly feared that his

enemies both outside and inside his party would try to combine in
order to insure his defeat.

His stratagems, however, proved superior

to his enemies* plans, and he won both the Democratic nomination and
the Senate contest on the first ballot-

Despite all of his efforts

and worrying, and apparently unaware of any irony, Slidell wrote to a
friend, "There was really no doubt or trouble about my re-election."'i
By 1855, most Louisiana opponents of Slidell outside of the
Democratic party had accepted Know Nothings label.

Some historians

have contended that Know-Nothingism in the South was "Whiggery in
disguise," and Louisiana Democrats labelled the Know Nothing party "a
Whig Trick.”

This explanation is too simplistic.

The bulk of the

Know Nothing party did consist of former Whigs, both because many had
a past affinity for nativism and because they found joining the
Democratic party anathema.

At the same time, however, the party in

Louisiana was not simply a surrogate for the Whigs.

Know Nothings

^John Slidell to John F.H. Claiborne, July 8 , 1854, (first quote).
October 31, 1854, December 16, 1854, January 29, 1855, Claiborne Papers,
MDAH; Slidell to James Buchanan, October 18, 1854, January 6 , 1855, March
5, 1855 (second quote), Buchanan Papers, HSP; Slidell to James Robb,
November 5, 1854, Robb Papers, HNO; Louisiana Courier, January 19, 23,
1855. For opposition to Slidell see Charles Gayarre to Evert A.
Duyckinck, December 26, 1854, "Some Letters of Charles Etienne Gayarre,"
228: W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, January 16, 1855, Pugh Family
Papers, OT.
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proudly pointed out that they included four former Democrats on their
state ticket in 1S55 and that ex-Democratic Senator Charles Gayarre
had enlisted in the party.

Some Know Nothings even sarcastically

rebutted Democratic charges by countering that the Democratic party
was a Whig trick-

Not only did some Democrats become Know Nothings,

but some Whigs refused to join the Know Nothings and eventually
entered the Democratic ranks instead.

Senator Benjamin proved to be

the Democrats’ most significant Louisiana recruit.

Both the defection

of Democrats into the Know Nothing party and the presence of former
Whigs in the Democratic party belie a one-to-one correspondence
between Whigs and Know Nothings / 3
One reason that some Louisiana Whigs proved reluctant to join
the Know Nothing party involved its attitude toward Catholics.

The

national party opposed all immigrants, but specifically singled out
Catholics who allegedly followed the dictates of the Pope over their
elected political leaders in the united States.

Louisiana Whigs had

received their greatest support in South Louisiana, primarily because
this sugar-cane growing region demanded a protective tariff.

Catholic

Creoles predominated in South Louisiana which had over three-fourths
of its church accommodations in Catholic churches.

These Catholic

Creoles shared the Know Nothings’ animosity toward immigrants who
served as tools for the Democratic party but challenged the party’s
anti-Catholic stance.

This issue proved more disruptive to the Know

43

For a discussion of historians viewing Know-Nothingism as a Whig
disguise see Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 1-4.
For Democrats’ accusations see ibid.. 95-8; and J.D. Richardson to John
Liddell, September 4, 1855, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC; Pierce Butler,
Judah P. Beniamin (Philadelphia, 1907), 151.
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Nothing party in Louisiana than it did in any other southern state
because Louisiana contained the region's highest concentration of
Catholics.

According to the 1850 census, the state possessed 4S.S

percent of the South’s Catholic church accommodations.

Because of the

presence of a significant numbers of Catholics in Louisiana, the
state's Know Nothings denounced the national organization's antiCatholic plank and instead stressed opposition to immigrants and to
If

the Democratic ol igarchy.*T
The divergent attitudes of Louisiana and national Know Nothings
regarding the proscription of Catholics climaxed at the 1855 national
convention in Philadelphia.

Louisiana’s delegation included a

Catholic, former Democrat Charles Gayarre.

The convention refused to

seat him, and ail but two of Louisiana’s other delegates boycotted the
meeting in protest.

The convention then proceeded to include an anti-

Catholic plank in the party platform.

Explaining his attempt to gain

admission to the assembly, Gayarre stated that his goal had been "to
tear the mask of hypocrisy" from the national party, and he believed
that he had "rendered an immense service to [his] country" by forcing
the convention to take a stance on Catholicism.

Gayarre, who seemed

to have a pamphlet prepared for every occasion, immediately published
the speech that he had intended to give to the conference.
that "Louisiana—

Declaring

cannot compromise away the Constitution of the

^’Seventh Census. 137.
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United States." he asserted that Louisiana would adopt the platform
lz
"save one rotten fragment of it.""
Gayarre’s pamphlet not only addressed Catholicism, but
intertwined the religious issue with another topic important to
Louisiana and the rest of the South— slavery.

In the lS50s. tension

between the North and the South over the expansion of slavery had
increased, and Gayarre's pamphlet made a specific entreaty to
southerners in the Know Nothing ranks.

Appealing to this southern

sensitivity regarding slavery, he compared "slaveholders enslaving
negroes and Protestants enslaving Catholics" and alleged that the
party sought to reduce Catholics to the level of "a white slave."
More importantly, he appealed to "Men of the South, you who are in the
minority on so many questions in relation to the rights which you hold
dearer than your lives."

He asked if the federal government could

unconstitutionally attack Catholics, what would stop it from attacking
slavery next?*6
In the wake of the Philadelphia Know Nothing convention both
state parties held conventions to prepare for the fall campaign to
elect a governor and four congressmen.

In June, the Democrats

convened in Baton Rouge and resolved that they "had no sympathy" with
the Know Nothings’ "religious intolerance."

The party, however,

45

Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery. 167; Socola, "Charles E.A.
Gayarre," 144-48; Charles Gayarre to James D.B. DeBow, June 17, 1855,
James D.B. DeBow Papers, Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North
Carolina (Hereinafter DU) (first quote); Judge Gavarrd’s Address to the
General Assembly of the Know Nothing Party Held in Philadelphia in May
1855, (New Orleans, 1855), 27 (second quote).
&&
Judge Gayarre’s Address —

. quotes on p. 16, 19, 8 respectively.
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concentrated more on slavery than on religion.

The first six planks

of its platform addressed the slavery question and pledged the party's
opposition to tampering with slavery where it existed or in the
territories.

The unity on an activist government program in

Louisiana, which had contributed to the Whig party's demise, was
apparent as the Democratic platform possessed no planks regarding
internal improvements, banks, tariffs, or constitutional revision.
Though united on a platform. Democrats faced some division over their
nominee for governor.

Prior to the convention, north Louisiana

Democrats had demanded that their section deserved the nomination.
The convention, however, narrowly nominated Robert C. Wickliffe. a
state senator from the Florida Parishes, who had served as president
*7

of the senate in the past session.T

Know Nothings gathered in a state convention on July 4 to
prepare for the November elections.

The representatives affirmed the

state delegation’s withdrawal from the national convention.

Following

Gayarre’s suggestion, they adopted the entire national platform except
for the article proscribing Catholics.

Declaring "America should be

governed by Americans," they pledged themselves to changing the
naturalization laws and to opposing the interference of foreigners in
the voting process and the immigration of paupers and criminals.
Demonstrating fidelity to the South, two of the ten planks of their
platform pledged opposition to governmental interference with slavery.
For governor, they nominated Charles Derbigny, a Catholic who had run
47

For North Louisiana’s preference for a candidate from its section
see W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, March 3, 1855, Pugh Family Papers,
UT; Proceedings of the convention in Louisiana Courier. June 22, 1855.
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for the post in 1S4-6 as the Native American party candidate.

In a

further effort to distance themselves from the national parry's
proscriptive policy, they included three other Catholics on their
-

,

state ticket.

it

Despite the Louisiana Know Nothings' rejection of the national
party's anti-Cathoiic plank, the state’s Democratic party continued to
make political capital out of it.

Slidell delighted in the effect the

action of the national convention would have in the Second
Congressional District— the Catholic Creole region— and predicted that
the Democrats would be able to capture many parishes which had
ig

previously supported Whig candidates.

Democrats made the national

party's proscription of Catholics a linchpin of their 1855
gubernatorial and congressional campaigns.
pronged attack.

They engaged in a three

First, they contended that the Louisiana party’s

rej'ection of the national plank was a lie.

Second, they pointed out

that regardless of the stance of Louisiana Know Nothings, the national
party still proscribed Catholics.

Third, and most effectively, they

charged the Louisiana Know Nothing party with speaking out of both
sides of its mouth.

They alleged that in South Louisiana, Know

Nothings preached their rej'ection of the national plank and celebrated
the inclusion of Catholics on their ticket.

In North Louisiana,

however, where less than ten percent of church seating was in Catholic

^ Bee. June 13, 1855.
*5John Slidell to W.W. Pugh, July 23, 1855, Pugh Family Papers, UT;
For a Know Nothing who left the party over the religious question see
Jefferson McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, September 11, 1855, Jeptha
McKinney Papers. LLMVC.
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churches, the order embraced the anti-Catholic test and. and according
Democrats, gave Derbigny the oxymoronic label "Protestant Catholic."
They added that Know Nothings claimed Derbigny would rather have his
children killed than educated as Catholics.^
Although Gayarre asserted that twenty thousand Know Nothings in
Louisiana rejected the national platforms and "only fifty Iowr bred
scoundrels" accepted it. the Democratic charges were not entirely
without merit.

Outside of the predominately Catholic areas of the

state— South Louisiana and Greater Orleans— some Louisiana nativists
accepted the entire national platform.

A Know Nothing meeting in

Bienville Parish endorsed the national platform, and North Louisiana
Know Nothings even offered a separate slate of state officers which
included no Catholics.

This ticket immediately fizzled, especially

after its nominee for governor denounced it.

Other Louisiana Know

Nothings tried to compromise between the national and state party
alleging that the national party only proscribed Roman Catholics and
their papist doctrines.

They contended that Creoles were Gailican

Catholics who did not share the Roman Catholics’ papist ideology, and
therefore were welcomed in the party.^
Despite a Louisiana Know Nothing’s contention that the whole
religious controversy "was a mole hill, made into a mountain by our

^Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 131, 140-2; For
Democrats
claiming
northern
Louisiana Know
Nothings
advocated
proscription of Catholics see Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate. September
13, 1855; For Catholic church seating see TABLE 1.1; Louisiana Courier.
July 7, August 1, September 23 (quote), October 11, 24, 1855.
^Charles Gayarre to James D.B. DeBow, June 17, 1855, DeBow Papers,
DU; Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 87, 140-2.
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enemies.” the accusation placed Louisiana Know Nothings on the
defensive, and they were forced to expend much of their efforts in
denying it.

Denouncing the charge that Know Nothings opposed

Catholics as an "infamous falsehood” former congressman John Moore, in
an angry Letter to the editor, impatiently explained that the party
"utterly condemns anv attempt to make religious belief a test for
political office."

Another Know Nothing admitted that reports of the

Louisiana delegation's exclusion from the national convention had
contributed to the party's defeat in a judicial election.

And. the

Bee acknowledged that the action of the Philadelphia convention had
stemmed the Know Nothing's momentum in Louisiana and proved disastrous
because the Democrats had seized "the Catholic question

[as] a God

send to them, and they have used it, or rather abused it."^
If Louisiana Know Nothings divided over the presence of
Catholics in their movement, they all agreed on opposition to
immigrants.

In Gayarre’s The School for Politics, a character

articulates the Know Nothing attitude, ”1 don’t care how long they may
have been naturalized, they can never become familiar with our
institutions."

During the 1855 campaign, a Know Nothing congressional

candidate railed against "debased foreigners who are attempting to
interfere with our government" and all partisans proclaimed that
America must be ruled by Americans.
"vast hords[sic]—

Another candidate complained of

composed chiefly of the rudest classes" who are

F.D. Richardson to John Liddell, September 12, 1855, Liddell Family
Papers, LLMVC; John Moore to Thomas Johnson (editor of Franklin Planters’
Banner), August 13, 1855, Weeks Papers, LLMVC (first quote); Thomas Ellis
to E.P. Ellis, June 28, 1855, Ellis Family Papers, LLMVC; Bee. October
22, 1855 (second quote).
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''uneducated, ignorant and prejudiced."

Contending that immigrants

drained the state treasury, a Know Nothing speaker asked the
rhetorical question, "Who fill your parish prisons, your work-houses.
your penitentiaries?"11
Throughout the campaign, the Know Nothings produced statistics
to answer this question and to show the baneful effect of immigrants
on Louisiana.

Know Nothings asserted that foreigners were criminals.

beggars, and burdens on society.

Citing the 1S50 census, the Bee

contended that foreigners were ten times more likely to be paupers
than were native-born Americans.

A Know Nothing legislative candidate

explained that the nation’s prison population contained foreigners at
a rate six times more often than their percentage in the population
would suggest.

Additionally, according the Know Nothing press, out of

the 13,“59 patients treated by Charity Hospital in New Orleans in
1S53. 12.333 were immigrants while only 1,534 were natives.

54

The Know Nothings particularly decried immigrants’ pernicious
influence on Louisiana politics.

According to the Bee, immigrants

cast almost one-half of the votes in New Orleans and in the 1852
presidential election had cast almost one-third of the votes in
Louisiana, and consequently the foreign-born population provided the

33Gayarre, The School for Politics, 44 (first quote): George Eustis,
Jr., 1855 Speech, Papers of George Eustis, LC (second quote); Speech of
Colonel Theodore G. Hunt at the Houma Barbecue. Parish of Terrebonne, on
the 15th of September (New Orleans, 1855), 5-6 (third quote): "Address
of Adolphus Olivier" in Opelousas Patriot. September 22, 1855 (fourth
quote).

^Bee, August 31, September 22, 1855; "Address of Adolphus Olivier”
in Opelousas Patriot, September 22. 1855; For a desire to close down
Charity Hospital because too many Irish immigrants used it see Robert
Wilson to James Robb, March 8 , 1852, James Robb Papers, HNO.
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balance of power in Louisiana elections.

Assessing this situation, a

Know Nothing congressional candidate employed a traditional republican
argument to demonstrate what would happen if this trend continued.

He

contended that this flood of immigrants ”threaten[edj the overthrow of
our American system of government” and eventually would lead to "the
erection upon its ruins of monarchical establishments.”

He concluded

that immigrants "cannot be politically incorporated with and
assimilated with us."

Raised in monarchical regimes, the immigrants

could not understand American political traditions.

Thus, they became

"mere instruments and creatures of cunning wire-pullers.”

These wire

pullers, of course, were Democrats, and the nativists estimated that
almost ninety percent of naturalized citizens supported that party and
that Ireland and Germany "poured out their hosts to swell the throng”
at Democratic meetings.^'
The new topics of immigration and religious proscription joined
the traditional issue of loyalty to slavery and the South in the
campaign.

As in prior campaigns, politicians regardless of party

affiliation attacked their opponents’ slavery credentials.

Know

Nothings charged that foreigners opposed slavery because they competed
with slave labor and because they came from countries where slavery
did not exist.

They claimed that it was more than a coincidence that

the northern states with the greatest abolitionist sentiment contained
the greatest percentage of immigrants.

Additionally, with, according

to their estimates, eighty percent of the foreigners settling in the

^ Bee, July 21 (third quote), August 7,
September 5, 28 (second
quote), October 15, 1855; Speech of Theodore G. Hunt
6 (first quote);
Gayarre, Address to the People of Louisiana. 30.
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North, immigrants helped further the North's majority over the South
in Congress.

The Know Nothings added that the vehement opposition of

abolitionist newspapers to their party validated their own slavery
credentials.30
As the Democrats questioned the Know Nothings7 attitude toward
Catholics, they also doubted the party7s fidelity to slavery.
Alluding to the Know Nothings. Democratic Congressman John Perkins
delivered a speech in May addressing how "certain disguised movements
of Abolitionists of the North’7 were trying "to undermine the cherished
institutions of the South.7’ A former Know Nothing, while expressing
his agreement with the party’s opposition to foreigners, resigned from
the organization partially because he feared that the party possessed
a secret third degree "strongly connected with the principles of the
northern abolitionists.77 Democrats seized on the allegation of a
third degree in their assaults on Know Nothings.

A Democratic

newspaper contended that "Abolition is the backbone of the secret
order," and another observed that the party was "nurtured and
conceived in abolitionist hotbed" of Massachusetts.

The charge that

the northern wing of the order was "abolitionised" emerged as a staple
of Democratic newspapers.^

56Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate. September 13, 1855; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel. October 20, November 3, 1855; Bee. May 24, July 27,
August 17, 1855.
^Committee to John Perkins, June 5, 1855. John Perkins Papers, SHC
(first quote); Jefferson McKinney to Jeptha McKinney, September 11, 1855,
Jeptha Mckinney Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Plaquemine Iberville
Gazette quoted in Southern Sentinel. February 10, 1855 (third quote);
Louisiana Courier. February 1, May 10, July 10, 14, September 21, October
21, 1855 (fourth quote).
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By 1855. debate over slavery in Louisiana and throughout the
United States meant debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act.

In 1854.

Illinois Senator Stephen A. DougLas introduced a bill creating the
Kansas and Nebraska territories out of a portion of the Louisiana
Purchase.

According to the terras of the Missouri Compromise of IS20.

slavery should have been prohibited in this area.

At the behest of

southerners. Douglas, however, called for the explicit repeal of the
Missouri Compromise and for these territories to be admitted under the
basis of popular sovereignty.

Though few believed that slavery could

exist in either Kansas or Nebraska, southerners considered the
incorporation of popular sovereignty into the bill a matter of honor
and an opportunity to see if northerners could be trusted regarding
slavery.

The bill easily passed in the Senate and narrowly passed in

the House with the chief opposition coming from northern Whigs who
unanimously voted against it.

«

In 1854, with a single exception, Louisiana’s congressional
delegation supported the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the state’s
legislature passed a resolution endorsing the measure.

All four of

Louisiana’s Democratic representatives, including Senator Slidell and
three congressman, voted for the measure, and the 1855 Democratic
platform contained a plank celebrating the bill.

The actions of the

other two representatives, both elected as Whigs, shows the divergent
paths of Louisiana Whiggery.

Declaring the measure to be a southern

58

For the South and the Kansas Nebraska Act see Wi 11 iam J. Cooper,
Jr., The South and the Politics of Slavery. 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge,
1978), 346-59; David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis. 1848-1861 (New
York, 1976), 199-224.
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question. Senator Benjamin, who within two years would become a
Democrat, voted for it.

Congressman Theodore Hunt, however, contended

that in 1820 the South had supported the Missouri Compromise, and he
would continue to stand by it.

Hunt, who in IS55 would run for re-

election as a Know Nothing, voted against the Kansas-Nebraska Act
because he felt slavery could not exist in the territory, and
therefore the measure unnecessarily agitated the North, increased
abolitionist sentiment, and consequently threatened the Union."
During the 1855 campaign, Democrats used the vote on the KansasNebraska Act to show that only their party could be trusted on the
slavery question.

In an effort to demonstrate that northern Whigs and

Know Nothings were abolitionists, the Louisiana Courier printed the
vote from the House of Representatives, which indicated that the only
northerners who voted for the bill were Democrats.

Democrats

excoriated the Know Nothing’s nomination of Hunt and alleged that
Free-Soilers desired his election and that Hunt’s position was
"worthier of a New England than a Louisiana candidate."

Know Nothings

tried to brand the Democrats’ charges as slanderous, but Hunt was
clearly placed on the defensive.

While maintaining that he had acted

correctly in opposing the Kansas-Nebraska act and sticking to the
Missouri Compromise, Hunt tried to save face by declaring that now
that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had passed, he would not tolerate its
repeal.

Hunt faced a double dilemma.

Not only did he have to

59

For a discussion of the actions of Louisiana regarding the KansasNebraska Act see Dolph W. McCleish, ’’Louisiana and the Kansas Question,"
(Master’s thesis, Louisiana State University, 1939), 21-30; Democratic
platform in Louisiana Courier. June 22, 1855.
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overcome the perception that he was unfaithful to the South, but.
running in a predominantly Catholic district, he lost votes because of
the religious question as well.

These twin difficulties contributed

to a Democrat being selected to represent the South Louisiana sugar
cane-producing parishes for only the second time in the party’s
history.^
Hunt’s loss in parishes which had previously cast majorities
against Democratic candidates illustrates the confusing nature of
party politics in Louisiana in LS55.

On one hand. Know' Nothings tried

to emphasize that both traditional parties had disappeared and that
their organization included both Whigs and Democrats.

Describing the

party, the Clinton American Patriot declared "there is no Whig and no
Democrat known among them...the parties...having passed away," and the
Bee contended that the party was composed of equal portions of Whigs
and Democrats.

The French-language Le Meschacebe contended that the

Know Nothing state platform could have been the work of a Democratic
or Whig convention.

Arguing that "the Democratic party is there but

democracy is not,” Charles Gayarre proclaimed that "the occasion had
arrived for the formation of a new party."

To demonstrate the

bipartisan nature of their party, the Know Nothings included three
former Democrats on their state ticket, including their candidate for

60Louisiana Courier. July 22, September 6 (quote), December 1, 1855;
Weekly Delta. September 30, 1855; Speech of Theodore G. Hunt. 4-, 7.
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lieutenant governor. Lewis Texada.

Partisan newspapers also published

the names of Democrats who had switched to their party.3i
On the other hand, the Democrats incorporated two different
attitudes regarding the status of Louisiana parties.

In regions where

they had always been strong, they contended that only one party
remained.

They labeled the Know Nothing party as Whigs led by a

different leader.

With the national Whig party defunct, the Democrats

provided the only vehicle to protect the South.

Democratic newspapers

asserted that many Know Nothings had come to this conclusion, and
throughout the campaign printed lists of Know Nothings who had
abandoned their party in favor of the Democracy.^

In areas such as

South Louisiana where the Whigs had predominated and where they could
exploit the Know Nothing’s anti-Catholicism, the Democrats tried a
different tactic.

In this region, they did not run Democrat

candidates but supported "Anti-Know Nothing" nominees instead.

With

this stratagem, they hoped to attract Whigs who would not vote for a
Democratic but distrusted the Know Nothings.

lClinton American Patriot, April 21, L855 (first quote); Lucy (St.
John the Baptist Parish) Le Meschacebe. July 15, 1855 (second quote):
Bee. March 16, July 6 , September 8 , 1855; Charles Gayarre, Address to the
People of Louisiana on the State of Parties (New Orleans, 1855), 8 (third
quote).
^"Phantom" to the editor, October 9, 1855, James Muggah Papers, HNO;
for lists of Know Nothing defections to the Democracy see Louisiana
Courier. July-November, 1855.
63For Anti-Know Nothings in South Louisiana see Knight to W.W. Pugh,
July 26, 1855, Pugh Family Papers, OT; Baton Rouge Democratic Advocate.
August 23, September 6 , 1855; Louisiana Courier. July 17, August 14, 25,
September 10, 1855; Houma Ceres. August 16, 1855.
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Charges of abolitionist tendencies, debate over immigration, and
accusations of religious proscription dominated the 1855 campaign.
The Louisiana Courier succinctly summed up the Democratic campaign
strategy in its contention that Know Nothing principles were
"hostility to foreigners, the Catholic religion, and slavery.”
Previous Louisiana campaigns had experienced partisan divergence on a
much wider range of topics.

By 1855, however. Louisiana politicians,

regardless of party affiliation, could agree on most issues.

Almost

everyone accepted the constitution of 1852 and its provisions
regarding an activist state government.

They also concurred on the

charter’s democratic provisions— universal white male suffrage with
almost all offices elective.

Furthermore, as memory of French and

Spanish rule and of the Louisiana Purchase faded, debate over
candidates’ birthplaces became less and less common.
According to a country parish newspaper, the elections resulted
in a "Grand Democratic Victory" and "the total annihilation of KnowNothingism with all its proscriptive features."

Receiving 53.7

percent of the votes, Wickliffe defeated Derbigny for governor, and
Democrats won three of the four congressional seats.

The Know

Nothings best showing occurred in Greater Orleans and the Florida
Parishes where Derbigny obtained 51.2 and 51.5 percent of the votes
respectively.

The party also elected George Eustis, Jr., to Congress

in the New Orleans-dominated First District.

Undoubtedly, the

Democrats’ accusations of anti-Catholicism hurt the Know Nothings.
Not only did Theodore G. Hunt lose his race for re-election to
Ct
TLouisiana Courier. May 24, 1855.
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Congress in the Creole parishes, but the Democrats also achieved their
greatest victory ever in South Louisiana with Wickliffe receiving 5".S
percent of the region's ballots .53 (SEE APPENDIX B)
A comparison of the support given to the Know Nothings' Catholic
gubernatorial candidate Charles Derbigny and their Protestant Attorney
General nominee Randall Hunt reveals some of that party’s internal
tension over Catholicism.

In the twenty parishes of North Louisiana,

some of which endorsed the national party’s anti-Catholic platform.
Derbigny’s candidacy had engendered controversy.

In this region, the

Protestant Hunt's vote exceeded Derbigny’s 6,736 to 6.205 (8.5
percent) including Claiborne and O'nion Parishes where Hunt out-polled
Derbigny 1,365 to 1,075 (27.0 percent).

In contrast, in the seventeen

parishes of predominately Catholic South Louisiana the two candidates’
support was almost identical (5,039 votes for Derbigny to 5,005 for
Hunt).

In all but one parish in this region, the two Know Nothings

received within five votes of each other.
After the 1855 state contests, attention turned to the 1856
presidential contest.

As he had in both 1848 and 1852, John Slidell

supported his devoted friend, Pennsylvanian James Buchanan, for the
Democratic nomination.

Writing from Washington to an ally in

Louisiana, Slidell referred to "endeavoring to secure Mr. Buchanan’s
nomination" as his "constant occupation."

To another partisan,

Slidell claimed Buchanan, a northerner who stood with the South on the
slavery question, was "bv far the strongest man in the [Democratic]

^ Point Coupee Echo. Broadside, November 6 , 1855, in William S.
Hamilton Papers, LLMVC (quote); Election results Louisiana Courier.
December 1, 1855.
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convention."06

With Slidell in Washington. Soule and his allies in

Louisiana, who preferred Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas, the
author of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. sought to control the state's March
nominating convention.

Tension between Douglas and Buchanan delegates

disrupted the convention from the beginning with acrimonious disputes
over the time it should start, who would serve as chairman, and
whether legislators could serve as delegates.

According to Soule, who

attended the convention, opposition to the "Slidell clique" led the
delegates to repudiate those who claimed to be Buchanan's "exclusive
friends."

Instead, they sent an unpledged delegation to the

Cincinnati national convention.

Delighting in the rebuff given to

Slidell. Know Nothing journals celebrated the state convention as a
Waterloo defeat for the "Napoleon of Louisiana."67
Soule appeared to have achieved a triumph over Slidell,
especially since Soule had been selected as a delegate to the national
convention, while Slidell had been rejected.

Soule declared that he

did not oppose Buchanan himself just Slidell, but the chief Soule
organ in New Orleans openly advocated Douglas’s nomination.

Though

not a delegate, Slidell attended the Cincinnati convention to work for
Buchanan’s nomination.

Undoubtedly, he also strove to place

Louisiana’s delegation behind his friend.
again proved his political sawy.

In Cincinnati, Slidell once

At his behest, the Louisiana

^John Slidell to John F.H. Claiborne. June 22, 1856. Claiborne
Papers, MDAH (first quote): Slidell to James A. McHatton, April 11, 1856.
Benjamin Flanders Collection, LLMVC (second quote).
^Proceedings of the convention in Louisiana Courier. March 13, 1856:
Pierre Soul6 to George Sanders, April 10, 1856, Pierre Soule Papers, DU
(first quote); Bee, March 15, 1856 (second quote).
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delegation decided to cast the state's vote as a unit, and they
selected Buchanan with only Soule dissenting.

After Buchanan received

the nomination. Louisiana newspapers expressed their amazement that
"King Slide 11,r had recovered so spectacularly from his March defeat.
Though earlier in the year. Slidell's name had been mentioned for the
vice presidency, he denied any aspiration for the position.

Instead,

in an effort to restore party harmony at the convention, he
spearheaded the nomination of John C. Breckinridge, a Kentucky
slaveholder and ally of Douglas.

Louisiana's delegation nominated

Breckinridge, who was unanimously selected as the Democrats' candidate
for the vice-presidency on the second ballot.
Emphasizing its commitment to Union over its aversion to
immigrants and Catholics, the Know Nothing party selected as its
nominee for the presidency former President Millard Fillmore, who in
1852 had contended for the Whig nomination.

The national convention

seated the Louisiana delegation, which included a Catholic, and
resolved against religious tests for office and interference with
religious practice.

Louisiana Know Nothings, especially former Whigs,

voiced their pleasure with Fillmore’s nomination.

His actions as

president, particularly his support for the Compromise of 1850 and his
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave law, had endeared him to
southerners, and Louisiana Whigs had advocated his nomination for the
presidency in 1852.

Additionally, Louisianans had welcomed Fillmore

go

John Slidell to James Buchanan, May 26, 1856, Buchanan Papers, HSP;
W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, June 3, June 7, 1856, Pugh Family Papers,
UT; Slidell to Robert Tyler, January 17, 1856, John Slidell Letters, DCJ:
A.L. Diket, Senator John Slidell and the Community He Represented in
Washington. 1853-1861 (Washington, D.C., 1982), 77-81.
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when he visited New Orleans in 1854. and on that occasion one
expressed a sentiment which Louisiana Know Nothings would embrace as a
battle-cry in 1S56— "No purer Patriot now lives than Mi 1lard
Fillmore."c?
According to Louisiana Know Nothings. Fillmore’s behavior as
president had proved the desirability of his returning to the White
House in 1S56.

Throughout the campaign, whenever opponents challenged

Fillmore’s fidelity to the South. Know Nothings responded by referring
to his conduct in office.

The Bee concluded that Fillmore would

"protect the South in her inherent rights" just as he had done in
1850. and each day during the campaign it published a quote from the
deceased Whig statesman. Henry Clay, declaring that Fillmore "has been
tried and found true, faithful, honest, and conscientious."

And, when

the Louisiana Courier attacked Fillmore, the Bee included a series of
letters entitled, "The Courier vs. the Courier," which compared
articles from that newspaper in 1852 to those in the present campaign.
The Bee found it ironic that in 1852. the Louisiana Courier had
praised Fillmore’s "noble efforts to check abolitionism” as president
but now tried to portray him as an abolitionist.^
The nomination of Fillmore forestalled the attempt to reorganize
a separate Louisiana Whig party in 1856.

Declaring that "the

prosperity and safety of this Union" depended upon its reorganization,

CQ
Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery. 207-10; Henry Mars ton to Payne and
Harrison, March 28, 1854, Marston Papers, LLMVC (quote); Louisiana
Courier, February 27, 1856.
^Shreveport South-Western, October 15, 1856; B e e , August-November
1856 (first quote), August 6 , (second quote), August 7, 1856.
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the Whig Party of Louisiana did hold a meeting in New Orleans and
selected delegates to a Whig convention in Baltimore.

The national

convention endorsed Fillmore's nomination, and for the remainder of
the campaign the Know Nothing and Whig parties of Louisiana were
virtually indistinguishable.

Most Louisiana Whigs had championed

Fillmore’s unsuccessful bid for the party's nomination in 1S52 and
faced no difficulty in advocating his election to the presidency in
1S56.

A New Orleans Whig meeting even instructed those voters who

still called themselves Whigs to vote for a Whig (Fillmore) over a
Democrat (Buchanan) and professed that only Fillmore’s victory could
preserved the Union.^
While in the South, Buchanan faced Fillmore, in the northern
states, a third candidate ran for the presidency— John C. Frdmont, the
nominee of the antislavery Republican party.

Though Fremont did not

appear on the ballot in Louisiana, his nomination shaped the race in
the state, and James D.B. DeBow called the campaign a "time of
peculiar peril."

Southerners viewed Fremont’s potential election as a

threat to their section and their way of life.

A Baton Rouge Democrat

declared "we have to choose any one before Fremont" whose election
would lead to "disunion and consequently to bloodshed."

A Know

Nothing pamphlet expressed a similar sentiment declaring Fremont "out
of the question in the South, for all parties unite in detesting the
principle which lays at the foundation of his political faith."

7*

lBaton Rouge Weekly Morning Comet. September 7, 1856; Bee. July 8 ,
1856. For attempt to resuscitate Louisiana Whig party see "No. 2 (1856),"
Letter to the Editor of the Commercial Bulletin, and Appointment, in
Hennen-Jennings Papers, LLMVC; Louisiana Courier. October 15, 1856.
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Lamenting the election of a Republican speaker of the House in
February 1S56. the only Louisiana Know Nothing in Congress worried
that "abolitionism is getting too powerful in this country.
With the entry of Fremont into the race. Louisiana Know Nothings
and Democrats adopted the same campaign strategy.

The Bee contended

the South "must stand firmly by her rights," and a Democratic
congressman concurred that it was "the duty of the people of the South
to meet together irrespective of party association."73

The parties

also agreed that only one candidate could prevent Fremont's election.
The parties disagreed, however, on which candidate could best defeat
the Republicam nominee.

On one hand, Know Nothings charged that

Buchanan's candidacy was a red herring, and that "every Southern vote
cast for Buchanan is virtually a vote in favor of Fremont."

On the

other hand. Democrats repeatedly warned Louisianans that Fillmore had
no chance to win the race.

Consequently, a vote for Fillmore would be

a vote taken away from Buchanan and would be "practically a vote for
71
the Black Republicans.”
Both Democrats and Know Nothings also labelled each other’s
candidate as an abolitionist.

Democrats resurrected stories from the

72

James D.B. DeBow to My Dear Sir, August 20, 1856, James D.B. DeBow
Letter, HNO (first quote); F.M. Kent to Mrs. A.A. Means, August 11, 1856.
Kent Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote); "Fillmore and Donelson," July
20, 1856, p. 8 , Ellis Family Papers, LLMVC (third quote); George Eustis,
Jr., to John Moore, February 5, 1856, Weeks Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
73

Bee. March 20, 1856 (first quote); John Perkins to Gentlemen,
September 28, 1856, John Perkins Papers, SHC (second quote).
7<Bee, July 1, 16, 1856 (quote); Louisiana Courier. April 5 (second
quote), June 14, 18, August 8 , 1856.
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184S presidential campaign when Fillmore ran for the vice-presidency.
As in that campaign, the Democrats produced an 1S3S Letter in which
Fillmore had professed antisiavery sentiments and argued that as a
congressman. Fillmore was "quite as sectional as any of his Black
Republican opponents of the present day."

Additionally, they charged

that in many northern states the Know Nothing party had fused with the
Republicans.

The Know Nothings mocked the Democrats' labelling of

Buchanan as a northern man with southern principles.

They compared

him to Martin Van Buren. a candidate who had previously received this
title, but in the end had turned out to be opposed to slavery.

Know

Nothings also alleged that northern and southern Democrats differed
over slavery, with northerners possessing a free-soil opinion against
the spread of slavery into the territories.^
Charges of abolitionism and arguments over which candidate best
protected southern interests had been a staple of presidential races
in Louisiana for two decades.

In a description which could have

applied equally well to either party, the Bee charged that "the
slavery question has, for the last twenty years, been the theme on
which the Locofoco chiefs of the South have harped." and later added
that "in every presidential election, the South has been blindly drawn
into the support of the Democracy by the cry of slavery."

Since 1836,

Whigs, Democrats, and now Know Nothings in Louisiana had branded

Louisiana Courier. July 15 (quote), September 13, 28, 1856;
"Fillmore and Donelson," July 20, 1856, Ellis Papers, LLMVC; Bee, May 17,
June 16, 1856.
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opposing presidential candidates as abolitionists or tools of
abol itionists.,K
The LS56 campaign, however, presented, a difference from previous
races.

Unlike prior campaigns where sLavery was a campaign topic, in

1S56 slavery was the campaign topic.

The Louisiana Courier termed

slavery "the great and pervading issue.*'

Other traditional issues

disappeared from Louisiana’s political discourse.

In preceding

elections, the candidates* ties to Louisiana, the tariff, the national
bank, republicanism, and the Creole-American split had joined slavery
in partisan debate.

A decreased interest in these concerns when

combined with the entry of the explicitly sectional Republican party
into the campaign meant that by 1856 the slavery issue stood alone.
Stumping for Buchanan in Maine. Louisiana Senator Benjamin expressed
this sentiment when he declared "tariffs, free trade. United States
Banks....and a thousand other issues of my early manhood, had all been
settled by the people."

In 1856. only one substantial issue remained

in Louisianans’ minds— which party best protected the South and
slavery. 1
Additionally, the slavery debate in 1856 differed as Democrats’
assessments of the national situation took on a more ominous tone.
They combined allegations of abolitionist tendencies and opposition to
Republican victory with threats of disunion.

In his inaugural

76
Bee, September 9, (first quote), September 23, 1856 (second quote).
^ LouisianaCourier. August 3, 1856 (first quote); Benjamin’s remarks
from Portland Argus (second quote) in Pauline A. Randow, "A Collection
of Speeches of Judah Philip Benjamin,” (Master’s thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1970), 149.
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address. Governor Wickliffe argued that if Congress would decline the
admission of a slave state, "the time for separation will have
arrived." and a Democratic meeting in Caddo Parish concurred.

A

circular distributed by a Democratic congressman declared that the
South only wanted security for its people and institutions, and "if
such security cannot be had any longer within the Union, she will have
to seek it— and in my Judgment, the sooner, the better— out of the
Union.”

Louisiana had never been a hotbed of secessionists, and

Senator SouLe had been chastised for his disunionist course in 1S50.
but in 1S56 for the first time ail wdngs of the Louisiana Democratic
party spoke openly of secession for the first time.

Even the ever

careful Senator Slidell got carried away with this theme and did not
''hesitate to declare that if Fremont be elected, the Union cannot and
ought not to be preserved.”^'
Fillmore supporters in Louisiana branded Democrats as traitorous
disunionists who must be defeated.
Slidell's statement.

They especially seized on

Calling it the "insane ebullition of heated

partisanship." Know Nothings expressed disbelief that anyone in
Louisiana shared its sentiment.

The Know Nothings celebrated the

defection of a Democratic legislator who had voted for Slidell for the
Senate but did not adhere to Slidell's dire forecast.

In charging the

Democrats with disunionist sentiments, the Know Nothings even invoked
the revered name of Democratic leader Andrew Jackson.

In the 1830s,

78
Wickliffe inaugural in Louisiana Courier. February 1. 1856 (first
quote): Louisiana Courier. March 11. 1856; John Perkins to Gentlemen,
September 28, 1856, John Perkins Papers, SHC (second quote); Daily
Picayune. October 8 , 1856 (third quote).
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when South Carolina had threatened secession. President Jackson had
boldly declared that the Union "must and shall be preserved."

The

Know Nothings argued that perhaps they were the more legitimate heirs
of Jackson, especially with his ward and nephew Andrew Jackson
7Q
Donelson as their vice-presidential candidate.'
In contrasting themselves with Democrats. Fillmore men giadly
assumed the mantle as the party which most respected and best
protected the Union.

Know Nothings downplayed their opposition to

immigrants, and instead made Unionism the centerpiece of their
campaign decrying the sectionalism of both Republicans and Democrats.
They claimed that Fillmore represented a middle course between these
two extremists— the only truly national candidate.

A Know Nothing

asserted that Fillmore knew "no North as against the South." and
another wondered "without Mr. Fillmore, how are to suppress the
sectional proclivity of north and south?"

Emphasizing this Union

theme, pro-Fillmore clubs in New Orleans called themselves the
Constitution Club and Union Hussars.

Presenting a banner on behalf of

the women of Shreveport, a Know Nothing orator declared Fillmore to be
the only candidate who could "restore harmony and discord to our
divided land."^

79

Daily Picavune, October 8 , 1856 (first quote); Shreveport SouthWestern. October 15, 1856; Bee. September 23, 1856 (second quote).
80

John Moore to Shreveport Committee, August 27, 1856, John Moore
Papers, HNO (first quote); Glendy Burke to John J. Crittenden, August 10,
1856, John J. Crittenden Papers, LC (second quote): Carriere, "The Know
Nothing Movement in Louisiana,” 167-9, 181-2; Plaquemine Southern
Sentinel. September 27, 1856; Bee, June 23, July 8 , September 1, 1856
(third quote).
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Though the Know Nothing party preferred to consider itself the
party of the Union and the Const icut ion. Democrats charged it with
being more anti-immigrant and anti-CathoIic than pro-Union.

A

Democratic letter to the editor chastised the Know Nothings for
"bickering about foreigners...and popery, when the whole country is
convulsed on the momentous question of slavery."

Despite the Know

Nothing party's claim to the contrary, the Democrats warned Louisiana
Creoles that the party wanted to proscribe them from political
participation.

As in 1855. this charge proved most effective in South

Louisiana where voters who had actively supported Fillmore as a Whig,
proved more reluctant to support him as a Know Nothing. '
Despite the party's nativist origins and the charges of the
Democrats, opposition to immigrants played only a minor role in the
Know Nothings' campaign strategy.

And, more importantly, when they

did discuss immigration, they discussed it in terms of its interaction
with abolitionism.

Know Nothings alleged that German newspapers

throughout the country, including one in New Orleans, championed
Fremont and claimed that immigrant voting would defeat slavery in the
Kansas territory.

The party also reminded voters that immigration

added congressional seats in the North, and concluded that
"abolitionism asks no better policy than the encouragement of foreign
immigration."

Overall, however, the party downplayed this aspect of

Cl
Louisiana Courier. July 19, 1856.(quote)
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its organization, instead preferring to distinguish itself from the
8*
Democrats by its fidelity to the Union. ‘

Democrats in Louisiana gained a valuable ally when Senator
Benjamin officially joined their party.
Benjamin had refused
1856,

Elected as a Whig in 1S52.

to endorse either party in the 1S55 campaign.

In

because of the Republican party threat to slavery. Benjamin felt

he could no longer avoid making a partisan commitment, and in a speech
on the Senate floor he pledged his allegiance to the Democratic party.
In a letter expressing his willingness to stump for Buchanan, Benjamin
echoed the fears of many Democrats:
public affairs have reached such a point that it is
inconceivable that there can exist two parties now in the
South. He who does not see that a vote for Fillmore is in
reality a vote for Fremont is incredibly blind...Such is
the feeling of old party prejudices that I verily believe
that there are many old whigs who would see the Union
dissolved sooner than vote for a Democrat.
Democrats urged other Whigs to follow Benjamin's example, and the
Louisiana Courier celebrated his defection along with that of other
prominent Louisiana Whigs including former gubernatorial candidate
Alexander Declouet and the president of the 1852 constitutional
convention Duncan Kenner.

8*

Know Nothings attacked Benjamin for his defection into the ranks
of his lifelong enemy.

They concluded that the ambitious Benjamin

desired re-election to the Senate, and that he had selfishly concluded

8"Bee, July 21, 1856; "FiLlmore and Donelson,” July 20, 1856, 17-18
(quote on p. 18), Ellis Papers, LLMVC; Carriere, "The Know Nothing
Movement in Louisiana," 165-6.
83

Judah P. Benjamin to John Perkins, July 2, 1856, John Perkins
Papers. SHC (quote); Louisiana Courier. October 11, 28, 1856.
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that his best chance involved allying with Slidell.

The Bee alleged

that the traitorous Benjamin had become "the blind dupe and victim of
[Slidell's] seduction" and argued that Louisiana now only had one
senator since a sycophantic Benjamin merely followed Slidell's
footsteps.

Another newspaper contended that a Senate seat would not

quench Benjamin's insatiable ambition.

It maintained that the

foreign-born Benjamin sought the presidency, and only the Democrats
would alter the Constitution to allow a man b o m outside the United
31

States to ascend to this office.
While it is impossible to measure the effect of Benjamin upon
the campaign in Louisiana, the candidate of his new party. James
Buchanan did capture the state's electoral votes and won the national
contest.

Buchanan swept the South and divided the northern states

with Fremont, while Know Nothing Millard Fillmore only received the
electoral votes of Maryland.

In Louisiana, Buchanan triumphed in

three of the four regions and received 51.7 percent of the state's
votes.

The historically Democratic North Louisiana and Florida

Parishes sided with him.

In South Louisiana, the combination of

animosity concerning the Know Nothings’ religious proscription and
sensitivity regarding slavery contributed to Buchanan receiving 60.6
percent of the region’s vote— the greatest percentage ever received
there by a Democratic presidential candidate.

Only in Greater

Orleans, where Know Nothing violence marred the election and forced
many Democrats to stay away from the polls, did Buchanan suffer a

gi
Bee, September 26, (quote), September 30, 1856; Plaquemine Southern
Sentinel. May 17, 1856.
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tremendous defeat, which made the state race relatively close. (SEE
APPENDIX A)
The election of 1S56 marked the end of the Know Nothing as a
national party and weakened it as Louisiana party.

With the northern

and southern wings of the party unable to come to an agreement
regarding slavery, the party soon disappeared.

The party’s anti

immigrant stance never had much appeal in most of the South, and when
southerners perceived that it could not serve as an effective vehicle
to protect slavery, they quickly abandoned it.

As the Know Nothing

party disappeared nationally and regionally, it collapsed much of
Louisiana.

The New Orleans party organization, however, countered

this trend.

Fillmore had captured the Crescent City by over 3.500

votes, the largest majority ever given a presidential candidate in the
city, and he won an astounding 70.1 percent of the vote in Greater
Orleans.

While disappearing in the rest of the state, the Know

Nothings, preaching opposition to immigrants and using intimidation at
the polls, continued to control New Orleans’ municipal government
until the Civil War.^
Though New Orleans remained a Know Nothing stronghold. Democracy
reigned triumphant throughout the rest of Louisiana.

Since 1852, the

party had fought off two potent challenges— the ratification of a Whig
constitution and the sudden popularity of the anti-immigrant Know
Nothing party.

In the former instance, Democrats simply adopted the

popular Whig state program and let fissures in the national
85

Sou 16, The Know Nothing Party in New Orleans. 85-120: For Know
Nothing intimidation see Robert M. Lusher, Diary, June 2. 1856, Robert
M. Lusher Papers, LLMVC; Niehaus, The Irish in New Orleans. 90-7.
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organization destroy the Whigs.

In the latter. Louisiana Democrats

effectively employed their opponents anti-Catholicism against them
and again watched as sectional tension over slavery contributed to the
defeat of an apparently formidable state competitor.

By the end of

1S56. the Democratic party held the White House, occupied Louisiana’s
governorship, possessed three of the state’s four congressional seats,
and dominated the state legislature.
Democracy controlled Louisiana, but this mastery did not
guarantee harmony.

Tension between John Slidell and Pierre Soule

divided the party, and without a common opponent, this animosity
threatened to disrupt the organization.

Also, the national Democratic

party was not immune to the same sectional pressures which had
destroyed the Whigs and the Know Nothings.

Additionally, the

antislavery Republican party had made a strong showing in the 1856
presidential campaign, and Louisianans split on how best to react to
this organization.
Union.

Some talked of secession while others favored the

If the Republicans could gain the electoral votes of a few

more states, then they could capture the presidency.

Then. Louisiana

Democrats would be forced to decide whether they favored secession in
practice or merely in their rhetoric.
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CHAPTER SEVENDEMOCRATS AND DISUNION. 1S5“-IS61
By 185“ the Democratic party controlled all of Louisiana except
for New Orleans.

Conversely, the Know Nothings dominated the Crescent

City but had little influence in the country parishes.

Within the

city. Know Nothings used intimidation and violence to control access
to the polls and ensure victory for their candidates.

In most of the

country parishes. Democrat candidates were unbeatable, but the absence
of an organized opposition did not lead to harmony within Louisiana's
Democratic party.
Know Nothings.

Intraparty disputes replaced battles with Whigs and

Previously, Democrats had solved their problems in

party caucuses and conventions but by the late ISSOs, congressional
contests and even a governor’s race would see dissident Democrats
rejecting the official party nominee and running their own candidates.
Thus, disagreement within the Democracy resolved itself not in party
meetings but on the campaign trail and at the polls.
In 1857 Louisiana Democrats attempted to use their control of
the state legislature to gain command of New Orleans— the one area
where they had almost no strength.

They believed that their majority

in the legislature could counteract the power of New Orleans Knowr
Nothings.

In 1856, the Democrats had succeeded in overturning the

election of three Know Nothing senators from New Orleans and replacing
them with Democrats.

In March 1857, the legislature attempted to

remove control of New Orleans elections from local Know Nothing
officials.

Following Governor Wickliffe’s 1857 address, the

legislature, citing the "unparalleled disorder" of New Orleans
elections, passed a bill giving the state government power over city
383
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elections.

The bill established a central board of election including

New Orleans5s mayor but composed mainly of members from outside of the
city.

It also created a powerful post— superintendent of elections.

Selected by the governor, the superintendent could appoint an
unlimited number of deputies and had broad powers of arrest.

The vote

on the measure demonstrates Its partisan nature— Democrats cast 94.7
percent of their ballots in favor of the measure, while every Know
r

Nothing voted against it.1
New Orleans Know Nothings immediately attacked the law.
especially the unprecedented power given to the superintendent of
elections.

According to the B e e , "at least nine-tenths of the

community are radically hostile to this monstrous bill."

The Bee also

warned Democrats that the passage of this onerous measure would
backfire on them and actually further reduce their minimal backing in
the city.

In opposing the law, Know Nothings tried to capitalize on

southerners 5 sensitivity to slavery and their own independence.

One

country' Know Nothing newspaper accused legislators of "attempting to
enslave the people of the city," and another asserted that under the
bill New Orleans tax-payers would be only as free as Russian serfs.
Within New Orleans, only the Democratic Louisiana Courier defended the

Louisiana House Journal, 1857, 14-7; Leon C. Soule, The Know
Nothing Party in New Orleans: A Reappraisal (Baton Rouge, 1961), 86-7;
Marius Carriere, "The Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," (Ph.d.
dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1977), 208-10.
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measure, arguing that threats and violence throughout the 1850s had
1
kept the city's true Democratic majority away from the polish
While in New Orleans Democrats hoped the election bill would
ensure victory over the Know Nothings, outside the city intraparty
squabbles overshadowed Know Nothing competition.

Not surprisingly,

the tension continued to involve the role of party chieftain John
Slidell.

Slidell and his allies attached themselves to the Buchanan

administration and controlled the distribution of federal offices in
Louisiana.

His opponents within the Democratic party included two

groups: partisans who resented Slidell’s control of patronage in
Louisiana, and a growing portion of the Democratic party, called the
southern or states-rights faction, that felt that the Buchanan
administration could not be trusted to protect the South and slavery.
This latter group had begun to speak of secession from the Union as a
possible remedy for the South.

With the SIidel 1-directed patronage

policy of the administration favoring more moderate Democrats, these
two groups of adversaries frequently overlapped.3
With his ally Buchanan in the White House, Senator Slidell used
federal patronage to enhance his power and to increase the
administration’s support in Louisiana.

While in Washington, he

‘New Orleans Bee. February 28 (quote), March 2, 1857; Houma Ceres.
March 7. 1857; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. March 2, 1857; New
Orleans Louisiana Courier, February 12, 26, March 8 , 1857. (Hereinafter
all newspapers from New Orleans unless otherwise specified)
3Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. October 14, 1857; Edward G.W. Butler
to John Slidell, May 18, 1857, Butler Family Papers, Williams Research
Center, Historic New Orleans Collection (Hereinafter HNO); W.W. Pugh to
Josephine N. Pugh, March 12, 1857, Pugh Family Papers, Barker History
Center, University of Texas, Austin. (Hereinafter UT).
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requested that Buchanan replace the New Orleans postmaster with a
Slidell man. explaining that if no change were made then his ability
to secure a pro-Buchanan legislature and elect a pro-Buchanan senator
would be reduced.

After securing the president's agreement to this

change. Slidell returned to Louisiana in March to help his wing of the
party.

Arriving in New Orleans, Slidell soon left to visit the

state’s northern parishes-

Closely following what one newspaper

sarcastically termed "The Progress of the Mighty Pilgrim.” his enemies
charged that Slidell's North Louisiana travels had elaborate goals— to
secure the reelection of the unpopular Thomas Green Davidson in the
Third Congressional District, to obtain support for Fourth District
congressman John Sandidge’s election to the United States Senate, and
to aid Slidell’s own presidential ambitions.
denied these accusations.

Slidell vehemently

He contended that his visit to North

Louisiana had no connection with electioneering other than to get
Sandidge reelected to Congress: not to have him placed in the Senate.
Instead, he claimed to have gone to the region in an to secure support
for a North Louisiana railroad .4
In May animosity between Slidell and his enemies within the
party subsided enough for the Democrats to hold a relatively
harmonious state convention in Baton Rouge to nominate candidates for
minor state offices— treasurer, auditor, and superintendent of public

I
John Slidell to James Buchanan, March 20, 1857, James Buchanan
Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Hereinafter HSP); John
Slidell to Edward G.W. Butler, June 3, 1857, Butler Family Papers, HNO;
Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. April 26, 1857; A.L. Diket, John
Slidell and the Community He Represented. 1854-1861 (Washington, 1982J,
109-110.
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education.

Close ballots over whether to allow proxies to vote and

over which office to nominate first signalled some dissension as did
the necessity of four and five ballots co make selections for state
auditor and superintendent of public education respective ly.

Nro

delegates, however, deserted the convention nor did any competing
Democratic tickets emerge in the following months.

The convention and

ensuing parish ratification meetings declared their commitment both to
the Democratic platform of 1S56 because it protected slavery in the
territories and to President Buchanan's administration."
While the state convention proceeded smoothly, the concurrent
gathering of Democrats of the Third District to nominate a candidate
for Congress illustrated the divisions within the party.

After

caucusing until midnight, the meeting adjourned without selecting a
candidate, and the delegates agreed to reconvene the following month
in Baton Rouge.

The district's Democrats split into two camps—

proponents of the incumbent, SlideII-backed Thomas Green Davidson, and
advocates of Andrew S. Herron, a states-rights Democrat currently
serving in the legislature.

At the subsequent district convention,

tension arose when two delegations— one pro-Davidson and one proHerron— claimed to represent the Democrats of St. Tammany Parish.
When the convention decided to seat both groups, Herron’s supporters
bolted from the meeting, and Davidson easily received the nomination .6

Proceedings of the state convention in Louisiana Courier. May 20,
1857; Post-convention parish meetings in Louisiana Courier. July 12, 18,
August 7, August 18, 1857; Resolutions of [Assumption] Parish Convention,
1857, in Pugh Family Papers, OT.
^Louisiana Courier. May 20, June 19, 1857.
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In a district which the Democratic party had never lost and in
the previous two contests had won by over one thousand votes.
receiving the party's nomination had been tantamount to victoryDespite pleas for party unity, some Democrats refused to accept
Davidson's nomination and argued that the convention had not
represented the true feelings of the district.

Calling Davidson "the

pretended nominee for Congress." a St. Tammany Parish meeting urged a
new gathering.

Other parishes joined the anti-Davidson movement, and

in September Democratic delegates from five of the district’s sixteen
parishes met in Baton Rouge and nominated Laurent J. Sigur, an
Iberville Parish legislator.

Though Herron. Davidson's original

opponent, did not contend for this nomination, he endorsed Sigur and
campaigned on his behalf.^
The split within the Democratic ranks shaped the campaign.
Sigur Democrats listed a number of reasons to oppose Davidson.

Some

directed their challenges directly against Davidson’s unfitness for
office.

In a campaign speech, Sigur accused his opponent of ignorance

and of failing to understand the issues before Congress, particularly
those involving slavery.

Another dismissed him as an "old tub of

quack and trite vulgarisms" whose presence in Washington embarrassed
the South.

Others reminded voters that Davidson had backed an

independent Democrat in opposition to the party nominee in a judicial
election earlier in the year.

This defection had divided the

7

'Louisiana Courier. July 4, July 15 (quote), August 1, 7, 9, 11,
September 2, 1857; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. October 13,
1857.
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Democratic vote and contributed to a Know Nothing victory.

They

argued that Davidson's previous disloyalty forfeited party fealty in
this race.

Even the pro-Da^•idson Louisiana Courier admitted that the

candidate had made a "grave error" in this instance but urged voters
to sustain him as the regular Democratic nominee .4
Sigur supporters did not limit their attacks to Davidson's
qualifications but challenged the proslavery credentials of Davidson.
President Buchanan, and the national Democratic party.

Delegates to

the meeting that nominated Sigur passed resolutions condemning the
administration's course in the territories as unfair to the South and
asserted that, as a native of Louisiana. Sigur would protect states
rights and southern interests.

While Sigur's birth in Louisiana may

have helped him. Davidson's birth in Mississippi certainly did not
reduce his commitment to slavery.

Davidson undoubtedly did not

challenge the idea of states rights, and his opponents’ attempts to
differentiate between the candidates’ positions regarding the South
represented more a political tactic than an actual distinction.

G

Without any tangible measure separating the two wings, Sigur
proponents seized this vague theme of commitment to the and slavery as
a method to distinguish between the candidates.

They used phrases

such as southern rights, states rights, and fire-eating
interchangeably, for their definitions were not as important as the
Q
Sigur speech in Plaquemine Southern Sentinel (extra), September 14,
1857: Poem (1857) and James Moore to Tom Ellis, February 8 , 1857, (first
quote) in Ellis Family Papers, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley
Collections, LSU Libraries, Louisiana State University (Hereinafter
LLMVC); Louisiana Courier. August 1, 1857 (second quote).
g

Louisiana Courier. September 3, 1857.
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effect they had on voters.

A pro-Sigur newspaper maintained that the

time had come for the formation of a southern party, and Herron
praised Sigur as a states-rights advocate.

According to a newspaper

in his home parish. Sigur. a staunch defender of the South did not shy
away from but welcomed the label "fire-band.”

The national Harper’s

Week 1v viewed the candidates in terms of their contrasting stances on
sectional politics when it described the race as between Davidson, a
"Union Democrat.” and Sigur, a "Secession Democratic candidate.”1
Additionally. Sigur advocates attacked Davidson's association
with Senator Slidell.

Alluding to Slidell’s control of patronage in

Louisiana, Sigur Democrats derisively referred to Davidson as the
customhouse candidate and "a creature of oligarchy."

A newspaper

advocating Sigur's bid alleged that in addition to campaigning for
Davidson during his spring tour of Louisiana. Slidell had spent
S30.000 on his fall campaign.

Sigur partisans contended that unlike

Davidson, their candidate was not "a slave to a one-man interest or
power."

While demagogues from outside the Third District had selected

Davidson, the people of the district had chosen Sigur.

Declaring that

"the iron chain of oligarchy is broken," a Know Nothing newspaper
celebrated Sigur’s nomination, and the New Orleans Bee agreed that the
Sigur-Democrats had acted "under the suspicion that their actions have

Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. October 16, 1857; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel. September 12, 1857 (first quote); Harper’s Weekly.
December 5. 1857 (second quote).
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been hitherto controlled by the despotic will of handful of
:t
leaders.
The Democratic division in the Thini District contributed to a
brief increase in Know Nothing optimism throughout Louisiana.

Because

portions of the party stronghold New Orleans were included in both the
Firsc and Second Congressional Districts. Know Nothings believed they
had a chance in each of those races.

In New Orleans, they hoped to

capitalize on anger over the new oppressive election law to increase
their majority over the city's Democrats and thus overcome Democratic
majorities in the country parishes of these districts.

While

acknowledging the difficulty of winning in the Fourth District, they
hoped that they could exploit the Davidson-Sigur split to win the
traditionally Democratic Third District.

Some Know Nothings even

predicted that this Democratic division would weaken the entire state
ticket and allow for their victory in the statewide contests .1*1
In their 1856 campaign for Fillmore, Louisiana Know Nothings had
presented themselves as a conservative Unionist party, but in 1857 the
party developed what one historian has referred to as a "creeping
sectionalism.”

The party joined southern rights Democrats in

criticizing the Slidell Democrats for their support of what one Know
Nothing congressional candidate derisively called "the BuchananWalker-Kansas Treachery”— referring to Buchanan’s Kansas policy,

•‘Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. September 12 (first quote), September
19, November 14, 1857: Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet, September
25, 1857 (second quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. June 27, 1857
(third quote); Bee. July 15, 1857 (fourth quote).
n
Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. June 7, 1857; Letter to the
Editor. July 1857, in Ellis Family Papers, LLMVC.
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particularly his refusal to recall the perceived antisiavery Governor
Robert J. Walker whom a Know Nothing meeting referred to as a second
Benedict Arnold.

Using flawed logic. Know Nothings made the following

argument: (1) Louisiana Democrats championed Buchanan: (2) Buchanan
appointed Governor Walker: (3) Walker opposed slavery: (4) therefore
Louisiana Democrats supported Governor Walker and his antislavery
policies.

The party also claimed that they had detected a growing

rift between the northern and southern wings of the Democratic party
and announced that the Democracy could no longer be considered a
national party."
Slidell Democrats viewed the state and national situation
differently.

Unlike the pro-Sieur faction, they did not condemn

Slidell but celebrated him.

The Louisiana Courier proclaimed. "No man

has ever done so much for the Democratic party of Louisiana as the
Hon. John Slidell."

They also branded their opponents as a "mixture

of Disunionists and Know Nothings" and pronounced this combination "a
dead failure."

They praised Buchanan and separated him from the

obnoxious Governor Walker.

Democrats also continued to portray

themselves as the only national party.

According to the Louisiana

Courier, the salvation of the nation and the preservation of slavery
rested upon "a Southern union upon the Democratic platform in firm
alliance with Northern Democrats standing on the same platform."
Writing to Slidell, a partisan scoffed at the states-rights Democrats’
idea of peaceable secession declaring "dissolve this Union and civil

' Carriere, "Know Nothing Movement in Louisiana," 195-200 (quote p.
200 ).

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

393

war and its concomitant horrors will be the immediate and unavoidable
result.
Know Nothings joined the Sigur Democrats of the Third District
in attacking the influence of Senator Slidell.

They chastised him as

a behind the scenes wire-puller and added new' charges of corruption.
They contended that Slidell had profited from malfeasance in the
administration of the Louisiana Swamp Land Fund.

Also, they alleged

that because of his northern birth and the lack of time that he had
spent in Louisiana in the past few years. Slidell had no loyalty to
the South.

Earlier in the year, former Know Nothing Charles Gayarre

had continued his personal crusade against the Slidell oligarchy.
Writing A Sketch of Andrew Jackson bv Himself. Gayarre used the words
of the great Democratic president to attack Slidell.

As in Gavarre's

previous works, Slidell is never mentioned by name, but undoubtedly
Louisiana readers grasped the allusion to the senator.

Gayarre

contended that in the 1830s Jackson saw threats to the Onion coming
from a national bank.

In the 1850s, he would now see these evils in

"the system of obtaining nominations through packed and bought up
conventions, and of governing the people through an oligarchy of
bankrupt politicians —

[which] is fast undermining the institutions

founded by our ancestors."

For Louisianans, this oligarchy could only

mean Slidell and his minions who ran the Democratic party.

The

!4

Louisiana Courier. June 20, (second quote). June 25, July 9, (first
quote). August 21, 1857 (third quote); Edward G.W. Butler to John
Slidell, May 18, 1857, Butler Family Papers, HNO (fourth quote).
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pamphlet implied that if Jackson were alive, he would destroy Slidell
t C

as he had destroyed the Bank of the United States."
As in the IS56 presidential campaign, know Nothings included
opposition to immigrants in their rhetoric but did not make it the
centerpiece of their campaign.

They again contended that immigrants

opposed the South and slavery.

Gayarre also attempted to portray

Jackson as giving sanction to nativism.

In his biography, he cites an

1S44 letter from Jackson complaining that the ’'monied aristocracy” of
Mew Orleans used "foreign influence" to "crush the democracy."
Gayarre praised Jackson's "keen eye" which had "denounced the
existence in our bosom of a foreign influence."

Yet. he observed that

in the lS50s Louisiana Democrats continued to ignore Jackson's
warnings by denying the

presence of a

perniciousforeign influence in

the country.

denounced the

Know Nothings’association with

nativism.

Democrats

Edward G.W. Butler, the source of the letters Gayarre used

in his work on Jackson, declared that if Jackson were still living, he
would consider Know Nothings contemptible because of their violent
suppression of Democrats in New Orleans elections.10
Slidell’s role in
Buchanan administration

the Democratic party and the conduct of the
dominated the

campaign. The additional topics

debated actually show the paucity of other issues available in

^West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. October 10, 1857; Plaquemine
Southern Sentinel, October 14, 1857: Charles E.A. Gayarre, A Sketch of
General Jackson bv Himself (New Orleans, 1857), 17; Diket, John Slidell
and the Community He Represented. 108.
l0Gayarre, A Sketch of General Jackson. 17 (Jackson quote), 19
(Gayarre quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. October 10, 1857; Edward
G.W. Butler to James D.B. DeBow, March 13, 1857, Charles Gayarre
Collection, LLMVC.
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Louisiana.

Legislative candidates of both parties addressed the topic

of railroads.

This debate fizzled as both sides spoke in favor of

state aid in the development of internal improvements.

Even in South

Louisiana, where for the first time in over a decade the tariff on
imported sugar reappeared as an issue, the parties did not differ
substantially.

In 185" Congress had reduced the duty on imported

sugar, and Know Nothings attempted to use the votes of Louisiana
Democrats in favor of this reduction against them.

Louisiana

Democrats in Congress, however, agreed on the importance of the tariff
and had worked hard on its behalf.

They contended that the resulting

tariff was the highest that the sugar cane growers could have received
and that the region should celebrate their efforts on behalf of the
tariff.Ll
Despite their divisions, Louisiana Democrats emerged triumphant
in the November election.

Three months earlier, in a postscript to a

list of Democratic difficulties, the Bee had acknowledged that
Democrats had a way of solving their problems prior to election day
and again that proved to be the case.
statewide elections.
congressional battles.

The Democrats won all three

They also triumphed in three of the four
In the Third District, Davidson, the party’s

regular nominee received 42.9 percent of the vote with Sigur garnering
only 21.7 percent and the Know Nothing candidate 35.3 percent.

The

Democrats also kept a majority in both branches of the legislature.

'^Rai 1roads-Henry Marston Diary, September 19, 1857, Henry Marston
Papers, LLMVC; "Fellow Citizens," July 6 , 1857, Bythell Haynes Letter,
LLMV'C: Tariff— Louisiana Courier. September 15, 16, October 2, 1857;
Judah P. Benjamin to W.W. Pugh, January 8 , 1857, W.W. Pugh Papers, DT.
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They held 49 of the S7 nouse seats and 23 of the 32 senate seats These numbers underestimate the breadth of the Democratic 1S5~
victory.

Of the 9 Know Nothing senators. ~ were hold-overs from the

prior term who had not faced re-election, and the Democrats won an
astounding S2.7 percent of the races held outside Greater Orleans.
After its annihilation in this campaign, the Know Nothing party would
Jg
never again enter a statewide race in Louisiana.'
New Orleans and its surrounding area remained the only Know
Nothing stronghold. If Democrats had hoped that the new election law
would change this situation, they were disappointed.

With Know

Nothings challenging the statute in the state court system, the
Democrats had refused to participate in the June municipal elections,
and consequently the Know Nothings swept the races.

Not wanting to

waste their efforts, the Democrats waited until the court upheld the
election law to nominate candidates for the November election.

Since

this decision occurred in October, the Democrats had very little time
to choose standard bearers and to campaign.

Even with the new

election law, Know Nothings continued to practice intimidation, and
their candidates triumphed in every Newr Orleans precinct.

The party

controlled 30 of the 33 legislative seats in Greater Orleans, and only
one of the three Democrats had been elected.

The other two had been

appointed by the legislature in 1856 after it threw out Know Nothing
votes.

These Greater Orleans seats represented 62.5 percent of the

Know Nothings’ total legislative delegation.

In both the First and

!C
Bee. August 3, 1S57; Plaquemine Southern Sentinel. January 27,
185S; James K. Greer.
"Louisiana Politics,
1845-1861," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly (June 1930) XIII. 267.
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Second Districts, the Know NTothing candidates left the city with a
lead.

Their candidate won i~ the former, but lost in the latter as

Democratic majorities in the country parishes overcame the city
t.
*
»
vote.
By 1S58 outside of Mew Orleans, politicians of all stripes
called themselves Democrats-

In February, citing the lack of any

partisan differences and asserting that "the Democratic party has
swallowed up or destroyed all opposition." the two competing political
newspapers in Iberville Parish merged into a single Democratic sheet.
With everyone a Democrat, tensions were bound to arise within the
party.

The anti-Democratic Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet

mocked the party as a collection of Unionists and secessionists, proand anti-administration men, those in favor of re-cpening the slave
trade and those against it.

The following year, the Alexandria Red

River RepubIican separated the Democratic party into seventeen
different classifications.

Even the Democratic Louisiana Courier,

while celebrating the power of its party, worried about its prospects
7()

because of the divisions within the organization."
Headed by John Slidell, the major faction within Louisiana
Democratic party backed the Buchanan administration and ostracized
their Democratic enemies, especially those who had advanced Sigur5s
candidacy.

In fighting back, adversaries of Slidell within the

Sould, Know Nothing Partv m
Sentinel, January 27, 185S.

New Orleans, 91; Plaquemine Southern

20

Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. February 27, 1858 (quote); West
Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. March 26, 1859; Louisiana Courier. May 4,
1859; Mary L. McLure, "The Presidential Election .of 1860 in Louisiana,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly IX (October 1926), 638.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

3 9S

Democratic party adopted a policy which had proved effective in
interparty competition: they questioned the SiideIi-supported Buchanan
administration's commitment to the South and slavery.

Reminding its

readers that "the question of slavery is no new thing." an editorial
called slavery "the great turning point in American politics" and
cited it as the most important issue dividing the Democratic party.
Though Louisiana, unlike other southern states, did not have a long
history of adamant states-rights proponents. Slidell’s adversaries saw
fidelity to slavery as a possible method to distinguish between
themselves and the Slidell faction-

Although this course had failed

in Sigur’s congressional bid, with sectionalism on the increase across
the nation, they hoped it could prove more successful in the future.“
This move had two potentially dangerous consequences.

First, in

challenging John Slidell’s power. Democrats risked banishment from the
party’s patronage trough.

At least one Democratic legislator

attempted to have it both ways.

Trying to explain an anti-party vote,

he claimed to follow party lines on party questions such as elections
for speaker of the house.

But, when more important issues arose,

which he broadly defined as those affecting the state, the parish, or
individuals, he did not know a party.

A second more serious

repercussion involved the disunionist atmosphere that the opposition
created.

Throughout the antebellum period, extreme states-rights

views in Louisiana had been subsumed within the Democratic party’s
caucuses and conventions.

Many Democrats rejected these opinions, and

2f

Plaquemine Sout hern Sent ine1, January 20, 27, 1858;
Democrats," (1858) in Charles A. Brusle Papers. LLMVC (quote).
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still others realized that an open avowal of them would give the
opposing party an opportunity to brand Democrats as disunionists.

For

instance, in the IS51 legislative and congressional elections, the
Whigs had successfully exploited Democratic division over the
Compromise of 1S50.

In the late 1850s. without a competitive Whig

party to take advantage of Democratic schisms, the party's statesrights faction became more outspoken.

They took secessionist talk

from party gatherings and brought it out in the open, and some
Louisianans began to consider secession as a viable option if
ti
antislavery forces gained power in the nation-*"
In the late ISSOs, states-rights Democrats in Louisiana made
their presence most felt during legislative debates regarding slavery.
First, in 1857, the legislature passed a bill banning the emancipation
of slaves.

Second, the following year it debated another measure

calling for the selling into slavery of Louisiana’s free people of
color except for those b o m in the state or having special permission
to remain.

Third, later in the same session, a legislator introduced

the more controversial African Apprentice Bill that called for 2,500
African apprentices to serve in Louisiana for at least fifteen years
each.

Despite the label "apprentice," opponents of the bill justly

claimed it would unconstitutionally re-open of the African slave
trade, which had been illegal in the United States for over fifty
n
years.
Yi

"F.L. Claiborne letter in Pointe Coupee Democrat. April 10, 1858.
23

Greer, "Louisiana Politics," 272; Joe Gray Taylor, Negro Slavery
in Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1963), 157; James Paisley Hendrix, Jr., "The
Efforts to Reopen the African Slave Trade in Louisiana," Louisiana
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Proclaiming the bill, "the only southern measure introduced
during the session." its proponents charged its detractors with aiding
the abolitionists.

They also portrayed themselves as democrats

because their proposal would make African labor affordable by all not
just the rich.

Legislators against the bill claimed that its passage

would actually backfire and give northern abolitionists ammunition to
attack the South.

By a 46-21 vote, the bill passed the House, but the

Senate postponed its consideration indefinitely. 15 to 13.

The close

margin in the Senate led to charges that the bill had failed only
because of the machinations of Senator Slidell.

Supposedly Slidell.

who worried that the bill’s passage would hurt President Buchanan and
the Democratic party in the North, had telegraphed an ally in the
Louisiana Senate and convinced him to switch his vote.

Regardless of

whether Slidell’s influence had doomed the measure, the voting
demonstrates the difficulties the Democrats had in acting as a unit.
In the Senate. 8 Democrats voted in favor of the measure and 12 voted
H
against it.'
In 1858 not only did the Democrats divide amongst themselves in
the legislature, but they remained impotent in New Orleans.

Years of

thuggery in the Crescent City climaxed in the 1858 mayoral campaign,
which according to a country parish newspaper, placed New Orleans "in

History X (Spring 1969), 97-123.
^Hendrix, "Efforts to Reopen the African Slave Trade in Louisiana."
97-123; F.L. Claiborne letter in Point Coupee Democrat, April 10, 1858;
B.H. letter in West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. May 29, 1858; Daily True
Delta. March 21, 1858, in Brusle Papers, LLMVC. Hendrix does not find any
correlation between the vote and the SlidelI-Soule split, and his vote
tabulation is different than mine because he labels two New Orleans Know
Nothings (Adams and Laidlaw) as Democrats.
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a state of anarchy."

Without any regular Democratic party in the

city, the opposition to the Know Nothings came from an independent
party which sought to counter "years of disorder, outrage, and
unchecked assassination.”

With New Orleans's legacy of election day

violence, the independents established a Vigilance Committee which
seized an arsenal and occupied Jackson Square.

The Know Nothings

organized a counterforce, and the city seemed on the verge of civil
war.

At the last moment, a compromise was reached and the election

was peacefully held.

Fearing bloodshed, most voters stayed away from

the polls, and the Know Nothings easily triumphed.'3
Paradoxically, the Democrats, who in 185S suffered from so few
partisans in New Orleans that they did not nominate candidates, may
have had too many followers in the rest of the state.

The 1S59 senate

race again demonstrated the difficulty that Louisiana Democrats had in
uniting without the presence of a strong second party.

Senator

Benjamin desired to remain in Washington but his long association with
the Whig party and its American System made many Democrats less than
enthusiastic about his candidacy.

Others challenged Benjamin not

because of personal animus but because both he and Senator Slidell
lived in New Orleans.
deserved a senator.

These Democrats felt that North Louisiana
With the weak Know Nothings unlikely to nominate

anyone, both Benjamin supporters and detractors believed that their
candidate could use Know Nothing votes to win the contest.

25
Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. June 5, 1858 (quote); John S.
Kendall, "The Municipal Elections of 1858," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly V (1922), 357-76; Soule, Know Nothing Partv in New Orleans. 92105.
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The Democratic party caucused in an effort to unite behind a
candidate but after forty-tw.- ballots, the gathering adjourned without
agreeing on a nominee.

Many regular Democrats, especially north

Louisianans. backed Fourth District Congressman John Sandidge.

The

caucus reconvened and after another inconclusive ballot, the Sandidge
men withdrew in disgust.

The remaining Democrats nominated Benjamin.

Some Democrats agreed to back Benjamin because they feared the victory
of a states-rights candidate more than triumph of Benjamin— ''a true
Southern man” though ”no fire-eater, alarmist, agitator, [or]
sectionalist.”

The incumbent received enough Democratic support and

five Know Nothing votes to lift him to a narrow victory.

Benjamin's

opposition knew immediately where to place the blame for his triumph—
John Slidell who. according to their theory, had again used intrigue
to elect a candidate against the wishes of the majority.*0
Describing the Democrats’ problems, the speaker of the house
worried, "I have nothing pleasant to communicate, the [Democratic
party as found here is completely disorganized by the Union of the
K[now] Nothings and disaffected Democrats,” and another Democratic
legislator later publicly complained that the good of the state
suffered because of the divisions within the party.

The Louisiana

Courier agreed that "the parties appear to be both split and mixed up
together."

In the early weeks of the session, this disorganization

crippled the legislative process.

Constitutionally required to pass

^Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. December 4, 1858, January 29, 1859
(quote); David W. Magi 11 to John Moore, January 23, 1859, Joseph T.
Hawkins to Moore, January 27, 1859, David Weeks Papers, LLMVC: W.W. Pugh
to Josephine N. Pugh, January 23, 1859, Pugh Family Papers, UT: Baton
Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. October 20, 1858, January 26, 1859.
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an apportionment bill before any other legislation, the process
dragged on for weeks.

The debate eventually culminated in the

Democratic lieutenant governor's resignation from his post as
president of the state senate.

He resigned because his party could

not agree on the apportionment bill.
allegiances in the capitoi.

His leaving further twisted

The anti-Slidell Democrats and Know

Nothings disingenuously expressed outrage at the affront given to the
lieutenant governor, while the regular Democrats saw the whole affair
as a further attempt to split the party.*'
The division between Slidell and anti-Slidell forces that
disrupted the legislature had even more serious repercussions in the
1859 gubernatorial campaign.

With no organized opposition to the

Democracy, receiving the nomination at the May convention appeared to
be equivalent to being named governor.

The competing factions within

the Democratic party scrambled to gain control of the convention, and
a former Know Nothing predicted that there would be "a strong almost
invincible array of Anti-Slidell forces."

Sensing the party’s

disharmony and realizing the importance of controlling the convention.
Slidell travelled from Washington to New Orleans in March and, as in
1857. made a tour of northern Louisiana.

A northern Louisiana

newspaper branded Slidell an autocrat and chief ruler of an
"organization within the Democratic partyn that used the party for its
own selfish purposes picking its nominees as much as two years before

:,W.W. Pugh to Josephine N. Pugh, February 17, 1859 (first quote),
February 26, 1S59, Pugh Family Papers, DT: Letter from W.M. Kidd in
Vernon Southern Times August 19, 1859; Louisiana Courier. January 26,
1859 (second quote).
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each election.

In New Orleans. Slidell's competitors blamed the

Louisiana Club, an exclusive gentleman's club, for choosing the
Democratic candidates as they sipped champagne, and then
undemocratically dictated their choices to the rank and file of the
party."
New Orleans remained the Achilles heel of the Slidell Democrats-now referred to as Old Liners.

In the city. Slidell's adversaries

coalesced behind his long time nemesis Pierre Soule.

Soule had not

participated in the 185" campaign because he had been in Mexico
unsuccessful ly fighting for a railroad contract against a company in
which both Slidell and Benjamin had significant interests.

Back in

Louisiana. Soule called for an April 4 meeting at Odd Fellows Hall to
take advantage of the Old Line Democrats' disorganization in the city.
In a highly symbolic move, the delegates elected Maunsei White as
president.

In 1S4S, White, a Zachary' Taylor Democrat, had wasted his

ballot rather than vote for Slidell for the Senate.

White's defection

from party ranks had cost Slidell the seat which eventually went to
Soule.

After selecting White, the convention denounced the corruption

of the administration and of John Slidell and resolved to stand behind
the doctrine of states-rights and state sovereignty.

Its members,

referred to as New Liners, called upon Democrats, Whigs, and Know
Nothings to reject dictation of nominees and to rally behind Andrew S.

70

John A. Smith to John Moore, March 7, 1859, Weeks Papers, LLMVC
(first quote): John Slidell to Edward G.W. Butler, March 21, 1859, Butler
Family Papers, HNO; McLure, "Election of 1860," 615-19; For complaints
about Slidell's interference in northern Louisiana races see Vernon
Southern Times, July 15, August 19, 1859 (second quote); Louisiana
Courier. April 6 , 14, 17, 1859.
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Herron for governor.

By selecting Herron, a Legislator from East

Baton Rouge Parish, they hoped to win converts in the country
parishes
To demonstrate their independence from the Oid Line Democrats,
the New Liners called for a different date for the selection of
Orleans Parish delegates to the state convention.

By 1S59 all

Democrats in New Orleans voted for delegates by precinct in the same
manner that they chose legislators.

The state Democratic committee,

controlled by Old Liners, had chosen May 16 as the date for this
primary, but the Odd Fellows Hall meeting selected May 14 instead.
New Liners hoped that by gaining control of the largest delegation to
the state convention, they could defeat Slidell’s designs.

Efforts to

compromise on a date failed, and elections were held on both dates.
Thus, Orleans Parish sent two competing delegations to the Baton Rouge
convention.
Slidell struck back at the Odd Fellows Hall traitors.

He used

his influence in the national administration to oust two Odd Fellow
Democrats from their federally appointed positions.

He informed

President Buchanan that his journey to Louisiana had been successful—
the Old Line Democrats would have a decided majority at the May
convention and would "drive the Souleites for ever from our ranks."

‘ John Preston Moore, ed., "Correspondence of Pierre Soule: The
Louisiana Tehuantepec Company," The Hispanic American Historical Review
XXXII (February 1952), 59-72; Van D. Odom, "The Political Career of
Thomas Overton Moore, Secession Governor of Louisiana," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly. XXVI (October 1943), 975-1054; Louisiana Courier.
April 5, 1859; For split in the Democracy outside New Orleans see Baton
Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. April 27, 1859. In 1859, Democratic
opponents to Slidell had several of labels including Odd Fellows, New
Liners, States Rights Democrats, Purificators, and Bobtails.
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On May 25 the statewide Democratic convention sat competing sets of
delegates from two smaller parishes.

After hearing a speech by

Slidell's ally Emile LaSere denouncing the Odd Fellows Hall meeting,
it rejected the New Line delegates from Orleans Parish in favor of
Slidell loyalists.

Subsequently. Soule and his states-rights allies

withdrew, and the convention proceeded to endorse the Buchanan
administration.

Six candidates were put forward for governor, and

friends of each dutifully read letters from each one condemning the
Odd Fellows Hall meeting.

On the sixteenth ballot, the delegates

selected Thomas Overton Moore as their nominee for governor.

The

nomination of Moore, a Rapides Parish sugar planter who had served in
both houses of the state legislature, helped assuage north Louisiana
Democrats who felt they had not received their fair allocation of
offices.

Though not a delegate to the convention, Slidell had gone to

Baton Rouge to make sure it resulted in the triumph of his branch of
the party.

He expressed his pleasure with the nominations and

asserted that "Soule is completely annihilated" as the entire state
ticket consisted of "what they call here Slidell men ."30
Soule and the New Liners did not concede the race.

They

realized that their only hope for winning the state contest rested on
combining with former Whigs and Know Nothings.

Soule tried to g a m e r

Know Nothing party support by publicly voting its ticket in the June
New Orleans municipal elections.

In September the New Liners held a

30John Slidell to James Buchanan, May 2, 1859 (first quote), May 22,
1S59, May 30, 1859 (second quote) Buchanan Papers, HSP: McLure, "Election
of 1860," 624-6; West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. May 28, 1859; Baton
Rouge Weekly Advocate. May 29, 1859.
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New Orleans convention and passed resolutions condemning the Buchanan
administration and the Democrats' maladministration of the state
government.

To emphasize their condemnation of the corrupt Old

Liners, they referred to themselves as Purificators. and to attract
support from all parties, they labeled their ticket simply "The
Opposition."

Although only five parishes sent delegates and over half

the total delegates were from Orleans Parish, they proceeded to
nominate Thomas J. Wells for governor.

Wells, who like Moore resided

in Rapides Parish, accepted the nomination and declared that he would
redeem the state from "the degenerating and corrupting misrule of
Slidellism."

The meeting's resolutions did not mention Slidell

specifically but condemned partisans who "enrichfedj themselves from
the industry of an honest people” and decried the rewarding of
partisanship instead of merit on both the national and state levels.
With two Democratic candidates in the race, former Whigs and
Know Nothings faced a dilemma over which side to take.

On one hand,

they had long detested John Slidell, but on the other hand, they did
not like the Opposition’s association with the doctrine of states
rights which many Louisianans saw as a code phrase for secession.

A

Know Nothing newspaper hoped that its party could provide the balance
of power in the election, but it could not decide which candidate to
endorse.

A former Whig expressed the predicament of Louisiana

conservatives:

3iBaton Rouge Weekly Advocate. June 12, 1859; Convention proceedings
in Daily Crescent. September 21, 1S59, Daily Delta. September 14, 1859;
Wells’s acceptance in West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. October 22, 1859
(quote).
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The first impulse (that is amongst us old Whigs) is to go
against the perpetrator of the Plaquemines Fraud..-but
John Slidell is a safer man than Pierre Soule
this is
sober second thought. Having all my old prejudices and
not merely prejudices, but real objections to Mr. Slidell,
suddenly starting up before me. I was ready to exciaim
7Your hour has cornel7 but when I reflected that he was the
representative of the Conservative branch of the Democracy
in this state I paused and came to the conclusion to vote
for Barrow [a Slidell Democrat running for state
legislature] in order to secure defeat of the great
Southern States Rights alias Dissolution of the Union,
branch of the Democracy. For these fellows who are
eternally preaching northern despotism. Southern
oppression and peaceable withdrawal from the Union...I
have a most sovereign detestation.
The conduct of the Know Nothing West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter further
demonstrates its party's difficulties.

In the spring, it had asserted

that though it bitterly opposed Slidell and Buchanan, its antipathy
toward the ultra secessionist wing of the Democracy was even greater.
By September, however, the newspaper had reversed its stance and come
out in favor of Wells.

37

Old Line Democrats mocked the pretensions of the Opposition
party.

Slidell expressed his view that the separation of the party

into two wings actually helped the Democrats because it removed men
like Soule from party caucuses, and he later added that Soule’s party
existed only in his imagination.

An Old Line Democratic newspaper

warned partisans that the Opposition ticket consisted entirely of exKnow Nothings hungry for office.

To combat Wells’s candidacy, the

Democrats emphasized the necessity of party discipline and asserted
that the independent candidates ran only to advance their personal

JiBaton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. April 27, 1859; Thomas Gibbs
Morgan to Henry Marston, August 23, 1859, Henry Marston Papers, LLMVC
(quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. January 29, September 17, 1859;
Vernon Southern Times. September 23, 1859.
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interests.
them.

They also ridiculed the heterogeneous elements that faced

Not only did the Opposition include both Binow Nothings and

Democrats but even its Democrats were divided— they preached state
rights but at the national level endorsed Illinois Senator Stephen A.
Douglas, who held views on slavery in the territories which most
southerners considered unsound.'*
The gubernatorial campaign became a referendum on Slidell's
leadership of the Louisiana Democracy.

Neither Moore nor Wells

canvassed the state, and Moore even travelled to North Carolina for a
month during the summer, while his patron Slidell remained in
Louisiana.

Wells charged that any corruption amongst the state’s

recent governors stemmed from Siidellism, and the Opposition objected
to his one-man rule in Louisiana.

Wells portrayed himself as the man

who would redeem Louisiana from this misrule.

The president of an

Opposition mass meeting stated that they had gathered "to express
their dissatisfaction of the course pursued by the clique dynasty and
the members of the Custom-house," and the meeting proceeded to
denounce Slidell, the Custom-house, and all who supported these men.
During the campaign. Opposition newspapers printed a long article
detailing Slidell’s corruption from the 1844 Plaquemines Frauds to the
present and alleged that he had placed the unqualified Moore on the

n*

J John Slidell to James Buchanan, September 28, 1859, Buchanan
Papers, HSP; Louisiana Courier. April 22, May 20, October 1, November 1,
1859.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

410

state ticket in exchange for the money necessary to bribe legislators
to return Slidell to the Senate."’^
In the concurrent legislative races, the candidates' stances on
what should be done when Slidell's Senate term expired emerged as the
most divisive topic.

New Liners complained of his dictatorial conduct

and contended that he looked out for his own interests before
Louisiana's.

They charged that Slidell ruled Louisiana

autocratically, not only designating men for patronage posts but for
elective offices, too.

By 1859, many Louisianans had come to see

Slidell as all-powerful.

According to the Sugar Planter, which

opposed Slidell, no doubt existed about his reelection to the Senate.
Even if a majority in the legislature opposed his election, the West
Baton Rouge newspaper despaired that Slidell would find a way to
purchase or influence enough legislators to obtain victory.^
One purpose of Slidell's spring travels through North Louisiana
had been to advance his own Senate candidacy.

With Benjamin’s victory

earlier in the year, both senators still lived in New Orleans, and the
country parishes continued to clamor for a fairer distribution of the
state’s Senate seats.

Slidell’s trip had mixed results.

Even an Old

Line Democratic newspaper resented his attempt to influence
legislative races.

It claimed that North Louisiana would "never,

NEVER submit to Mr. Slidell’s interference in their home affairs."

*/
JGreer, "Louisiana Politics," 458-9; Louisiana Courier. October 13,
(quote), October 18. 1859; Alexandria American. October 22, 1859 quote
in Daily Crescent, October 29, 1859.

35West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter, September 10, 1859.
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Another replied that Slidell had proved lovai to the South and no
northern Louisianans were superior to him in ability.

An Opposition

newspaper and a Ouachita Parish Democratic meeting called on
candidates to pledge themselves to vote for a country Democrat to
succeed Slidell.

At the same time. Slidell advocates reminded north

Louisianans that Slidell spent as much or more time in their region
than he did in New Orleans-

They also attacked the idea that

geography should overshadow principles in picking a senator .'13
Old Line Democrats agreed that legislative races should turn on
the candidates’ stances on the upcoming Senate election to fill
Slidell's seat.

A Democratic ratification meeting did not refer to

policy issues but instead resolved that it had "unlimited confidence
in the honor, talents, and patriotism of John Slidell."

An Old Line

newspaper asserted that Slidell had always been loyal to the party and
that it belittled the intelligence of party members to portray him as
having an unlimited influence over the party.

It added that "Slidell

seems to be the terror of the would-be-somebody politicians of the
age" who attacked him because they do not "receive any aid politically
or pecuniary from him."

Old Liners also contended that accusations of

Slidell’s omnipotence were exaggerated as the state’s last two
governors had challenged his wing of the Democracy.^

^Odom, "Political Career of Thomas Overton Moore,” 18; Vernon
Southern Times. July 15, (quote), July 22, August 19, 1859; Bossier
Banner. December 16, 1859; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. August
11, 1859; Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. August 27, 1859.
37
West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter. September 10, 1859; Plaquemine
Gazette and Sentinel. September 24, 1859, January 7, 1860 (second quote);
Louisiana Courier. November 2, 1859 (first quote).
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The result of the IS59 campaign revealed that the discordant
Opposition had not really challenged the Old Line forces.

Moore

achieved the largest margin of victory of any antebellum gubernatorial
candidate, winning 62 percent of the vote.

In the Florida Parishes.

North Louisiana, and South Louisiana, he captured two-thirds of the
votes.

Moore's victory in 46 of the staters 4S parishes perhaps best

exemplifies his dominance in the state.

Not only did Moore win in

every parish but Orleans and Terrebonne, but he beat Weils
convincingly in most of them, achieving over sixty percent in 35
parishes.

The Democrats also obtained a large majority in the

legislature, winning 79 seats with the opposition holding 36 and with
10 independents.

Only Greater Orleans continued its obstinate

opposition to the Old Line Democrats.

Prior to the election Slidell

had complained of the difficulty in re-organizing the Democratic party
in the Crescent City after years of terrorism and the controversy
surrounding the Vigilance Committee of the prior year.

The Old Lines’

Crescent City organ ran a series of articles entitled, "The Rule of
Blood," which described the city’s recent history of violently
suppressing Democratic votes.

No matter, Greater Orleans gave 54.3

percent of its ballots to Wells, and Old Line Democrats lost 22 of the
27 legislative seats in the region. (SEE APPENDIX B)^
The elections for Congress further exhibited the Old Line
Democrats’ dominance in the state.

As in 1857, Democrats won three of

the four races, losing only the First District.

In that race, a Know

IQ

John Slidell to James Buchanan, July 3, 1859, Buchanan Papers, HSP:
Legislative results in Vernon Southern Times. November 25, 1859;
Louisiana Courier. October 25, 26, 28, 1859.
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Nothing candidate defeated the Old Line Democratic nominee and a New
Line Democrat.

Old Line Democrats complained that if the New Liner

had not entered the contest, the party would have won the district
since the combined total of the two Democrats exceeded that of the
Know Nothing victor.

They also claimed that their candidates six-fold

majority over the New' Line candidate represented the relative strength
of the two wings of the Democracy in New Orleans.

Outside New

Orleans. Old Line Democrats ran virtually unchallenged.

In the Second

District, the Old Liner captured 57 percent of the vote, including
72.3 percent outside New Orleans.

In the Third and Fourth Districts

their dominance was even greater with Old Liners obtaining 89.6 and
73.3 percent of the votes, respectively.

19

The legislature which met following the November elections
immediately focused on national issues, especially slavery and the
upcoming 1860 presidential campaign.

While the protection of slavery

had long dominated Louisianans’ discussion of national politics, John
Brown’s unsuccessful raid at Harper’s Ferry in October, 1859, had
heightened the already strained atmosphere.

A radical abolitionist.

Brown had attempted to incite a rebellion among southern slaves.

For

many Louisianans, Brown was not a lone madman but an example of what
all abolitionists wished to do.

The Louisiana Courier referred to his

raid as the "bold and unscrupulous attempt of the Abolitionists to
trample under foot the constitutional rights of slave owners,” and
added it showed "to what dastardly extremes the enemies of the South

jq

Greer, "Louisiana Politics," 459-60; Louisiana Courier. November
9, 19, 1859.
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are to determined to resort.”

In his inaugural. Governor -Moore

decried the wide-spread sympathy for Brown which existed in the North
and warned that this northern sentiment had contributed to a greater
iA

distrust of that section in the South. "
With this tense sectional mood and with a presidential election
impending. Governor Moore aid not limit his comments regarding
national events to condemning John Brown's raid, but also broached the
subject of secession-

He sent a mixed message.

He declared that

Louisiana ’'has never at any period of our national history
countenanced extreme opinions or violent measures," but added. "I am
sure, however, that Louisiana dearly as she loves the Union will never
separate herself from her sister siavehoiding states."

The House

Committee on Federal Relations issued a report agreeing with the
governor.

The report said Louisiana "desires to see the union

perpetual" but "recognizes no higher duty than the protection of her
slave institutions."

While not desiring an immediate gathering of

slave-holding states, the report urged the governor to call for an
election of delegates if such a conference were called/'
Though not specifically mentioned, this discussion of national
issues obviously referred to not only Brown’s raid but the November
1860 presidential election and a fear that the antislavery Republican
party might capture the presidency.

In the Senate, the majority Old

Line Democrats asserted that they knew of a candidate who could defeat

^ Louisiana Courier, October 19, 21, 1859 (quote); Governor Moore
inaugural in Louisiana House Journal, 5th leg., 1st sess., 20— 22.
I•

’‘Louisiana House Journal. 5th leg.. 2nd sess.., 20-22; Resolution of
Committee on Federal Relations in McLure, "Elections of I860,” 686-87.
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the Republicans and protect southern interests.

They passed a

resolution endorsing party chieftain John Slidell for the presidency,
and several Louisiana newspapers concurred with this resolution.
Slidell denied any aspirations for the position but. after admitting
his egotism, celebrated the endorsement as T’a great tribute to ray
services to the democracy of Louisiana."*"
The national Democrats had scheduled their presidential
nominating convention to meet in Charleston. South Carolina in April.
1S60.

On March 5. Louisiana Democrats held a convention in Baton

Rouge to select delegates.

The Old Liners dominated, with New Liners

only controlling the delegations from a handful of parishes.

The

delegates passed resolutions endorsing President Buchanan and
asserting Slidell’s qualifications for the presidency.

They did not

pledge their delegation to a particular candidate, but in two measures
indirectly indicated their opposition to Stephen A. Douglas.

With

Buchanan not running for reelection, Douglas was considered the frontrunner for the nomination.

The Baton Rouge convention resolved that

the delegation, which had an anti-Douglas majority, would cast its
vote as a unit, ensuring that it would give no votes to Douglas.

The

delegates added that they supported the rule requiring a candidate to
receive two-thirds of the votes to gain the nomination.

This

"John Slidell to T.J. Semmes, March 23, 1S60, T.J. Semmes Papers,
Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, NC (Hereinafter DU); McLure,
"Election of 1860," 686-87; Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. March 24,
1860.
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provision would make the nomination of Douglas, who controlled a
/*
majority but not two-thirds cf the delegates, very difficult.*'
Though not in Louisiana’s delegation. Slidell went to Charleston
to work against Douglas.

Slidell had long detested Douglas because he

was a key Democratic rival to Slidell's friend James Buchanan.

In

1S5S the relationship between Slidell and Douglas had taken a further
downturn when Slidell travelled to Chicago in order to work against
Douglas’s reelection to the Senate.

In Illinois. Slidell’s name had

been associated with false allegations that a Louisiana plantation in
Douglas’s custody was notorious for the maltreatment of its slaves.
Slidell denied involvement in the affair, but the two politicians’
enmity continued to increase as they accused each other of attempting
to make political capital out of lies surrounding the story.

In 1859.

Harper’s Weekly even accused Slidell of trying to provoke a duel with
Douglas.

Inaccurately contending that for Slidell duels were routine,

the journal claimed that the Louisiana senator, unable to defeat
Douglas politically, would seize this challenge as an opportunity to
murder him.14
No duel occurred, but Slidell unquestionably desired Douglas’s
political death.

In Charleston, as in most Louisiana conventions

where Slidell played a behind-the-scenes role, his name appeared in

^McLure, "Election of I860,"
Louisiana’s Democracy is evidenced by
pro-Slidell resolution, which failed
the two-thirds rule see Pierre Soule
1859, Pierre Soul6 Papers, DU.

645-649. Slidell’s control of
the vote on call to strike out the
206-34. For Souid’s opposition to
to George Sanders, September 24,

ii

Diket, Senator Slidell and the Community He Represented. 145-156;
Harper’s Weekly. January 8 , 1859, p. 18, col. 4.
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rumors that surfaced regarding corruption and bribery of delegates.

A

journalist claimed that Buchanan had sent Slidell to South Carolina
solely to defeat Douglas's nomination, and in his memoirs, a Louisiana
delegate agreed with this assessment.

At the convention, northern and

southern Democrats battled over the party platform's stance on
slavery.

Though Slidell had held moderate sectional views throughout

his career, his hostility to Douglas led him to join southern
extremists in this contest.

When the South failed to receive the

guarantees regarding slavery in the territories that it desired,
southern delegates withdrew from the convention and called for a
regional convention to meet in Richmond.

Louisiana's delegation, by a

vote of 10 to 2. decided to join this exodus.

Because of the two-

thirds rule, the remaining delegates could not muster enough votes to
4C
nominate Douglas, and they adjourned to meet in Baltimore in June. '
Louisiana Democrats reconvened on June 4- in Baton Rouge to
determine how to react to the Charleston convention.

Both publicly

and privately, Slidell called for an endorsement of the conduct of
Louisiana's delegation and urged that it be recognized as a true
representation of the feelings of Louisiana's Democrats.

He believed

that the "safety of the South can now only be secured by taking a bold
& decided stand for the plaint,] explicitt,] unequivocal recognition
of her rights by the Convention at Baltimore."

The Dailv Delta agreed

that the southern Democracy must resist the tyranny of the northern
45

For Slidell at the national convention see William B. Hesseltine,
ed., Three Aeainst Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports the Caucuses of 1860
(Baton Rouge, 1960), 10-1, 17-8, 66 , 79: Richard Taylor, Destruction and
Reconstruction: Reminiscences of the Late War, edited by Richard
Barksdale Harwell, (New York, 1955), 6 ; Dailv Crescent. May 2, 1860.
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majority, and a New Orleans meeting praising the delegates* conduct
declared, "in the Union if we can: out of the Union if we must.”

The

June convention returned the same delegation to meet with the other
seceding groups at Richmond later that month.^
A year earlier Soule had predicted that if the Charleston
convention broke up. the "days of Jacksonian enthusiasm would be
revived” and "political blackieggism" would be defeated.

So. when

Louisiana’s delegation withdrew from the convention, the Soule wing of
the Louisiana Democracy condemned its actions-

The Dailv True Delta

blamed the South’s defection on unprincipled schemers, including
Slidell, who had long controlled the federal government.

The

newspaper alleged that these men feared that a Douglas nomination and
victory would end their reign of corruption.

These placemen, who

subsisted on profit and patronage, threatened the Union by joining
southern fire-eaters in abandoning the convention.

Two days after the

Slidell wing met in Baton Rouge. New Line Democrats held a Douglas
Convention in Donaldsonville attended by 21 of the state’s 48
parishes.

They condemned the Charleston delegation’s course as making

personal preference paramount to party discipline.

Then, they

endorsed Douglas, and claiming to represent Louisiana’s true

John Slidell to T.J. Semmes, May 2, 1860, Semmes Papers, DQ;
Slidell to W.W. Pugh, May 10, I860, Pugh Family Papers, UT (quote);
Slidell Letter in Louisiana Courier. May 24, 1860; Editorial in favor of
the secession of Louisiana delegation see Dailv Delta. May 2, 1860 in
Dwight L. Dumond, ed., Southern Editorials on Secession (New York, 1931),
69-71: New Orleans meeting in Willie M. Caskey, Secession and Restoration
of Louisiana (Baton Rouge, 1938), 4 (quote).
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Democratic party, sent a delegation to the national Democratic
convention m

Baltimore.

n

An examination of Douglas's leading supporters in Louisiana
illuminates the strange combination of national and Louisiana
politics.

Slidell's opposition to Douglas actually aided the Illinois

senator's cause among some Louisiana Democrats even if they did not
embrace his policy regarding slavery in the territories.

At a New

Orleans rally, former congressman Isaac Morse joined Soule in
condemning the secession of the state’s delegation at Charleston and
pronounced his opposition to anyone "identified with disorganization
or disunion sentiments and designs."
Morse and Soule had themselves

Ironically, ten years earlier,

been called disunionists when they were

the two members of Louisiana’s congressional delegation most closely
associated with opposition to the Compromise of 1850.
had preached states rights and

In 1850, they

attacked the compromise which Douglas

had championed. As a consequence, Soule had been excoriated
throughout Louisiana, and Morse had lost his seat in Congress.

SQ

In the late 1850s, New Line Democrats in Louisiana had taken a
strong states-rights position to distinguish themselves from Slidell’s
Old Liners.

In 1857 Third District Democrats challenging the regular

party nomination had adopted a militant southern stance as a method to
attack Thomas Green Davidson.

In 1859 Soule’s Opposition ticket had

11
Pierre Soule to George Sanders, September 24, 1859, Sould Papers,
DU (quote); Dailv True Delta, May 10, 1860 in Dumond, ed., Southern
Editorials, 86-9; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. June 10, 1860.
is
For pro-Douglas, anti-squatter sovereignty view see Alexander F.
Pugh, Diary, March 12, 1860, LLMVC; Morse address quoted in Caskey,
Secession and Restoration. 4.
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again expressed their adherence to states rights, and this opinion had
cost them among former Whigs.

Though Slidell Democrats endorsed state

rights themselves, in the tense sectional atmosphere. Soule and his
allies had hoped to use a call for states rights to portray their wing
of the party as more loyal to the South.

Soule’s faction lacked

precision both in describing how the Old Liners’ position regarding
states rights was lacking and in defining what their wing of the party
meant by the term.

Some equated it with a desire for secession, and

others with a strong proslavery position in Congress.

Primarily they

hoped that each voter would create a definition with which he agreed,
and thus elevate the New' Liners to power.
After adopting states rights as a clarion call for years, Soule
and his associates did a political somersault in the 1S60 presidential
campaign.

Never doctrinaire in their adherence to state rights, their

antipathy toward Slidell easily overcame their fidelity to the
measure.

In this campaign, they decided that Old Liners had become

more vulnerable to charges that they threatened the Onion than that
they did not protect the South.

Since New Liners’ main objective was

to gain control of the state and not to advance a clear-cut ideology,
they easily transformed their stance.

Thus, because Slidell and the

Old Line Democrats took on a distinct southern rights position by
allying with the seceding delegates at Charleston, Soule and his
allies decided to back the national Democrats and Douglas even if this
switch contradicted their arguments of the past decade.
Old Line Democrats attacked the Douglas convention referring to
it as an unauthorized assembly of dissatisfied politicians trying "to
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barter away the rights of the South for the spoils of office.”

They

did not let the Mew Liners’ abandonment of states-rights phitosophy go
unnoticed.

A Democratic newspaper contended that "’never was the

principle of 'States Rights’ so thoroughly carried out” as when the
Baton Rouge convention praised the seceding delegates.

Yet, the Soule

faction which had long flaunted states rights as its "hobby” opposed a
convention which carried out its own principles.

The article

concluded that this group "opposes everything indeed that does not
emanate from the faction, or assist its adherents to office and
power.”

Later, the same newspaper claimed that though Soule used to

be popular despite his disunion sympathies, his stock had now fallen
because of his advocacy of Douglas and his new role as a "Union
shrieker.
The Richmond convention met on June 12. and its members recessed
to journey to Baltimore to give northern Democrats a second chance to
adopt a pro-southern stance on slavery in the territories.

Thus,

delegations representing both wings of Louisiana’s Democratic party
attended the Baltimore convention.

The convention sat the anti-

Slidell group which joined the other delegates in nominating Stephen
A. Douglas for the presidency.

The southern delegations that had

seceded at Charleston, including Louisiana’s Slidell group, rejected
this choice and nominated Kentuckian John C. Breckinridge.

Speaking

to the Baltimore convention, Pierre Soule berated those who had left
declaring that they had abandoned the Democratic party— the only

' Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel, June 2. (second quote), July 7,
(first quote); September 29, 1860.
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organization left in the country which could preserve the Union— and
that this withdrawal could orly lead to disunion.

He later added that

their bolt from the Democratic party would not help southerners but
would result in the election of an antislavery Republican.

Another

Louisiana Douglas proponent agreed and chastised Breckinridge men
arguing that the South's woes could be blamed on their breakup of the
national Democratic party (the only group which could defeat the
Republicans), and southern legislators who had repeatedly yielded
southern rights, especially Louisiana's two pro-Breckinridge
senators. 'u
Breckinridge and Douglas faced a two other candidates—
Republican nominee Abraham Lincoln, who did not run in Louisiana and
Tennessee Senator John Bell.

In May, the newly formed Constitutional

Union party nominated Bell, calling him the only non-sectional
candidate in the race.

With the Democracy divided and with no other

national party, Constitutional Unionists in Louisiana met on July 4
and called for all patriots to rally around the Constitution and
Bell’s candidacy.

Much of Bell’s support in Louisiana came from

former Whigs who had long opposed the Democrats and preached adherence
to the Union over states rights.

One observed, "I can hear of but one

old Whig who will support Breckinridge, but there is a good number of
Democrats who will support Bell."

These former Whigs, who had long

detested Slidell and the Democrats, portrayed themselves not only as

50

Waldo W. Braden, ed., " ’Secession Means Disunion’: A Speech by
Pierre Soule," Louisiana History VI (Winter 1965), 77-82; Bee, September
1, 1860; Maunsel White to James D.B. DeBow, December 10, 1860, James D.B.
DeBow Papers, DU.
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defenders of the Union but also as representing the people against
corrupt party leaders.

A North Louisiana Bell supporter proclaimed

that conservative men of his region embraced BelL's cause because they
feared that a vote for Breckinridge could only plunge the South into
revolution ."1
Breckinridge supporters, who included Slidell and Governor
Moore, stressed that neither Bell nor Douglas stood a chance, and thus
the election was a contest between their candidate and Lincoln.
Siidell believed Douglas had been nominated by a bogus convention and
would not get

a single electoral vote.

His candidacy would only split

the Democrats

and ensure Lincoln’s victory. Another called Douglas a

traitor to the South and the Democratic party claiming he fought "the
battle of the

Black Republicans.... If he is a democrat. God save us

from such Democrats."

Congressman Davidsonadded that he had found

it

difficul to distinguish between the doctrines of Douglas and of
Lincoln, and a Breckinridge elector asserted that Douglas's National
Democratic platform was neither national nor democratic.^
Breckinridge Democrats also contended that only they protected
southern institutions.

They published The Challenge, a pamphlet that

claimed Bell had voted with the abolitionists in Congress on the issue

~’‘Bee, July 3, 1860; Fred D. Tunnard Speech, July 4, 1860, LLMVC:
John King to John Moore. September 7, 1860, John Moore Papers. HNO: For
pro-Bell Whigs see unknown to Henry Mars ton, September 26 (quote), George
A Freret to Marston, August 16, 1860, M. Watson to Marston, September 25,
1S60, Henry Marston Papers, LLMVC.
c2

J For Moore’s support of Breckinridge see Joseph P. Horner to Thomas
O. Moore, October 8 , 1860, Thomas 0. Moore Papers, LLMVC; John Slidell
to Edward G.W. Butler, August 25, 1860, Edward G.W. Butler Papers, DU;
Diket, Senator John Slidell and the Community He Represented. 220-1; B.
Haynes to W.W. Pugh, October 13. 1860, Pugh Family Papers, UT (quote).

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ith o u t perm ission.

424

of slavery in the territories.
only created a division in tr

They also said that Bell's candidacy
South that would prevent the region

from presenting a united front to the North.

Constitutional Unionists

realized the potential of this attack on their commitment to slavery.
A former Whig senator acknowledged the difficulty in opposing
Breckinridge because it "looks like consorting with the enemies of the
South, giving them aid and comfort.’’ A Constitutional Unionist
newspaper disparaged the Democrats’ "eternal agitation of the slavery
question." contending that they had relied on charges of abolition in
presidential campaigns for more than thirty years.

While these

accusations had often been undeserved, they had never been more
unmerited than in IS60.

They called absurd the idea that Beil, one of

the largest slaveholders in the South, opposed slavery."

In the strained sectional climate of i860, both Breckinridge and
Bell proponents staked a claim to the Constitution but in different
ways.

Breckinridge supporters argued that the North threatened

southern rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and that in order to
save the ideals of the Constitution, the South might have to abandon
the Union.

A Breckinridge meeting resolved that "We will not

surrender the rights guaranteed to us by the constitution."

Slidell

wrote a public letter explaining the evolution of his position.

When

X M. Gill is to John Liddell, August 6 , 1860, Liddell Papers, LLMVC;
Charles M. Conrad to John J. Crittenden, April 19, 1860, Crittenden
Papers, Library of Congress (quote); Thomas Green Davidson to the People
in Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel (Extra), August 25, 1860; The
Challenge (1860) in St. Martin Family Papers, Manuscript Department,
Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (Hereinafter TU); B.B. Simmes
letter in Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. July 7, August 11, 1860; Bee.
July 20, August 5, 20, 29, 1860.
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he first entered the Senate, he felt "the Union had no more devoted
worshiper[sic] at its shrine than I." but he had now arrived at the
conclusion that "unless some great, and...unexpected revolution shall
take place in the sentiment of the people of the free States, w'e can
not w'ith safety and honor continue the connection much longer."’*
In contrast. Beil supporters believed that the Constitution
provided the South with protection within the Union.

They attached

themselves to the Constitution by identifying themselves as the
Constitutional Union party and naming two of their New Orleans clubs
the Union Guards and the Constitution Club.

A Bell meeting passed a

resolution in favor of the "Constitution, the Union, and Enforcement
of the Laws."

Constitutional Unionists also reminded voters that in

1S56. Democrats had pledged their support to Buchanan claiming that
only he could save the Union.
should now' support Bell.

Using this rationale, these same men

They called Breckinridge a sectional

candidate and branded his supporters disunionists, adding that even if
not all Breckinridge advocates were disunionists. all disunionists
certainly were Breckinridge men.^
Despite the presence of three candidates in the race and the
realization that the fate of the Union might hang in the balance at
this election, the results roughly paralleled recent Louisiana
contests.

In an election in which over fifty thousand Louisianans

participated, Breckinridge, the candidate of the Old Line Democrats,

54

Caskey, Secession and Restoration, 8 (first quote); Weekly Delta.
October 6 , 1860 (second quote).
^ Bee. July 6 , 16, August 3, 17, 1860.
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captured the state's electoral votes although he received only 44.9
percent of the votes.

Bell ~:nished second with 40 percent, and

Douglas followed with 15.x percent.

As in ail recent races, the

Slidell candidate, in this case Breckinridge, performed best outside
of Greater Orleans.

He triumphed in North and South Louisiana and the

Florida Parishes with an average of 51.9 percent of the vote.
Furthermore, he achieved a plurality or majority in 3? of Louisiana's
49 parishes.

While Slidell exhibited his ability to return a majority

in the country parishes, he again failed at securing the vote of New
Orleans.

In Greater Orleans, Breckinridge finished third with only 25

percent of the vote.

Bell, who won 9 parishes,

led in this region

with 47.9 percent, and the Soule-supported Douglas received 27.1
percent of the vote in Greater Orleans.

Competitive in the Crescent

City, Douglas faltered in the country parishes, garnering only 10. S
percent of the vote in the other three regions.

The electoral votes

of Louisiana and the rest of the South, however, proved irrelevant to
the national outcome.

Abraham Lincoln, who had not even appeared on

southern ballots, gained the electoral votes of enough northern states
to attain the presidency without southern help. (SEE APPEM5IX A)
After Lincoln's election, discussion over the steps necessary to
respond to a Republican victory moved from theory to reality.

In

Louisiana, this debate involved the question of whether the state
should secede immediately or whether Louisiana should meet with other
southern states to decide what action to take.

Fearing Lincoln’s

election, a Breckinridge Democrat had asked:
What are we to do? Shall we remain quiet and wait to see
him inaugurated, and develop his plan and policy or shall

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

we anticipate what it will be. and act at once to take
steps for our self-preservation? What snail these steps
be! Shall we have a Southern Convention of the slave
states or will each state act by itself? These are
important questions.
For some the choice was straightforward, and one firebrand declared
that ’’The people of the City of New Orleans and of the state of
Louisiana...are almost unanimous in their determination not to live
under the government of a Black Republican Administration."

Another

wrote in his diary, "all the talk now is disunion." and a third
equated the probability of Louisiana's secession "from this union with
its rotten Yankev[sicJ government” to the likelihood of the sun rising
each morning.jC
Slidell accurately assessed the situation.

He felt that

Louisiana was "not prepared to take the initiative in any measure of
resistance," and he personally preferred a conference of southern
states to secession.

He recognized, however, that "a very large

minority, perhaps even a majority of the people in L[ouisianJa d[idj
not share [his] convictions" and instead favored more immediate
action.

Slidell also realized that Louisianans did not have a

complete freedom of action in choosing their course.

He knew that

"other states will move & the rest will follow' with greater or lesser
alacrity— Louisiana will not be the last to do so.”

Sensing the

electorate’s growing secessionist attitude, Slidell, ever the

■°B. Haynes to W.W. Pugh, October 13, 1860, Pugh Family Papers, UT
(first quote): Henry L. Webb to E.C. Wharton, December 10, 1860, Edward
C. Wharton Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Alexander F. Pugh, Diary,
November IS, 1860, LLMVC (third quote); J.M Gaulden to Dear Friend,
November 5, 1860, William W. Garig and Family Papers, LLMVC (fourth
quote).
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practical politician, did not openly express his support for a
regional conference but instead endorsed secession.

Ten days after

composing this letter, he wrote to President Buchanan. "Louisiana will
act with her sister states of the South." and continued. "I see no
probability of preserving the Union, nor indeed do I consider it
desirable to do so if we could."

Senator Benjamin, himself a

moderate, concurred that "the wild torrent of passion" engulfing the
South "can no more be checked by human effort... than a prairie fire by
a gardener’s watering pot.”

The day before penning this letter.

Benjamin, in a public letter, had added to this excitement by agreeing
with Slidell that since the interests of the South were no longer safe
in the Union, secession was demanded.'
Like Louisiana’s two senators. Governor Moore privately opposed
immediate secession.

Prior to the Lincoln’s election, he had

expressed the conservative opinion that even if the Republican
triumphed, he would not favor secession and added. ”1 do not think the
people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course.”
After Lincoln’s victory, however, Moore sensed that his prior views
were at a variance with Louisiana’s secessionist climate.
Consequently, he ”deem[ed] it wise to fall in line with popular
opinion" and advocate secession.

He urged the necessity of keeping

his previous anti-secession opinion secret.

He added. "Were Slidell

^John Slidell to Edward G.W. Butler, November 1, 1860, Edward G.W.
Butler Papers, DU (first three quotes); Slidell to James Buchanan,
November 11, 1860, Buchanan Papers, HSP (fourth quote); Judah P. Benjamin
to Samuel L.M. Barlow, December 9, 1860 (fifth quote) in James M.
McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War .Era (New York, 1988),
237; Pierce Butler, Judah P. Beniamin. (Philadelphia. 1907), 203-4.
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or I to plead for rational thought at these times our positions would
be worth nil to us."'*
Thus, the governor abandoned his stance against rash behavior he
held during the presidential campaign and acted quickly.
special session of the legislature to meet in December.

He called a
Addressing

that body. Governor Moore emphcitical ly called for disunion.

Declaring

that "the Northern mind is poisoned against us.” he asserted. "I do
not think it comports with the honor and self-respect of Louisiana, as
a staveholding State, to live under the Government of a Black
Republican President."

The legislature heeded Moore's suggestion and

passed a bill calling for a special convention to decide the state's
course.

On December 12. Moore signed the bill which scheduled an

election for delegates for January 7, 1S61 and slated the convention
to meet two weeks later.^
No partisan nominations were made during the brief campaign
season.

Instead, the race involved a contest between secessionists

and cooperation!sts.

The secessionists favored immediately joining

South Carolina, which had seceded on December 20, outside the Union.
The cooperationists included everyone not in the first group, and thus
they did not possess a unified viewpoint.

A New Orleans newspaper

^Thomas 0. Moore to William H. Gist, October 20, 1860, quoted in
Charles B. Dew, "Who Won the Secession Election in Louisiana?" Journal
of Southern History XXXVI (February 1970), 19 (first quote); Moore to
R.J. Brent, December 2, 1860, quoted in Edwin J. Putzell, Cui Bono: A
Study of Secession in Louisiana (New Orleans, 1935). TU (second quote).
Special Message of Thomas O. Moore. Governor of the State of
Louisiana, to the General Assembly, December 1860 (Baton Rouge, 1860),
5, 7; D. Clerwell to Henry Marshal 1, December 17, 1860. Marshal 1-Furman
Papers. LLMVC: Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. December 15, 1860.
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described the difficulty in using the term "cooperationist" since
"with some it means delay, wi'h some conference with other states,
with some it means submissionist."

Most cooperationists desired

Louisiana to act with the other states of the South in seceding or
remaining in the Union.

Because of the lack of party nominations and

the short time for canvass, in many parishes candidates either ran
unopposed or faced opponents who advocated the same position.^
In addition to secessionists and cooperat ionists. the state also
possessed some Unionists, but they were a small group which, realizing
the difficulty in winning seats in the convention merged themselves
with the cooperationists.

Blaming Lincoln’s election on the southern

withdrawal from the Democratic convention, a Louisiana legislator
claimed that the Republican would be impotent against an antiRepublican majority in Congress.

This Douglas Democrat added that

Lincoln’s election though sectional was constitutional and therefore
did not necessitate secession.

Hoping that the slavery question could

be settled forever, an East Feliciana Parish Unionist believed that
"the election of Lincoln could be made a blessing to the country." but
this sentiment was not widely shared.

In New Orleans, a secessionist

exclaimed, "the Union men at any price now stand in such a minority
that they don’t even speak of it."

By December 1, all New Orleans

newspapers acknowledged the need for, at the very least, a convention
of southern states .61

60Dailv Crescent. January 5, 1861. (quote)
5‘Edward Delony to the People of East Feliciana in Baton Rouge Weekly
Gazette and Comet. November 14, 1860; R.J. Bowman to Alexander K. Farrar,
December 14, 1860. Alexander K. Farrar Papers, LLMVC (first quote); M.
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Secessionists decreed their course the only way to protect the
South and its institutions from the antislaverv Republicans of the
North.

The Pointe Coupee Democrat asked its readers why they should

remain under the rule of a government that strangled business and
oppressed the state's energy.

The heretofore conservative Bee agreed

that "The North and South are heterogeneous and are better apart
are doomed if we proclaim not our political independence."

We

To sway

cooperationists. a Madison Parish secessionist explained that the
election of secessionists was important to show the North that the
southern threat was real, and the Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel
agreed that the North would only give in to southern demands after
secession not before it.

Prominent New Orleans Presbyterian minister

Benjamin M. Palmer preached a sermon proclaiming divine sanction for
secession.

According to Palmer, the Republican victory already ended

the Union because it made the Constitution an "engine of oppression"
and since the Union could not be saved, he urged southerners to secede
and therefore "save the inestimable blessing it enshrines."

Most New

Orleans newspapers reprinted the sermon, and as many as fifty thousand
copies were distributed in the Crescent City alone.

After examining

the document, Senator Slidell announced that he had "never read
anything with more pleasure."*

Gill is to John Liddell, November 24, 1S60, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC
(second quote): Greer, "Louisiana Politics,” 621.
62
Pointe Coupee Democrat. November 24, 1860; Bee, December 14, 1860
(first quote): James Foster to John Foster, January 7, 1861, James Foster
Family Papers, LLMVC; Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel. December 1, 1860;
Benjamin M. Palmer, The South: Her Peril and her Duty. A Discourse
delivered in the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, on Thursday.
November 29. 1860 (New Orleans, 1860), quotes 12, 16; Haskell Monroe.
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Secessionists stigmatized ail cooperationists regardless of
their actual stance as submit .ionists.

In the weeks preceding the

convention, the N'ew Orleans Dailv Delta and the Baton Rouge DaiIv
Advocate did not distinguish among the opponents of immediate
secession.

A New Orleans secessionist described the cooperationists

as "all such Abolitionists. Black Republicans. Union shriekers. Knee
benders, traitors. &c that we have among us."

Senator Benjamin warned

of the "widespread ruin, degradation and dishonor" which would result
"from tame submission" that cooperationists advocated.

Others agreed

that secession had become a matter of honor for the South-

Discussing

these allegations, a cooperationist wrote to Governor Moore that he
and others had to hide their true feelings and come out in favor of
secession because they feared punishment after Louisiana seceded.3'
Louisiana cooperationists faced a difficult task.

Branded as

submissionists. they had to explain how their position protected the
South and Louisiana better them secession did.

In addressing this

charge, some cooperationists demonstrated that the two groups differed
only on means, not on the result.

Asserting that his enemies had

twisted his words, a cooperat ionist claimed. "I am no submiss ionist,
or Unionist in that sense of the word; I am in favor of Louisiana

"Bishop Palmer’s Thanksgiving Day Address," Louisiana History IV (Spring
1963j. 105-118; John Slidell to Samuel A. Cartwright, December 25, 1860,
Samuel A. Cartwright Papers, LLMVC (fourth quote).
r*
■'Dew, "Who Won the Secession Election in Louisiana?" 21: M. Gillis
to John Liddell, November 20, December 22, 1860 (first quote). Moses
Liddell and Family Papers, LLMVC; Benjamin quote in Charles P. Roland,
"Louisiana and Secession," Louisiana History. XIX (.Fall 1978), 395; John
S. Summerlin to Governor Moore, December 5, 1860, in Putzell, Cui Bono.
86-7.
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going, with the neighboring States, out of the present Union."
According to this definition, the oniy difference between
secessionists and cooperations involved the phrase, "with the
neighboring States” or as the platform of the Friends of United
Southern Action iterated, it was not against secession but against
"separate and hasty state action."

Pierre Soule, the most prominent

cooperationist. expressed a similar attitude in arguing for a southern
convention.

Asserting "I am no submissionist." Soule admitted that

having "to choose between ignominy or revolution. I am for
revolution!"

But, like many other cooperationists. Soule believed

that if secession should occur, it should be in conjunction with the
other slave states.
Other cooperationists denied that the choice rested solely on
when secession should occur.

After listening to a fiery secessionist

sermon, a church member complained that the preacher and others had
forgotten the close bonds that existed between the South and the
North.

Claiming that separate secession looked very foolish, another

cooperationist urged, "if we have common cause why not combine
before

Let the whole South propose the conditions on which she is

wi 11 ing to remain in the Union."

The Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and

Comet agreed that "there are remedies yet left us within the Union.”
The Sugar Planter appealed both to readers’ patriotism and to their

^Letter from Edward G.W. Butler to P.M. Lambremont (editor of the
Gazette and Sentinel). December 27, I860, Butler Family Papers, HNO
(first quote); Platform of the Friends of United Southern Action,
December 27, 1860, James G. Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC (second quote);
Pierre Soule, "A Card," December 22, 1860, Hennen-Jennings Papers, LLMVC
(third quote).
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economic interests.

Reminding them that Lincoln's election had been

constitutional, it urged them to stay in the Union as long as the
South’s rights were protected.

The newspaper added that membership in

a confederacy of southern states would put an end to the protective
tariff on sugar cane which southern Louisiana growers required to
remain economically competitive.83
The January ~ election resulted in a triumph for the
secessionists.

They captured 32.7 percent of the popular vote and 29

of Louisiana's 4S parishes.

More significantly, they secured at least

SO of the 130 seats at the convention, and a secessionist joyfully
declared "we have ail made up our minds to seceed[sic] from the
Union."

As Slidell predicted, events beyond the borders of Louisiana

had affected the debate in the state.

By the time of the January

election. South Carolina had seceded, and four other states had
already elected secessionist-controlled state conventions.

Once one

state seceded, the probability of others joining increased
substantially.

For many cooperation no longer meant staying in the

Union but now meant leaving it, and within two weeks a cooperat ionist
would admit that "the strongest Union men have abandoned all hope of
reconciliation & are calmly awaiting the crash of collision."

A

secessionist delegate claimed he would have preferred to cooperate

Mrs. L.J. Stanton to Governor Moore, December 14, 1860, in Putzell,
Cui Bono. 94-5; Mattie to My Dear Sister, [January 1861], W.W. Pugh
Papers, UT (first quote); West Baton Rouge Sugar Planter, December 1,
December 8 , 1860; Baton Rouge Weekly Gazette and Comet. December 25, 1860
(second quote).
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with other states but as they have decided to act separately Louisiana
must join them. (TABLE 7.1)^
TABLE 7.1
Vote for Delegates to the Secession Convention
Secessionist
FLORIDA
NORTH LA
ORLEANS
SOUTH LA

Secession
Cooperat ionist Percent

1522
8205
5056
6140

2130
6178
4944
5556

41.7
57.1
50.6
52.5

20923

18808

52.7

The election did not follow the results of the November
presidential race.

Despite its importance, twenty percent fewer

voters participated in the January contest.

This absenteeism probably

did not indicate a repressed Unionist sentiment, but instead stemmed
from the lack of competitive races in many parishes— in 18 parishes
the winner received over 75 percent of the vote.
Orleans shocked many observers.

The vote of New

Because of the Crescent City’s

commercial ties to the North and Greater Orleans’s repudiation of
Breckinridge in the presidential contest, much of the cooperat ionists’
hope rested in this region.

Instead, Orleans Parish joined Madison

Parish as the only two of the twelve parishes that had gone against

John S. Foster to James Foster, January 11, 1861, John Foster
Papers, LLMVC (first quote); E.J. Ellis to Brother, January 22, 1861,
Ellis Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Dew, "Who Won the Secession Election
in Louisiana?" 23; The most extensive investigation of the convention
lists 80 members as secessionists, 44 as cooperat ionists, and 6 as
doubtful, Ralph Wooster, "The Louisiana Secession Convention," Louisiana
Historical Quarterly XXXIV (April 1951), 105; Edward G.W. Butler letter
in Plaquemine Gazette and Sentinel, December 29, 1860; For realization
that once one state left others would follow see M. Gill is to John
Liddell, November 9, 1860, Liddell Family Papers, LLMVC.
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Breckinridge in November to vote in favor of secessionist candidates
in January.

In Greater Orleans, the secessionists won 20 of the 25

seats contested, and a cooperationist lamented? "New Orleans after a
conservative career of so long a time has at last disgraced herself by
voting secession. ”0,
The city’s vote revealed the conditional nature of Unionism not
only within New Orleans but throughout Louisiana.

Describing the

crowd at a secessionist Southern Rights Association gathering, an
observer saw "all shades of politics" as people of "all avocations,
occupations, ages &c stood together in defense of southern rights."
Obviously. Lincoln’s election was the most significant change which
had affected secession sentiment in Louisiana.

Labelling Breckinridge

supporters as disunionists did not equal tolerance for a Republican
president.

As early as the day after the election, according to a New

Orleans secessionist, Bell and Douglas men no longer ”roll[ed] their
eyes with such holy horror

at the names of secession."

Most people

probably agreed with the Weekly Delta on the impossibility of viewing
Lincoln’s election as anything other than a display of northern
animosity.

In December, the Bee, which had supported Bell, declared
rc
the Union severed and called New Orleans "the hotbed of secession."

“'Roland, "Louisiana and Secession," 393-4; For lack of competition
see A.F. Pugh, Diary? January 7, 1861, LLMVC; For a race by race
comparison see Charles B. Dew, "The Long Lost Returns: The Candidates and
Their Totals in Louisiana’s Secession Election," Louisiana History, X
(Fall 1969), 353-69; E.J. Ellis to E.P. Ellis, January 10, 1861, Ellis
Family Papers, LLMVC (quote). In contrast, in the presidential election,
only 3 parishes gave a candidate over 75 percent.
68M. Gillis to John Liddell, November 24, 1860, Liddell Family
Papers, LLMVC (first quote); J.M. Gaulden to Dear Friend, November 5,
1860, William W. Garig and Family Papers, LLMVC (second quote); Greer.
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43In addition to Lincoln's election, four other stimuli
contributed to the change in sentiment in New Orleans.

First, at the

special meeting of the legislature. Governor Moore adamantly called
for secession.

Although he based his stance on the idea that a

secessionist majority already existed in the state, his speech
probably swayed some Louisianans who favored cooperation.

Second.

Reverend Paimers's widely-publicized secessionist sermon helped shape
opinions not only in the Crescent City but throughout Louisiana.
Third, with South Carolina having already seceded and four other
states having already elected secessionist conventions, the southern
climate had changed dramatically in the two months before the January
vote.

Fourth. Sliae11-supported candidates had never fared well in

New Orleans, and many New Line Democrats and Know Nothings probably
refused to vote for Breckinridge because Slidell championed his
candidacy.

With the January race not an openly partisan contest, this

anti-Slidell logic no longer applied.

This combination of forces
.*Q

combined to produce a secessionist victory in New Orleans.0
After the election, even the conservative Dailv Picayune
admitted that there was "no Union party left in Louisiana," and a
diarist tersely concluded, "Cooperation is dead.” The state
convention met in Baton Rouge on January 24 with the result a foregone

"Louisiana Politics," 628-32; Bee. December 22, 1860 (third quote).
Prominent businessman and former Whig state senator James Robb recognized
the conditional nature of New Orleans Unionism and left Louisiana for the
North in the summer of 1860, James Robb to unknown, August 9, 1860, James
Robb Papers, HNO.
69

Monroe, "Bishop Palmer’s Thanksgiving Day Address," 108; Lane C.
Kendall, "The Interregnum in Louisiana in 1861," Louisiana Historical
Quarterly (April 1933), 187.
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conclusion.

With five other southern states having seceded by that

date, for many Louisianans cooperation now meant secession.

The

secessionists elected Alexander Mouton. a former Senator and governor,
as president of the convention.

On the first day. a delegate read a

letter signed by Louisiana's entire congressional delegation that
declared "the time for argument has passed, that of action has
arrived....We recommend immediate and unqualified secession."
delegates agreed.

The

The last hope of cooperation within the Union— a

call to send delegates to a Nashville convention— failed 106 to 24.
showing that cooperation was a dead letter in Louisiana.

On its third

day. the convention overwhelmingly adopted a secession ordinance, 113
to 17, and subsequently all but 7 delegates signed the document.

The

pro-secession vote easily exceeded the number of the number of
secessionist delegates present.

A cooperationist offered an

explanation for why he and others had voted for this cause.

He

unenthusiastically explained, "similar action having already been
taken by her neighbors, Louisiana of necessity followed.”7®
After the vote, Mouton declared the connection between Louisiana
and the United States dissolved, and pronounced the state, "a free,
sovereign, and independent power."

Then, as Governor Moore entered

the chamber, a large banner depicting an eight foot pelican feeding
her young was brought out to replace the American flag.

A priest

blessed the banner, military music played, and cannons boomed.

7QPai lv Picayune. January 9, 1861 (first quote): A.F. Pugh, Diary,
January 8, 1861 (second quote): Roland, "Louisiana and Secession," 396-7;
Official Journal of the Convention of the State of Louisiana (New
Orleans, 1861); Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, 8 (third quote).
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Delegates entered their reasons for voting in favor of secession upon
the official record and retained their pens as keepsakes of the
historic moment.

Subsequently, the convention recessed to reconvene

in New Orleans where the streets were decorated with fiags and
transparencies, and fireworks exploded as secessionists paraded
through the city.

Upon reconvening, the convention selected

representatives attend a conference of seceding states meeting in
February in Montgomery. Alabama.

And. on March 21. 1S61. they

transferred Louisiana's loyalty to the nation established in
Montgomery— the Confederate States of America.'*
In New Orleans, the delegates ratified the Louisiana
Constitution of 1861. the state's fourth constitution in fifty years.
The writing of the new charter took almost no time, for the convention
adopted the 1852 constitution almost word for word, only deleting any
mention of the federal government.

Having revised their constitution

twice in the preceding sixteen years, Louisianans saw no need for
changes in their organic law.

Jacksonian democracy had reached its

limits with universal white male suffrage and all major offices being
elective.

Railroad fever had not dissipated during the 1850s. so

activist government also went unchallenged.

So, despite having an

71
Roland, "Louisiana and Secession." 396-7; Official Journal of the
Convention of the State of Louisiana: For a delegate’s description of the
events see series of letters from Lemuel Conner to Fanny Conner in Lemuel
P. Conner Papers (Four January and two February letters at HNO, three
March letters at LLMVC). For best description, of events following
secession vote see letter of January 25, 1861, HNO.
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opportunity to rewrite the entire charter, the Louisiana delegates
merely altered a few words.'*
An overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed on the
constitution and on secession, and these men expressed their
intolerance for any who continued to object to their actions.

The

treatment of James G. Taliaferro, a delegate from Catahoula Parish who
spearheaded the minimal opposition to secession, reveals their
hostility.

A former Whig. Taliaferro authored a protest which claimed

secession would lead to anarchy and war which would destroy Louisiana.
According to the protest, southern rights would be better protected
within the Union than in a weak: confederacy.

The majority not only

disagreed with his dour assessment but refused to include it in the
official record of the convention.

After this rejection, Taliaferro

returned to Catahoula where he owned the Harrisonburg Independent. the
only newspaper in the state which still opposed withdrawal from the
Union.

In response, secessionists immediately began raising funds to

establish a newspaper in his parish to combat what they saw as his
malign influence.7*
As secessionists suppressed Taliaferro's protest, they also
tried to hide the vote totals from the January election for delegates
to the secession convention.

Their 52.3 percent majority hardly

V

“The 1861 constitution does not even merit a separate section in
Warren M. Billings and Edward F. Haas. ed., In Search of Fundamental Law:
Louisiana’s Constitutions. 1812-1974 (Lafayette, La., 1993).
n

"James G. Taliaferro’s Protest, James G. Taliaferro Papers, LLMVC.
For efforts to challenge his newspaper see Henry Peck to John Liddell.
February 18, 1861, and L.P. Blockson to Liddell, March 5, 1861, Liddell
Family Papers, LLMVC.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

441

represented a mandate for withdrawal from the Union.

Although this

vote undoubtedly underestimated secession sentiment because many races
were uncontested and because as other states seceded many
cooperationists would become secessionists. it could prove
embarrassing.

Cooperationist newspapers demanded the official

returns, but none appeared for months and then only semi-official
results were published in the DaiIv Delta.

These results slightly

exaggerated the secessionist vote, crediting them with 54.2 percent of
the ballots.
hundred years.

The official returns would not be published for over one
Also, unlike in 1845 and 1S52. the delegates also

refused to allow the electorate to vote on the new constitution,
justifiably contending that the only true issue— secession— had been
thoroughly discussed prior to the January 7 election.
Louisiana secessionists wanted the state to appear as unified as
possible because, like most Louisianans, they realized the frightful
consequences of their actions.

After reading Lincoln’s March 4

inaugural, a Concordia Parish delegate wrote to his wife from the
Louisiana convention, "This is war

It is now necessary for the

Southern Confederacy to make every preparation for a most desperate
conflict."

Addressing a militia unit after Louisiana had seceded,

Senator Benjamin regretted that he spoke "in the belief that our
independence is not to be maintained without the shedding of blood.”
Even cooperationists recognized the need to defend their homeland
after Louisiana seceded.

After the election of delegates to the

Dew. "Who Won the Secession Election in Louisiana?" 23; A.F. Pugh,
Diary, January 7, 1861, LLMVC.
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secession convention, a cooperationist admitted. "If it comes to the
worst, as southerners we must fight to the last man.”

Before

Louisiana had officially seceded. Governor Moore, despite his earlier
moderation, had already ordered the seizure of the United States
arsenal at Baton Rouge and taken control of a pair of forts on the
Mississippi River below New Orleans.

Additionally, he had loaned arms

and ammunition to Mississippi which had left the Union prior to
Louisiana. '
The secession of Louisiana raises the question of how a state
which had always lagged behind the rest of the South in terms of
secessionist rhetoric suddenly abandoned the Union in 1861.

One

historian has called it "perhaps the Least likely state of the Deep
South to attempt to break from the Union." and another agrees that
”[a]t the beginning of the secession movement. Louisiana was without
doubt the most conservative of the Gulf States.”76

Unquestionably,

throughout the majority of the antebellum period Louisiana had never
welcomed threats to dissolve the Union.

Very few Louisianans had

embraced South Carolina’s attempt at nullification the 1830s. and the
state legislature had emphatically declared that it considered the
doctrine to be treasonous.

The Whig party in Louisiana did not share

Lemuel P. Conner to Fanny Conner, March 4, 1861, Conner Papers,
LLMVC (first quote); Benjamin speech in Daily Crescent. February 23, 1861
(second quote); E.J. Ellis to E.P. Ellis, January 10, 1861, Ellis Family
Papers, LLMVC (third quote): Odom, "Political Career of Thomas Overton
Moore,” 25— 7. For a cooperat ionist delegate who soon joined the army see
David Pierson to William H. Pierson, David Pierson Letter, April 22,
1861, LLMVC; For belief that war would not occur see M. Gill is to John
Liddell. March 9, March 15, 1861, Liddell Papers, LLMVC.
7*”

°Roland, "Louisiana and Secession.” 389
Secession and Restoration. 16 (second quote).

(first quote);
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Che state-rights proclivity of its southern neighbors and instead
embraced the more national1stic ideas of Kenry Clay.

The presence of

sugar cane meant that some Louisianans welcomed national activism, at
least in the form of a tariff.

In 1851. after Isaac Morse and Pierre

Soule spoke out against the Compromise of IS50. the Louisiana
electorate punished both men and their party.

In IS56. Millard

Fillmore, running as more of a Unionist than a know Nothing almost
captured the state's electoral vote.

Even in 1860. the combined total

of Bell and Douglas votes exceeded that of Breckinridge by more than
ten percent.
By the end of IS60 conditions had changed significantly.
Slavery, which for years had been a topic in campaigns, completely
overshadowed all other issues.

In earlier campaigns, the extent of

democracy, the Creole-American split, state activism, and tariffs
could eclipse slavery or at least join it as topics of debate.
Additionally, the presence of a vibrant two party system throughout
most of the antebellum period helped suppress disunionist talk in two
ways: it gave conservatives an electoral opportunity to punish the
fire-brands, and it subsumed most fire-eating talk within the
Democratic party.

With the disappearance of campaign debate over many

non-slavery issues and the absence of any organized opposition to the
Democrats in the late 1850s, the protection of southern rights emerged
as a way for disaffected Democrats to challenge the regular party.
Also, the rise of Jacksonian democracy contributed to secession.
By 1860, politicians felt a need to cater to voters In way that was
unnecessary in the 1820s.

In the 1820s, a Louisiana governor could
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claim that the people of Louisiana should have no voice in government
and with only propertv-hoider

voting, many of the people indeed did

not have a voice in the political process.

The elimination of

property requirements for suffrage in the 1845 constitution and the
reduction of residency restrictions in the 1852 charter along with the
increase in the number of elective offices in both these documents
gave the people a voice they did not have in the 1820s.

By i860.

Senators Slideil and Benjamin and Governor Moore did not have the
option of ignoring public opinion.

With universal white male

suffrage, more people had a vote and therefore a voice in Louisiana
politics.

Recognizing this change, both senators and the governor

publicly championed secession despite their personal preferences for a
less drastic approach.^
When examining secession in Louisiana, one must be wary of
equating the earlier rejection of secessionist talk with a lack of
commitment to the South and slavery.
a conditional Unionism.

Louisiana’s Unionism was always

Although most Louisianans may have opposed

secession during the majority of the antebellum period, they did not
believe that it was unconstitutional.

Louisianans questioned the

right or need to secede at various times, but because they felt it was
unnecessary at that time, not because they felt it was illegal.

If

they believed that the best protection for the state, the South, and

slavery no longer rested in the Union, then secession could occur.
Until the election of the Republican Abraham Lincoln, Louisianans

77
Governor Thomas Bolling Robertson in John B. Dawson to William S.
Hamilton, April 4, 1825, Hamilton Papers, LLMVC.
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feared the fire-eaters' secessionist solution more than the problems
they faced by remaining in the Union.

Lincoln’s election, however,

convinced a majority of Louisianans for the first time that their
state and its institutions would be better off outside rather than
inside the Union.

With this catalyst, Louisiana acted quickly and in

a most southern manner, seceding just a month after fire-eating South
Carolina.
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EPILOGUE
On the night of October 12, 1861, in Charleston, South Carolina,
John Slidell, along with his wife and family, boarded the Theodora, a
small ship designed to slip through the Union naval blockade.

After

Louisiana's secession in January, Slidell had resigned from the Senate
and then accepted a diplomatic post from the newly formed government
of the Confederate States of America.

He was embarking on the first

[eg of a journey to France to represent the nascent nation at the
court of N'apoleon III.

As the ship carefully made its way out to sea.

Slidell, always a meticulous planner, could be confident that the
training he had received during his lengthy Louisiana political career
would help guide him in his post.
Born in New York, Slidell arrived in Louisiana in IS 19 and
within a decade entered the state’s political arena.

His early

political experiences provided him more with invaluable lessons than
with victories.

This period of Louisiana’s political development

emphasized personal relationships and ethnicity over partisanship.

In

182S Slidell made an unsuccessful bid for Congress, but for his
efforts on behalf of the state’s hero Andrew Jackson in the concurrent
presidential contest, he received an appointment as a federal district
attorney.

In this patronage post, Slidell learned the importance of

back room politics and manipulation from a master, fellow Democrat
Martin Gordon.

At first Slidell and Gordon were allies in the Jackson

party, but Gordon would soon view Slidell as a threat to his control
of the state.

Using his close ties to the national administration,

Gordon had Slidell ousted from his post in LS33.

The 1830s also

446

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

447

provided Slidell with the lesson that many Louisianans. whether Creole
or American, voted on the basis of ethnicity regardless of party
affiliation,

in LS35 Slidell’s marriage into New Orleans’s Creole

elite provided him with a link; to that ethnic group.

In 1S37 this

connection proved to be insufficient as Slidell lost a contest for the
United States Senate because several Creole legislators preferred a
French-speaking candidate.
In 1S3S Slidell waged another unsuccessful campaign for
Congress.

In this race, he discovered that Louisiana politicians

could gain valuable political capital by attacking their opponent’s
fidelity to slavery.

The 1S36 presidential campaign had introduced

Louisianans to the potency of charging one’s opponent with
abolitionist tendencies.

Two years later, Slidell employed these

allegations in a state contest for the first time.
his assertions had gained his campaign publicity.
lS30s,

Slidell lost, but
After the mid-

in almost every race, whether for president, governor, or

Congress, Louisiana politicians would routinely accuse their opponent
or his party of possessing antislavery sentiments.
Although Slidell suffered these early setbacks, from this period
onward his career was primarily a success.

More than any other

Louisiana politician, Slidell capitalized on the growing importance of
political parties in the state.

Elected to Congress in 1342, Slidell

stressed that allegiance to the Democratic party transcended any other
commitment.

A single-vote defeat in a I84S Senate contest provided

Slidell with the last reminder that political victory required
unceasing vigilance.

Armed with this final lesson. Slidell and his
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chosen candidates would never lose a Louisiana race in the 1850s.
From 1853 to 1861, he served in the United States Senate and ruled the
Louisiana Democratic party.

Employing the power of party loyalty.

Slidell supposedly hand-picked governors, United States senators, and
even a president.

His enemies spoke his name with trepidation, and

they, along with his friends, considered Slidell omnipotent.

He

deftly wielded the patronage of the federal government and his own
wealth to maintain party discipline and tolerated no challenge to his
rule.
Slidell’s success involved a blend of dictation and democracy.
While apparently in control of the Louisiana political situation,
Slidell, and the rest of the state’s politicians, realized that they
often did not lead but followed the people.

Recognizing the growth of

Jacksonian democracy, they tailored their stances to meet the
electorate’s views.

A southern Democrat, Slidell, nonetheless

realized the importance of a sugar cane tariff for Louisiana, and he
along with most of the state’s other Democrats championed this
exception to free trade doctrine.

Despite its long battle against

activist government, his Democratic party espoused state aid to
railroads after the electorate ratified the 1852 constitution.
Slidell also sent voluminous documents from Washington to his
Louisiana constituents and travelled throughout the state to meet
them.

Most significantly, after a long career as a moderate on the

sectional issue between the North and the South, Slidell reluctantly
embraced the secession movement when he perceived that a majority of
Louisianans favored it.
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As the Theodora sailed into the Atlantic Ocean on its way to
Havana, the man who best personified Louisianans’ antebellum political
world could not have realized that he would never see his adopted
state again.

The combination of the issues which Slidell had deftly

employed for so many years: the politics of slavery, partisan
commitment, and the rise of Jacksonian democracy had thrust his state
and the entire Union into a terrible war.
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APPENDIX A
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

NORTH LA

ORLEANS

841-68.2
392-31.8

856-49.2
885-50.8

1356-36.9
2319-63.1

4605-53.1
4066-46.9

146S-79.1
389-20.1

991-73.6
355-26.4

621-60.2
411-39.8

979-41.6
1372-58.4

4059-61.6
2527-38.4

1404-67.5
675-32.5

722-49.2
745-50.8

760-50.8
735-49.2

956-40.1
1428-59.9

3842-51.7
3583-48.3

1683-51.4
1590-48.6

1767-44.2
2230-55.8

2175-40.9
3146-59.1

1991-31.5 7616-40.
4330-68.5 11296-59.

2006-58.1
1447-41.9

3972-56.0
3115-44.0

4106-52.7
3682-47.3

3698-43.3 13782-51.3
4839-56.7 13083-48.7

1865-51.9
1727-48.1

4376-52.2
4008-47.8

5678-46.3
6579-53.7

3460-35.9 15379-45.4
6173-64.1 18487-54.6

2279-56.4
1763-43.6

5560-56.3
4321-43.7

6278-51.4
5939-48.6

4530-46.4 18647-51.9
5232-53.6 17255-48.1

2541-55.1
2068-44.9

8909-58.2
6393-41.8

3118-29.9
7317-70.1

7596-60.6 22164-51.7
4931-39.4 20709-48.3

10333-54.5
7143-37.7
1479- 7.8

3301-25.0
6310-47.9
3570-27.1

6607-49.2 22687-44.9
4822-35.9 20205-40.0
1996-14.9 7617-15.1

FLORIDA

SOUTH LA

TOTAL

1828
Jackson-D
Adams-NR

1552-76.8
470-23.2

1832
Jackson-D
Clay-NR

1836
Van Buren-D
White-W

1840
Vein Buren-D
Harrison-W

1844
Polk-D
Clay-W

1848
Cass-D
Taylor-W

1852
Pierce-D
Scott-W

1856
Buchanan-D
F i 1Imore-KN

1860
Breckinr idge-D 2446-49.4
Bell-CTJ
1930-39.0
Doug1as-D
572-11.6

KEY
D NRW KNCU-

Democrat
National Republican
Whig
Know Nothing
Constitutional Union
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APPENDIX B
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION RESULTS

FLORIDA

NORTH LA

ORLEANS

SOUTH LA

TOTAL

53- 3.9
1064-77.6
50- 3.6
191-13.9
14- 1.0

118-15.3
439-56.9
168-21.8
10- 1.3
37- 4.8

3- 0.2
270-21.1
360-28.2
14- 1.1
631-49.4

9- 0.3
1054-33.6
1252-39.9
21- 0.7
802-25.6

183- 2.8
2827-43.1
1830-27.9
236- 3.6
1484-22.6

189-10.1
718-38.5
23- 1.2
937-50.2

343-32.9
338-32.5
271-26.0
89- 8.5

851-56.5
302-20.0
336-22.3
18- 1.2

1870-64.4
221- 7.6
661-22.8
150- 5.2

3253-44.5
1579-21.6
1291-17.6
1194-16.3

1.1

353-30.5
782-67.5
24- 2.1
0 0.0

837-52.0
206-12.8
565-35.1
3- 0.2

1928-52.1
428-11.6
841-22.7
501-13.5

3639-43.8
2668-32.1
1478-17.8
525- 6.3

387-18.2
1737-81.8

681-40.6
995-59.3

1289-63.8
731-36.2

3829-77.0
1145-23.0

6186-57.3
4608-42.7

1251-50.4
1232-49.6

1493-55.2
1212-44.8

1941-50.0
1940-50.0

2905-54.8
2392-45.2

7590-52.8
6776-47.2

2002-63.1
1169-36.9

2883-57.4
2137-42.6

1381-45.1
1684-54.9

3384-51.2
3231-48.8

9650-54.0
8221-46.0

1841-66.0
950-34.0

4043-60.5
2638-39.5

3964-54.5
3303-45.5

2966-47.3 12814-55.7
3301-52.7 10192-44.3

2144-58.4
1530-41.6

5472-59.8
3682-40.2

6669-52.1
6135-47.9

4281-41.2 18566-51.5
6106-58.8 17453-48.5

2063-54.7
1707-45.3

5156-53.9
4416-46.1

6248-56.7
4772-43.3

4491-47.3 17958-53.0
5013-52.7 15908-47.0

2277-48.5
2414-51.5

7908-56.0
6205-44.0

5869-48.8
6147-51.2

6898-57.8 22952-53.7
5039-42.2 19805-46.3

1824
Butler
Johnson
Vi H e r e
Thomas
Marigny

1828
Derbigny
Butler
Marigny
Thomas

1830
Roman
Hamilton
Beauvais
Randall

521-28.3
1252-70.0
48- 2.6
21 -

-

1834
White-W
Dawson-D

1838
Roman-W
Prieur-D

1842
Mouton-D
H. Johnson-W

1846
I. Johnson-D
DeBuys-W

1849
Walker-D
Declouet-W

1852
Hebert-D
Bordelon-W

1855
Wickliffe-D
Derbigny-KN
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1859

Moore-D
Wells-0

KEY
D W KN0 -

2870-64-.8
1556-35.2

10681-65.3
5672-34.7

4011-45.7
4761-54.3

7892-68.7 25454-62.0
3598-31.3 15587-38.0

Democrat
Whig
Know Nothing
Opposition
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